Entering the Agon: Dissent and authority in Homer, historiography and tragedy by Elton Barker
ENTERING THE AGO¯N
Barker 9780199542710_000i-0xiv_Barker_frontMatter Final Proof page i 29.4.2011 10:34am
Barker 9780199542710_000i-0xiv_Barker_frontMatter Final Proof page ii 29.4.2011 10:35am
Entering the Ago¯n
Dissent and Authority in Homer,
Historiography and Tragedy
ELTON T. E. BARKER
1
Barker 9780199542710_000i-0xiv_Barker_frontMatter Final Proof page iii 29.4.2011 10:35am
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
# Elton T. E. Barker 2009
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
First published 2009
First published in paperback 2011
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2008942572
Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India
Digitally printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
ISBN 978–0–19–954271–0 (Hbk)
ISBN 978–0–19–960928–4 (Pbk)
Barker 9780199542710_000i-0xiv_Barker_frontMatter Final Proof page iv 29.4.2011 10:35am
Preface
Though it has become axiomatic to think of ancient Greek society in
terms of competition, the contest of words (ago¯n) in literature—the
scene of debate in which, with varying degrees of formalization, char-
acters confront each other with opposing views—is less well appre-
ciated. This book sets out to explore for the first time the agon in
three generic traditions—epic, historiography and tragedy—and trace
its changing representations over those genres and, by comparing two
examples of each type of narrative, within them. It demonstrates not
only the fundamental importance of debate to these genres, but also the
ways representations of debate construct a political community through
the reproduction of dissent.
Previous works have studied the ago¯n in isolation: yet, the focus on
one genre, author or text, most commonly Euripidean tragedy, has
failed to grasp the ago¯n’s range of forms and has encouraged the
assumption that it should provide resolution or derive ‘naturally’ from
the plot; moreover, the cataloguing of the ago¯n’s features in abstraction
from textual context has overlooked its performance in each narrative or
drama. Combining literary approaches to debate with a sociological
understanding of structures within society, this book aims to investigate
textual debates in relation to recognizable parameters that indicate an
institution, such as the assembly. Being closely connected to the idea of
public gatherings, literary representations of debate set issues out ‘into
the open’, challenge authority and enact the potential for dissent. But
this book also shows that, because debate gestures towards allowing
difference of opinion, its establishment and procedure are highly
charged and important to control.
Act I investigates the two Homeric epics for the rival narrative
strategies towards dissent that each bequeaths to the tradition. Building
on the recent suggestion that the Iliad acts as a foundational narrative,
Chapter 1 demonstrates the Iliad ’s institutionalization of dissent within
the Achaean assembly. It differs, however, from previous studies that
have located a political community at the end of the Iliad by conceiving
of the discovery of politics as a process originating from the poem’s very
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beginning in the strife between Achilles and Agamemnon. Chapter 2
presents the Odyssey’s radically different approach to the subject, in
which dissenting voices are grouped together and aligned as obstruc-
tions to Odysseus and his epic return. As well as showing the narrative’s
marginalization of dissent, this study exposes the playfulness of the
Odyssey rather as a serious challenge to the utility of debate and exam-
ination of the authority exercised over it.
Act II rethinks the relationship between Herodotus and Thucydides,
who, as prose authors and uniquely responsible for their narratives,
faced the problem of getting their voice heard in a culture which
privileged the oral, public spoken word: their differing responses can
be traced through their representation of debate. Herodotus counters
the marginalization of his voice by reworking an Odyssean strategy
towards representing debate that challenges its normative institutional
value: while the most formal debates occur paradoxically in the Persian
king’s court, Greek assemblies frequently degenerate into rival in-fight-
ing. The problem clearly relates to the incapacity of the assembly to
transcend any one particular polis : Herodotus’ written enquiry provides
an alternate means by which a Panhellenic political community may be
achieved. Chapter 4 suggests that Thucydides takes an even more
challenging approach to the way politics was done by representing
debate as ago¯n. In contrast to the usual claim that Thucydides’ debates
serve only to show the limits of democratic deliberation, this chapter
interprets Thucydides’ more exact reproduction of assembly scenes as
exposing his readers to the dangers of rhetoric, while providing them
with the tools to analyse it. In an Achilles-like stand against the decision-
making practice of his contemporaries, Thucydides’ representation of
debate offers a strikingly innovative, and better, way of doing politics,
through the activity of reading.
Act III re-examines the tragic ago¯n and the issue of politics in tragedy
more generally in the light of this broader enquiry by looking anew at
two problem plays that suffer from an overly formal ago¯n. Chapter 5
discusses Sophocles’ Ajax as a reworking of the Iliad from the viewpoint
of others engaged with the hero: this approach makes sense of the
problematic double agon which takes place after Ajax’s suicide by
showing how it dramatizes competing reactions to the hero and repro-
duces the crisis of interpretation among the audience. Chapter 6 takes
the even more disturbing case of Euripides’ Hecuba, whose Odyssean
vi Preface
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insistence on the protagonist’s suffering culminates in an ago¯n that
appears to legitimize even Hecuba’s extreme vengeance. Yet, dissent
spills over this formal frame as Polymestor continues to speak frankly,
ultimately leaving the audience to deal alone with dissent and face the
consequences of their own judgement outside the security of any
institutional framework, including the play itself.
The aim of this book is to show how the presence of formal debate in
the public literature of ancient Greece helps to create a ‘mentalite´’ of
ago¯n that intersects with and informs the political development in the
culture at large. It will be of interest to scholars and students alike,
especially those specializing in Greek epic, historiography or tragedy.
Yet, its broad scope and careful consideration of the cultural context of
literature will also appeal to non-classicists interested in the origins of
political thought or literary critics interested in narrative constructions.
Given the breadth of this study and the correlative importance
assigned to interrogating each example closely, it has been neither
possible nor desirable to examine every single instance of debate in the
three genres under investigation. It is hoped, however, that the reason
for omission will be clear from each particular study, and that no single
omission detracts from the overall value of the argument being made.
The same may be held for other generic traditions that are not investi-
gated here, but that also feature debate, such as the comedy of Aristo-
phanes and the philosophical dialogues of Plato. While it is true
that both authors have been the subject of recent dissertations (see
N. Papageorgiou, ‘A Study in the Aristophanic Ago¯n: Clouds, Wasps
and Plutus’, Diss., Royal Holloway (2000) and A. G. Long, ‘Character
and Dialectic: the Philosophical Origins of the Platonic Dialogue’,
Diss., Cambridge (2004)), even so there is sufficient overlap with the
genres included in this book for most relevant issues and considerations
to be discussed here. It should also be noted that this study explores
literary representations of debate: that is to say, ‘real-life’ debates or
arenas for debate do not come under investigation. Nevertheless, it is
the intention of this study to engage with some ways in which literary
representations of debate may impact on and intersect with their cul-
tural contexts in the construction of a cultural imagination. The issue of
speech in Herodotus is also the subject of a current dissertation by
V. Zali (Provisional title: ‘(Re)shaping Herodotean Rhetoric: a Study of
the Direct and Indirect Speeches in Books 5–9’, University College,
Preface vii
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London): while time has not permitted me to incorporate her findings
into this book, the chapter on Herodotus’ speeches has benefited greatly
from her comments.
Material from the following articles appears here (in some shape or
form) with the kind permission of their publishers: ‘The fall-out from
dissent: hero and audience in Sophocles’ Ajax’, G&R 51 (2004), 1–20;
‘Between a rock and a safe place: the chorus becoming citizens in
Sophocles’ Ajax’, in A. P. Jime´nez, C. A. Martı´n, and R. C. Sa´nchez,
(eds.), Les Actas el Congreso Internacional con motiv del xxv centenario
del nacimiento de So´focles (Ma´laga, 2004), 259–72; ‘Achilles’ last
stand: institutionalising dissent in Homer’s Iliad’, PCPS 50 (2004),
92–120; ‘Paging the oracle: interpretation, identity and performance
in Herodotus’ History’, G&R 53 (2006), 1–28.
viii Preface
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Prologue
OPENING SKIRMISHES
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.
(George W. Bush)1
How would Homer or Demosthenes had either been present have
listened to this said by me? How would they have reacted to it? In
truth, great is the struggle, if we posit such a law court and theatre
for our private words, and to pretend that we are submitting
public accounts of our writings to the scrutiny of such long-
standing heroes as witnesses and judges.
(Longinus, On the Sublime 14.2)2
At one point in his analysis of great writing, On the Sublime, Longinus
ponders his own reception by turning to two of the greats, Homer and
Demosthenes. By bringing together these particular authors, Longinus
already reveals certain cultural assumptions which can read an epic poet
and classical orator alongside each other.3 Indeed, Longinus goes some
way to inserting himself within that canon by citing Homer and
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. The web-based
encyclopaedia Wikipedia surveys the historical resonance of the phrase ‘you’re either
with us, or against us’ from Jesus to Dirty Harry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/You%
27re_either_with_us%2C_or_against_us.
2 !"Ø #b $Aºº%&, 'N ŒIŒ'E&% "fi B #ØÆ&%(fi Æ )æ%*ı)%ªæ+ç%Ø$'&, )H, i& "-#' "Ø .)/ K$%F
º'ª-$'&%& )Ææg& 0…$Åæ%, XŒ%ı*'& j ˜Å$%*Ł2&Å,, j )H, i& K)d "%3"øfi #Ø'"2ŁÅ*Æ&! "fiH
ªaæ Z&"Ø $2ªÆ "e Iª4&Ø*$Æ, "%Ø%F"%& .)%"(Ł'*ŁÆØ "H& N#(ø& º-ªø& #ØŒÆ*"5æØ%& ŒÆd
Ł2Æ"æ%&, ŒÆd K& "ÅºØŒ%3"%Ø, læø*Ø ŒæØ"ÆE, "' ŒÆd $+æ"ı*Ø& .)2å'Ø& "H& ªæÆç%$2&ø&
'PŁ3&Æ, )')ÆEåŁÆØ.
3 Too (1998), 214 relates these lines to ‘[Longinus’] belief that the sublime should
transcend its current temporal context’, for ‘the classical lawcourt and theatre are patently
anachronistic contexts in which to locate Homer’.
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Demosthenes not as objects of his analysis but as themselves a
critical audience of his own writings. In making this move, Longinus
reconfigures these epic authors or ‘heroes’ (læø',) as an audience drawn
from the contemporary world of the law court and theatre (#ØŒÆ*"5æØ%&
ŒÆd Ł2Æ"æ%&)—‘judges and witnesses’ (ŒæØ"Æd ŒÆ( $+æ"ıæ',). Thus
reading is imagined as a public act, the reception of the writer’s ‘private
words’ (%ƒ N#(%Ø º-ª%Ø) a matter of ‘public auditing’ ('PŁ3&ÆØ).4 For a
writer to hypothesize such a scenario would be a ‘struggle’—a public
contest (Iª4&Ø*$Æ).5
In setting up a public contest over his words, then, Longinus con-
structs a judging audience deeply embedded in the agonistic culture of a
shared heritage, best represented by the civic institutions of the law
court and theatre he mentions. Even though he is describing the act of
reading, he nevertheless draws on an image derived from the public
spaces of his cultural tradition. That is to say, in spite of the fact that, by
this period, the author’s world is thoroughly literary and bookish, it
appears natural for the act of reception to be thought of in terms of
public contest or ago¯n.6
This book investigates representations of the ago¯n in ancient
Greek literature. The agonistic spirit of ancient Greek culture is well
4 On rendering accounts in Athenian democratic procedure, see Vernant (1982),
51–2.
5 The term Iª4&Ø*$Æ, first coined it seems by Herodotus to describe the product of
striving for something (1.140), famously occurs at the end of Thucydides’ methodolo-
gical statement to denote ‘a contest for the moment’ (Iª4&Ø*$Æ K, "e )ÆæÆåæB$Æ),
against which he defines his work, a possession for always (Œ"B$Æ K, ÆN'(, 1.22.4). See
Chapter 4 below.
6 Too (1998), 214–16 discusses the implications of the literary struggle being
described here. She argues that this ago¯n ‘is a site which patently acknowledges the social
and political significance of criticism as a process which seeks the benefit for the
community as a whole by judging in favour of certain discourses against others’
(p. 216). While the present study will put the stress on the ago¯n reproducing the crisis
of judgement, Too’s reading of literary criticism and politics is suggestive of the power of
the ago¯n. The image of the ago¯n—as a contest that writers enter into to become part of a
canon—dominates the literary theory of Harold Bloom: see e.g. Bloom (1973) and
(1982). His use of the ago¯n, however, is avowedly aesthetic, not political.
2 Prologue
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documented,7 from the rivalry between heroes8 or poets9 to the estab-
lishment of competitive festivals.10 Less well appreciated, however, is
the contest of words (ago¯n) in literature—the scene of debate in which,
with varying degrees of formalization, characters confront each other
with opposing views. This book sets out to explore for the first time the
ago¯n in three generic traditions—epic, historiography and tragedy—and
trace its changing representations over those genres and, by comparing
two examples of each type, within them with the aim of understanding
debate in terms of dissent from authority.
Dissent is an important phenomenon in modern political culture and
the subject of much contemporary anxiety, being frequently cited both
as a defining feature of Western liberal democracies in the current ‘war
on terror’ rhetoric and as under threat precisely during such trying
times.11 More generally there is a current perception that formal demo-
cratic institutions are disconnected from people’s everyday lives, while
dissent continues to thrive in other arenas and media.12 These current
7 For contest (or ago¯n) in Greek society, see Nietzsche (1997); Gouldner (1965),
41–77; Cartledge (20022); Goldhill (1999a), 2–3. Burckhardt (1998), 160–213 remains
fundamental, though focused on elite culture; cf. Spariosu (1991), 1–55. Contrast
Ehrenberg (1935), 63–96, who argues that the ago¯n increases in importance as democ-
racies emerged. Poliakoff (1987), 178f., n. 49 discusses previous scholarship. For the
ago¯n in Greek thought in general, see Weiler (1974); G. E. R. Lloyd (1987), 50–108, cf.
(1996), (1996); Sandywell (2000), 110–19; and the discussion of Vernant (1982) below.
8 On competitive versus cooperative values, see Adkins (1965; 1969); M. Scott
(1980; 1981); Gagarin (1986); D. Cairns (1993a); Yamagata (1994); Schofield
(1999), 3–30. See also Le´vy (1995) with further bibliography (p. 177, n. 1). On verbal
conflict, or ‘flyting’, see Parks (1986; 1990), and esp. R. P. Martin (1989). For a
sociological analysis of competition in language more generally, see Ong (1981).
9 For poetic competition, see Griffith (1990). For an analysis from the perspective of
the performer, see now Collins (2004), who explores the practice of ‘capping’: the mode
by which speakers or singers seek mastery over one other by coming up with a response
that outdoes their rival.
10 For the Greek games, see M. Finley and H. W. Plecket (1976); Scanlon (1984);
Golden (1998). Osborne (1993) describes a process by which the collective interest in
competition transforms the institution into a democratic framework.
11 See e.g. S. J. Hartnett, Democratic Dissent and the Cultural Fictions of Antebellum
America (Urbana, Ill., 2002); L. H. Lapham, Gag Rule: On the Suppression of Dissent and
Stifling of Democracy (New York, 2004); R. L. Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on
Terror (Tuscaloosa, 2005). Cf. P. Scranton (ed.), Beyond September 11: An Anthology of
Dissent (London, 2002).
12 With the advent of new media for mass communication, such as the internet, many
alternative venues for dissent aside from traditional arenas are forming, prompting both
academics and politicians alike to speculate on the possible consequences for the way
Prologue 3
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political controversies over dissent—both its production and its limita-
tions—offer a way into thinking about how debate is represented in
ancient Greek literature. On the one hand, the ways in which examples
of opposition in political rhetoric, such as ‘you’re either with us or
against us’, may work to silence dissent challenge a simplistic notion
that dissent is generated through opposition alone.13 To put that
slightly differently, the establishment of contrary positions—or dissoi
logoi14—within a narrative does not necessarily invite dialogue.15 On
the other hand, the observation that dissent occurs in a variety of
different arenas invites reflection on the consequences of those different
manifestations for assessing the dynamics and impact of dissent and, in
particular, also draws attention to the importance of the institutional
context for thinking about dissent.
This study sets out to make three interlocking claims. They are: first,
that debate is fundamental to the public forms of ancient Greek narrative,
as exemplified by epic and tragedy, and to the writing of history as
politics is carried out. On the adaptation of democratic institutions, processes and
cultures to digital interactivity, see J. G. Blumler and S. Coleman, Realising Democracy
Online: A Civic Commons in Cyberspace (Cambridge, 2001); S. Coleman, ‘Exploring
New Media Effects on Representative Democracy,’ Journal of Legislative Studies, (Jan.
2005); R. Butsch (ed.), The Media and the Public Sphere (Basingstoke, 2007).
13 Claims to be fighting terrorism have been used to justify the suppression of
legitimate opposition, as in Zimbabwe (Gary Younge, Guardian, 10 Dec. 2001) or
Uzbekistan (editorial, Daily Telegraph, 16 Oct. 2004). See esp. E. S. Herman and G.
O’Sullivan: The ‘Terrorism’ Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of
Terror (New York, 1989); J. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and Interna-
tional Terrorism (London, 1999); R. Mahajan, The New Crusade: America’s War on
Terrorism (New York, 2002). See also N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, Manufacturing
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York, 1988), who explore
concerns of contemporary governments over the potential for their citizens to act and
think differently and question their obsession with manufacturing consent. Rehm
(2003), 87–118 suggests that Athenian tragedy resists ‘ideological truisms that cover
up deeply intractable problems’ (p. 118).
14 The notion of arguing from opposing positions or with opposing speeches (dissoi
logoi) is regarded as a characteristic of the activity of sophists in Athens, as testified by
fragments of Protagoras (DK80A1, DK80A20), the treatise of the same name (DK90),
and Aristophanes’ satirical treatment in his Clouds. See Kerferd (1981), esp. 84–5,
131–2. See also Chapter 4, n. 96 below.
15 The extent to which Platonic dialogue may be considered open or closed has been
the subject of recent intense speculation: see e.g. the debate between Euben (1996) and
Barber (1996). Much may depend on the particular dialogue: for a discussion of the
dialogue form and its variances in Plato, see Rutherford (1995), esp. 7–16, 23–9.
4 Prologue
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demonstrated by Herodotus and Thucydides; second, that representations
of debate may be best understood in terms of institutional dissent, by virtue
of which authority is challenged and alternative views are not only tolerated,
but also somehow incorporated, managed and utilized; third, that textual
representations of debate do not exist independently from an institutional
framework but, by working through strategies for managing dissent, serve
to reproduce an agonistic mental horizon among its many audiences.16
SETTING THE BOUNDARIES TO DEBATE
We must not confuse dissent with disloyalty . . .We will not be
driven by fear into an age of unreason if we dig deep in our history
and our doctrine and remember that we are not descended from
fearful men. Not from men who feared to write, to associate,
to speak and to defend the causes that were for the moment
unpopular.
Edward R. Murrow
While the institutions of the democracy guaranteed free speech—
that is, the right to address the Assembly—and therefore to try to
persuade the majority, it was not imagined that this procured
unanimity. So the democratic ideal was not one of total agree-
ment, so much as one of the due management of disagreement.
(Geoffrey Lloyd, (1996), 132–3)
Previous work on debate in ancient Greek literature has been limited in
scope in at least two ways. First, studies have focused on debate
in individual genres, authors or plays.17 These approaches, limited in
16 These three claims are explored in greater detail over the course of the rest of the
Prologue below: the importance of debate is discussed in the section ‘Setting the
boundaries to debate’; the value of reading debate in its institutional context is set out
in ‘Laying down the ground-rules’; and the interrelationship between the institutional
form of debate and its textual representations in the reproduction of dissent is articulated
in ‘Entering the ago¯n to judge’.
17 On debate or ago¯n in Homer, see R. Martin (1951); M. Finley (2002); Momi-
gliano (1973); Ruze´ (1997); Ho¨lkeskamp (1998); Hammer (2002); in Thucydides:
Cogan (1981); Macleod (1983), 52–122; Ober (1998); in Aeschylus: Goldhill (1986),
33–56; in Euripides: Strohm (1957); Collard (2003); Downing (1990); M. Lloyd
(1992); Croally (1994), 46, 120–62; in Aristophanes: Gelzer (1960). A notable
exception to these single author/text studies remains Duˆchemin (1968), whose concern
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scope, have failed to grasp both the range of forms of debate and how it
functions differently in varying cultural contexts or even within a
particular genre.18 Second, critics have tended to catalogue the different
attributes of debates in abstraction from their textual context. The
subsequent studies have resulted in little attention being accorded to
how debate works, or performs, in a narrative at a particular point.19
An example of some of the difficulties that arise from taking a narrow
approach to debate is most obvious when we consider Thucydides and
Euripides, two authors whose debate scenes have frequently been criticized
for lacking dramatic coherence, appearing artificial or failing to affect the
outcome of events (let alone resolve the crisis).20 Even less negative criti-
cism tends to be double-edged. Thus Josiah Ober argues that Thucydides
shows debates going wrong in order to justify his own presentation of the
facts, an approach that fails, however, to appreciate how debates work
to read tragedy’s formal debates as part of its ‘natural inheritance from a long popular or
pastoral tradition of dramatic poetry’ wins the approval of Collard (2003), 64 (his
quotation). As well as the historiographical genre that Duˆchemin identifies, Collard
(ibid. 65) adds ‘the chief place of oral epic in time and influence in the Greek literary
tradition’. It remains true, however, that both Duˆchemin and Collard concentrate on the
tragic ago¯n, particularly as it is handled by Euripides. On the long and varied tradition of
tragic stichomythia, see Collins (2004).
18 Collard (2003), 65 issues a similar caveat against the ‘instinctive temptation to
isolate Euripides’ formal debate from their dramatic setting’, insisting instead on taxo-
nomic flexibility: ‘formal debates are too various and loose in structure, despite frequent
responsion or symmetry between their various elements in position, length, or even
content’ (p. 66).
19 For the theory of ‘performativity’—the ability for words to effect situations—see
J. L. Austin (1962); Searle (1969). For its application to literature, see Levinson (1983);
Petrey (1990); and to the study of ancient Greek culture, see Goldhill and Osborne, eds.
(1999). Performance theory, in particular the speech acts of outstanding individuals, also
underpins Vincent Farenga’s recent study of the development of citizenship in ancient
Greece. See Farenga (2006), 4–33 for an introduction to and discussion of his metho-
dology. Collard (2003) again is alert to the problem we face in this book: ‘Even to define
formal debates risks isolating them still further in criticism from their dramatic setting’
(p. 68).
20 Duˆchemin (1968), 124–35; Rusten (1989), 10; M. Lloyd (1992), esp. 1–18.
Heath (1987a), 133 observes that, even when defending Euripides’ ago¯n against the
charge of being ‘dramatically inorganic’, Conacher (2003), 101 [¼ (1981), 25] repro-
duces that criticism. In fact, Heath’s analysis shows well how scholars commit themselves
to making judgements that reflect their own concerns when they read the ago¯n. Answer-
ing the charge of ‘theatrical frigidity’ are Goldhill (1986), 225; Heath (1987a), 130–2;
Croally (1994), 135; Allan (2000), 118–48.
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within Thucydides’ narrative;21 on the other hand, Neil Croally reads the
ago¯n’s lack of resolution sympathetically in Euripides’ Trojan Women, but
his conclusion that ‘the agon itself is questioned as an institution which can
properly produce a victor’ is still based on the assumption that debate
should lead to resolution and provide a definitive outcome of the kind one
that would expect from a law-court model.22
The value of the present study lies in its dual approach to debate.
First, it traces the changing representations between genres and, by
comparing two examples of each type of narrative, within them. De-
bates are most recognizable in Thucydides and Euripides by virtue of
their formality: two speeches of more or less equal length formally are
set down in antithesis to each other. Athenian tragedy in general stages
opposing voices, and even in Aeschylus, an author whose plays do not so
evidently or formally represent a set-piece ago¯n, speeches frequently
occur in opposition to each other.23 The greater prominence or self-
conscious application of debate in Euripides should prompt us to
investigate the different effect that he is trying to achieve.24 Further-
more, while being less of a feature in his narrative than in Thucydides,
competing public speeches delivered in a formal setting before an
audience also occur in Herodotus, particularly among the Persians
and more so as the narrative progresses. Indeed, we can trace the idea
of a contest of words back to epic itself, when Achilles and Agamemnon
square up to each other in the assembly (agora) at the beginning of the
Iliad ’s exploration of strife. Taking the long view, then, will allow us to
better account for the variations in the representation of debate and
thematization of dissent across different genres and authors. The second
benefit of the present study lies in the close attention it pays to the ways
21 Ober (1998), 52–121. See Ch. 4 below.
22 Croally (1994), 160. On persuasion—its failures and triumphs—in Athens, see
Buxton (1982) esp. 1–18. For the law-court model of the ago¯n see Act III, introduction
below.
23 Putting aside the more general point that tragic plays stage a contest of voices, there
are many occasions even in Aeschylus when speeches occur in some kind of more formal
opposition to each other. See e.g. the long central scene of the Seven Against Thebes that
juxtaposes the Scout’s speeches with Eteocles’ responses (Aesch. Sept. 375–676), or
Clytemnestra’s series of confrontations with the men who come on stage, notably her
husband (Aesch. Ag. 810–974).
24 Euripidean characters often draw attention to the rhetorical structure of their
speeches: see M. Lloyd (1992), 19–36; Scodel (2000).
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in which debates are embedded within their narratives. In the case
studies presented below the concern is not just to define and describe
the form of each individual debate; the context of each scene and the
interplay between the debate and its surrounding narrative will also be
explored. In this way it is hoped to demonstrate the importance of
debate in ancient Greek literature, not only by accounting for the scene
of debate in isolation, but also by explaining its role in each narrative.
The problem of defining the topic of debate may be illustrated if we
consider for one moment the terminology involved in signalling it. By
the time of Athenian tragedy a formal debate may be identified as an
ago¯n—contest—of words: this is the marker that is used in both the
plays of Sophocles and Euripides under examination here, and the
reason why this book’s title reads entering the ago¯n.25 Even in tragedy,
however, the term agon does not achieve ubiquitous usage, even if a
formal debate occurs in a play; it will be important to consider on what
occasions, and for what reason, an agon is called an agon or not.26 On
the other hand, in Homeric epic even the primary meaning of ago¯n as
denoting contest is disputed:27 since it applies to a variety of different
contexts, from a divine assembly28 and place by the ships29 to the
funeral games in honour of Patroclus,30 scholars tend to define the
Homeric meaning of ago¯n as: any gathering, and hence an assembly of
spectators at a contest, or the place of contest, and then the contest
25 For the phrase ‘an agon of words’ (e.g. Iª4& º-ªø& or –$ØººÆ º-ªø&) in tragedy,
see Eur. Andr. 234; Her. 1255; Heracl. 116; Hipp. 971; Med. 546; Phoen. 588, 930;
Supp. 426–8; fr. 21; fr. 189; Soph. El. 1492; cf. Pl. Prt. 335a4. See M. Lloyd (1992);
Mastronade (2002), 262. But a contest of words often remains implicit in the reference
to an impending agon: see e.g. Soph. Aj. 1163 and Eur.Hec. 229, discussed in Chs. 5 and
6 below respectively. Thucydides’ Cleon explicitly labels assembly-debate as agon, and
suggests that this is a typical Athenian feature (Thuc. 3.37): see Ch. 4, sec. 3 below.
26 To a certain extent all tragedy, by virtue of setting voices in some kind of formal
opposition to one another, may be considered agonistic. Certainly, the formal opposition
of speakers belongs to the very structure of a tragic play, whether or not an agon is
formally marked. See Act III below.
27 See the definition by Cunliffe (1963), 6: (1) An assembly: (a) ‘the assemblage of the
gods supposed to meet together to receive their worshippers.’ (b) ‘An assembly brought
together to view contests.’ (2) ‘A place for contests.’ (3) ‘In reference to the Greek ships
drawn up on the beach.’ Cf. Entry I under Iª4& in LSJ 18.
28 Il. 7.298; 18.376. Cf. Kirk (1990).
29 Il. 15.428; 16.239, 500; 19.42; 20.33. Duˆchemin (1968), 11–12.
30 Il. 23.258, 273, 448, 451, 495, 507, 531, 617, 654, 685, 696, 710, 799, 847, 886;
24.1.
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itself.31 This study, then, will have to go beyond merely the study of the
word ago¯n, if we want to gain an insight into ancient Greek conceptions
of debate.32 For example, my analysis of debate in Homeric epic will be
based on occurrences of the term agora—the ‘place of assembly’ or
‘assembly’ itself. Having identified the contexts in which an assembly
takes place, I will examine the ideas related to its setting up and
performance in order to erect a framework for thinking about the
process of debate.
One approach to penetrating the idea of debate in ancient Greek society
and to getting ‘away from the assumptions that the Greek way of doing
things was the natural or inevitable way of doing them’ has been suggested
by Geoffrey Lloyd.33 Reflecting on ancient Chinese approaches to
science, Lloyd describes how alternative views do not lead to competi-
tion because the groups engaged in research belong to a royal court:
being patronized by a ruling authority, these scholars work within and
for the promotion of that authority, fitting their work into the tradition
in a way that builds on it.34 In contrast, ‘on the Greek side,’ Lloyd
31 N. J. Richardson (1993), my italics. Cf. Kirk (1985; 1990); Janko (1992).
Attempts have also been made to trace an etymological connection between the two
terms, with varying degrees of confidence. Chantraine (1968), 9 calls it ‘a simple
hypothesis’. Rix (1998), 246 fails to find a cognate for Iª'(æø, which could support
its identification with ¼ªø and an ag- root. Note, however, Pokorny (1994), 382, who
reconstructs a root *ger, connected to both Iª'(æø and the Latin grex, gregis: ‘herd’. I
thank Olga Tribulato for a helpful discussion about these conjectures.
32 A brief analysis of the term ‘ago¯n’ in the Iliad, however, may yield reward.
Ellsworth (1974) argues that the phrase ‘the ago¯n of the ships’ occurs only during that
time when Achilles’ absence from battle is felt and the Achaean ships are under threat;
that is, when there is a ‘contest’ over them. When Achilles returns to the battle, he
removes the threat from the ships and, consequently, transforms the phrase to ‘the
assembly of the ships’. See Ch. 1, sec. 4 below. The idea that ‘ago¯n’ consistently means
‘contest’ is the central point of his 1971 Berkeley Ph.D thesis. Contrast Poliakoff (1987),
181, n. 78: ‘The most one can say is that Homer has begun to show the later semantic
concept of agon [that is, as a form of competition not simply a place] but this is not
provable.’ For ago¯n as ‘including the space reserved for spectators’: Autenrieth (1984), 7.
33 G. E. R. Lloyd (1996), quotation from p. 18.
34 The ruler as a part of the system was not threatened: though the individual ruler
could be ousted, the idea or reality of having a ruler itself was not questioned: G. E. R.
Lloyd (1996), 207. It is open to question, however, whether it really was the case that
competition did not exist in ancient Chinese society, or whether as Western critics we fail
to see it operating: on the distorting lens of ‘orientalism’, see Said (1978). Interestingly,
the extent of China’s difference in terms of political structure has been recently raised
by M. Leonard, What Does China Think? (London, 2008), which explores China’s
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suggests, ‘not only were political ideals disputed, but the prime target of
persuasion was less often the ruler. It could be the general public, or
your own colleagues, rivals or potential adherents . . . [C]ompetitiveness
was built into the institutional set-up within which they operated.’35
According to Lloyd, not only was there no individual authority figure
presiding over the classical Greek polis, but no embedded superstructure
existed to support one:36 authority was something that was won or lost,
upheld or extended, in a continual struggle.37 Extending this idea to the
political field, Lloyd writes: ‘the democratic ideal was not one of total
agreement, so much as one of the due management of disagreement.’
Whether oligarchy or democracy, politics was not so much about
achieving unanimity as about regulating or even asserting the right to
dissent from authority.
This book proposes that the dynamic between authority and dissent
provides a useful matrix for thinking about textual representations of
debate: hence the subtitle ‘dissent and authority in Homer, historio-
graphy and tragedy’. It has been argued, for example, that authority is
most successful when it is not noticed: when threatened, it comes under
experiences of democratic debate and participation within, and as part of, an embedded
communist framework.
35 G. E. R. Lloyd (1996), 45.
36 For the absence of a centralized monarchy with attendant priestly caste in Greece,
see Ehrenberg (1935); G. E. R. Lloyd (1979), 226–67; Vernant (1982), 38–68; Deti-
enne (1996), 89–106. The classical Greek polis that fits the bill is, of course, Athens.
Lloyd seems to take for granted that a similar notion of institutional competition could
apply, though in varying degrees, to other Greek poleis. In fact, the extent to which and
the manner in which debate ‘works’ in oligarchies such as those of Sparta, Corinth or
Thebes warrants further investigation, especially since there is a tendency—a problem
with which this book too struggles—for modern scholars to equate debate with demo-
cratic procedure, as if democracy (especially Western liberal democracies) had a special
claim on notions and practices of freedom. See, however, Raaflaub (2004a), 225–47;
(2004b), who compares and contrasts aristocratic with democratic views on free speech.
Herodotus and Thucydides too are important witnesses for complicating this ideal: see
Act II below.
37 Golden (1998), 28–33 argues that the evidence is lacking for signs of such a
competitive spirit elsewhere in the ancient world. Contrast Bernal (1987–91), who, in
resisting the notion that the Greeks were some how superior, claims that they are no
more competitive than other cultures. But we do not have to deny their competitiveness
to dispute the claim that it is superior, precisely because it is their claim. Here Lloyd’s less
judgmental approach, which attempts to understand competition and the ways in which
it is represented, offers a more fruitful line of enquiry.
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scrutiny.38 This study will show that one such occasion is in debate.
It proposes that representations of debate pose a whole range of ques-
tions, from who has authority and how does one gain or hold on to
authority, to who can (or cannot) dissent, where, how, with what
consequences, and so on.
Dissent has been the subject of an important recent monograph on
literature in democratic Athens. Working from the premise that in
Athens political authority was ‘at least potentially discontinuous with
economic power’, Josiah Ober analyses a range of Athenian authors,
including Thucydides, as forming a ‘critical community’ of Athenian
democratic practice.39 Although most of Ober’s reviewers have criti-
cized him for in effect creating a ‘community of critics’40 according to a
model of an educated intelligentsia Ober himself acknowledges,41 a
problem also arises in his use of the term dissent itself. While conceding
that dissent ‘was rightly recognized at the time as an important and
distinctive attribute of popular rule’, Ober understands dissent in terms
of an opposition to the dominant ideology of ‘democratic knowledge’,42
as if dissent equated to elite criticism of democracy.43
38 The notion of authority as ‘an aspect of discourse’ (Lincoln (1994), 2) derives from
the work of Foucault (1980) and Bourdieu (1991).
39 Ober (1998), 39, 45. Cf. Ober (1993, 1994).
40 ‘To maintain his thesis that the critics formed a unified community’, Ober is obliged
to misrepresent specific criticisms of laws and procedures as a more general attack on
‘democratic knowledge’: Harris (2000), 509. Cf. J. Roberts (2000), 482; Rhodes (2000),
182.More problematically, Ober groups authors of widely differing works together, from a
comic poet performing in public for the public at public expense (Aristophanes) to an elitist
critic of politics constructing a written philosophical programme (Plato).
41 Ober (1998), 5 notes in passing that he took the term dissent from the title of an
American journal, which had sought to offer a fresh left-wing critique of politics in
America after Stalinism had tainted the previous Marxist credo. Ober later makes the
comparison even more explicit when, in labelling the Athenian critics of democracy a
‘virtual community’, he notes: ‘a modern analogy might be sought in the contributors to
a journal of political opinion’ (46, n. 63).
42 Ibid. 39.
43 Thus the title of his book notably slides from ‘political dissent ’ to ‘critics of popular
rule’. Here the quotation from Ed Murrow is useful. Whereas Ober reads dissent in
terms of elite critics of the dominant government—as in political dissidents—Murrow
emphasizes the importance of dissent per se for democracy. It is this ‘popular’ sense of
dissent with which this book works. Murrow is a particularly interesting and important
figure to counterbalance Ober’s claims about dissent, given his prominence as a (pop-
ular) news-broadcasting personality during the specific period Ober himself uses: Cold
War US politics.
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One problem may relate to the difficulty of defining dissent. Though
‘authority’ may be translated by the Greek words Iæå5 or Œæ+"%,, the
term dissent finds no exact equivalent. This is in part due to the range of
associations which the English ‘dissent’ triggers. The Oxford English
Dictionary definition for the verb ‘to dissent’ reads (in sum):
1. intr. To withhold assent or consent from a proposal, etc.; not to assent; to
disagree with or object to an action.
2. To think differently, disagree, differ from, in (an opinion), from, with
(a person).
3. To be at dissension or variance; to quarrel.
4. To differ in sense, meaning, or purport; also, in more general sense, to
differ in nature, form, or other respect. Obs.
The fundamental idea in ‘dissenting’ is, therefore, difference or opposi-
tion: when the term ‘dissent’ is used in this book, it is meant to evoke a
sense of disagreement, variance and/or opposition. In the case studies
under examination differences come to light by various kinds of formal
opposition, rather than by specific terminology describing the act of
replying or disagreeing. Since tragedy is a dramatic art form, speeches
lack introductory tags that denote the tenor of their content anyway;44
but explicit evaluation tends to be absent from Homeric speech intro-
ductions as well. So, for example, even in the exchange between
Agamemnon and Achilles at the beginning of the Iliad, the narrator
uses for the most part neutral descriptors such as ‘he answered the
other’, or ‘answering him, the other replied’:45 yet, when the assembly
dissolves, the narrator glosses their exchange as ‘fighting with opposing
words’ (I&"Ø7(%Ø*Ø $Æå'**Æ$2&ø K)2'**Ø&, Il. 1.304).46 Besides,
44 The Chorus may provide on occasions some indication of the relationship between
speeches; primarily, however, the structure of tragedies themselves brings out opposition.
45 "e& #/ M$'(7'"/ , Il. 1.121 (Achilles), 172 (Agamemnon), 292 (Achilles); "e& #/
I)Æ$'Ø7-$'&%, )æ%*2çÅ, Il. 1.130, 285 (Agamemnon). At the same time, the narrator
generates a sense of an escalating quarrel with admirable economy: in his second reply to
Agamemnon Achilles ‘looks under his eyebrows’ ("e& #/ ¼æ / .)-#æÆ N#g&, Il. 1.148—see
Ch. 2 n. 121 below); in his third he reaches for his sword (Il. 1.187–94); in his fourth he
speaks with ‘harmful words’ (I"Ææ"Åæ%E, K)2'**Ø&, Il. 1.223–4); his last reply interrupts
Agamemnon (Il. 1.292—see Ch. 1, n. 153 below).
46 This description, however, matches the narrator’s earlier advertisement of his
theme: when first Agamemnon and Achilles ‘stood apart in strife’ (#ØÆ*"5"Å& Kæ(*Æ&"',
Il. 1.6). Richard Martin (1989), 67–77 has a good discussion of agonistic speaking in the
Iliad. He comments: ‘at times the dispute language might be called neikos or ‘cutting
12 Prologue
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dissent as an idea finds expression in many forms, ranging from
non-participation (the Iliad ’s Achilles), silence (Sophocles’ Ajax) or
mediation (Sophocles’ Odysseus), to frank speaking (Sophocles’ Teu-
cer, Euripides’ Polymestor), potential insurrection (the Odyssey’s sui-
tors) and even violent reprisal (Euripides’ Hecuba).47 As we shall see,
the general notion of dissent or disagreement may be gainfully em-
ployed to think about a wide variety of situations, such as the scenes of
Homer’s heroes vying with words, or the historians scripting the
decision-making process undertaken by various groups, or the tragic
protagonist’s refusal to accept their circumstances lying down. The
unifying strand running throughout these examples is the formal con-
text in which a contest of words may be said to take place: the scene of
assembly in epic and historiography, and the ago¯n in tragedy.
Starting from a series of questions—Who does debate? How? Where?
With what effect?—this book aims to show that literary representations
of debate may be best understood in relation to certain recognizable
parameters that indicate a special—or institutional—space: the assem-
bly. As a formal gathering, part of what is at stake in debate is how
people relate to each other within an arena that is set up according to an
words’, at other times it may be introduced, as I contend, simply as muthos, and again, it
might be unmarked completely, when the poet allows the dramatic setting of the
speeches itself to cue the audience to the genre involved’ (p. 68). Martin, however,
follows Nagy (1979), 222–42 in viewing this kind of speech generically, specifically in
contrast to what Martin calls ‘political’ discourse (p. 68). It is one premise of this book
that such an exclusive focus misrepresents the evidence by introducing an anachronistic
dichotomy between politics and poetics.
47 An important related topic here is the idea of freedom of speech. This has been a
burgeoning area of interest in recent years, as evidenced by the edited volume on ‘free
speech’ by Sluiter and Rosen, eds. (2004). In that volume see esp. D. Carter (2004) for
questions of definition; Balot (2004) for the centrality of free speech to democratic
identity, particularly its relation to the institutions and practices of democracy; J. Rois-
man (2004) for the power struggle between the speakers and the audience, ‘who, by law
and self-perception, held the supreme power in the state’ (p. 276); and Raaflaub (2004b),
who compares democratic and aristocratic notions of free speech. See also Raaflaub
(2004a), 221–5 for a discussion of the terminology of free speech: eleutheros legein,
ise¯goria, and parrhe¯sia. In order to move away from modern notions of rights, Saxon-
house (2006) prefers the definition of parrhe¯sia as ‘frank speech’: ‘Parrhe¯sia as free speech
or speaking all is not a “right” in our terms; rather it captures both the egalitarianism of
the regime that rejected the hierarchy implicit in the treatment of Thersites and the
expectation that speech reveals the truth as one sees it, that speech opens and uncovers’
(p. 87). This study will make use of the notion of ‘frank speech’ or ‘speaking back’ for the
analysis of tragedy in Act III below.
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ideal of putting ideas ‘into the open’. This book, then, understands debate
in terms of an institution that accommodates dissent: a place where
authority is challenged, resisted and explored; where the possibility of
different responses gains communal sanction; and where the ideal is not
one of total agreement so much as the due management of disagreement.
LAYING DOWN THE GROUND-RULES
Human social activities . . . are not brought into being by social
actors but continually recreated by them via the very means
whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their
activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activ-
ities possible.
(Anthony Giddens, (1984), 2)
For an entire tradition, to put things es meson is to set them ‘in
common’ . . . . The significance of the center emerges clearly from
the institutional forms operating both in the allocation of prizes
and in the distribution of booty: the center means both ‘that
which is held in common’ and ‘that which is public’.
(Marcel Detienne, (1996), 95)
The institutionalized context for dissent in ancient Greek culture argued
for by Lloyd has led us to posit that representations of debate in literature
are best understood in relation to the institutions of assembly or ago¯n48
Modern approaches to institutions have been greatly influenced byMichel
Foucault’s conception of power ‘as the multiplicity of force relations
48 The study of politics in ancient Greece has tended to take two approaches: either
the institutional, which analyses the constitutional framework of a city (e.g. Hansen
(1989; 1991; 2006)), or else the ideological, which examines the assumptions, opinions
and principles common to the majority (e.g. Ober (1989), esp. 3–52; Ober and Hedrick
(1996) (eds.)) on the basis that an ‘analysis of the “parliamentary” mechanics alone’
(M. Finley (1983), 56, his italics) is insufficient to understand politics. See J. Davies
(2003), esp. 325–6, for a critique of ideological/political approaches that do not take into
consideration the institutions on the ground. This book attempts to combine both
approaches in a study of how institutions are lived in and acted out through literary
representations. Vlassopoulos (2007b) takes a different approach by gathering evidence
of Athenian political life outside institututional settings in so-called ‘free spaces’. For a
recent critique of modern approaches to the Greek polis, see Vlassopoulos (2007a).
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immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their
own organization’ and ‘as the process which, through ceaseless struggles
and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them’.49 By re-
garding power as being immanent within social structures rather than ‘as a
group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the
citizens of a given state’,50 Foucault challenges the top-down notion of
institutions that regards them as imposed from above by a governing
entity. Expanding on Foucault’s work, Antony Giddens51 argues that
‘we should not conceive of the structures of domination built into social
institutions as in some way grinding out “docile bodies” who behave like
the automata suggested by objectivist social science’. From this perspec-
tive, structure is to be regarded not as external to individuals but as
fundamentally part of people’s everyday lives, which each person lives
and experiences, works through and enacts.52 Thus Giddens’ approach
stresses the activity of people working within social structures to reproduce
them (whether consciously or not)—a process he labels ‘structuration’. He
writes: ‘Analysing the structuration of social systems means studying the
modes in which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of
situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action
contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction.’53 Giddens here is
talking about social and political institutions, which, he argues, people
perpetuate in their everyday lives.54Nevertheless, what he has to say about
real-life institutions can be helpful for thinking about their literary man-
ifestations. As an audience or a reader, we experience the text as a series of
structures. This is not, however, to conceive of interpretation as, to
49 Foucault (1979), 92.
50 Ibid.
51 Giddens (1984), 16.
52 Ibid. 25; cf. 16–18. Working in the tradition of modern liberalism, Farenga (2006)
puts a similar onus on the activity of the individual, in terms of the relationship of
citizenship and selfhood (pp. 10–12) and the intersubjectivity of the self in deliberative
democracies (pp. 12–14).
53 Giddens (1984), 25.
54 Also relevant is Bourdieu (1990), whose work derives more from the field of
anthropology than political science. He writes: ‘contrary to simplistic uses of the
distinction between infrastructure and superstructure, the social mechanisms that ensure
the production of a compliant habitus are . . . an integral part of the conditions of the
reproduction of the social order and of the productive apparatus itself’ (pp. 129–30). For
the theory and practice of putting together Giddens and Bourdieu, see esp. Cohen
(1991), 14–34.
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paraphrase Giddens, ‘in some way grinding out docile bodies’; nor is it,
however, to regard reading as somehow ‘free play’. Rather, this is to
recognize an essential duality within the interpretative process: each text
is composed of structures that position the reader or audience in particular
ways, and yet that come into being precisely because they are realized by
that reader or audience.55 With the case of those texts which represent
debate—the subject of this book—the reader or audience experiences the
process of going through competing arguments, which has the effect of
shaping responses to the events: debate becomes internalized. In turn,
however, by that very process of internalizing competing arguments, the
audience or reader realizes the institution of debate within the text.56
In the light of Giddens’ theory of structuration, then, the proposition
that debate may be best understood in relation to the institutional form
of debate, such as the ago¯n and agora,57 may be fleshed out by two
additional points. First, by virtue of their structure the scenes of institu-
tional debate involve the reader or audience in a process of negotiating
between dissent and authority. Second, by becoming involved in that
process the audience/reader reproduces those representations of debate
and, therefore, realizes them as institutional arenas. We might say that
responses to debate are part of an interpretative process that simulta-
55 The interdependence of both text and reader/audience has given rise to the theory
of dialogism, associated with the Russian formalist theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. He writes:
‘Every literary work faces outward away from itself, towards the listener-reader, and to a
certain extent thus anticipates possible reactions to itself’ (Bakhtin (1981), 257). In this
respect, Bakhtin is responding to the unidirectional model of communication ex-
pounded by Jakobson (2000). See also Holquist (1981), 63, who calls the outwardness
of the text ‘relational’; Morson (1981); Todorov (1984), 54–6; Holquist (1990), 40–66.
The other aspect of ‘dialogism’ or ‘heteroglossia’—the representation of competing
voices within the text itself—is discussed below. For a good discussion of the duality
of the critic’s task, in resisting domination by the text while recognizing that one cannot
be liberated absolutely from the conventions of language: McGann (1993).
56 Raaflaub (2004b), 227–33 makes the important observation that, while demo-
cratic institutions are important for notions of freedom, primary identification with
freedom seems to be in relation to democracy as a comprehensive way of life, a politeia.
This study also puts the emphasis on process and experience—a way of conducting
oneself—but in relation to embedded structures (within the text) and, in particular,
representations of debate.
57 As we saw above, Homeric scholars understand the term agora as not simply
indicating the place of an assembly but marking that an assembly is going on—the
assembly as an institution.
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neously is a performance of those institutions as they are represented in
the text.58
So far I have been setting out how to approach representations of
debate in ancient Greek literature, and I have suggested that thinking of
them as institutions that work through possibilities for dissent allows us
to make sense of their varying manifestations. The focus on the explora-
tion and valorization of dissent within a text reproduces something of
the openness that Marcel Detienne has seen as characteristic of the series
of contests or ago¯nes that Achilles sets up in honour of Patroclus in Iliad
23, when Achilles ‘held the people and sat them down in a wide space’
(ÆP"%F ºÆe& !æıŒ' ŒÆd ¥ÇÆ&'& 'Pæf& IªH&Æ, Il. 23.258).59 So, for
example, having won the first contest (the chariot race), Diomedes
‘stands in the middle of the ago¯n’ (*"B #b $2*øfi K& IªH&Ø, Il. 23.507)
to collect the prize, on which basis Detienne argues that ‘the centre
means both ‘that which is held in common’ and ‘that which is public’.60
That is to say, Achilles’ act of placing goods ‘into the middle’ of the
ago¯n has symbolic value: it signifies that the goods are no longer any one
person’s property but are common to all and, as such, may be competed
for and acquired. The idea of the ago¯n as the place in which all-comers
may enter to compete for the goods placed ‘in the middle’ has a clear
application for this study; indeed, Jean-Pierre Vernant has expressly
extended the concept of the centre, or meson, to thinking about debate.
He writes:
The agora, which represented this [new] spatial arrangement on the ground,
formed the center of a common public space. All those who entered it were by
that fact defined as equals, isoi. By their presence in that political space they
entered into relations of perfect reciprocity with one another . . .The social
58 At best a supplement of or substitute for ‘real life’ debate, these representations
nevertheless offer important insights into the construction of narrative and a reader’s/
spectator’s place within it. For the dual notion of the supplement as supplying something
that is missing or supplying something additional, see Derrida (20002), 99.
59 Cf. Il. 23.273, 448, 451, 495, 507, 531, 617, 654, 685, 696, 710, 799, 847, 886;
24.1. It seems that, by killing Hector, Achilles has definitively warded off ‘contest’ over
the Achaean ships (see n. 32 above); instead, in a move that mirrors his establishment of
the assembly Achilles institutionalizes the ago¯n within the Achaean community. For
Hammer (1997b) 21 the funeral games introduces a new kind of political relationship.
See Ch. 1, conclusion.
60 Detienne (1996), 95.
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space was a centered space—common, public, egalitarian, and symmetrical—
but also secularized, intended for confrontation, debate, and argument.61
In the case of an assembly, we can think of obvious practical reasons for
standing in a circle, in that it gives everyone the opportunity to hear what is
said. But it has symbolic value as well: everyone stands equidistant from
the centre, fromwhat is said, discussed and ratified; arguments set ‘into the
middle’ become symbolically the common property of all, to be taken up
or taken over as each person deems fit.62 Yet, the notion of the meson as
discussed by Vernant and Detienne represents an ideal of openness;
paradoxically, for the concept of openness to have any meaning it must
necessarily be accompanied by limitations and exclusions: only by having
certain circumstances, material or groups for whom or for which disclo-
sure does not or cannot apply can openness itself be defined.63
Not only that: as we shall see, proclaiming openness is never an
innocent gesture. Precisely because of the ideal of openness, places of
debate become highly charged and important to control. Setting up
an assembly or ago¯n, then, is an act that is not simply descriptive
61 Vernant (1982), 125, 126. For an analysis of the agora as a place external to a city’s
institutional framework see Vlassopoulos (2007b). He shows that the Athenian agora—in
this case, solely the marketplace—not only ‘brought together public life, social life, work
and exchange’ (p. 40); it also blurred boundaries between citizen and non-citizen in its
activation of a ‘free space’.
62 AsVernant (1983), 185 puts it: ‘in that they have access to this circular space centred
on the agora, the citizens enter a political system governed by equilibrium, symmetry, and
reciprocity.’ According to Vernant, this contrasts with eastern kingdoms, where ‘political
space took the form of a pyramid dominated by a king, with a hierarchy of powers,
prerogatives, and functions stretching down from top to bottom’ (p. 190). Cf. Vernant
(1982), 45–8; Steiner (1994), 191–2. Loraux (2002), 98–104 makes compelling reading:
though she rather fetishes consensus, her focus is on post-Peloponnesian War Athens,
when there must have been a particular concern to control dissent.
63 A completely different example that exposes the claim to openness is a version of
Jesus’ ‘Sermon on the Mount’, in which a great throng of people are depicted hanging on
every word of his parable that the meek shall inherit the earth—a message that mirrors
the spatial inclusiveness of the circular performance context. But, then, as the camera
pans back, and back and back, and Jesus’ words fade out to a mere murmur, eventually a
point is reached on the outer edge of the circle where the sermon is no longer audible at
all, and Jesus’ message gets misheard as ‘blessed are the cheese-makers . . . ’. While of
course, not holy scripture but the unholy script of Monty Python’s Life of Brian, this
example aptly demonstrates an important limitation to the ideology of openness: even
when a message of inclusiveness is being broadcast, one eventually meets the margins,
and those margins are all the more powerful for the inclusiveness of the message. In short,
there is already a fiction of openness in the phrase es meson.
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but prescriptive : it makes a difference what kind of debate is established,
when, where it takes place, and who does it. In fact, where, or rather, how
the boundaries may be drawn is one of the critical problems that will be
encountered.64 And it is because the form of debate is by no means self-
evident or given, but demands that boundaries be drawn and redrawn
each time it is entered, that previous attempts at describing debate have
proven insufficient: while debate, notably the ago¯n, has been commonly
studied as fixed in form, precisely what we don’t get is a form that
sustains or remains consistent over different manifestations. Where a
debate is drawn up, for what reasons, and with what consequences when
it is dissolved, all make a difference: its form is always a matter of trial,
contest and negotiation. There is no ground zero for setting up a
debate;65 words are always heard or read in a context.66
Such an understanding of debate assumes particular significance if
one thinks of it as the place where an author cedes his stage to the characters
in his drama or narrative: how the author frames these other voices in
debate has implications for howwe respond to the work as a whole.67Two
frames to debate come to mind. On the one hand, there is the narrative
context in which a debate takes place, which means investigating how a
debate is set up vis-a`-vis the events by the agents in the narrative or drama.
On the other hand, there is the external commentary on debate that a
narrator may offer: in this case the task will be to consider how debate is
narrated by the poet, written up by the historian or staged by the dramatist.
64 This is another way of recognizing the problem of representation even as one tries
to establish a model or, at least, a pattern. See Spariosu (1984) and, in particular, the
essays by Rapp (1984), 142–3 and Black (1984), 184–8.
65 On the impossibility of reading degree zero: Barthes (1967).
66 This is another essential insight of ‘dialogism’ as articulated by Bakhtin (1981),
especially: ‘discourse is a social phenomenon’ (p. 259); any utterance ‘finds the object at
which it was directed already overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with
value’ (p. 276); ‘Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the
private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is populated—overpopulated—with the
intentions of others’ (p. 294). Cf. Morson (1981), 6, who writes: ‘Meaning—in the sense
of dictionary meaning—means nothing; it only has the potential for meaning.’
67 Goldhill (1994), 59–60: the frame is not a borderline but the source of difference
that undermines the inside–outside polarity. Felman’s (1985) study of Henry James’Turn
of the Screw is exemplary in this respect. Extrapolating from the prologue frame, in which
the character-narrator warns us that ‘the story won’t tell’, Felman argues that the text
‘comprehends the critic’ and ‘through its reading, orchestrates the critical disagreement as
the performance and the “speech act” of its own disharmony’ (p. 161). Cf. Booth (1961),
311–16, 364–71.
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Here the notion of ‘heteroglossia’—the theory inspired by Mikhail Bakh-
tin’s analysis of the modern novel’s plurality of voices—will be an im-
portant tool: its emphasis on the creative tension between the narrative
frame and the alien voices incorporated within it is potentially disruptive
of the authorial word.68More generally we will be faced with the problem
of making sense of the contest of voices, as either setting up rival positions
in which a space opens up in-between, thereby allowing ‘dialogue’ to take
place between the text and its reader,69 or else constructing an opposition
in which one position is clearly favoured over another.
The nexus between dissent and authority, and the tension between
ideals of openness and its fiction; the shifting forms, parameters and
locations of debate; and the importance of framing debate by both its
internal agents and external author, all provide the methodological
framework that underpins this book.
INTRODUCING THE RIVAL COMPETITORS
In the Millennium Declaration, all States resolved to intensify
their efforts ‘to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security
Council in all its aspects’ . . .This reflected the view, long held by
the majority, that a change in the Council’s composition is needed
to make it more broadly representative of the international com-
munity as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities of today,
and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world.
(Kofi Annan, Report on UN reform)70
The only emulator successfully to challenge the Iliad ’s supremacy
as a model of how narrative should be done was the Odyssey,
68 Bakhtin (1981), 259–422. He writes: ‘Heteroglossia, once incorporated into the
novel . . . is another’s speech in another’s language’ (p. 324). Cf. Emerson (1997). This is
the form of dialogism most familiar to classicists, in particular those working on
Herodotus: see Act II below.
69 Holquist (1990), 38 speaks of a ‘dialogic’ triad between the utterance, the reply,
and the relationship between the two. Goldhill (1999a) 3 emphasizes the display element
of democratic performance, which ‘triangulates competition through an audience’. For
the significance of contest as being derived from con-testari, an implied ‘third-stander’ in
an agonistic confrontation, see Ong (1981), 45–6 (quotation from p. 45).
70 Kofi Annan, ‘In Larger Freedom,’ para. 168 (21Mar. 2005). http://www.globalpolicy.
org/reform/initiatives/annan/2005/followupreport.pdf.
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apparently a generation or so later. Yet despite its higher technical
ambitions and accomplishment, even this did not knock the Iliad
off its paradigmatic perch. What it did instead was to bequeath to
later narrative systems a dual template: a pair of fundamentally
distinct narrative key signatures, one minor one major, between
which all subsequent Western classical narrative would be re-
quired to choose or compromise.
(Lowe (2000), 103)
The material gathered here derives from three genres on the principle
that a study of debate is best served by an investigation that crosses
generic boundaries and incorporates different textual and cultural con-
texts. Each of the three genres has been chosen due to the prominence of
scenes of debate within it; but other factors are at play too, since each
genre also presents the opportunity of looking at debate from radically
different and distinctive points of view. Epic is chosen because of its
place as the ‘super genre’ where everything begins:71 the prominence of
verbal conflict in the Iliad and Odyssey has long attracted the interest of
scholars, whereas signs of an institutional framework underpinning
Homeric society have only recently gained scholarly attention.72 At
the other end of the scale, tragedy’s central place in the institutional
fabric of Athenian society affords the opportunity to explore the im-
portance of debate in a particular polis, and to test whether tragedy
engages more directly with issues that may be considered democratic
rather than merely political.73 On the other hand, the third genre,
historiography, finds its way into this study on the basis of the vastly
different genesis of its narrative. In tragedy actors verbally confront each
other on stage with varying degrees of formality without intervention on
the part of the dramatist; it is also the case that narratorial comment on
the setting up of debates is minimal in Homeric epic, where the narrator
71 J. Foley (2005), 209 talks about epic as the ‘omnibus genre’ in an ‘ecosystem of
living, interactive oral genres’. Whether or not epic poetry truly does pre-date all other
ancient Greek literature is not the concern of this study, though there is enough evidence
from ancient Greek poetry to suggest inter-poetic rivalry with epic: see e.g. Irwin (2005);
Barker and Christensen (2006). It is enough to acknowledge that Homeric epic at any
rate presents itself as a foundational narrative: Graziosi and Haubold (2005). Cf. Ford
(1992).
72 See Ch. 1, conclusion.
73 See Act III.
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(for the most part) avoids intrusive personal comment. In both Her-
odotus and Thucydides debates play an important role in the experience
and conduct of their respective wars, but, given the fact that their
narratives derive from their own personal enquiry and study,74 the
way they frame debate becomes a critical issue: when representing
debate their authority is at risk in a way that is not true of the Homeric
poet or Athenian tragedian.75
The data collected here are presented according to two types of
organizational principle. First, the book is divided into different Acts,
which correspond to the different genres under investigation. Act I
investigates scenes of debate in Homeric epic. It demonstrates that
debate takes place within carefully codified parameters, marked by
formulaic language, and indicating the presence of an institution, the
assembly. In this way the Homeric epics act as foundational narratives
that explore the importance of dissent within the community. Act II
takes up the story by turning to the creators of history-writing, Herodo-
tus and Thucydides, and enquires how these two authors overcome the
problem of writing in a culture that is dominated by the public, spoken
word. It will show that one way in which they negotiate that problem and
displace it onto their readers is through their representation of public
debate: in the ways that they write up debate, the historiansmake reading
(history) useful for thinking politically. Lastly, Act III examines tragedy,
in which scenes of debate become formalized and embedded in the very
structure of the genre itself in the form of the ago¯n. Unlike historiogra-
phy, tragedy lacks a narratorial figure, removing explicit guidance for
audience interpretation; whereas epic focuses on the actions of individual
heroes, tragedy explores reactions to the hero. Both points lead to the
proposal that tragedy puts the audience’s judgement under the spotlight.
Thus tragic debates often fail to lead to resolution precisely because the
ago¯n is as much about reproducing the crisis of interpretation among the
audience as about displaying the contest between characters, all of which
suggests a significant interrelationship between tragic dissent and the
new cultural conditions of democracy.
74 And, in Thucydides’ case at least, personal experience of assembly debate.
75 On problems of authority for an ancient historian, see Marincola (1997), and Act
II below.
22 Prologue
Barker 9780199542710_0001-0028_Barker_chap1 Final Proof page 22 29.4.2011 10:38am
While this rather schematic outline may suggest an evolutionary path
towards the greater valorization and institutionalization of dissent,
evidence mustered within those genres can also be used to flag up
anxieties about debate and the benefits of allowing dissent—from this
perspective contest takes place not only between different genres but also
within the same genre. To put it simply: Chapter 1 presents an Iliad
that institutionalizes dissent within the heroic community, while Chap-
ter 2 offers an Odyssey that radically challenges and undermines that
positive outcome of contest. Chapter 3 picks up this thread by analysing
Herodotus’ open narrative texture as an Odyssean strategy to gain
authority for his enquiry, while Chapter 4 reads Thucydides as taking
an Achilles-like stand in dissenting from his contemporaries’ way of
political decision-making, whether Athenian, Spartan or Sicilian, and so
on. Chapter 5 puts on stage a version of Sophocles’ Ajax that sees its
hero as a second Achilles and the play as a performance of dissent from
authority figures, while Chapter 6 dresses Hecuba up as an Odysseus-
like figure in Euripides’ provocative challenge to the Athenian ideals of
open debate. As can be seen from this summary account, one conse-
quence of thinking about debate in terms of dissent and authority
will be to suggest that the Homeric epics offer alternative, contesting
narrative paradigms, which are taken up, negotiated and challenged by
later authors in a variety of ways. This book contends that the Iliad,
Thucydides and Sophocles’ Ajax all privilege an understanding of dis-
sent in which characters, or the author, take a stand in the arena of
debate to challenge the dominant figures, ideals or discourses of their
time. On the other hand, theOdyssey, Herodotus and Euripides’Hecuba
expose that ideal of open contest and fruitful dissent as a fiction. The
opposition I will trace undoubtedly has many reasons (as well as many
manifestations), but this study flags up one of particular importance:
that is, the problem of negotiating dissent from the perspective of, or
when dealing with, other groups, whether by that we mean the Odyssey’s
suitors, Herodotus’ Persians or Euripides’ female barbarian ex-queen,
Hecuba.
The complex ideological issues raised by the subject of debate are
particularly noticeable in Herodotus, who, while showing the impor-
tance of dissent for the survival of Greece, looks into, represents and
articulates the fault-lines of the Greek resistance to the Persian invasion
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through a series of fractious assemblies.76 The problem of negotiating
dissent in international institutions still confronts Western-style nation-
state democracies today, particularly in the ‘democratization’ of interna-
tional bodies such as the United Nations.77 As Kofi Annan has said,
reform of the institution of the United Nations is something on which
just about all of its members agree: it needs to be more ‘democratic’ in
order to be ‘more broadly representative of the international community’
and ‘thereby more legitimate’. The problem, however, is how to carry out
those reforms in practice: how, in other words, ‘its working methods’ can
be made ‘more efficient and transparent’. Just how much dissent is
allowed, when and by whom? And who decides? For the importance of
such questions one need only point to the crisis in the UN during the run-
up to the invasion of Iraq, the fall-out from which is still being felt in the
international community as this book goes to press. A study of the way
debate is represented in ancient Greek literature has the potential to
prompt new ways of thinking about the role of debate in contemporary
culture and of reinvigorating those institutions involved in its production.
ENTERING THE AGO¯N TO JUDGE
It is in the nature of the ago¯n neither to render its participants
mute nor to attain the conquering finality of telos. The agonistic
paradigm allows texts, author, historical events, and cultural
voices to engage in a creative and regenerative contest.
(Janet Lungstrum and Elizabeth Sauer (1997), 25)
Indeed, politics, too, had the form of an ago¯n: an oratorical
contest, a battle of arguments whose theater was the agora, the
public square, which had been the meeting place before it was a
marketplace. Those who contended with words, who opposed
speech with speech, became in this hierarchical society a class of
76 For the circumstances of and problems within Greek inter-poleis relations: Purnell
(1978); Giovannini (2007).
77 A recent book published under the auspices of the UN tackles precisely this issue:
T. G. Weiss and S. Daws (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the UN (Oxford, 2007). See
esp. the chapters by W. A. Knight, ‘Democracy and Good Governance’, pp. 620–33 (on
democratization in the outside world), and E. C. Luck, ‘Principal Organs—Prospects for
Reform’, pp. 653–74 (about the internal reform of the UN).
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equals . . .What this urban framework in fact defined was a mental
space; it opened up a new spiritual horizon.
( Jean-Pierre Vernant (1982), 47–8)
One subsidiary effect of this study will be to draw attention to the
importance of context on the act of interpretation. In their introduction
to an edited volume of literary essays on the theme of ‘agonistics’,
Elizabeth Sauer and Janet Lungstrum argue that the ago¯n, as a concept,
is dynamic and dialogic. Their description of the ago¯n as avoiding
definitive resolution and putting the onus on a response suggests some-
thing more than the weighing of arguments that one might expect from
antilogy; they emphasize rather the range of actors involved—‘texts,
author, historical events, and cultural voices’—and the processes by
which authority is displaced and dispersed through the text as these
competing voices jostle for attention and endorsement. This creates, in
the words of one of their contributors, a ‘logic of dispossession’ in the
reader;78 that is to say, the reader is dispossessed of knowledge or, rather,
dispossessed of the security of knowing.79
This description of agonistics resonates strongly with the analysis of
debate in terms of dissent as outlined above. Yet the concept of ‘ago-
nistics’ as outlined here and applied throughout that edited volume
appears to be a tool for the modern scholar to interpret texts from any
period of time or culture without regard to context.80 Similar criticism
may be levelled at reader-response theories. For all their utility in
analysing reading as ‘an event’ and in considering the reader’s experience
of a text,81 they also all too readily examine the text detached from its
78 Trey (1997), 332.
79 In his analysis of the interpretive act Goldhill (1993), 151 describes how ‘there is
an inevitable gap between the author’s voice and the voice of authority. This gap opens a
space—un e´cart—in which writing as an author takes place.’ He goes on to stress that
posing the question ‘What is an author?’ leads to the question ‘What is reading?’
(p. 152).
80 The term ‘agonistics’ is also used by Graff (1997), who sees the policy of embracing
diversity and conflict as the way forward for a discipline like ours: ‘Unfortunately, it does
not occur to us that we have been looking for common ground in the wrong place—that
is, our conflicts and differences constitute whatever common ground we have or have
had’ (p. 393).
81 See e.g. Iser (1978), 127.
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cultural context.82 Indeed, Edward Said has criticized reader-led the-
ories precisely for not being historically grounded in the literature that
they purport to analyse: instead they lead to an essentially private,
internalized event, which, according to Said, can promote a self-
confirming authority within academic institutions.83 This caveat is
particularly meaningful for those of us who analyse texts that were
both publicly performed and publicly received, such as Homeric epic
and Athenian tragedy.
A brief example of a recent controversy among classicists may help
to highlight what is at stake in terms of the strategies of interpretation
one may adopt. Richard Seaford has complained that the emphasis of
tragic criticism on ambiguity is ‘in danger of becoming a disabling
cliche´, in which irreducible ambivalence . . . becomes the final desti-
nation of analysis’.84 Seaford’s concern articulates the intellectual
bankruptcy of the kind of decontextualized reading that frustrates
Said: according to this view, contemporary studies on tragedy, re-
gardless of context and structure, reduce all possible interpretations of
tragedy to one of ambiguity—the prevailing trend within the acad-
emy at the present time. On the other hand, one of Seaford’s targets,
Simon Goldhill, has responded by asserting that ‘reading for closure
or reading for ambiguity is always already a politicized positioning, an
engagement’,85 by which he means that each critic is inevitably
involved ‘in the agon of producing, controlling, debating political
meaning’.86 The example he cites makes that point starkly: ‘I am as
unswayed by a claim of ambiguity when it is applied to the anti-
Semitic writing of Paul de Man, as I am dismayed by the certainty
with which the Bible is read to justify the violent re-possession of
land. The issue is not simply “is it ambiguous or not?”, “open or
82 Fish (1980), 14, when speaking of the ‘interpretative communities’ that claim to
make sense of a text, means the strategies of reading that are the fashion in the academy,
and not the cultural context of interpretation to which the target text belongs.
83 Said (1983). He complains: ‘It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that an
implicit consensus has been building for the past decade in which the study of literature
is considered to be profoundly, even constitutively nonpolitical’ (p. 18). Critics of
Athenian tragedy now complain that the reverse (that political, even democratic, read-
ings dominate) is true. See Act III, introduction below.
84 Seaford (1995), 203.
85 Goldhill (2000), 56.
86 Ibid. (my italics).
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not?”, but “what is at stake in our determination that it is ambiguous,
open or not?”.’87 Yet while Goldhill is making a claim for ambiguity
that encompasses different cultural circumstances—‘the ago¯n of pro-
ducing, controlling, debating political meaning’—the language that
he draws upon betrays the context of his debate with Seaford: both
critics are responding to the trial scene in Aeschylus’ Eumenides,
arguably the ago¯n on the tragic stage.88 Here I return to the metaphor
of the ago¯n which began my investigation: drawing on two authors
from his tradition and constructing a law court out of their rival
perspectives, Longinus introduces a metaphor for criticism that still
has purchase in contemporary studies of those texts. The power of the
ago¯n as a metaphor for reading ancient Greek literature derives in part
at least from its presence in the literature under investigation.
This study aims to ground the idea of ‘agonistics’ in close readings
of exemplary texts, and show the impact of those texts in establishing
a particular cultural framework of interpretation.89 As noted above,
Jean-Pierre Vernant has discussed the idea of the centre (meson) in
relation to the institution of the assembly (agora) in the typical Greek
polis. He goes on to suggest that the physical landscape of the polis has an
effect on the psychology of the people within it: by investing in
the central space of the community as a public arena in which decisions
that affected the community were made, the citizens of the community
not only took charge of running their own lives, but also became better
prepared to do so. In Vernant’s words: ‘What this urban framework in
fact defined was a mental space; it opened up a new spiritual horizon.’ In
a similar fashion, this book will argue that the presence of formal debate
in the public literature of ancient Greece helps to create a ‘mentalite´’
of ago¯n; it challenges each audience (member) not just to find a place
87 Ibid. (his italics).
88 See Act III, introduction below. Cf. Goldhill (1986), 30–2, 48–56.
89 In another context Goldhill (1999b), 118 writes about the need to study reading
practices in different periods as a means of exploring how reading and self-formation are
interconnected; as he puts it, ‘the conceptualization of the citizen as a speaking subject,
the cultural frames of interpretation, and the idea(l)s of the body, each informs the
notion of reading in antiquity’.
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in-between the opposing positions represented, but also to reflect on the
reasons for doing so.90
Ultimately, then, the representation of debate is a two-way process,
and continually so: the importance attached to institutional debate
within the broad cultural framework of the time (sixth–fourth century
bc) generates the intense interest in it in each of the three literary genres
under investigation; and at the same time these very representations
help renew the audience’s or, even, a readership’s commitment to
debate and the management of dissent.91 Being an audience of epic or
tragedy, or even reading history, may thus be understood as an activity
intimately connected to the exercise of citizenship.92
It is with the origins of this institution that we begin, with the scenes
of debate in Homeric epic.
90 Modern studies of theatre criticism have emphasized the plurality of responses,
even among audiences homogenous in other respects, such as time and place. Given the
highly fractured nature of ‘we’, this book tries to avoid the suggestion that there is only
one way ‘we’ read the debates in ancient Greek literature. Nevertheless, it hopes to show
the value of bringing out the structures embedded in the text, such as the ways in which
they invite certain responses, and of speculating on the possible experience of those
structures. See also Pelling (2000), esp. 1–17, who suggests that ‘there is . . . a sense in
which a text illuminates the dynamics of its own occasion’ (p. 17).
91 Smith (1984), 26 argues that evaluations are not individual acts but take place
through various institutional procedures. A right or wrong evaluation is contingent, not
upon an abstract truth, but upon ‘how well it performs various desired/able functions for
the various people who may be concretely involved with it’.
92 Farenga (2006), esp. 7–12, offers an alternative route to citizenship, through an
examination of individuals who perform ‘scripts’ (p. 8) of justice. Cf. Hammer (2002),
esp. 19–48.
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Introduction: founding dissent
Our enquiry into debate begins with the two Homeric epics, whose
interrelationship has occupied critics since antiquity.1 Longinus draws a
contrast between the ‘dramatic body’ (!e "ø#$!Ø%& 'æÆ#Æ!ØŒe& ()-
*"!+"Æ!%) of the Iliad and the Odyssey’s more ‘diegetic’ ('ØÅªÅ#Æ!ØŒ,&)
1 How to talk about the relationship between the two poems has become particularly
problematic in the wake of Parry and Lord’s work on oral tradition. Critics such as
Gregory Nagy have questioned the integrity of the Homeric poems as set texts, empha-
sizing rather the multiformity of oral composition: Nagy (1996), 29–112, (1999); on the
multiformity of oral poetry see esp. J. Foley (2005), 202. It is striking, however, that
most discussions of multiformity centre on (what is known as) the ‘Epic Cycle’ (cf.
Finkelberg (2000); Burgess (2002)): the Iliad and Odyssey appear to be of a different
order: cf. Griffin (1977). Indeed, Richard Rutherford treats the Homeric poems as
literary creations precisely because of their apparent familiarity with each other, which
is ordinarily conceived in terms of the Odyssey replying to the Iliad (though see Pucci
(1987), 17–18): Rutherford (1986), 162 with n. 87; (1991–3), esp. 53–4; (1996),
58–61. It is important, then, to be sensitive to the possible interrelationship of the
Homeric poems, while at the same time paying heed to their orality, as Allan (2005),
14 maintains: ‘the pursuit of specific dependence or influence (from Homer to the cyclic
poems, or vice versa) is, in the pre-textual stage of early Greek epic, a misleading
methodology.’ As a result, the two following chapters will attempt to talk about this
relationship in terms of resonance—the theory that describes the process by which
particular formulae (conceived of as word-units, motifs or even story patterns) evoke a
wider epic tradition, which in turn resonates through each and every particular instance of
a particular formula. See esp. J. Foley (1997), 151–3; (1999), 13–34. (He labels this
process ‘traditional referentiality’: for the term ‘resonance’, see Graziosi and Haubold
(2005), 53.) While, for the most part, this theory operates according to a general
perception of a wider epic tradition, at times—as will come to the fore in the study of
the Odyssey—resonance may have particular charge if thought to be activating a series of
interconnections between our two poems (or, if not the extant texts themselves, then
between their respective narrative traditions). Nevertheless, to avoid the suggestion that
we are dealing with written texts, examples of resonances will be discussed in terms of
their Iliadic or Odyssean tonality—even if the connection to particular passages from our
extant texts seems undeniable: see esp. Ch. 2, sec. 3 below. For an attempt to supplement
studies of resonance with the added focus on inter-poetic rivalry, see Barker and
Christensen (2008).
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character.2 On the face of it, Longinus’ assessment seems to draw a
distinction between the battlefield duels of the Iliad and the storytelling
scenes in the Odyssey, the latter of which has been reframed in modern
theoretical discussions as denoting theOdyssey’s greater self-reflexivity3
and openness.4 Yet Longinus disrupts his neat antithesis by supple-
menting his description of the Iliad with the gloss ‘ŒÆd K&Æª-&Ø%&’,
which, while unclear in meaning, has the idea of ‘contest’ at its root.5
Indeed, contest lies at the heart of heroic society as presented in the
Iliad, particularly in battlefield encounters, which are framed by and
fought out in speech.6 But the Odyssey also dramatizes contest, most
notably in Odysseus’ battle against the suitors. Besides, Longinus
applies the two other terms to denote the way the story is told, as either
dramatic (in the case of the Iliad ) or else diegetic (as regards the
Odyssey). In this sense the suggestion seems to be that the Iliad is
somehow more ‘in contest’ in its narration, making that poem the
more dialogic narrative. Following this cue, my approach to contest
within the Homeric poems will reappraise the customary division
2 ‘For the same reason, I believe, writing the Iliad in the heyday of his spirit [Homer]
made the whole body of it dramatic and belonging to a contest, whereas concerning the
Odyssey he made it for the most part diegetic, the characteristic of old age’ (I)e 'b !B.
ÆP!B. ÆN!/Æ., %r#ÆØ, !B. #b& 0I ºØ$'%. ªæÆç%#1&Å. K& IŒ#fi B )&*2#Æ!%. ‹º%& !e "ø#$!Ø%&
'æÆ#Æ!ØŒe& ()*"!+"Æ!% ŒÆd K&Æª-&Ø%&, !B. 'b 0O'ı""*/Æ. !e )º1%& 'ØÅªÅ#Æ!ØŒ,&, ‹)*æ
Y'Ø%& ª+æø., On the Sublime 9.13).
3 Frontisi-Ducroux (1986) rightly stresses that the Iliad is also self-reflexive. Never-
theless, in her review of this book, H. Foley (1989) asserts that the Odyssey remains more
reflexive; cf. Goldhill (1993; 1994); Segal (1994); J. Foley (1995); Scodel (1998).
Rutherford (1991–3), 48 comments: ‘The Odyssey is a much more self-conscious poem
than the Iliad, in the sense that it includes more overt reference to the powers and
practitioners of poetry.’
4 Though scholars such as Lynn-George (1988) and Heiden (1991) have successfully
shown how aspects of the Iliad too may be analysed according to dialogic theory, the
view that the Odyssey is more playful and open remains unchallenged: see Schein (1996),
31 on the ‘openness’ of the Odyssey compared to the Iliad; cf. Katz (1991); Goldhill
(1991); Peradotto (1990; 1993); Felson-Rubin (1994).
5 ‘[K&Æª-&]-Ø%., %&, of or for a contest’. sec. II, LSJ 553. Under ‘III. Rhet. 2,’ LSJ reads
‘of style, energetic, vivid, opp. 'ØÅªÅ#Æ!ØŒ,. (as epith. of Il. compared with the Od.)’.
Russell (1964) renders the translation, ‘he made the whole piece lively with dramatic
action’.
6 This is ‘flyting’, fighting talk: Parks (1986; 1990); R. P. Martin (1989), esp. 65–77.
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between the Iliad ’s monumentality and the Odyssey’s dialogism by
analysing the representation of debate.7
Debate in Homeric epic—what form it takes, what significance it
has, whether or not it even exists—has been a matter of some con-
troversy in recent scholarship. Generally speaking it is possible to
identify two contrasting strands of criticism. The first has been to
examine the external surroundings and formal trappings of a debate,
from which some kind of political community presented by the
Homeric epics has been extrapolated;8 there have been many very
different ideas, however, about how to describe that society, how to
interpret that depiction, or whether such attempts are even fruitful.9
An alternative approach has focused on the internal form of debate, by
means of which speech is analysed as the production of thesis and
antithesis, and the cut-and-thrust of debate is regarded as a form of
proto-rhetorical theory.10 Yet, neither approach has proven capable of
coming to terms with the sheer range of the ways in which debate is
represented in either narrative. Instead, strategies of reading conform
to certain expectations of what debate should look like, which has led
to a tendency to homogenize different scenes of debate, with little
7 For Longinus the conclusion is rather different: he conceives of the Iliad being a
product of Homer’s youth, when he was energetic, while the Odyssey’s tale-telling derives
from the poet’s old age. But this conclusion could derive from the biographical tendency
of ancient reception, in which literary criticism takes the form of assigning characteristics
to the author of the text: see Graziosi (2002).
8 Much of this work derives from the anthropologically influenced French school of
criticism. For example, on the Homeric agora, see R. Martin (1951); Ruze´ (1997); on
institutions in general, see Detienne (1996); Vernant (1983); Carlier (1984; 1996); on
the importance of law, see esp. Gernet (1955).
9 Is there a polis (Raaflaub 1997), or not a polis (Finley 2002)? Does the society
depicted reflect elitist conservatism (Morris 1986), or the beginnings of a class struggle
(Rose 1997)? On the utility of talking about ‘Homeric society’, see Raaflaub (1998)
(for); Snodgrass (1974) (against). Scodel (2002), 179 aptly warns against interpreting the
Homeric epics as ideological productions, at least in the sense that the plurality of voices
tells against conceiving the texts as having been produced with ‘propagandistic intent’.
10 According to Ho¨lkeskamp (1998), the Homeric assemblies sort out alternatives
(p. 36); the alternation between argument and counter-argument, constructs a rational,
consensus-oriented discourse (p. 39). Ho¨lkeskamp’s understanding of the ago¯n as the
method of opposing arguments, by which a rhetra—a binding word or covenant—is
forged by the text, seems too clean-cut and cut off from the drama of the narrative. (The
term ‘rhetra’ itself occurs only once in Homer, at Od. 14.393.) Lohmann (1970) is less
reductive in his analysis of how speeches, in the way that they are structured, assist the
weighing-up of arguments.
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regard to differences in structure or context.11 Therefore, we need to
read debate in context and pay careful attention to its differing
circumstances and form(s).
With this in mind, it will first be necessary to identify scenes
of assembly, a procedure which must be done through the language
itself.12 On the basis that the term agora (Homeric agoreˆ) defines the
location or event of an assembly of people,13 study of the Iliad will supply
four Achaean assemblies (in books 1, 2, 9, and 19), three assemblies of the
gods (in books 8, 20, and 24), and four Trojan assemblies (in books 2, 7, 8,
and 18);14 on the other hand, theOdyssey provides four Ithacan assemblies
(in books 2, 16, 20, and 24), two divine assemblies (in books 1 and 5), and
various assemblies as reported in Odysseus’ narrative (from books 9
to 12).15
11 Ruze´ (1997), 35, taking the assemblies en masse, concludes that the procedure is
already fixed. In his review Goldhill (1999c) complains that an approach in which ‘the
Homeric poems are raided for all indications of formal decision-making bodies’ runs the
risk of ‘failing to account for “pouvoir” or “deliberation” in action’ (pp. 151, 152, my
italics). For further discussion and bibliography, see Momigliano (1973); Taplin (1992),
49; Hammer (1997b), 1–4, nn. 1–18; (2002), 19–26; Haubold (2000), 11, nn. 46, 47.
R. Martin (1951), 20 warns against treating the assemblies as ‘une source de documents
homoge`nes’.
12 Schofield (1986) discusses six particularly important assemblies and councils;
Hammer (2002), 230, n. 63 identifies sixteen scenes of shared decision-making. In her
table of Homeric assemblies Ruze´ (1997), 103–4 omits two of the Ithacan assemblies
(presumably because they are passed over so swiftly—see ch. 2, n. 70 below), but finds an
additional scene of assembly in Chryses’ appeal to the Atreidae. For the significant lack of
institutional apparatus in this example, see ch. 1, n. 5 below.
13 Benveniste (1969). Battlefield speeches are of a different order and, while impor-
tant instances of dissent do occur (such as when Sthenelaides answers Agamemnon’s
insults against Diomedes, Il. 4.404–10), they are less clearly related to a political frame-
work and, of course, do not seek to stimulate a debate. The question of the council
(bouleˆ ) is trickier, since, among the Achaeans at least, it appears to be intimately related
to, and yet quite distinct from, the assembly: in Iliad 2, for example, a council precedes
the assembly, whereas in Iliad 9 it succeeds it. Christensen (2007), ch. 3, esp. pp. 132–5,
argues that it is in the council where political language comes under particular scrutiny.
14 The Achaean assembly: Il. 1.54–395; 2.50–440; 9.10–78; 19.40–276. The assem-
bly of the gods: 8.2–40; 20.4–30; 24.33–119. The Trojan assembly: 2.788–808;
7.345–79; 8.489–542; 18.245–310. The term agora is also used in passing before
Thoas speaks (15.283–4) and occurs on Achilles’ shield (18.497–508).
15 The Ithacan assembly: Od. 2.6–257; 16.342–408; 20.240–7; 24.421–64. The
assembly of the gods: 1.26–95; 5.3–42. Odysseus’ assemblies: 9.171–7; 10.188–201;
12.319–24. There are also two assemblies narrated by Nestor (3.136–50) and Demo-
docus (8.503–13), and two more briefly represented during Odysseus’ time in Phaeacia
(8.5–46; 109–256).
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But, while isolating the term agora constitutes the important first
step, analysing a debate is quite another thing altogether. The occasion
of a debate is generally marked by various formulae, such as ‘x called y to
an assembly’ or ‘y was in an assembly’.16 Marked vocabulary of this kind
signifies a particular interpretative framework by means of which both
internal and external audiences can: (a) realize when an assembly is
going on; (b) compare it to other manifestations marked by this formula
(both intra-and inter-textually); and (c) assess its outcome in relation to
its particular narrative context. When an assembly happens, two distinct
groups and the relationship between them are mapped out: an indivi-
dual gathers together the people (laos). According to Johannes Haubold,
this relationship is one of dependency: the laos signify an undifferen-
tiated pre-political social mass who rely (in epic) upon a leader, ‘the
shepherd of the people’, for protection.17 Significantly, when addressing
the assembled body, individuals do not do so qua heroes:18 rather,
scenes of assembly investigate how the leaders relate to their group.19
On the other hand, the act of assembly constructs the ºÆ,. as a united
and cohesive group, in contrast to elsewhere in epic where they remain
largely silent.20 Convoking an assembly establishes a special arena, in
16 See e.g. the first instance in the Iliad: !fi B '*Œ$!fi Å '0 Iª%æ+&'* ŒÆº1""Æ!% ºÆe&
3åØºº*2., Il. 1.54. Such phrases are not simply formulaic, but resonate throughout an
epic tradition. Cf. Scodel (2002), esp. 1–2.
17 Haubold (2000), 1–54. On the question of the definition of the Homeric hero,
one can point to Hesiod’s description of a race of ‘heroic men’ (¼&'æ*. læø*., Op.
158–60). According to Haubold, ‘the “hero” (læø.) among heroes participates in a
fundamentally amorphous social world’ and ‘above all points to “us”, the non-heroes,
outside his world’ (p. 7, his italics). That is to say, the Greek term ‘hero’ indicates a world
before ours, a world before social formation.
18 The few exceptions are notable. One is Agamemnon (Il. 2.102), who attempts to
use the assembly as a vehicle for self-promotion: see Haubold (2000), 55–8. See also the
first Ithacan assembly in the Odyssey: Ch. 2, n. 39 below.
19 That is not to say that the individual’s pursuit of glory is not an issue in the
assembly; the Homeric warrior not only must perform his deeds but also speak about
them—be ‘a speaker of words and a doer of deeds’, in Phoenix’s words (Il. 9.443). But in
their capacity as heroes, the characters enjoy a different (even destructive) relationship
with the laos, in the Iliad at least. Haubold (2000), 55–9 shows how the bond between
leader and laos breaks down because Agamemnon addresses the group as heroes: with
each man acting according to his own aspirations, they rush to the ships.
20 Clearly the people do not play an active role in the assembly; the leaders dominate
the speaking arena and the group do not even possess the power of ratifying policy. So
Strasburger (1997), 50: ‘The assembly of the army in the Iliad and the peaceful assembly
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which the relationship between the leader and his people is examined,
questioned and forged.21
Equally, however, the absence of either a coherent polis structure or
even a uniform presentation of assemblies is striking.22 Therefore, we
should pay attention to the performativity of the narrative: or, to put
that another way, the task of examining debate should be informed by
the audience’s experience of it as a process. Analysing the assembly in
this way has the advantage over previous studies that seek to crystallize
debate by compiling lists of attributes, since it approaches debate
dynamically, with due regard to variation over the course of the poems.
The relevance of a narrative’s performativity for thinking about
debate may be exemplified by a brief survey of the scholarly discussion
of the strife between Agamemnon and Achilles. While Walter Donlan
and Ian Morris have argued that Agamemnon’s authority is first threa-
tened then confirmed by Achilles’ challenge,23 Peter Rose and Dean
Hammer have suggested that Agamemnon’s leadership is far less easy to
of the people in the Odyssey are mute assemblies, in which the crowd receives announce-
ments and instructions’ (my italics). But the reactions of the group are important, as
Hammer (1999), 337 suggests: ‘The people, through the assembly, do not vote nor do
they make binding decisions. But neither are they compliant, inert, absent, or silenced.
We see decisions “enacted” in a public space.’ Cf. Hammer (2002), 44–8. R. Martin
(1951), 20 summarizes the competing views of the assembly as showing either ‘la toute-
puissance du roi’ or, on the contrary, ‘une puissance populaire’. Carlier (1984), 183–4
argues for the importance of the assembly in the Homeric poems, which must have
reflected a deep-seated reality.
21 The assembly ‘opens a space in which the joint efforts of shepherd and group are
co-ordinated with the aim of ensuring the success of social life’: Haubold (2000), 35;
Ho¨lkeskamp (1998), 33 identifies the agora as centre of the ordered world and place of
common action. Once the agora is dissolved and the laoi disperse, the speaking agent
returns to acting as an individual: at Il. 19.303–8, cf. 276–7, in spite of the Achaean
elders urging him to eat, Achilles refuses in mourning for his friend; cf. 1.306–7;
9.79–88.
22 See Hammer (2002), 20–6 for a critique of the scholarship that views the Homeric
epics as pre-political. The fact that the assembly is not represented uniformly helps
account for the scholarly disagreement over whether or not the Iliad presents a pre-
political, political or even proto-political society, or whether indeed any coherent picture
of society can be isolated and described. Hammer goes on to emphasize politics as
performance, but sees this as a separate activity from the assembly: ‘the political field is
not defined by institutional and territorial boundaries but rather is constituted by groups
who are engaged in political activity’ (p. 26).
23 Donlan (1979) usefully raises questions about who has authority and how it is
acquired but comes down on the side of Agamemnon. Morris (1986) reads debate in the
light of an Iliad that is sensitive to elite reactions against a growing demotic consciousness.
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put back together again because of the way the narrative unwinds.24 For
Hammer, the Iliad presents not only a functioning social system, but a
system in which we can see ‘competing values and orientations’. As a
result, interpreting the Iliad is ‘not premised on the maintenance of
a static, monolithic social order but . . . contains within it traces of
conflict and dissent that, in the end, remain unresolved’.25 Rose also
favours a dynamic, ‘relational’ model to describe the internal struggle of
the ruling class; yet more suggestive still are the terms with which he
counters Morris’ criticism: ‘Morris seems to envision a short-circuited
process of artistic production in which the consciousness of the main
target audience, the de¯mos, contributes no relevant feedback to the
generation of the text.’26 Whether or not the (or even a) de¯mos was
really the ‘main target audience’ is a moot point; but the role of the
poem’s audience is an important aspect to take into consideration.27
Rose’s emphasis on feedback identifies the audience as equally impor-
tant to the generation of the text. Developing Giddens’ notion of
structuration outlined above, this section will argue that it is not just
the characters but the audience of the poem who experience ‘traces of
conflict and dissent’ in the context of the assembly. At one level the
textual structures help shape an agonistic response to these events; but,
simultaneously, the varying responses to each of these crises involve the
audience in realizing the assembly as an institution that supports the
challenging of authority and accommodates differences of opinion.
The idea that dissent in the assembly is enacted and has its potential
as a forum for managing dissent realized over the course of the Iliadmay
help get away from the notion that the Homeric poems, in some trivial
sense, presuppose a socio-political framework or—a more sophisticated
version of the same approach—challenge or question such a framework.
24 See esp. Hammer (2002), 82–92, 129–32. So too Taplin (1992), 6–7: ‘Issues . . .
are open for dispute, both by characters within the poem, and by the audience outside. It
is, indeed, vital to the quality of the poem that such matters are not closed.’ For Taplin,
this makes the Iliad a ‘highly political poem’, p. 7 (his italics on both occasions). See also
Osborne (1996), 150–5.
25 Hammer (1997a), 341.
26 Rose (1997), 167.
27 Scodel (2002), 182 argues that, by creating a shared past, the Homeric poems
foster a sense of inclusiveness amongst their listeners; cf. Graziosi (2002), 171–80,
253–5. For the idea of the Iliad presenting a shared past, see Ford (1992), 6, 18; Scodel
(2002), 88. For the notion that a text may be understood as actively constructing an
audience, see Prologue, ‘Laying down’, above.
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This leads me to consider one last methodological approach, which
regards the Homeric poems act as foundational narratives. Building on
the idea of the resonant patterns of traditional formulae, Barbara
Graziosi and Johannes Haubold have outlined how the Homeric and
Hesiodic poems belong to, and help form, an epic cosmos.28 They
explain:
[I]ndividual hexameter texts tend to sketch the overall history of the cosmos as
well as placing themselves at a particular point within it. This is perhaps most
obvious in the Hesiodic Works and Days, which incorporates a full account of
past history from the golden age to the present. In a similar vein, the Theogony
can be read as a complete account of the world, which ends with the present,
that is, with a stable Olympian hierarchy under the rule of Zeus . . . Similarly,
the Iliad and Odyssey describe developments which, conceptually, if not actu-
ally, lead us from the distant past to the present day.29
Conceiving of the Homeric poems as somehow mapping out the history
of the world can make sense of the inconsistencies in the ways in which
debate is represented, as well as taking on board the idea mooted above
regarding the narrative’s performativity. The subsequent chapters will
present an Iliad which brings dissent within the boundaries of the
assembly over the course of its narrative, and an Odyssey which chal-
lenges the capacity of the assembly to manage dissent properly. My
analysis of debate in terms of dissent and authority, then, has implica-
tions for understanding the competing narrative strategies of the two
Homeric epics, such as that outlined at the beginning of this section.
Chapter 1 explores debate in the Iliad in four parts. The first section
sets out Achilles’ challenge to Agamemnon’s authority in the assembly
that opens the epic, a challenge that precipitates the even greater crisis in
the Achaean community of Achilles’ withdrawal. The second section
takes up the story by analysing the two subsequent Achaean assemblies
of books 2 and 9, which are key not only for charting a process of
dissenting without Achilles, but also for exploring the boundaries
of debate, such as who can dissent, who cannot, how does one do it
properly, and so on. The third section tests my conclusions—that
28 See ‘Resonant Patterns’: Graziosi and Haubold (2005), 63–149.
29 Ibid. 139, 140. An important division remains, however, between the world of epic
narrative and the world of the audience. Cf. Clay (1989).
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dissent becomes valorized within the Achaean community—by consid-
ering the two other groups who hold assemblies, the Trojans and the
gods: while the Trojan assembly shows the value of the contest of voices
in the Achaean assembly, scenes of assembly among the gods similarly
chart a gradual institutionalization of dissent under, however, Zeus’
unquestioned governance. Section 4 examines the less closely studied
final assembly of book 19, when Achilles returns to the fray: by con-
tinuing to resist attempts at control, he turns the debate onto the utility
of debate itself and the achievement of the Iliad ’s narrative strategy
in subjecting its audience(s) to the process of founding a political
community.
Chapter 2 argues that the Odyssey takes a very different approach to
debate in line with its own narrative dynamics that privilege storytelling
andOdysseus’ return to his home and family.Whereas the consequences
of Achilles’ establishment of an assembly reverberate through the Iliad,
the institution of the assembly plays a far less prominent role in the
Odyssey; far more important to the success of this narrative than the
hero’s dissent is his deceit. The first section analyses the two assemblies
that take place on Ithaca: it will be argued that the assembly of book 2
does little more than draw up the battle-lines between the friends and
enemies of the house of Odysseus, the consequences of which are
unpacked in the final assembly scene of book 24, when the suitors’
relatives ignore clear warnings against challenging Odysseus, and go
off to their deaths. Section 2 confronts the issue of dissent as it is
represented in character narration, particularly when Odysseus himself
takes control of the telling of his tale: by dissenting from their comman-
der, Odysseus’ companions bring destruction upon themselves. Section
three examines the end-game of book 22, when the suitors see their
symposium turn into an Iliadic battleground: it brings to light the way in
which the Odyssey makes use of Iliadic scenes of representing contest in
order to marginalize and ultimately suppress the dissenting voices of the
suitors. The final section considers the scenes of divine assembly in
the epic: by virtue of their very formality and overt management of the
narrative they emphasize the Odyssey’s control over debate.30
30 The concern of this chapter will not be to deny ‘dialogism’ to the Odyssey; rather, it
will be to demonstrate that the Odyssey makes its audience/reader fully aware of the ways
in which the contest is loaded.
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1
Challenging authority in the assemblies
of the Iliad
1. STRIFE IN THE ACHAEAN ASSEMBLY (ILIAD 1)
Achilles calls an assembly
The Iliad begins in strife. After the muse is instructed to sing ‘from that
time when Agamemnon lord of men and godlike Achilles stood in strife
against each other’ (K5 %y 'c !a )æH!Æ 'ØÆ"!+!Å& Kæ/"Æ&!* j 3!æ*6'Å.
!* ¼&Æ5 I&'æH& ŒÆd 'E%. 3åØºº*2., Il. 1.6–7), the narrator brings on
stage1 Chryses,2 whose speech propels the Iliad into a narrative of
political, as well as martial, conflict (1.22–4):
7&Ł0 ¼ºº%Ø #b& )$&!*. K)*ıç+#Å"Æ& 3åÆØ%d
ÆN'*E"ŁÆ/ Ł0 ƒ*æBÆ ŒÆd IªºÆa '1åŁÆØ ¼)%Ø&Æ·
Iºº0 %PŒ 3!æ*6'fi Å 3ªÆ#1#&%&Ø l&'Æ&* Łı#fiH . . .
Then all the other Achaeans shouted assent to respect the priest and accept the
glorious ransom; but it was not pleasing to the heart of Agamemnon, son of
Atreus . . .
While the Achaeans acclaim Chryses’ speech en masse, Agamemnon,
taking the appeal as a personal affront to his authority, rounds on the
priest and sends him scurrying away in fear.3 His assertion of a ‘mighty
1 Aristotle uses the theatrical term *N"$ª*Ø to describe Homer’s narrative technique:
Arist. Po. 146010.
2 Redfield (1994), 94 observes the importance of Chryses to the tone of the Iliad ’s
narrative. On this scene in general, see: Griffin and Hammond (1998); Scodel (2002),
65–89, 99–114.
3 Griffin and Hammond (1998), 72 show how Agamemnon makes his assertion of
authority personal by the emphatic use of the first-person pronoun. It was suggested by
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word’ (ŒæÆ!*æe. #FŁ%., 1.25), however, emphatically does not stand as
the final word: Apollo’s swift and silent answer to his priest’s prayers
obstructs the kingly manifestation of power through language with a
plague on all their houses (1.44–52); in response, Achilles calls the
people to assembly (1.54) and asks whoever has knowledge that may
benefit the community to speak up.4
The community in crisis sets the stage for the first assembly;5 and the
community is in crisis because of the king’s wilful assertion of authority.
From the beginning, therefore, the assembly dramatizes the relationship
between speech and power. In effect, it is what debate is all about.
The problem of debate is immediately raised by the figure who, by
virtue of knowing past, future and present (1.70) and speaking ‘with
good intention’ (K€ıçæ%&1ø&, 1.73), ought to be able to benefit the
community—Calchas, the seer. Invited to speak out by Achilles, Calchas
initially refrains from doing so (1.74–80):
‘t 3åØº*F, Œ1º*Æ/ #*, ˜ØU ç/º*, #ıŁ+"Æ"ŁÆØ
#B&Ø& 3),ººø&%. 9ŒÆ!Å:*º1!Æ% ¼&ÆŒ!%.·
!%Øªaæ Kªg& Kæ1ø· "f 'b "2&Ł*% ŒÆ/ #%Ø Z#%""%&
q #1& #%Ø )æ,çæø& 7)*"Ø& ŒÆd å*æ"d& Iæ+5*Ø&·
Ruth Scodel (in a paper entitled ‘Boundless Ransom’, presented in Hilary Term, Oxford
2007) that Agamemnon’s blunt response may be explained by the fact that his answer
had been pre-empted by the group reaction. This explanation does not quite let
Agamemnon off the hook, however, since as ‘lord of men’ (¼&Æ5 I&'æH&, Il. 1.7) he
should be looking out for the group’s best interests: Haubold (2000), 52–68.
4 ‘Come, let us ask seer or priest . . .who could tell us why Phoebus Apollo has been so
angered’ (‘Iºº 0 ¼ª* '+ !Ø&Æ #$&!Ø& Kæ*/%#*& j ƒ*æBÆ, . . . j ‹. Œ 0 *Y)%Ø ‹ !Ø !,""%&
Kå-"Æ!% ;%E:%. 3),ººø&’, Il. 1.62, 64). The herald of the Athenian assembly will
later open proceedings with a similar open invitation: ‘Who wishes to speak?’ (</.
Iª%æ*2*Ø& :%2º*!ÆØ;): Dem. 18.170; cf. Ar. Ach. 45, with the note by Sommerstein
(1980), 160. Haubold (2000), 175 suggests that, while ‘the herald of epic carries in
himself the seed of institutional progress’, epic represents the people ‘in unresolved
crisis’: at Athens, on the other hand, the herald’s direct address to the people ‘becomes
the all-pervading token of institutional stability in the polis’. This chapter aims to show
the institutional progress made over the course of the narrative to the extent that the Iliad
may be considered foundational for the kind of institutional security Athens enjoys.
5 There is some doubt whether Chryses’ supplication takes place in an ‘assembly’.
Ruze´ (1997), 103–4 includes it in her list of assemblies, though the term Iª%æ+ is not
used. By swiftly taking us to a crisis point, the narrator’s description has a clear dramatic
function. But the omission of any indication of the assembly’s institutional frame may
have significance beyond that. (How is it that Agamemnon can send Chryses away? What
might the lack of formal trappings imply?) See sec. 1 below.
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q ªaæ O6%#ÆØ ¼&'æÆ å%ºø"1#*&, n. #1ªÆ )$&!ø&
3æª*/ø& ŒæÆ!1*Ø ŒÆ/ %ƒ )*/Ł%&!ÆØ 3åÆØ%/·
Œæ*/""ø& ªaæ :Æ"Øº*f. ‹!* å-"*!ÆØ I&'æd å1æÅØ·’
‘Achilles, dear to Zeus, you urge me to pronounce on the anger of Apollo the
Lord who strikes from afar. I shall indeed peak. But you agree and swear to me
willingly to protect me with words and hands. For I think a man will get angry,
who rules greatly over the Achaeans and they obey him. For a king is stronger,
when he is angry with a lesser man.’
Calchas fears the man ‘who exercises power greatly over all’, ‘him whom
the Achaeans obey’. With the middle voice of )*/Łø suggestively play-
ing on an ambiguity over whether the Achaeans are persuaded by or
obey Agamemnon,6 Calchas’ speech threatens to strike right at the heart
of Agamemnon’s leadership and authority in general: do the commu-
nity sanction his rule, on account of merit, or are they cowed by the
power associated with him by virtue of the numerical superiority of his
forces?7 Calchas leaves us in no doubt of his view: he needs Achilles’
protection to speak up on account of the king’s greater strength and his
own lesser standing. The opening gesture of this assembly sets power
against speaking freely, obedience against persuasion. The possibility of
speaking freely on behalf of the community is threatened by presence of
the king.
Significantly, this opening assembly brings to the fore Agamemnon’s
obsession with power as he attempts to manage its outcome. On the
three occasions when a speaker enters the debate—Calchas, Achilles and
Nestor respectively—Agamemnon grudgingly accepts their point, but
attempts even so to retain some semblance of control. Thus, he accepts
Calchas’ statement that he must return Chryseis, but immediately
demands another woman in recompense (1.116–19); in response to
Achilles’ initial outburst, he articulates the formal procedure for return-
ing Chryseis, but names and shames prominent individuals over whom
6 Hammer (1997b) traces the narrative’s examination of Agamemnon’s leadership
using Achilles’ question: ‘How shall any of the Achaeans readily obey you?’ (Il. 1.150).
Cf. Hammer (2002), 82–92.
7 Among Agamemnon’s detractors may be counted Taplin (1990; 1992); Alvis
(1995), 21; Rose (1997); Hammer (1997b ; 2002). His defenders include Morris
(1986); McGlew (1989). The scholia are a good example of how later readers in a
different institutional context have tried to salvage Agamemnon’s status and reputation,
on whom see O. Murray (1965).
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he can—and will—exert his power (1.137–9); lastly, he pays lip-service
to Nestor’s plea for compromise, before launching on a tirade against
his rival. This last example is particularly revealing of Agamemnon’s loss
of control. His final attempt to reassert his leadership over the proceed-
ings—‘But this man is minded to be above all ()$&!ø&); over all
()$&!ø&) he wishes to hold sway and to be king over all ()$&!*""Ø)
and to instruct all ()A"Ø)’ (1.287–91)—is betrayed by his insistent and
obsessive repetition of ‘all’. Indeed, he loses his grip entirely as he is
interrupted—a phenomenon unique in Homeric epic8—and Achilles
gets in the last word. Even as Agamemnon grabs at power, authority is
wrested from his grasp.
It is noteworthy too that Agamemnon spectacularly fails to silence
opposition. His demand for recompense from the group (º*2""*!* ªaæ
!, ª* )$&!*., 1.120) opens up another site of contention: Achilles
lambastes him for being the ‘most profit-loving of all’ (çØº%Œ!*Æ&-!Æ!*
)$&!ø&, 1.122). His pulling of rank over Achilles (1.146) provokes the
equally wilful response: fine, I’ll go home (1.169–71). Most revealing of
all is his initial entry into the debate (1.106–14):
‘#$&!Ø ŒÆŒH&, %P )- )%!1 #%Ø !e Œæ+ªı%& *r)Æ.·
ÆN*/ !%Ø !a Œ$Œ 0 K"!d ç/ºÆ çæ*"d #Æ&!*2*"ŁÆØ,
K"Łºe& '0 %h!* !/ )ø *r)Æ. 7)%. %h!0 K!1º*""Æ.·
ŒÆd &F& K& ˜Æ&Æ%E"Ø Ł*%)æ%)1ø& Iª%æ*2*Ø.
‰. 'c !%F'0 =&*Œ$ "çØ& 9ŒÅ:,º%. ¼ºª*Æ !*2å*Ø,
%o&*Œ 0 Kªg Œ%2æÅ. >æı"Å6'%. Iªº$ 0 ¼)%Ø&Æ
%PŒ 7Ł*º%& '15Æ"ŁÆØ, K)*d )%ºf :%2º%#ÆØ ÆP!c&
%YŒ%Ø 7å*Ø&. ŒÆd ª$æ ÞÆ ˚ºı!ÆØ#&+"!æÅ. )æ%:1:%ıºÆ,
Œ%ıæØ'/Å. Iº,å%ı . . . ’
‘Seer of evil, never yet have you said to me something agreeable, but always evil
things are dear to your heart to prophesy; nothing good have you spoken or
accomplished. And now among the Danaans you announce your divination
that the far-shooter afflicts them with pains on account of the fact that I was not
willing to accept the shining ransom for the girl Chryseis, since I really wanted
to have her at home. And, let me tell you, I think more of her than Clytemnes-
tra my wedded wife . . . ’
8 M. Edwards (1991), 244. See n. 153 below, with accompanying text.
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Purely as a response to the revelation of the plague’s origin, the vitriol
Agamemnon pours on the seer seems wildly disproportionate. One may
account for Agamemnon’s abuse of Calchas as ‘seer of evil’ by pointing
to Aulis when, as other traditions tell, Agamemnon had sacrificed his
daughter in order to launch the ships in accordance with Calchas’
prophecy.9 One recent critic has cast doubt on the assumption that
this event is being referred to, on the basis that ‘the tradition’ must
always be established in the process of performance.10 Nevertheless,
such caution with regard to the possibilities of resonance appears
unwarranted so far as this episode is concerned, especially when the
issue here is precisely Agamemnon’s lack of control.11 By having him not
only label Calchas as the seer who has ‘always’ prophesied him evil (such
as having to sacrifice his daughter), but even rank his concubine above
his wife Clytemnestra (as he will when he returns home with Cassan-
dra), the Iliad invites its audience to reflect on events when Agamem-
non’s authority and life are at stake. Resonant echoes of the wider
tradition ominously signal his loss of command over the telling of the
tale. Moreover, the relevance of those echoes to the present tale must be
assessed by each and every spectator, a process which implicates the
audience in the resistance movement. Dissent from Agamemnon is
underscored by the narrative, which threatens to fracture and unwind
9 See Kullmann (1960), 198–9, 267–8; Dowden (1989), 9–19; Taplin (1992), 86;
Burgess (2001), 144, 150. Burgess notes that ‘there is a strong variant tradition in which
the daughter of Agamemnon is rescued from sacrifice (e.g. Cypria [Proclus], Hesiodic
Catalogue of Women fr. 23a M–W), which should not necessarily be regarded as
secondary’ (p. 246, n. 63). He emphasizes that the fundamental outlines of the Trojan
War story, including Aulis, ‘were not cobbled together late in the day’ (p. 144). The
temporal vagueness of Agamemnon’s attack on the seer (‘never’, ‘always’) may well
suggest that the Iliad is playing off other accounts.
10 The tradition is not simply a collection of reified reminiscences: Scodel (2002), esp.
1–41.
11 Referring to this example, Ruth Scodel (ibid. 106) comments: ‘The poet probably
had the sacrifice in mind as he generated angry words for Agamemnon, but the audience
need not follow the allusion.’ Perhaps not, but the invitation is there: see also Dowden
(1996), 58; Pulleyn (2000), 158. Nor is it necessary to follow Scodel’s assertion that the
audience ‘should not’ remember the story since that would create too much sympathy for
Agamemnon; sympathy is not difficult to withhold from Agamemnon, given his perso-
nal abuse of the seer and his appetite for the slave girl. In this context one might even
suspect that Clytemnestra had a point.
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in directions contrary to what the ‘king who exercises power greatly over
all’ had intended.12
The conditions for challenging authority had been laid down from
the beginning of the episode. After Apollo’s darts of plague had rained
down on the army for nine days, ‘on the tenth’, the narrator relates,
‘Achilles called the people to assembly; for the white-armed goddess
Hera put it into his mind (!fi B '*Œ$!fi Å '0 Iª%æ+&'* ŒÆº1""Æ!% ºÆe&
3åØºº*2.· j !fiH ªaæ K)d çæ*"d ŁBŒ* Ł*a º*ıŒ-º*&%. @ ´˙ æÅ, 1.54–5).
Three critical issues may be noted initially. First, Hera’s involvement:
divine intervention immediately marks this event as out of the ordinary.
Second, her turn to Achilles: this is somewhat surprising given the fact
that Agamemnon is ‘lord of men’ (¼&Æ5 I&'æH&, 1.7)—and, after all, his
actions had precipitated the crisis in the first place. Third, the establish-
ment of an assembly: apparently this represents the best means of
placating Apollo’s wrath. All three issues are hardly intuitive and, as a
result, render this event as significant. The challenge to authority is laid
down in the very act of assembly.
Moreover, the first assembly, as noted above, is convened for the
benefit of the community as a way of finding relief for their suffering.13
Achilles plays an instrumental role in making sure that this is the case.
When the seer Calchas explains to the assembly that he knows what is
wrong but fears saying it, it is Achilles who speaks up. He asks Calchas
to speak what he knows (‘ŁÆæ"+"Æ. #$ºÆ *N)b Ł*%)æ,)Ø%& ‹ !Ø %r"ŁÆ’,
1.85), and gives the reassurance that not one of the Danaans will
manhandle the seer while he—Achilles—lives, not even if Agamemnon
himself is angered (‘%h !Ø. K#*F ÇH&!%. ŒÆd K)d åŁ%&d '*æŒ%#1&%Ø% j "%d
Œ%/ºfi Å. )Ææa &Åı"d :Ææ*/Æ. å*EæÆ. K)%/"*Ø j "ı#)$&!ø& ˜Æ&ÆH&, %P'0
j& 3ªÆ#1#&%&Æ *Y)fi Å.’, 1.88–90).14 By these words Achilles sponsors
the assembly as the place where opinions should be freely given and
freely heard, even if those views directly defy the authority of the king.
Furthermore, in his resistance to Agamemnon’s attempts to pull rank,
Achilles couches his argument in terms that replay his concern for the
12 Agamemnon’s diametrically opposed response to the group on the issue of Chryses’
supplication has anticipated, and helped to structure, the dynamics of dissent in this first
episode of debate.
13 This point is emphasized by Taplin (1992), 63.
14 The narrator brings out the efficacy of Achilles’ words: Calchas ‘then indeed took
courage’ (ŒÆ/ !,!* 'c Ł$æ"Å"*, Il. 1.92).
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community at large15 and for his effort to be recognized.16 Yet, ulti-
mately he possesses the capacity to stand up to Agamemnon because of
his unique status among men.17 Whereas the proem defines Agamem-
non in terms of his social relationships, the epithet identifying
Achilles—‘divine-like’—hints at his divine origins (3!æ*6'Å. !* ¼&Æ5
I&'æH& ŒÆd 'E%. 3åØºº*2., 1.7). Indeed, his speech is endowed with a
special quasi-divine force.18
It is important to bear in mind both the social contract that Achilles
articulates and enforces and the singularity of his status when interpret-
ing this assembly.19 For, by the time it is broken up, Achilles has
asserted his individual will over all by cursing the community he had
15 ‘How will the great-hearted Achaeans give you a prize? We do not know I think of
any common goods lying around, but what we seized from cities, all has been distributed.
And it is not becoming for the people to call back things once given’ (‘)H. ª$æ !%Ø
'-"%ı"Ø ª1æÆ. #*ª$Łı#%Ø 3åÆØ%/ ; j %P'1 !/ )%ı Y'#*& 5ı&+œÆ Œ*/#*&Æ )%ººa· j Iººa !a
#b& )%º/ø& K5*)æ$Ł%#*&, !a '1'Æ"!ÆØ, j ºÆ%f. '0 %PŒ K)1%ØŒ* )Æº/ºº%ªÆ !ÆF!0
K)Æª*/æ*Ø&’, Il. 1.123–6). Gernet (1955), 15 points out how Achilles connects his
personal ‘prize’ (ª1æÆ.) to the ‘what lay in common’ (5ı&+œÆ Œ*/#*&Æ, 1.124); cf. Alvis
(1995), 21.
16 Il. 1.161–8. D. Wilson (2002), 54–5 comments: ‘Achilleus claims that the quarrel
originates in a long-standing conflict between Agamemnon’s privileged position and the
agonistic timeˆ-based status system. The opposition is thus not presented as one between
traditional kingship and a leading warrior, though Nestor construes it as such . . . It arises
instead from a contradiction in a social organization that contains a fixed system, in
which Agamemnon can legitimate his preeminence, and a fluid, timeˆ-based system in
which Achilleus can legitimately claim to be the best of the Achaians.’ This fluid and
dynamic conception of society extends to Iliad ’s depiction of political activity within the
Achaean assembly, as we shall see.
17 Donlan (1979), 58 makes the case that Achilles’ ‘leadership authority’ is grounded
in his relationship to the group, which rather overlooks Achilles’ prayer for their
destruction (Il. 1.239–44).
18 His language is full of superlatives, he uses multiple numbers to emphasize his
argument, he coins neologisms: Griffin (1986); R. P. Martin (1989), 147–9, 171, 185;
Clark (1992). Most scholarship on Achilles’ language focuses on his response to Odys-
seus in the Embassy: see Parry (1989), 1–7, with the responses by Reeve (1973) and
Lynn-George (1988), 50–152. Cf. Griffin (1986).
19 Farenga (2006), 68–108 analyses ‘the moral dimensions of [Achilles’] individual
autonomy in terms of citizenship’s political and communicative (linguistic) components’
(p. 69). But, for the most part, Farenga studies Achilles’ speech acts outside the institu-
tional framework, since—according to Farenga—in the assembly he fails to make his
case. See also Hammer (1997a), who discusses Achilles as an outsider (#*!Æ&$"!Å.), a
position that ‘gives him (at least in his mind) a privileged perspective of the artifice of
Achaian society’ (p. 353). He regards Achilles’ dissent as showing not so much an ‘anti-
cultural’ strain as ‘the value of non-coerciveness’ (355); cf. Hammer (2002), 93–113 on
Achilles’ self-sufficiency. This present study both suggests that Achilles’ dissent is very
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claimed to support (1.239–44). Furthermore, he promptly withdraws
unilaterally from the coalition and retreats to his tent in a move that
dominates the poem thematically and structurally. Lastly, the way in
which the narrator frames the assembly underscores what has been at
stake in it: Achilles and Agamemnon ‘stood apart fighting with violent
words’ (S. !- ª0 I&!Ø:/%Ø"Ø #Æå*""Æ#1&ø K)1*""Ø& j I&"!+!Å&, 1.304–
5).20 It appears, then, that this first assembly has simply replaced one
crisis with another. Strife (7æØ.) has not been kept within the institution;
fighting (with words) has broken out among the Achaean community.
As Dean Hammer comments in reference to this opening assembly, ‘it is
precisely the absence of formalised political institutions that makes any
mediation between Agamemnon and Achilles so difficult’.21 In order to
discover just how dissent has gone wrong—even when it had been
shown to be absolutely necessary and desirable—it will be necessary to
consider the two mediations that do occur in the assembly.
And there came Athena
The one Achaean who tries to intercede in the struggle of words is
described in glowing terms by the narrator: Nestor is the ‘clear-voiced
orator’ (ºØªf. Iª%æÅ!+., 1.248), ‘from whose tongue flowed speech
sweeter than honey’ (!%F ŒÆd I)e ªº-""Å. #1ºØ!%. ªºıŒ/ø& Þ1*& ÆP'+,
1.249), who had seen ‘two generations of men’ pass ('2% ª*&*Æd
#*æ,)ø& I&Łæ-)ø&, 1.250).22 The speech that flows forth from his
mouth justifies such a description: he redirects conflict towards its
appropriate ends—their war against the Trojans (1.255–8); he cites a
much cultural (in a context that—initially at least—struggles to make use of it), and will
take up what happens to the Achaean assembly in Achilles’ absence.
20 The next time the assembly is described is as the place where ‘men win glory’
(Iª%æc Œı'Ø$&*ØæÆ, Il. 1.490); Œı'Ø$&*ØæÆ otherwise appears only with #$åÅ (Il. 4.225,
6.124, 7.113, 8.448, 12.325, 13.270, 14.155, 24.391). Cramer (1976), 300 calls
the single use either ‘tendentious’ or else ‘creative incompetence’.
21 Hammer (1997b), 3.
22 The description echoes the portrait of the good king at Hesiod, Th. 82–90, 96–7.
This might well be significant for thinking about Nestor’s relationship to the events of
the Iliad and its progressive institutionalization of dissent: Nestor belongs to a (Theo-
gonic) past, when kingly privileges were still intact. See n. 92 below. Christensen (2007),
41–93 discusses the importance of Nestor in scenes of deliberation, and compares him to
Hesiod’s good king at pp. 56–70. Cf. R. P. Martin (2000).
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previous example of his negotiating skills to underline his authority as a
mediator (1.259–74); he accords each man his due by drawing a subtle
distinction between Achilles as ŒÆæ!*æ,. (1.280) and Agamemnon as
ç1æ!*æ%. (1.281).23 The undecidability of these terms accommodates
different readings,24 which thereby create the conditions in which
negotiation may take place.
Yet, for all his persuasiveness, the speech fails; neither figure shows
any willingness to compromise and the assembly abruptly breaks up
with the community left in crisis. This is an important point. Nestor’s
intervention has shown the desirability of mediation; but the fact that it
fails defers providing any answer to the community’s woes. Both aspects
combine to implicate the poem’s audience in the debate over mediation;
they, like Nestor, are left to pick up the skeptron and work out a position
in between those staked out on either side. The fact that the skeptron—
the symbol of the right to speak in public25—lies on the ground,
moreover, suggests that Nestor’s intervention comes too late.26 Divine
intervention has already moved the conflict on and beyond.
Arguably the crisis-point of the assembly had arrived some hundred
lines earlier. After Agamemnon had dismissively goaded his rival to go
home, Achilles’ anger erupts (1.188–98):
23 Schofield (1986), 28–30 discusses the ‘euboulia’ of Nestor’s interventions. Of this
example, he writes: ‘Achilles and Agamemnon are invited to think not just of themselves
and their own honour (timeˆ), but of the other man’s view, and what his position or
situation entitles him to expect’ (p. 28, emphasis in the original).
24 Whether, for example, Nestor truly does give each man equal honour, or whether
he favours one over the other. After all, although Nestor speaks measuredly, he deploys
Agamemnon’s own description of himself as ç1æ!*æ%. (Il. 1.186) and Achilles as
ŒÆæ!*æ,. (1.178): Reinhardt (1961), 74, n. 15. See n. 92 with accompanying text
below. The narrator complicates matters still further by describing Achilles as ‘by far
the mightiest’ ()%ºf ç1æ!Æ!%., Il. 2.769) in the Catalogue of the Ships.
25 For the skeˆptron, see Reinhardt (1991), 159–60; Lynn-George (1988), 47–9;
Easterling (1989). Ruze´ (1997), 52 asserts that: ‘La parole qu’ils prononcent avec le
sceptre ne souffrira pas la contradiction ou alors le sceptre lui-meˆme sera mis en action
pour rappeler a` l’ordre l’outrecuidant.’ Along similar lines, Mondi (1980) argues that the
skeptron is the symbol of royal privilege. But see Detienne (1996), 95: he argues that
taking hold of the skeptron confers on the individual the right to speak. It is an
‘impersonal’ act, representing the sovereignty of the group. Cf. Gernet (1981), 188.
26 On the untimeliness of human intervention, see Lynn-George (1988), 163–4,
168–9, 172–3, 272–6.
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S. ç$!%· —Åº*6ø&Ø '0 ¼å%. ª1&*!0 , K& '1 %ƒ q!%æ
"!+Ł*""Ø& ºÆ"/%Ø"Ø 'Ø$&'ØåÆ #*æ#+æØ5*&,
j ‹ ª* ç$"ªÆ&%& O5f Kæı""$#*&%. )Ææa #Åæ%F
!%f. #b& I&Æ"!+"*Ø*&, › '0 3!æ*6'Å& K&Ææ/Ç%Ø,
q* å,º%& )Æ2"*Ø*& KæÅ!2"*Ø1 !* Łı#,&.
w%. › !ÆFŁ0 uæ#ÆØ&* ŒÆ!a çæ1&Æ ŒÆd ŒÆ!a Łı#,&,
=ºŒ*!% '0 KŒ Œ%º*%E% #1ªÆ 5/ç%., qºŁ* '0 3Ł+&Å
%PæÆ&,Ł*&· )æe ªaæ wŒ* Ł*a º*ıŒ-º*&%. @„æÅ,
¼#çø ›#H. Łı# fiH çØº1%ı"$ !* ŒÅ'%#1&Å !*·
"!B '0 Z)ØŁ*&, 5Æ&ŁB. 'b Œ,#Å. =º* —Åº*6ø&Æ
%Yø çÆØ&%#1&Å· !H& '0 ¼ººø& %h !Ø. ›æA!%·
So [Agamemnon] spoke. And Achilles became angry, and within his shaggy
breast his heart was divided in two, whether to draw his sharp sword from his
side, drive away all those who stood between them and kill the son of Atreus, or
check his anger and calm his spirit. While he was deciding in his mind and
spirit, and he was drawing his great sword from its sheath, Athena came from
the heavens. For the white-armed goddess Hera sent her, since she loved and
cared for both in her heart. Standing behind the son of Peleus, Athena grabbed
his blonde hair, appearing to him alone; no other saw her.
As Achilles reaches for his sword with the aim of bringing the debate to a
swift and decisive end (Agamemnon’s, he anticipates), Athena ap-
pears.27 As scholarship on this epiphany testifies, far from resolving
the crisis, her intervention challenges interpretation; if anything it
stresses human responsibility for making judgement.28 One suggestion,
made by Hartmut Erbse, has been that Athena is obliged to intervene
since none of the other kings could.29 At first sight this would seem to
overlook Nestor’s intervention which we have just discussed; but Erbse
is right in the sense that a point of no return has already, and precipi-
tously, been reached: Achilles is in the process of reaching for his sword.
A contest of words that leads to armed combat is not debate, however,
but flyting, the verbal sparring that prefigures physical duelling on the
27 M. Edwards (1987), 180–1 comments on the suddenness of her arrival; cf.
Reinhardt (1961), 68–73.
28 This is a favourite case for scholars wishing to comment on ‘Homeric’ man: Dodds
(1951), 14–15 sees Athena’s intervention as an outward projection of Achilles’ inner self;
Snell (1982), 30–4 denies Homeric man a sense of self; cf. Williams (1993), 21–31 for a
critique. I have learnt much about telling divine presence from Alex Stevens (2002).
29 Erbse (1986), 137–9.
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battlefield.30 There is at this point no human means for accommodating
Achilles’ dissent in the institution of assembly, regardless of how greatly
he had been initially motivated to speak on behalf of the community.
Athena’s intervention raises four issues fundamental to the rest of the
present enquiry. First, it marks a limit to dissent in the assembly. Her
hold on Achilles’ hair does not in any way suggest that his resistance to
Agamemnon is wrong,31 but nor does it legitimize the reaction of naked
force: the potential violence of an Achilles needs to be excluded as a
socially acceptable reaction in debate. Thus the narrative provides an
authorizing of, but equally a careful bounding to, dissent. By virtue of
Athena’s intervention, it may be concluded that dissent cannot, and
does not, equal violence.32
Second, that intervention identifies the agent who had convoked the
assembly, Achilles, as a problem in it. Athena compensates Achilles for
not drawing his sword with the possibility of greater licence in his verbal
assault.33 But it is precisely this licence that renders Nestor’s interven-
tion futile before the act. Similarly, when with his last words in the
assembly Achilles promises an immediate and demonstrative end to
contest,34 he has already sworn an oath which his mother, Thetis, will
30 For this assembly as a typical battlefield flyting exchange, see Parks (1986; 1990).
Cf. R. P. Martin (1989), 65–77. For an application of modern discourse analysis on the
debate between Agamemnon and Achilles, see Clark (1992). See also Cairns (1993b).
31 On the contrary, Achilles’ labelling of Agamemnon’s behaviour as hybris (Il. 1.203)
is endorsed by Athena (1.214). This kind of verbal collusion between a mortal and a
divinity is highly unusual, as the PCPS referee for Barker (2004c) remarked; cf. Griffin
(1986), 52. On the significance of hybris in this scene, see Farenga (2006), 70–2.
32 This important restriction on dissent nevertheless applies only internally with
respect to the Achaean assembly: there is no similar compulsion over the Achaeans to
stop fighting the Trojans. Far from it: the gods play a fundamental role in breaking the
oaths (at Il. 4.64–104), which had represented an attempt at conflict resolution. Eur-
ipides pushes to an extreme the notion that dissent can, and should be, kept within
limits: see Ch. 6 below.
33 Lynn-George (1988), 45–6. For Achilles’ dissent (after Athena’s intervention) as
blame, see Nagy (1979), 226. Agamemnon explicitly rules out the possibility that the
gods had granted Achilles the right to abuse him (O&*/'*Æ, Il. 1.291). But he is cut off in
mid-flow by Achilles’ angry response (()%:º+'Å&, Il. 1.292). Besides, Agamemnon is
wrong: Athena has granted Achilles permission to abuse the king (O&*/'Ø"%&, Il. 1.211). In
this way, while not manifesting itself as physical violence, Achilles’ dissent still exceeds
the bounds of the assembly by taking the form of abuse suggested by Athena.
34 ‘Try me so that these here may recognize who is best’ (‘)*/æÅ"ÆØ ¥ &Æ ª&-ø"Ø ŒÆd
%¥'*’, Il. 1.302).
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fulfil by going to Olympus to supplicate Zeus. In this way, Achilles’
challenge demonstratively exceeds the frame of this assembly.
From this perspective, the Achaean assembly does not appear to start
off as an institution that can easily accommodate dissent. It takes an
Achilles, by virtue of his unique status, to set up an assembly and then
support a voice in opposition to the recognized authority. The two
subsequent Achaean assemblies in Iliad 2 and 9 take the idea of dissent
further by exploring how it may be managed within the institutional
framework. But these assemblies occur, importantly, without Achilles:
having prepared the ground for supporting communal debate, he finds
himself excluded from it. Far from providing the answer, Achilles
becomes part of the problem with his assertion of individuality. This
first assembly opens a space into which the poem’s audience are invited
to enter and work out what they think about debate.
Lastly, Achilles’ unique relationship with the gods suggests a way of
looking at the Iliad in broader, more cosmic, terms. Athena appears at
the behest of Hera, who holds dear both Achilles and Agamemnon,35
just as before she had prompted Achilles to call an assembly because she
‘cared’ for the Danaans (Œ+'*!% ªaæ ˜Æ&ÆH&, 1.56). As we have just
noted, Athena in effect divorces dissent from violence, and instead
validates dissent as a mode of political interaction. On the other hand,
this is achieved here not through any pre-existent public arena—the
assembly fails—but rather through a personal bond of philia—a special
relationship, moreover, between a god and a mortal.36 Perhaps what is
wrong then with Achilles’ initial dissent is that its containment can be
guaranteed only at the level of personal relations, and not through the
public institution—yet. The Iliad ’s opening foray into the strife be-
tween Achilles and Agamemnon represents the beginnings of a political
community.
It is worth dwelling upon this idea for a moment. The first episode of
the poem culminates in the king’s rejection of Chryses’ appeal. That
he can do so, when so clearly out of line with the will of the people,
already shows the Iliad ’s interest in community relations; but it is also
striking that all formal indications of an institution are absent, though
35 ¼#çø ›#H. Łı# fiH çØº1%ı"$ !* ŒÅ'%#1&Å !* (Il. 1.209).
36 The Homeric narrator makes this clear: Athena appeared only to Achilles ; no one
else saw her (Il. 1.198).
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presumably some kind of an assembly must be taking place.37 When
Achilles calls an assembly, the protagonist of the Iliad lays the basis for
the Achaeans to discuss public concerns in the open in the vacuum
created by Agamemnon’s initial act.38 By regarding the assembly as in
the process of being established as a forum for accommodating dissent
for the salvation of the people helps explain why the issue of speech and
power is so central to it and why Achilles’ challenge is so problematic. In
turn, by their experience of these assemblies, the audience of the poem
gain a sense of managing dissent.
The opening assembly sets the stage for an exploration of dissent in
the rest of the epic. It is by no means clear, after the 7æØ. between
Agamemnon and Achilles, whether dissent is, or can be, institutional;
Achilles challenges the authority of Agamemnon on behalf of the
community for the good of the community, but ends up asserting his
uniqueness over it. In the two assembly scenes that follow, the Achaean
community respond by working through the possibilities for and the
limitations of debate that were set out in the prologue: who can dissent,
who cannot, and in what ways can you dissent properly?
2. MAKING DISSENT INSTITUTIONAL (ILIAD 2, 9)
By the time we see Achilles again, two other Achaean assemblies have
taken place forming differing kinds of responses to his challenge. In the
first, a necessary human limit is placed on dissent by the violent
suppression of a figure who is excluded from being able to speak by
37 So Ruze´ (1997), 103. The term Iª%æ+, however, is absent from the scene. See n. 5
above.
38 In Barker (2004c) I had argued that the Iliad represents this assembly as a first. The
argument sketched out here differs in that it suggests that the Iliad represents Achilles’
convocation of the assembly as a significant new usage (in terms of accommodating
dissent) of an institution already familiar to (an audience of) epic poetry. The bare
minimum use of formulae—‘Achilles calls an assembly’ (1.54) and ‘when they were
gathered all in one place together’ (1.57), which contrasts with three full lines of
formulae that introduce the next assembly (2.50–3)—reproduces the sense of novelty.
That this is not to say that the assembly has never been thought of or represented in this
way before now: rather that the Iliad presents itself as founding the assembly as a place in
which dissent may be, and certainly ought to be, accommodated. I thank Jon Hesk and
Chris Pelling for helping me articulate this point more clearly.
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virtue of his status. In the second, an Achilles-like figure takes up the
fight with Agamemnon, though, on this occasion, in a more construc-
tive way. Left at that, this would show the Iliad ’s interest in valorizing
dissent. The text goes further, however, by virtue of involving its
audience in the process of managing dissent.
The most shameful
Having plunged the Achaean camp into strife, the narrative soon
appears to get back on track for a tale of Troy’s sacking: the king
convokes a second assembly, a voice of opposition is silenced, and two
wise advisors prepare for the mustering of the troops before battle
(finally) commences.39 Yet, how that set of circumstances is arrived at
is rather more complex.40 This section analyses Agamemnon’s ongoing
efforts to reaffirm his authority and the ongoing challenge he faces,
particularly from Thersites. It will show that this assembly scene may be
understood as continuing to explore the boundaries of debate and to
implicate the audience of the poem more explicitly in setting those
boundaries for themselves.
Agamemnon, the shepherd of the people, formally convokes the
second assembly. In some detail the narrative describes the people
gathering. Under such institutional management, expectations are
raised of a rousing speech before battle.41 The heralds heralded, the
people gather really swiftly, but first . . .—the elaborate portrayal of
39 For the assembly of book 2 as restoring order and reasserting the kings’ dominance,
see Donlan (1979), 60–1; Lincoln (1994), 34. The line of critics queuing up to condemn
Thersites is well documented in Rankin (1972) and Rose (1988). Scodel (2002), 209
discusses how Odysseus and Nestor ‘use strikingly inclusive language’ to reunify the
group in preparation for the Catalogue of the Ships.
40 For problems in book 2 in general, see Reinhardt (1991), 153–69.
41 Il. 2.50–2: ÆP!aæ › ŒÅæ2Œ*""Ø ºØªıçŁ,ªª%Ø"Ø Œ1º*ı"* j ŒÅæ2""*Ø& Iª%æ+&'* Œ$æÅ
Œ%#,ø&!Æ. 3åÆØ%2.· j %ƒ #b& KŒ+æı""%&, !%d '0 Mª*/æ%&!% #$º 0 tŒÆ. ‘But Agamemnon
ordered the clear-voiced heralds to gather the long-haired Achaeans to an assembly. And
they gave the summons, and the people gathered quickly.’ These lines return almost
verbatim at the beginning of the Odyssey’s first act of assembly (Od. 2.6–8). While it may
be the case that the Odyssey is responding directly to this scene from the Iliad (or an
Iliadic tradition of assembling), using the theory of resonance articulated above (Act I,
introduction, n. 1) allows us to regard both scenes as resonating within a broader epic
tradition and both epics as manipulating the formulae in various ways for interesting
effects.
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public gathering breaks off suddenly as, instead, Agamemnon first calls
a council (:%ıºc& 'b )æH!%& #*ªÆŁ2#ø& xÇ* ª*æ,&!ø&, 2.53). Signifi-
cantly, this is the only time that the Achaean council (:%ıº+) is intro-
duced without the ritual formula ‘when their desire for food and drink
had been put away’.42 After this unanticipated break, when the narrative
returns to the assembling, ‘divine Rumour’ has wrested control from
Agamemnon’s heralds (2.93–4), who are struggling to maintain order
in the face of the multiplication of views. In spite of the formulaic
beginning, then, this assembly seems unduly chaotic and the instituting
individual—in this case Agamemnon—appears to have lost control of
it, until the heralds eventually make the people cease their clamour
(2.98). After all, Agamemnon has convoked the assembly on the basis of
a deceptive dream (2.5–34). Authority is still under investigation in the
context of assembly.43
This already unstable frame is compromised still further by another
surprise: Agamemnon not only relates his dream to the council, but
introduces a plan—not anticipated by the narrator—to ‘test’ the army
(2.73–5).44 He will only pretend to give up on Troy in order to provoke
his men to a greater effort.45 Agamemnon has the idea to test the army
because he assuredly believes that he will take Troy that very day. But he
42 Using :%ıº+ with the formulaic phrase ÆP!aæ K)*d ),"Ø%. ŒÆd K'Å!2%. K5 7æ%& =&!%
gives three councils: Il. 2.432, 7.323, 9.92. Cf. H. Mackie (1996), 21–3; Carlier (1996),
8–10; Ruze´ (1997), 31–4; Ho¨lkeskamp (1998), 19. Donlan (1979), 65 mentions in
passing that the formulas of :%ıº+ and Iª%æ+ suggest a structural deep-rootedness of
group authority. See also Schofield (1999), esp. 21–30.
43 For rumour as a corrosive discourse and a speech act not sanctioned by the
community, see Lincoln (1994), 78–9. Thalmann (1988), 7 identifies the dream as
one feature that problematizes the legitimacy of Agamemnon’s authority.
44 For bibliography on Agamemnon’s test see Knox and Russo (1989), 351, n. 2, to
which may be added McGlew (1989) (sympathetic); Haubold (2000), 54–9 (unsympa-
thetic). According to Cook (2003), 172, ‘the problem lies not with the plan, but its
execution’. On Agamemnon’s assertion that ‘it is the custom’ (l Ł1#Ø. K"!/&, 2.73), see
Reinhardt (1991), 159, who asks ‘Wieso? Weshalb?’ On the use of this phrase, see n. 82
below with accompanying text.
45 Commentators are much troubled by these narrative dislocations. Kirk (1985),
124–5, n. 86, comments: ‘Behind the paradoxes and confusions of the testing-motif in
its present form one is probably right to detect other versions, in the earlier tradition or in
the monumental poet’s own repertoire.’ Leaf (1960), i. 47 similarly asks: ‘How, then, are
we to explain this wonderful medley of inconsistent and self-contradictory motives? The
conclusion seems inevitable that we have a fusion of two quite different continuations of
the first book.’
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is far wide of the mark: not only has Zeus deceived him with a lying
dream, but his hopes are expressly set in opposition to what the tale will
tell. The Iliad is not going to fulfil his desire that Troy will fall ‘that very
day’: Agamemnon’s authority is resisted by the narrative thrust of the
Iliad itself.46
The council, in the form of Nestor, duly sanction Agamemnon’s plan,
but with serious misgivings.47 The mood of uncertainty continues when
Agamemnon finally addresses the (re)convened assembly. Addressing the
assembled ranks as ‘friends, Danaan heroes, attendants of Ares’ (‘t ç/º%Ø,
læø*. ˜Æ&Æ%/, Ł*æ$)%&!*. @æÅ%.’, 2.110), Agamemnon recasts his men
as individuals, hoping to inspire them to share in his dream of capturing
Troy;48 instead, he succeeds only in arousing their desire for home. His
complex ploy of saying one thing when meaning another—hardly an
advisable strategy to pursue in the context of an open debate49—goes
catastrophically wrong as the army are so taken in by his argument of
despair, from which they are supposed to dissent, that they rush to the
ships.50 It takes Odysseus to get everyone back in line with a combination
of persuasive guile and brute force.51 Even then, when order (noisily,
2.209)52 returns, the tale takes another unexpected turn: enter Thersites.
46 Scodel (2002), 210 describes Agamemnon’s dream as creating ‘an ironic distance
between characters and audience’. Though she shows how Odysseus and Nestor unite
characters and audience with the goal of taking Troy, she seems rather to underestimate
the lasting distance between what Agamemnon hopes—and Odysseus and Nestor argue
for—and the tale the Iliad will tell. Cf. Haubold (2000), 59.
47 Nestor somewhat wryly comments: ‘if anyone else of the Achaeans had told us of
this dream, we might say he was a liar and turn away from it’ (2.80–1). As for
Agamemnon’s idea to test the army, Nestor passes over that without mention.
48 See Haubold (2000), 55–9. Cf. Griffin (1995), 77, who considers this line to be
‘appropriate to a mass assembly’.
49 As we will see in the case of Nicias’ speech to the Athenian assembly Ch. 4, sec. 3
below.
50 Zeus ‘devised evil deception’ (ŒÆŒc& I)$!Å& :%ıº*2"Æ!%, 2.114), Agamemnon
says, hoping to deceive the assembled group that he has given up on the war. Of course, it
is Agamemnon who has been deceived by Zeus, who truly has ‘devised evil deception’.
And Agamemnon fails. Or, perhaps he succeeds rather too well, since the army are so
taken that they share his defeatism.
51 Against the view that this simply represents a reassertion of authority, Hammer
(2002), 88 argues: ‘in restoring order, Odysseus does not necessarily restore Agamem-
non’s power. For what holds the political field together now is not people acting
together, but force.’ Seen in this light, Odysseus’ demand that there be ‘one king’ (‘*x.
Œ%/æÆ&%. 7"!ø’, 2.204) as he ‘plays the role of being king’ (‹ ª* Œ%ØæÆ&1ø&, 2.207) could
be pointed: see Thalmann (1988), 12.
52 This description later characterizes a Trojan assembly (7.346).
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So far we have seen that the ways in which the assembly of book 2 is
convoked continues the investigation of Agamemnon’s authority. Now,
after Odysseus’ apparent restoration of order, a voice from below takes
the opportunity to perform on the epic stage. The strain on the narrative
in allowing such a figure to speak is such that the character’s introduc-
tion is the most detailed and evaluative of its kind. First, the narrator
draws attention to the inappropriateness of Thersites’ language: ‘of
measureless speech’ (I#*!æ%*)+., 2.212), he knew ‘many disorderly
words’ (7)*Æ ¼Œ%"#$ !* )%ºº$, 2.213) to cause strife with the kings
idly, not with due order, but whatever he thought would be funny for
the Argives (#$ł, I!aæ %P ŒÆ!a Œ,"#%&, KæØÇ1#*&ÆØ :Æ"Øº*F"Ø&, j Iºº0 ‹
!Ø %ƒ *Y"ÆØ!% ª*º%/œ%& 3æª*/%Ø"Ø&, 2.214–15).53 Then Thersites’ ‘sha-
meful’ (ÆY"åØ"!%., 2.216) appearance is described: he was ‘bandy-
legged’ and ‘lame’ (ç%ºŒ,., åøº,., 2.217), his shoulders ‘stooped’
(Œıæ!-, 218) and his head ‘warped’ (ç%5,., 2.219). As Bruce Lincoln
remarks: ‘Before we are permitted to hear what he says . . . the text is at
pains to describe him in such a way as to emphasize his anomalous
nature, and to shape the attitude we will adopt toward him.’54 Lincoln’s
choice of vocabulary is significant, since it flags up the manner in which
a description of Thersites’ appearance slides into an evaluation of his
speech; the narrator’s entry into the debate in his introduction of
Thersites shapes our response to him.
But just what is at stake in Thersites’ deformation comes to light in
the lines that follow (2.221–4):
!,!0 Æs!0 3ªÆ#1#&%&Ø '/øfi
O51Æ Œ*Œº+ªø& º1ª0 O&*/'*Æ· !fiH d0 ¼æ 0 3åÆØ%d
KŒ)$ªºø. Œ%!1%&!% &*#1""ÅŁ1& !0 K&d Łı#fiH.
ÆP!aæ › #ÆŒæa :%H& 3ªÆ#1#&%&Æ &*/Œ** #2Łøfi ·
At that time with shrill cries he again uttered abuse against divine Agamemnon.
With him the Achaeans were exceedingly angry and had indignation in their
hearts. But he shouting loud abused Agamemnon with a speech.
53 On these lines and their application to Thersites’ subsequent speech, see R. P.
Martin (1989), 109–13. Raaflaub (2004b), 43–6 suggests that the fact that Odysseus
disciplines Thersites on the basis that the other had not spoken well (2.212–13) compli-
cates the notion that this episode demonstrates the exclusiveness of freedom of speech to
an elite.
54 Lincoln (1994), 21 (my italics).
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After the explicit condemnation of Thersites’ appearance, the narrator
shifts into an altogether less certain mode when it comes to assessing the
impact of Thersites’ speech. The issue centres on the interpretation of the
two pronouns, the dative !fiH and the nominative ›. Do both refer to
Thersites, to stress his isolation, as in: ‘The Achaeans were angry with
him (Thersites); in spite of this he (Thersites) abused Agamemnon’?55
Or does the first pronoun mark out Agamemnon as the object of
malcontent, the second Thersites as the one figure who dares voice the
rank-and-file’s complaints: ‘The Achaeans were (all) angry with him
(Agamemnon); but it was Thersites . . . ’?56 The choice rather depends
on what the Iliad is adjudged to be doing. At the moment when the
narrator enters the debate, the audience must make a judgement.57
As it is, the audience are not given an opportunity to witness dissent
from—or with—Thersites; embedded audience reaction is deferred
until after Odysseus has spoken and beaten him up. Then the narrator
comments (2.270–4):
%ƒ 'b ŒÆd Iå&2#*&%/ )*æ K)0 ÆP!fiH B'f ª1ºÆ""Æ&·
z'* '1 !Ø. *Y)*"Œ*& N'g& K. )ºÅ"/%& ¼ºº%&·
‘J ),)%Ø, q 'c #ıæ/ 0 0O'ı""*f. K"Łºa 7%æª*
:%ıº$. !0 K5$æåø& IªÆŁa. ),º*#,& !* Œ%æ2""ø&·
&F& 'b !,'* #1ª 0 ¼æØ"!%& K& 3æª*/%Ø"Ø& 7æ*5*& . . . ’
But [the Achaeans], although they were pained, laughed sweetly at [Thersites].
And thus would one speak looking at his neighbour: ‘Well, well, Odysseus has
done many noble deeds in leading good counsel and conducting war; but now
this thing is by far the best he has done among the Argives . . . ’
Again, while the forcefulness of the sentiment is not in doubt, inter-
pretation is far less easy, as the diverse critical response demonstrates.
55 Kouklanakis (1999), 49 comments: ‘the voice of dissent is given a brief, but
substantial, space to be expressed, only to be cast in the most negative light, that is, as
the product of a lonely and freakish mind.’ See also Kirk (1985), 140, n. 220–3.
56 This translation takes the ÆP!$æ as strongly adversative: so Postlethwaite (1998),
93–5; cf. Leaf (1960) i. 65, n. 222.
57 Scholars tend to smooth over the linguistic difficulties of this section. Scodel
(2002), finding the ambiguity frustrating (‘Unfortunately, the lines that describe the
emotional state of the Achaean audience are difficult’), enters the scene to cast her own
judgment: ‘It is far likelier that the army is angry with Thersites’ (p. 205, my italics).
Description gives way to prescription: how the critic thinks the scene should be inter-
preted comes to the fore.
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Here the problem lies with the disjunction between the group’s gang-
laughter58 and the concessive particle that denotes their mindset:
‘although they were pained.’59 For Gregory Nagy, laughter comes at
the expense of the blame poet.60 According to Marcel Detienne,
‘Odysseus’’ treatment of Thersites, the epitome of the man of the
de¯mos, reflects the limits of egalitarian speech’.61 Peter Rose provoca-
tively suggests that the joke may be in fact on Odysseus: beating up this
miserable wretch is, apparently, ‘his best deed yet’!62 Thus, in their very
modes of responding to the violent suppression of dissent, scholars tend
to betray their own ideological positions.63 Laughter opens the audience
up to criticism even as they are invited to sanction the reassertion of
authority.64
Joking apart, this situation potentially represents an altogether more
serious moment in the Iliad, for at least two reasons. First, there is the
prominence of Odysseus and Odyssean echoes in this episode, signifi-
cantly just after Achilles has removed himself from the scene.65 It is
Odysseus to whom Athena goes to carry out Hera’s bidding, just as it
58 According to de Jong (1987), 82, the ‘someone’ (!Ø.) speech represents a commu-
nal voice; cf. S. Richardson (1990), 82, with 224, n. 28.
59 Postlethwaite (1998), 93 analyses this ambiguity in the light of the narrator’s
introduction. See also Rankin (1972), 43, n. 25; Rose (1988), 20; Cook (2003),
180–2. On the troubled laughter of this scene, see Halliwell (1991), 281.
60 Nagy (1979), 260–3; cf. Lowry (1991). According to Nagy (1979), 259–64, the
Iliad represeants Thersites as an object of ridicule, as if he were a figure from the rival
genre of blame.
61 Detienne (1996), 103; cf. Lincoln (1994), 26. We should note, however, that there
is little indication from the narrator that Thersites should be seen as a man of the de¯mos,
even if such a term can be usefully applied to Homeric epic.
62 See Rose (1988), 21.
63 As Rose (ibid. 10–11) puts it: ‘For those who view the Thersites passage as evidence
of the poet’s ideology there is almost an irresistible temptation to stand up and be counted
for or against’ (his italics).
64 While it would be easy to condemn the Iliad for brutally asserting the hierarchy
here, Thersites’ suppression still has significance: although politicians, and even social
theorists like Giddens, stress participation within institutions, even so democratic open-
ness must be sustained at some level by exclusion.
65 Haft (1990; 1992). She, however, sees the relationship between the two epics as
complementary, not agonistic. A similar situation comes about after Achilles reaffirms
his distinction in book 9; immediately afterwards, Odysseus undertakes a dangerous, and
somewhat digressive, night expedition. This episode belongs to the one book of the
Iliad—book 10—whose authenticity is most often doubted by scholars, presumably
because it appears the most Odyssean.
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had been Achilles in book 1.66 It is Odysseus who, as we have seen,
restores order in the assembly and silences Thersites, significantly nam-
ing himself as the father of Telemachus in the process.67 It is Odysseus
too who, in his second speech to the assembly, reminds the Achaeans of
the prophecy that Troy would fall only after much suffering, in the
tenth year, thereby correcting Agamemnon’s misplaced haste.68 All of
these elements—his proximity to Athena, his control over the assembly,
his epithet as Telemachus’ father, the hints at a return69—point to an
Odyssey (or an Odyssean tradition at any rate). It is as if Odysseus
threatens to hijack this, his rival’s, narrative. What is more, in Proclus’
summary of the Cypria, it was Achilles who prevented a disgraceful
flight to the ships;70 here Odysseus usurps that role in the wake of
Achilles’ withdrawal from the action. The fallout from Achilles’ act of
dissent extends to opening up his epic narrative to his rival.71
66 1.193–200. It is striking, though, that Odysseus departs from Athena’s advice,
all the more so since those instructions had been relayed to Athena herself by Hera.
Athena is told by Hera to ‘restrain each man with soft words’ ("%E. IªÆ&%E. K)1*""Ø&
Kæ+!ı* çH!Æ =ŒÆ"!%&, 2.164); Athena repeats this instruction to Odysseus verbatim
(2.180). Indeed, ‘whenever Odysseus came upon ‘a king or an outstanding man’ (n& !Ø&Æ
#b& :Æ"ØºBÆ ŒÆd 75%å%& ¼&'æÆ ŒØå*/Å, 2.188), he does ‘restrain him with soft words’ (!e&
'0 IªÆ&%E. K)1*""Ø& KæÅ!2"Æ"Œ*, 2.189). But ‘whenever he saw a man of the people’ (n&
' 0 Æs '+#%ı !0 ¼&'æÆ Y'%Ø, 2.198), he harangues (and physically beats) him (2.199–206).
Odysseus’ violent streak in the context of suppressing dissent, which will become all too
apparent in the Odyssey, is already present in the Iliad.
67 2.260. The only other time Odysseus is named as the father of Telemachus is
4.354. In the speech immediately following, he earns the epithet ‘sacker of cities’
()!%º/)%æŁ%., 2.278), again, one of only two uses in the entire poem (the other being
in the ‘Doloneia’, 10.362). See Haft (1992).
68 2.299–302.
69 The Achaeans’ flight to the ships ‘would have led to a premature return’ (()1æ#%æÆ
&,"!%., 1.155), had it not been for Hera’s intervention. The subject of nostos is
also teasingly prominent in Odysseus’ second speech in the assembly: 2.284–329, esp.
289–98.
70 Proc. Chr., p. 105.9–10OCT.While this scene possibly owes its origins to the Iliad
(as a manifestation of either the ‘Cypria’s’ derivative status or else Proclus’ rendering of
it), it is quite plausible that both scenes resonate within a broader tradition in which the
Achaeans rush to the ships.
71 While suggesting a rivalry, this argument does not rest on the primacy of one text
over the other; rather, it suggests that the Homeric poems may be considered as
representative of competing traditions, the one privileging Achilles, the other Odysseus,
and that a tension between the two surfaces here. See further the final assembly, sec. 4
below.
Challenging authority in the Iliad 59
Barker 9780199542710_0029-0202_Barker_chap2-3 Final Proof page 59 29.4.2011 10:44am
Second, the scene of laughter has the effect of co-opting the onlookers
back into the hierarchy: in the words of William Thalmann, through
laughter the audience adopt the language and values of their betters,
‘such are the complex dynamics of their laughter as it brings them back
to submission’.72 Such a dynamic includes potentially the audience of
the poem—which is important if we reflect on the fact that Thersites’
dissent is closely modelled on Achilles’.73 In this context it is worth
reconsidering the opening frame: Thersites ‘reviled the kings, reck-
lessly and in no due order, but whatever he thought would raise a
laugh’ (Iºº0 ‹ !/ %ƒ *Y"ÆØ!% ª*º%/œ%& 3æª*/%Ø"Ø& j 7##*&ÆØ, 2.215–
16).74 One possible problem with Thersites is the impression that he
is only interested in parody, with the consequent danger that the
audience may, if persuaded by Thersites, trivialize Achilles’ challenge
to Agamemnon and overlook the significance of what Achilles had done
when he called that first assembly. In other words, the audience may fail
to take dissent seriously. No wonder tradition has it that Achilles killed
Thersites . . . 75
Odysseus’ beating-up of Thersites draws attention to the exercise of
authority which, paradoxically, opens it up to analysis. Thus, even as it
suppresses a voice of dissent, the Iliadmakes its audience aware that this
72 Thalmann (1988), 21.
73 Whitman (1958), 161. See also Postlethwaite (1998), who analyses the speech as a
rehearsal of and commentary upon the quarrel; Reinhardt (1991), 162, who calls the
scene a ‘Nachspiel’ on the book 1 assembly; Schadewaldt (1987), 152, with n. 2, who
labels Thersites’ speech a ‘Zerrspiegel’ of Achilles’ anger. Rose (1988), 19 questions those
critics who condemn Thersites’ speech as a disorderly aberration when it seems so closely
modelled on Achilles’ complaints.
74 Halliwell (1991), 281 draws attention to Thersites’ role as a ‘habitual entertainer’.
He comments: ‘His aim of providing what he thinks ª*º%/œ%& (215) implies that he has,
or aspires to, the function of a ª*ºø!%)%Ø,. (as Plato shrewdly calls him at Rep.
10.620c3).’ But ‘Thersites’ mockery is, on this occasion, out of place, and isolates him.
His taunts are, ironically, too close to the bone, as their echoes of Achilles’ polemic
against Agamemnon in book one intimate.’
75 Judging by Proclus’ summary, Rosen (2003), 123 speculates that in the Aethiopis
Thersites is seen as ‘a bona fide satirist, i.e. one who displays an attitude of comic self-
righteousness endorsed by the narrative in which it is embedded’ (his italics). The difference,
according to Rosen, is in the performance context: in the Aethiopis ‘stasis arose over the
death of Thersites’ (Proc. Chr., p. 105.25–8OCT ) because he was killed at a feast, whereas
in the Iliad he is beaten out of the assembly. It seems that epic dissent does not equal
comic abuse. Halliwell (1991), 281 similarly comments: ‘Laughter here is inevitably
caught up in the highly charged action of the entire crisis for the army and its leaders.’
Cf. Rosen (2003), 134.
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is what it is doing.76 Thus, even as the Iliad sets out boundaries to
dissent, it does so in a way that involves its audience in the process of
reflecting on it and in setting the boundaries themselves. Through their
experience of the narrative, the audience are involved both in managing
dissent and realizing the potential of the assembly as an institution
where the management of dissent best takes place.
It’s the custom to fight with words
The next Achaean assembly opens as if it is going to replay the events of
book 2. Not only is Agamemnon again seen convoking the assembly to
raise the spectre of return; he quotes verbatim from that earlier speech
his recommendation that they should leave.77 But now Agamemnon is
in deadly earnest: the repetition of his earlier words cruelly exposes how
far misplaced his earlier hopes had been and how dependent the
Achaeans all are on Achilles.78
On this occasion, however, Agamemnon’s proposal of flight provokes
a fierce rejoinder by Diomedes.79 Significantly, he frames his speech by
emphasizing the right of reply in the assembly (9.32–3):
‘3!æ*6'Å, "%d )æH!Æ #Æå+"%#ÆØ IçæÆ'1%&!Ø·
m Ł1#Ø. K"!/&, ¼&Æ5, Iª%æfi B· "f 'b #+ !Ø å%ºøŁfi B..’
‘Son of Atreus, first with you I’ll fight since you’ve lost your wits; it’s the
custom, lord, in the assembly. And you, don’t get angry.’
76 As Rose (1988), 13 remarks: ‘It is impossible to attempt to “manipulate” or
“manage” a serious discontent without somehow reminding the audience of the grounds
for that discontent—without therefore running the risk of heightening the very discon-
tent one intends to contain and co-opt.’ See also Lincoln (1994), 6, who comments: ‘In a
state of latency or occultation, persuasion and coercion alike are constitutive points of
authority, but once actualized and rendered explicit they signal—indeed they are, at least
temporarily—its negation.’
77 9.18–28¼2.111–18, 139–41.
78 Lynn-George (1988), 81; Hammer (2002), 89; D. Wilson (2002), 72. She notes
(contra Griffin (1995), 77) that the gathering Agamemnon is addressing is a public
assembly, ‘as the remove to a private council make clear’ (p. 197, n. 3).
79 For Diomedes as a second Achilles, see: Andersen (1977); Griffin (1983), 74–5;
Schofield (1999), 29. Lohmann (1970) calls this scene ‘Die Spiegelung zur Streitszene im
ersten Buch’ (p. 217), and specifically identifies Diomedes as playing the role of Achilles’
‘Double’ (p. 221).
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Diomedes not only flags his disagreement with Agamemnon; he also self-
consciously parades his act in the precedent established by Achilles in
this poem.80 The end of that first assembly had concluded with the two
speakers ‘fighting with words’ (#Æå*""Æ#1&ø K)1*""Ø&, 1.304). Here
Diomedes explicitly states that he ‘will fight’ (#Æå+"%#ÆØ) with Agamem-
non. The verbal echo resonates with the authority of Achilles’ opposition in
book 1.
That is not all. Diomedes’ assertion goes one step further: he states that
‘it is the custom’ (m Ł1#Ø. K"!/&). John Foley glosses the expression used
here as follows: ‘The Assembly seems institutionally a place where disagree-
ment, perhaps for the sake of entertaining all factions and all possibilities, is
allowed without fear of personal reprisal.’81 Such a description appears apt
for our study. In section 1, it was suggested that the Achaean assembly is a
place where disagreement is allowed. Yet it was also pointed out that the
assembly of book 1 needed an Achilles to guarantee dissent without fear of
reprisal: without him, Calchas would not have spoken up and the source of
the community’s woes—Agamemnon’s refusal to return Chryseis—would
have remained unexposed. Precisely the problem with the assembly of
book 1 is that it was not able to allow dissent institutionally. Moreover, as
Jasper Griffin has noted, the phrase ‘it is the custom’ is only ever used by
characters: ‘the poet’, he explains, ‘never commits himself to expressing,
from his own mouth, the idea that something is correct, in line with
timeless usage.’82 The significance of the fact that it is Diomedes who
says ‘it is the custom’ should not then be overlooked: Diomedes applies the
phrase prescriptively, not descriptively, to provide for himself the author-
ization to speak in opposition to Agamemnon. That is to say, contrary to
80 It is important that we interpret Diomedes’ intervention in the light of his earlier
silence when (inappropriately) chastised by Agamemnon (4.368–400, with Diomedes’
silence at 401–2 and Sthenelus’ strenuous defence, 404–10): the fact that Diomedes does
speak up here lends weight to the significance of his speech and its social import. He was
also the Achaean who stood up in the assembly to reject the Trojans’ offer of compensa-
tion (7.400–2)—thereby pre-empting Agamemnon’s own response (7.406–11).
81 J. Foley (1991), 175, n. 79 (my italics).
82 Griffin (1986), 38. Hammer (2002), 89–90, 115–34, recognizing the need to
examine themis in ‘the context of the enactment of relationships within the epic’, sees its
invocation ‘not as the incoherence of custom or oral culture, but as an aspect of
regularization in which themis is stated as a public claim’ (p. 127). He locates the change,
however, in the understanding of political space in the character (Diomedes) and not the
poem’s audience (pp. 132–3).
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Foley’s claim, the assembly does not simply exist as institutionally a place
where disagreement is allowed; Diomedes makes it so in his opening salvo
and sanctions it as the place where fighting with the king’s point of view is
not only possible but essential. Furthermore, he can do that because of the
precedent Achilles had set down.83 By book 9, then, the assembly can
indeed be legitimately regarded as ‘institutionally a place where disagree-
ment is allowed’. Now there is no longer need for an Achilles to answer
Agamemnon: Diomedes institutionalizes dissent.84
The use of an institutional framework is taken up more explicitly in the
scene that follows.Nestor intervenes with the proposal that the whole army
take their meal (‘',æ)Æ !0 Kç%)ºØ",#*"ŁÆ’, 9.66), while Agamemnon
gathers the leaders together to take counsel (‘:%ıºc& :%ıº*2"fi Å’, 9.75).
By connecting the taking of a meal to deliberation, Nestor formally glosses
the formula ‘once they had put away their appetite’ (9.92) that precedes
every Achaean council.85 In this council, Nestor’s more direct criticism of
Agamemnon, especially his appeal that Agamemnon should act for the
common good, demonstrates the utility of this more intimate setting.86
The description of the kings’ gathering for a meal suggests the activation of
another institution, the bouleˆ or council, for the discussion that follows.
Under Nestor’s supervision the Achaean community appears to
manage dissent within an institutional framework.87 In the context of
book 9, indeed, both assembly and council are vital to the health of the
83 Schofield (1986), 14 glosses the importance of this speech by drawing a connection
with the prowess Diomedes has shown in battle.
84 According to Giddens’ understanding of structuration as set out in the Prologue
above, Diomedes, by so blatantly and self-consciously participating within the institu-
tion, helps to reproduce it.
85 See n. 42 above. For the understanding of the belly (gasteˆr) as the enemy of good
deliberation seeHesiod,Th. 26–8, with Pucci (1987), esp. 165–72, 181–208. By providing
an occasion for allotting proper ‘shares’ (timai ), communal meals perform a socially
stabilizing role. On the proper distribution of !Ø#Æ/ among the gods, see Clay (1989).
86 Nestor stipulates that the leader’s role is not only to declare an epos but to listen to
one as well (K)ÆŒ%F"ÆØ, 9.100), and act for the communal good (*N. IªÆŁ,&, 9.102).
Thus he prepares his advice: ÆP!aæ Kªg& Kæ1ø u. #%Ø '%Œ*E *r&ÆØ ¼æØ"!Æ (9.103).
87 The narrative signals his move to more intense negotiation with marked vocabu-
lary: (çÆ/&*Ø& #B!Ø& (9.93). These events represent a striking reversal of the similar
episode in book 2. In Iliad 2, Agamemnon had first tried out his idea of a test in the
council before testing the troops in the assembly, with near-catastrophic results. In the
assembly of Iliad 9 Nestor notably corrects Diomedes: while praising his spirit, he
identifies that his words have not found a solution to the crisis, presumably because
the king’s honour is at stake. Hence he moves the assembly to council, in which, in more
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community and to the telling of the tale. Had it been left to the ‘lord of
men’ Agamemnon, the Achaeans would now be returning home and the
audience would be on a nostos narrative. Instead, the careful framing of
dissent offers an escape from the predicament that the leader had
precipitated and, with equal importance, it allows the narrative of the
Iliad to be told: the audience remain at Troy with Achilles.88 Dissent is
being made integral both to the well-being of the Achaean community
and to the Iliad ’s Troy story narrative.
In saying this it is important to identify the involvement of the poem’s
audience, who are not only being led through the activation of various
institutions, but are also invited to reflect upon that process. A case in point
relates to the role of the main player in moving affairs to council, Nestor.
His powers of negotiation have won praise from Hellenistic critics on-
wards;89 some recent scholars, however, have expressed anxiety over his
evident support for the king. He defers to Agamemnon in the quarrel with
Achilles (1.277–9), in accepting the validity of Agamemnon’s lying dream
(2.79–83),90 and at the prelude of the embassy (9.103–5)—all of which
deepen the crisis. Though it can be said thatNestor represents the virtues of
the tradition,91 equally he could be understood as a remnant of a past when
everyone was indeed deferential to the king on the basis of status alone.
Indeed, Peter Rose has suggestively called Nestor’s (and Odysseus’) ad-
herence to an absolute notion of Agamemnon’s authority ‘residual’.92This
is interesting, because in theOdysseyNestor, along withOdysseus, is shown
intimate surroundings, Agamemnon can make a proposal of reparation. See Schofield
(1986), 29–30.
88 The critical embassy to Achilles follows directly.
89 For a discussion, see O. Murray (1965), 177; cf. Schofield (1999), 29.
90 See Taplin (1992), 90. Christensen (2007), 137–41 argues that Nestor’s reluctance
to dwell on the details of Agamemnon’s dreams shows his desire to reunite the group
behind their leader at all costs and avoid further dissent.
91 In particular, Nestor excels in his ability to spin a tale, as his manipulation of
Patroclus testifies. See R. P. Martin (2000).
92 Rose (1997), 163. Hammer (1997b) suggests that Nestor understands the basis of
leadership in a more traditional way, as one of ‘might’, which should be contrasted to a
more ‘interdependent’ notion of politics—a ‘politics of mediation’—embodied in the
figure of Achilles (pp. 20, 21); cf. Hammer (2002), 127–42. (It seems rather perverse,
however, to describe Achilles as a proponent of moderation.) For the role of Odysseus and
Nestor in supporting Agamemnon, see Sale (1994), 32–3. Schofield (1986), 29 com-
ments: ‘much of Nestor’s advice is intended to bolster Agamemnon’s authority, even when
. . . it opposes his will.’ According to Schofield, ‘tact is the hallmark of Nestor’s euboulia’. We
might also recall the narrator’s ‘Theogonic’ introduction of Nestor (1.249–52): see
n. 22 above.
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to be no lover of debate—at least when a divisive outcome results.93 Even
as the text establishes the boundaries to the institution of the assembly, the
audience are invited to think about their role in legitimizing or suppressing
dissent. Who can dissent (Thersites)? How can one dissent properly
(Diomedes)? And when (Nestor)?94
One later occurrence of the word agora underlines the progressive
nature of the Iliad ’s narrative. As a prelude to an important one-off
speech by the otherwise minor Achaean warrior Thoas,95 the narrator
underlines his skill as a speaker (15.283–4):
Iª%æfi B '1 9 )ÆFæ%Ø 3åÆØH&
&/Œø&, ›)),!* Œ%Fæ%Ø Kæ/""*ØÆ& )*æd #2Łø&·
In the assembly, few of the Achaeans could beat him, whenever the young men
vied with words.
Given our argument so far, this introduction is highly significant pre-
cisely because of its ordinariness: it affords a brief glimpse of a world
closer to home, where dissent in the assembly is a normal activity, a
‘whenever’. Moreover, the detail that it is a young man’s sport could
suggest that debating in the assembly is part of what one has to do to
prove oneself a man.96 Whereas in the first assembly the strife (7æØ.)
between Agamemnon and Achilles was represented as a crisis, even if
Achilles’ dissent had been necessary, the implicit premise here is of the
93 See e.g. his description of the catastrophic debate after the fall of Troy (Od. 3.148–
50), on which see Ch. 2, sec. 2 below. Nestor’s dislike of internal strife is clear from his
intervention in Iliad 1, when he attempts to direct conflict against its proper source—the
Trojans (1.254–8). Whereas fighting with words in the assembly is valorized in the Iliad,
however precarious that value may be (and Achilles himself expresses regret for his strife
with Agamemnon at 19.56), in the Odyssey strife remains a constant source of danger.
94 If one chooses to be more sceptical about Nestor’s role, one may want to distin-
guish between the two institutions which provide a framework for the Achaean com-
munity, the council and assembly. From what I have said, the former appears more fully
formed, restrictive and more closely associated with the king; the latter is less ordered,
open to everyone’s gaze and more highly competitive. In other words, the poem
represents the council as a more conventional arena for decision-making than the
newly activated and empowered arena of public debate. Haubold (2000), 60 comments,
‘institutional progress is not the Iliad ’s prime interest’, which, however, may lend rather
too much authority to Nestor’s management.
95 Hammer (1997b), 9 observes that Thoas uses the formula )*ØŁ-#*ŁÆ )$&!*. as a
sign of his concern to persuade his audience, and as a correction of Agamemnon’s initial
failure in the opening assembly.
96 Christensen (2007), 246–55 discusses this example as part of a rhetorical training
implicit in the Iliad ’s representation of debate and manifest, for example, in Diomedes’
progress over the course of the narrative.
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social acceptability of strife. As a matter of fact, this narratorial gloss on
the assembly is typically passed over in discussions of debate, perhaps
because, by this stage in the narrative, strife—in the form of dissent—
has been made institutional in the Achaean assembly.
Contrary to standard criticism of the Achaean assembly that points to
the absence of a strong figure to impose agreement and the indiscipline
in the political process that results,97 my opening two sections have
suggested that this initial impression of weakness comes to be seen as a
potential source of strength: by virtue of Achilles’ challenge to
Agamemnon’s authority, the Achaean assembly is transformed into an
arena that can accommodate different points of view. Before facing the
question whether and in what way Achilles can be received back
into the community (in the assembly of book 19), it is worthwhile
considering briefly the Iliad ’s two other communities, the Trojans and
the gods, both of which offer alternative ways of thinking about the
assembly.
3. OPPOSITION CONTROLLED IN THE ILIAD ’S
‘OTHER’ GROUPS (ILIAD 2, 7, 8, 18, 20)
So far I have been discussing scenes of assembly among the Achaeans,
and have suggested that dissent becomes gradually institutionalized
within that community. This section will consider the two other groups
who hold assemblies in the Iliad, the Trojans and the gods, as a useful
counterpoint to the story so far. The Trojans, while enjoying similar
institutional possibilities, do not make the most of them, but remain
committed to the royal house in obedience to Hector. Dissent among
the gods is a more problematic idea, given the catastrophic repercussions
that would ensue were the gods to descend into strife. Nevertheless, even
among this group it is possible to discern progress in the way dissent is
managed towards a more collective involvement in debate.
97 In contrast to the Achaeans’ grim discipline in war: 3.8–9.
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Leaning on his spear he spoke
On first inspection there seems to be little to distinguish the Trojan and
Achaean assemblies.98 Indeed, unlike later representations, such as in
tragedy, there is little sense of an ideological divide between ‘Greeks’
and ‘barbarians’.99 The institutional equivalence of the two groups,
however, has recently been challenged by Hilary Mackie, who claims
that the way in which the two groups talk differ from each other: the
Achaeans, she argues, participate in a discourse of blame, the Trojans in
speeches of praise. Although some of her methodological assumptions
may be open to question,100 her observation that the Trojans lack an
official context for blame is important. As we will see, the Trojan agora
is not an institution that accommodates dissent; moreover, that differ-
ence offers one explanation for their eventual defeat.
There are four Trojan meetings in their agora. The first occurs in
juxtaposition to the Achaean assembly in book 2, but nevertheless
exhibits some startling differences. The Trojan assembly is narrated
briefly from the perspective of Iris, the divine messenger, who comes
upon the assembly already in session (2.788); we do not hear how the
assembly was set up, who set it up, or the reasons for doing so. No doubt
these differences are in part due to narrative concerns: we have just
witnessed a long, confused and contentious Achaean assembly; a further
scene of debate now would serve merely to detract from the poem’s
impetus. Nevertheless, we may identify several important features that
characterize the Trojan assembly more generally. First, Iris addresses
the royal household alone, Priam (‘t ª1æ%&’, 2.796) and Hector (@‚Œ!%æ,
98 As Taplin (1992), 112 remarks, ‘ “ethnographically” the Trojans are virtually
indistinguishable from the Achaians’. Cf. Kakridis (1971), 54–67.
99 According to E. Hall (1989), 15, there is no difference ‘between the constraints
imposed upon Agamemnon and Priam or Hector by the institutions of civic debate’.
100 One problem is that her central dichotomy appears to rest on an awkward
distinction between public and private discourse: H. Mackie (1996), 40 assigns cona-
tive/persuasive speech—speech that is orientated towards the addressee—to the
Achaeans, and aesthetic speech—speech that is directed towards the self—to the Trojans.
For the basis of her theory, she acknowledges her debt to Jakobson’s model of commu-
nication: cf. Jakobson (20002). This model, however, has been criticized by Bakhtin,
who asserts that all utterance is directed towards another and must take into considera-
tion the addressee: see Prologue, n. 55 above. One further problem is that Mackie’s
interpretation of the different categories appears to derive from a post-romantic view of
poetry as being individually experienced.
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"%d 'b #$ºØ"!Æ’, 2.802). Second, Hector alone responds (2.807), and he
is responsible for dissolving the assembly (ÆrłÆ '1 ºF"’ Iª%æ+&, 2.808).
Third, the Trojans are assembled at the doors of Priam’s house (%ƒ '0
Iª%æa. Iª,æ*ı%& K)d —æØ$#%Ø% Ł2æfi Å"Ø, 2.788; cf. 7.346); by contrast
we later learn101 that the Achaean assembly is located at the ships of
Odysseus—not those of Agamemnon, the nominal leader of the expe-
dition—in the ‘middle’ of the line (11.807–8).102 Even the place of the
Achaean assembly, then, points to its independence from the king;103 it
is public territory, symbolizing its importance and accessibility to the
group as a whole. The detail that the Trojan assembly takes place
outside Priam’s palace suggests a different dynamic at work: the royal
family presides over debate.
That point is borne out by the most developed Trojan assembly in
book 7. Three figures speak, which matches the number of speakers in
all four Achaean assemblies, if the speeches of Calchas and Thersites—
both marginal figures in some sense104—are discounted. Yet that point
of similarity serves to underline the differences. All three Achaean
assemblies proceed in the same way: first, the institutionalizing agent
speaks; then one of the other leaders expresses a contrary view; lastly,
a third party adjudicates in a way that confirms neither position defini-
tively.105 Once again the Trojan assembly is already in session; its
institutionalizing agent is not named. Its first speaker is Antenor,
who, by urging the return of Helen, represents an Achilles-like figure
101 11.807: in the context of the critical meeting between Patroclus and Nestor.
102 But see 7.382–3, where the Trojan herald Idaios finds the Danaans ‘in assembly
beside the stern of Agamemnon’s ship’ (!%f. '0 *yæ 0 *N& Iª%æfi B ˜Æ&Æ%f. Ł*æ$)%&!Æ.
@æÅ%. j &ÅU )$æÆ )æ2#&fi Å 3ªÆ#1#&%&%.): cf. Janko (1992), 131–2. The possible reason
for the location of this assembly (which remains undramatized bar Diomedes’ brief
rejection of the proposal) could derive from its purpose, as an offer of recompense to
Menelaus.
103 This point further differentiates the Achaean assembly from the council, which
takes place in Agamemnon’s tent (9.89–90).
104 Prophets enjoy an ambiguous relationship to power throughout Greek literature,
having special access to divine knowledge but lacking power in other means, as Calchas’
fear of Agamemnon makes clear (1.78–84). On Calchas as marginal, see Redfield (1994),
95–6. On prophets more generally, see now Flower (2008).
105 That provides, in the assembly of book 1, Achilles as the institutionalizing agent,
Agamemnon as the contestant, Nestor as the mediator; in book 2, Agamemnon,
Odysseus and Nestor respectively; in book 9, Agamemnon, Diomedes and Nestor
respectively—though only in book 9 does the assembly proceed quite so simply as that.
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speaking up in the assembly for the benefit of the community.106 The
two responses that follow, however, show the Trojan assembly operating
according to a very different set of dynamics. Antenor’s proposal meets
with a fierce rejoinder from Paris, who claims that the gods must have
taken his wits away if he is proposing to return Helen.107 The swift and
forceful gagging of a speaker in the assembly recalls Odysseus’ suppression
of Thersites, but with none of the attendant problems that we had observed
there: here Priam adjudicates and rules in favour of his son. His opening
address, ‘hear me, Trojans’, represents more even than an appropriation of
Antenor’s words;108 elsewhere, ‘hear me’ (Œ1Œºı!*) is used exclusively in
proclamations that include the whole community and whose recommen-
dations are granted,109 which makes this the only case in which a proposi-
tion—Antenor’s—is countered: in effect, Priam’s appropriation embodies
both the definitive silencing of a dissenting voice and a ringing endorse-
ment of his son’s alternative proposal. The third-person imperative to
Idaois to take this message to the Achaeans signals both his judgement
and the end of the debate.110 Any dissent is effectively quashed.
Yet the subject of this assembly concerns the unquestionably impor-
tant decision whether or not to return Helen. This critical issue has
already been raised in a gathering of the Trojan elders in book 3.111
106 Thus Antenor is the first figure from outside the royal house to speak on public
matters; but he is an important figure in Trojan society, as his role in the Achaean
embassy (remembered at 3.203–24) testifies. Indeed, there he is represented as being
something of an authority on speech, weighing the relative merits of those by Menelaus
and Odysseus (3.212–24). He is clearly no Thersites, who can be effectively silenced
because he lacks the credentials to speak: R. P. Martin (1989), 111.
107 Paris’ formulaic opening, ‘These things you advise are no longer dear to me’ (‘"f
#b& %PŒ1!0 K#%d ç/ºÆ !ÆF!0 Iª%æ*2*Ø.’, 7.357), is only otherwise used by Hector, again
when silencing dissent (12.231; 18.285).
108 ‘Œ1Œºı!1 #*ı <æH*.’, 7.348 (Antenor), 7.368 (Priam).
109 Œ1Œºı!* is used for proposing and commenting on a duel (3.86, 97, 304, 456;
7.67); Zeus addressing the assembly of gods (8.5, 497; 19.101); exhorting a comrade
(17.220). Cf. H. Mackie (1996), 91, who cites Œ1Œºı!* as only used to address the
Trojan army.
110 ‘ 0I 'ÆE%. Y!ø’, 7.372. Idaios then reports the offer of recompense to the Achaeans
(7.384–97). Helen, however, is crucially not part of the deal, though Idaois himself seems
to will it (q #c& <æH1. ª* Œ1º%&!ÆØ, 7.393). Even the bearer of the message expresses his
dissatisfaction with the decision that has been made but, crucially, it is not heard in the
Trojan institution and it is made without the power to change anything.
111 3.146–60. The narrator calls them ‘the elders of the de¯mos’ ('Å#%ª1æ%&!*.,
3.149).
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These otherwise anonymous figures recognize that, while her beauty
makes her well worth fighting over, still they ought to give her back.
Two features of this scene shed further light on the institutional appa-
ratus enjoyed by the Trojans. First, the physical context: the elders ‘sat
by the Skaian gates’ (lÆ!% K)d CŒÆØfi B"Ø )2ºfi Å"Ø, 3.149). Crucially, these
elders do not sit in council (bouleˆ); rather, they occupy a space by the
city’s gates, on the very margins of the city, displaced spatially and
figuratively from the centre of power.112 Second, the narrator’s gloss:
even though they were ‘good public speakers’ (Iª%æÅ!Æd j K"Łº%/,
3.150–1), they ‘sat like cicadas’ which through the forest sit on trees
setting forth their delicate voices (!*!!/ª*""Ø& K%ØŒ,!*., %¥ !* ŒÆŁ0 oºÅ&
j '*&'æ1øfi Kç*Ç,#*&%Ø Z)Æ º*ØæØ,*""Æ& ƒ*E"Ø, 3.151–2). This image of
cicadas is highly suggestive of their lack of political clout:113 these are
people who could have something to say on the war, but who have no
power to influence the situation.114 Although the community is in dire
straits, their deliberation amounts to no more than the idle chattering of
cicadas.
The third Trojan assembly takes place in book 8, as the Trojans enjoy
unprecedented success on the battlefield. Leading his men away from
the ships to clear ground, Hector ‘makes an assembly’ (<æ-ø& Æs!0
112 Christensen (2007), ch. 7, esp. 351–2, argues that the Trojans lack not only an
operative assembly but also a productive council. Cf. H. Mackie (1996).
113 H. Mackie (1996), 41 interprets this scene as indicative of the Trojans’ greater
poetic capacity. Schein (1984), 171 remarks that these old men ‘are respected for their
wisdom and for the power of their oratory’, but acknowledges that they ‘have no effect on
the conduct of the war’. Though he sees Troy as a polis—and Troy’s many epithets
indeed mark it out ‘as a product of human labor and cultural achievement’ (p. 169)—his
description of the city’s social organization in fact stresses the importance of a single
family, that of Priam and his two sons (pp. 171–2). As a result this chapter contests his
conclusion that Troy’s social organisation is ‘more complex than that of the Greek army’
(p. 171): what the depiction of Troy does add is an awareness of inadequacy of political
responses when familial issues dominate the public arena, as they will do in theOdyssey in
Chapter 2 below.
114 In book 7, when the herald Idaios returns to the Trojans with the Achaeans’
rejection of their proposal, he delivers his message ‘standing in the middle’ ("!a. K&
#1""%Ø"Ø&, 7.417), echoing his original announcement to the Achaeans (7.384). The
language of ‘the middle’ suggests that the proposal was open to debate. Indeed, in the
Achaean assembly it is not the offended king (Menelaus) nor the nominal leader
(Agamemnon) who responds directly, but one of the other kings (Diomedes) who speaks
on behalf of the community. By way of contrast, the Trojans simply ‘put on their armour
straightaway’ (!%d '0 ›)º/Ç%&!% #$º 0 tŒÆ, 7.417), without any further deliberation.
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Iª%æc& )%Ø+"Æ!%, 8.489). With the exception of his dissolution of the
assembly in book 2, Hector’s establishment of an assembly here heralds
the one instituting act among the Trojans;115 in it Hector, the Trojans’
‘support’,116 delivers a speech on his people’s behalf. Yet the manner of
his institutionalizing act raises concerns (8.492–6):
K5 ¥))ø& '0 I)%:$&!*. K)d åŁ,&Æ #FŁ%& ¼Œ%ı%&,
!,& Þ 0 @‚Œ!øæ Iª,æ*ı* ˜ØU ç/º%.· K& '0 ¼æÆ å*Øæd
7ªå%. 7å0 9&'*Œ$)Ååı· )$æ%ØŁ* 'b º$#)*!% '%ıæe.
ÆNå#c åÆºŒ*/Å, )*æd 'b åæ2"*%. Ł1* ),æŒÅ.,
!fiH ‹ ª 0 Kæ*Ø"$#*&%. 7)*Æ <æ-*""Ø #*!Å2'Æ·
They stepped to the ground from behind their horses and listened to his speech,
which Hector dear to Zeus made. In his hand he held a spear of eleven cubits
long, and a bronze spearhead shone on its shaft, and a ring of gold held it.
Leaning on this spear he spoke words to the Trojans.
After the narrator’s introductory speech tag, ‘Hector spoke’ ( @‚Œ!øæ
Iª,æ*ı*, 8.493), the expected speech does not yet come: instead, a
further three lines of description follow that identify two important
issues. First, he convokes this assembly holding not the skeˆptron, the
symbolic instrument that gives a king the right to speak in the Achaean
assembly,117 but the emblem of military control, the spear.118 Second,
the terms used to describe his speech significantly differ. ‘Leaning on his
spear,’ the narrator relates, ‘Hector spoke his words (7)*Æ) to the
Trojans.’ Yet he previously notes that Hector’s men ‘stepped to the
ground from behind their horses and listened to his speech (#FŁ%.)’.
This initial use of #FŁ%., the marked, authoritative term of the pair with
115 Otherwise, the Trojans ‘gather to an assembly’ (2.788; 18.245–46), or else simply
‘are’ in the Iª%æ+ (7.345).
116 ‘The name of He´ktoˆr himself is an agent noun derived from the verb eˆkhoˆ in the
sense of “protect,” as is attested precisely in the context of Hektor’s protecting the city of
Troy’ (5.473–4; 24.729–30): Nagy (1979), 146. For the classic study of the tragedy of
Hector, see Redfield (1994), whose Hector is paradigmatically a man of the polis.
117 See n. 25 above, with accompanying text.
118 Griffin (1983), 13. See also the scholia Cb on Il. 8.494; cf. Reinhardt (1961),
182–5. The spear, no doubt, reflects the immediate military context in which Hector
delivers his speech; nevertheless, it has important consequences for how his words are
taken, and, it should not be forgotten, all Achaean assemblies take place in a martial
context but with very different results.
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7)*Æ presents Hector’s speech from the perspective of his audience:119 for
the Trojans, Hector’s speech is a command. Indeed, no Trojan speaks
after Hector has spoken in an assembly, neither here nor at any other
time in the epic. Hector may set up an assembly, but there is no debate.
Whereas the Achaean assembly is always a site of contention, the Trojan
agora is frequently used by Hector for announcing his plan.120
The fourth and final Trojan assembly represents a contest between
Hector and Poulydamas, the Trojan seer, whose credentials as a wise
advisor have already been established in three previous exchanges with
Hector.121 The end-game of their exchange takes place when the stakes
could not be higher: Achilles has announced his return. With the
Trojans encamped outside their city in fear, this assembly lacks the
signs of institutional security: its place is the battlefield, the time is
119 According to R. P. Martin (1989), 47–59, a #FŁ%. is a command, a speech act
demanding acceptance, while 7)%. is the unmarked word of the pair. It is a term that is
conspicuously absent from the narratorial descriptions of Achaean assemblies, though it
is sometimes used by the characters to label each others’ speeches.
120 So too 2.788, 18.245–46. Since these scenes occur in the context of the battlefield,
it could be argued that they represent the unquestioned nature of Hector’s military
command—surely important for the Trojan defence of their city. To a certain extent,
then, the context skews the way in which the Trojan assembly functions and is inter-
preted. Nevertheless, the lack of dissent is shown to be a problem, particularly in the last
example, as we shall see.
121 On Hector and Poulydamas, see esp. Redfield (1994), 143–52; Schofield (1986),
18–22; Taplin (1992), 157–61; Christensen (2007), 387–411. Poulydamas’ first words
of advice to Hector establish his credentials as a wise advisor (12.60–80), soon after
which comes their first confrontation. While this debate occurs in the midst of battle, the
language of ‘the middle’ (K& #1""%Ø"Ø, 12.209) flags Hector’s hostile rejection of
Poulydamas’ reading of the divine sign and the lack of an institutional context for
interpretation. In their second encounter Hector accepts Poulydamas’ advice, but in
such a way that again underlines his authority: Hector takes Poulydamas’ exhortation to
‘consider )A"Æ :%ıº+’ (13.741) to mean the ‘whole plan’. Yet )A"Æ can also be taken
distributively with :%ıº+ to mean ‘each and every idea’—a meaning Hector rules out
with his response: see Smyth (2002), 96, n. 337, where )A. is denoted as ‘all, entire,
every’, along with p. 296, n. 1174; Cunliffe (1963), 316. It may also be significant that
Poulydamas draws attention to the problem of social status in prefacing his advice to
Hector: ‘“Hector, always you rebuke me in assemblies, although my counsel is good—
since it is not in the least seemly for one of the people to speak beside the mark, neither in
council nor in war, but always to increase your power”’ (‘ @‚Œ!%æ, I*d #1& )-. #%Ø
K)Ø)º+""*Ø. Iª%æfi B"Ø& j K"Łºa çæÆÇ%#1&øfi , K)*d %P'b #b& %P'b 7%ØŒ* j 'B#%& K,&!Æ )Ææb5
Iª%æ*ı1#*&, %h!0 K&d :%ıºfi B j %h!* )%!0 K& )%º1#øfi , "e& 'b Œæ$!%. ÆNb& I15*Ø&’, 12.211–
14). Interpreting these difficult lines as bitterly sarcastic, Schofield (1986), 19, n. 30
understands Poulydamas as saying that he ‘is as good as a commoner whose job, if he
speaks at all, is to support Hector’s cause with appropriate deference’.
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dusk.122 With the safety of the community at stake, two narratorial
framing devices become critically important. With the first the narrator
explicitly ranks one of the speakers over the other: while Hector ‘wins’
with the spear, Poulydamas ‘wins’ with words (Iºº0 › #b& ¼æ #2Ł%Ø"Ø&, ›
'0 7ªå*œ )%ººe& K&/ŒÆ, 18.252). Poulydamas, who once more recom-
mends an orderly retreat, is clearly favoured. Hector, however, roundly
condemns Poulydamas’ advice and proclaims that he won’t allow any of
the people to be persuaded (%P ªaæ !Ø. <æ-ø& K)Ø)*/"*!ÆØ· %P ªaæ K$"ø,
18.296). Once more he hectors opposition into silence. In fact, the
Trojans praise his speech to the heavens, which prompts the narrator to
enter the scene of judgement (18.310–13):
S. @‚Œ!øæ Iª,æ*ı 0 , K)d 'b <æH*. Œ*º$'Å"Æ&,
&+)Ø%Ø· KŒ ª$æ "ç*ø& çæ1&Æ. *¥ º*!% —Æººa. 3Ł+&Å.
@‚Œ!%æØ #b& ªaæ K)fi +&Å"Æ& ŒÆŒa #Å!Ø,ø&!Ø,
—%ıºı'$#Æ&!Ø '0 ¼æ 0 %h !Ø., n. K"Łºc& çæ$Ç*!% :%ıº+&.
So spoke Hector, and the Trojans noisily acclaimed him—the fools: Pallas
Athena had taken away their wits. They praised Hector, though he gave bad
counsel, but no one praised Poulydamas, who had spoken good sense.
The Homeric narrator rarely intrudes into his narrative to cast judge-
ment;123 yet here he condemns the embedded Trojan audience, appro-
priating a term that Hector himself had used to describe his rival:
they are ‘fools’ (&+)Ø%Ø, 18.311; cf. 18.295). No one in a Trojan
deliberating arena ever speaks after Hector has spoken;124 here, that
degree of control is figured as a problem, as the narrator—no less—cries
out for dissent.125 It is significant, moreover, that the narrator calls the
122 H. Mackie (1996), 23–6.
123 On Homer’s objectivity, see Griffin (1983), 103–43; S. Richardson (1990),
165–6.
124 Ho¨lkeskamp (1998), 37, n. 88 cites an example of ‘free’ debate in the Trojan
Iª%æ+ in the Odyssey (Od. 8.505–10). But in that context the Trojans come to the wrong
decision: see Ch. 2, sec. 2 below. As we shall see, the Odyssey sets a different agenda,
which explores the problems of debate.
125 Hector’s death is a narrative goal and therefore something that the narrator must
support, even against his own dissent. Similarly counterfactuals are regarded as markers
of the possibility of divergence from the tradition: Lang (1989); Morrison (1992);
Lowden (1993).
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(internal) audience fools, not Hector, whose advice they applaud. It
helps affirm the importance of dissent: the assembly should be a place of
debate.
On first viewing, the order enjoyed by the Trojans in their assemblies
appears to be something to be admired, in comparison to the chaos of
Achaean attempts to debate. Moreover, in other respects Troy more
obviously represents a polis environment, where one might expect the
origins of a political community: and, indeed, from the brief glimpses
one gets of life inside Troy that appears to be true of the religious
life there depicted.126 Yet, on closer inspection, not only does the
control exerted over the assembly by Priam’s family appear to be a
crippling factor for political relationships within Troy; as we have seen,
the Iliad ’s investigation into the management of dissent takes place
within the Achaean assembly, which points to that arena as the origins
of a political community, however fledgling and fragile that may be.127
Thus, this brief examination of scenes of assembly among the Trojans
would appear to bear out the claims made above regarding the Achaean
assembly. In contrast to the gradual accretion of the properties for
dissent that have been witnessed in the Achaean assembly, the Trojan
assembly, lacking an Achilles-like figure to challenge the royal family,
notably fails to develop the institutional support for dissent: voices other
than Hector’s are marginalized or silenced, to the extent that even the
narrator himself objects.
There remains one other group to consider, whose assembling may
shed further light on the achievement of the Achaeans: the assembly of
the gods.
126 See esp. Scully (1990). Cf. Sale (1994), 62–80.
127 The army camp, with its lack of an obvious institutional framework, becomes
something of a paradigm—a model that is good to think with—on the Athenian tragic
stage, including both examples discussed below in Act III. An important point here
must be the relatively equal status held by the Achaean kings. This means that, when
they are gathered, speakers have to demonstrate something more than a simple
assertion of power, a scenario that remains possible in the Trojan assembly, which
basically represents the hierarchy of one community. For the armed camp as both like
and not like a polis, see Hornblower (2004), 243–63—on evidence mainly from
Thucydides and Xenophon.
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Obey my word, lest . . .
Given Zeus’ incontestable supremacy, the idea of the gods debating may
appear somewhat incongruous.128 Indeed, two of the formal divine
assemblies in the Iliad appear as little more than showcases for Zeus’
power: both are convoked by him and take place in his house. In book 8
his all-inclusive address: ‘Hear me all you gods and goddesses’ (‘Œ1Œºı!1
#*ı )$&!*. !* Ł*%d )A"Æ/ !* Ł1ÆØ&ÆØ’, 8.5), gives the sense of a procla-
mation rather than an invitation to debate. In book 20, although there is
a stronger gesture towards openness, as Poseidon ‘sits in the middle’ of
them and addresses Zeus (xÇ* '0 ¼æ 0 K& #1""%Ø"Ø, 20.15), no debate
follows. Poseidon just wants to know what Zeus has in mind.129 Zeus’
power is unassailable.
Nevertheless, at several points over the course of the narrative strife
threatens to break out on Olympus. The first, and most pointed,
example occurs at the end of book 1, in juxtaposition to the strife just
witnessed in the Achaean camp.130 In response to Thetis’ supplication
on behalf of her son Zeus nods, a reaction that shakes Olympus and
prompts Hera’s suspicions—but she is quickly cowed into silenced by
Zeus’ threat of force. The troubled mood among the gods is broken
only by Hephaestus’ Ganymede impression, which provokes laughter
and returns the gods to feasting. Thus, the first scene on Olympus ends
with a very different mood from the scene of internal strife witnessed in
the Achaean camp, which is important both for artistic reasons and for
showing the divine world in a different light.131 But, while the tension is
released, this scene has important implications for thinking about dis-
sent on Olympus. Achilles had prompted his mother to go to Olympus
in the first place by telling her to remind Zeus of the time when she had
helped him against the other Olympians.132 The story of the gods
fighting belongs to the past, as represented in Hesiod’s Theogony, and
128 Lucian plays on this incongruity by presenting his epic Zeus as familiar with
Demosthenes, addressing the assembled divinities as ‘citizen gods’ (t ¼&'æ*. Ł*%/, Iupp.
Trag. 15.2).
129 ‘He enquired about Zeus’ plan’ (˜Øe. '0 K5*/æ*!% :%ıº+&, 20.15).
130 1.493–611.
131 Cf. Reinhardt (1997), 178–80; Griffin (1983), 199.
132 1.394–407. Hephaestus’ lameness (1.590–4) belongs to that background story
too, as pointed out by Graziosi and Haubold (2005), 71–2.
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it has been suggested that the end of Iliad 1 recalls that ‘Theogonic’
world.133 Moreover, the threat and subsequent removal of divine strife
also serves to cast into human relief Achilles’ dissent. As Laura Slatkin
suggests, ‘what informs the human stature of Achilles is Thetis’s cosmic,
theogonic power—her role in the succession myth’.134 His challenge to
Agamemnon, which marks the establishment of the Achaean assembly,
paradoxically confirms Zeus’ power: while Achilles’ dissent helps to
establish the assembly as an arena in which debate may take place, it
also leads to the death of the race of heroes. In this way, the Iliad both
conforms to the tradition of Zeus’ plan and offers a brave new world: in
the wake of the death of the heroes and the confirmation of Zeus’
everlasting hegemony a human world of institutional security is
born.135
These events at the end of Iliad 1 do not only shed light on the
achievement of the Achaean assembly, in that Achilles is the guarantor
of Zeus’ authority and the catalyst for the possibility of institutional
dissent among men; it can also help us put into perspective the divine
assemblies we previously noted. Given the importance of strife to
cosmic security, it is important that Zeus is seen to be in control: but
the nature of his control seems to change over the course of the
133 ‘In the overall context of early Greek epic, this is easy to understand: by the time in
which the Iliad is set, the pantheon has reached a stable hierarchy under the rule of Zeus
and the gods know that they can only lose from a confrontation with him:’ Graziosi and
Haubold (2005), 71.
134 Slatkin (1991), 101. She continues: ‘If Themis had not intervened, Thetis would
have borne to Zeus or Poseidon the son greater than his father, and the entire chain of
succession in heaven would have continued: Achilles would have been not the greatest of
heroes, but the ruler of the universe. The price of Zeus’s hegemony is Achilles’ death.’ Cf.
Murnaghan (1997), esp. 21–8, 41–2. This myth appears to be (ironically) recalled by
Achilles himself in his very appeal to his mother to supplicate Zeus: he describes Briareus,
the figure who helps Zeus reclaim power, as ‘mightier than his father’ (:/Å& %y )Æ!æe.
I#*/&ø&, 1.404).
135 D. Wilson (2002), 54 describes how the eris between Achilles and Agamemnon
recalls the ‘mythological foundations of the war and even beyond it to the rise of the
Olympian order . . .Their quarrel thus enacts the cosmic struggle for dominance that
would have occurred had Zeus mated with Thetis.’ The simile at 16.387 underlines the
important religious dimension to our documentation of dissent. Zeus himself oversees
the process of making judgements in the assembly. See esp. Hes. Op. 194, 221 and
Theog. 85. On the justice of Zeus in the Iliad, see Lloyd-Jones (1983), 1–27. Graziosi
and Haubold (2005), 72 comment: ‘In terms of the overall logic of Homeric and
Hesiodic epic heroes come into existence precisely so as to ensure the permanent stability
of the Olympian world order under Zeus.’ Cf. Clay (2003), 171.
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narrative. For one thing, the Iliad traces a shift from a personal quarrel
in Zeus’ palace, which could threaten world security, to a debate in an
assembly, however strictly controlled that might be. It may also be
noted that the second assembly reveals greater participation, since it is
Poseidon who initially addresses it and sets the agenda.
This movement towards the establishment of a divine assembly with
ordered dissent under Zeus’ ultimate authority is confirmed by the final,
and most significant, example. At the beginning of book 24, with
Achilles still abusing Hector’s body, Apollo raises the issue before the
assembled gods.136 Three aspects of this scene are of fundamental
importance to my argument. First, Apollo’s intervention marks a strik-
ing reversal of book 1, when he intervened at the behest of his priest.137
As we have seen, throughout the whole of book 1 the gods act on
individual impulse for individual concerns.138 Here, however, Apollo
intervenes because of what he perceives to be an injustice: he speaks up
for the ‘dumb earth’, which Achilles is shaming by his treatment of
Hector’s body.139 Second, rather than acting on his own accord for his
own personal gratification, as he had done in Iliad 1 in support of his
priest, Apollo takes his complaint to a divine assembly, and argues for a
particular course of action to be adopted. This demonstrates a shift not
only to speech and discussion but also to a communal setting. Lastly,
although he provokes Hera’s wrathful response, a compromise is
reached by Zeus’ arbitration. Zeus’ power is no different substantively
from his earlier involvement in the plot, but it manifests itself differ-
ently. Whereas before he made his plans on the basis of a personal
136 24.32. While there is initially no linguistic indication that the gods are in
assembly, the form of two speeches set in opposition to each other with a third
adjudicating between them certainly suggests as much. That view is soon afterwards
confirmed when Iris and Thetis find the gods all ‘gathered’ around Zeus (›#Åª*æ1*., Il.
24.99): the root of the word Iª*/æø is clearly perceptible. See the note by Garvie (1994),
241 on the Phaeacian assembly (Od. 8.24).
137 For the many correspondences between Iliad 24 and Iliad 1, see esp. Macleod
(1982).
138 See esp. Hera’s continual interference: e.g. 1.54–5, 195–6.
139 ‘For he [Achilles] shames the dumb earth in his wrath’ (Œøçc& ªaæ 'c ªÆEÆ&
I*ØŒ/Ç*Ø #*&*&Æ/&ø&, 24.54).
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supplication, Zeus now sits in judgement in an assembly directing
events to their peaceful resolution.140
Dissent, then, is even important among the gods, provided, of course,
that it takes place under Zeus’ guidance. But it is interesting to note that
the Iliad again locates the management of dissent within the institution
of assembly over the course of its narrative. The sense of achievement in
making dissent institutional is the subject of my final section.
4. PUTTING A VALUE ON DISSENT (ILIAD 19)
Achilles roused the Achaean heroes
Given the progress of the assembly as an institution that can accom-
modate dissent traced in sections 1 and 2 above, the fourth and final
Achaean assembly already appears out of place. Moreover, its place
in the narrative is further challenged by the fact that Achilles
has already made the decision to return to battle.141 It is true, but
only up to a point, that this assembly formally marks reconciliation
between Achilles and Agamemnon; this final section will show
that many of the same issues relating to leadership, authority and
contest return in the narrative’s ongoing exploration of the value of
dissent.142
Significantly, the narrator marks the convocation of this assembly in
the most elaborate terms yet (19.40–6):
ÆP!aæ › :B )Ææa ŁE&Æ ŁÆº$""Å. 'E%. 3åØºº*f.
"#*æ'Æº1Æ N$åø&, tæ"*& '0 læøÆ. 3åÆØ%2..
ŒÆ/ Þ 0 %¥ )*æ !e )$æ%. ª* &*H& K& IªH&Ø #1&*"Œ%&,
140 The question whether Zeus’ plan extends to Thetis’ supplication has been the
source of controversy since antiquity. For studies on the polysemy of Zeus’ will, see
Murnaghan (1997); Clay (1999). The image of Zeus presiding over the assembly is
where the Odyssey chooses to begin.
141 When Agamemnon calls the Achaeans together in books 2 and 9, he too has
already made up his mind (to fight/to flee). But, while he uses the assembly as little more
than an arena in which to declare his view, both debates are far more wide-reaching. The
same is true here: Achilles establishes the assembly to announce his view, but debate
ensues nevertheless.
142 Formal reconciliation takes place: Donlan (1979), 62; yet Achilles is hardly
reintegrated into the community: Seaford (1994), 67.
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%¥ !* Œı:*æ&B!ÆØ ŒÆd 7å%& %N+œÆ &ÅH&
ŒÆd !Æ#/ÆØ )Ææa &Åı"d& 7"Æ&, "/!%Ø% '%!Bæ*.,
ŒÆd #c& %ƒ !,!* ª 0 *N. Iª%æc& Y"Æ&, %o&*Œ0 3åØºº*f.
K5*ç$&Å, 'Åæe& 'b #$åÅ. K)1)Æı!0 Iº*ª*Ø&B..
Divine Achilles walked along the shore, shouting terribly, and he roused the
Achaean heroes. And even those who before used to wait in the ago¯n of the
ships—those who were both helmsmen and wielded the ships’ oars and, when
beside the ships, were stewards giving out the food—even they at that time
came to the agora, since Achilles had appeared, and for a long time he had
ceased from grievous battle.
Many elements are striking about this description. First, the group
whom Achilles gathers are not the laoi but—uniquely—‘Achaean her-
oes’, a generic marker of the Iliad ’s status as heroic epic poetry.143
Second, the odd detail that ‘everyone came,144 even those who before
used to wait in the ago¯n of the ships’, represents the last usage of this
curious phrase, which occurs only for the duration of Achilles’ absence
from battle.145 In other words, the last time that all these people
gathered was in the assembly of book 1: this opening frame invites
reflection on the relations of these two assemblies to each other and the
progress made over the course of the narrative.
Achilles, as the institutionalizing agent, speaks first, and explicitly
reflects on the narrative of the Iliad. His speech, addressed to Agamem-
non alone, concedes the disastrous effect of their quarrel—seen from the
perspective of the Achaeans as a whole (‘ÆP!aæ3åÆØ%f. j 'Åæe& K#B. ŒÆd
"B. 7æØ'%. #&+"*"ŁÆØ O6ø’, 19.63–4)146—and advises against ‘being
143 The mention of heroes in the proem (1.2–3) immediately locates the Iliad in a
past era familiar to us from Hesiod’s myth of five ages, the ‘race of heroes’ being the age
before ours (Hes. Op. 156–73).
144 The inclusiveness of this assembly is matched by the divine assembly immediately
subsequent to it (20.5–10). The stakes are being raised.
145 The standard gloss is that the phrase &*H& K& IªH&Ø ‘maintains the original sense
of Iª-&, “gathering” . . . , whence derives its post-Homeric sense “contest”’: Janko (1992),
275–6, n. 426–8; cf. Leaf (1960), ii. 132, n. 428; Willcock (1978), 236, n. 298;
M. Edwards (1991), 240, n. 42–5; N. Richardson (1993), 200–1, n. 258. But see Ellsworth
(1974), who proposes that ago¯n even here signifies ‘contest’: it occurs only while Achilles is
absent from the field, as an indication of the increased threat to—or battle for—theAchaean
ships. Now ‘they came to the agora at that time because Achilles appearedwho for a long time
had ceased from warring’ (my italics). See Prologue n. 32 above.
146 This possibly explains why Achilles here puts their quarrel down to the sake of a
woman (*¥ &*ŒÆ Œ%2æÅ., 19.58), as Ajax had complained (9.637–8). Cf. M. Edwards
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always angry’ (‘ÆN*d #*&*ÆØ&1#*&’, 19.68). In response the embedded
audience, silent throughout the first assembly, rejoice.147 But they are
frustrated in their desire for the story to press ahead:148 fault-lines in the
assembly re-emerge as, first, Agamemnon tries to maintain control over
the events, and then Odysseus intervenes.
The narrator’s framing of Agamemnon’s response immediately chal-
lenges a complacent reading of the assembly: Agamemnon speaks from
where he is sitting,149 ‘not in the middle’ (%P'0 K& #1""%Ø"Ø&, 19.77). Since
these details are considered noteworthy, it is probably right to surmise
that customarily the speaker stands in themiddle of the group, signifying
his words as public property and in the public interest.150 By remarking
that Agamemnon does not stand in the middle, the narrator at the very
least poses a question regarding how this assembly should be under-
stood;151 but perhaps it also suggests the king’s continued unwillingness
to enter into a contest of words.152 While being an antagonistic gesture
(1991), 241, n. 56–73. The greater self-reflection that Achilles shows, first in responding
(progressively) to the speakers in the embassy (see esp. 9.644–8) and then in replying to
Patroclus (16.49–60), reveals a growing political maturity on Achilles’ part, which will
be important in his leadership over the contests in the funeral games. On Achilles’ ‘self-
reflexive rhetoric’ (in the embassy), see R. P. Martin (1989), 192; cf. Hammer (2002),
170–97; Farenga (2006), 76–95. On the politics of mediation, see Hammer (1997b) and
n. 169 below.
147 19.74. Kå$æÅ"Æ& occurs at one other place after a speech, when the Greeks and
Trojans, having heard the oaths, rejoice thinking that the war will soon be over (3.111).
There too, embedded audience reaction is premature.
148 Owen (1947), 191 perceptively notes how the poet anticipates our reaction by
‘representing Achilles as exasperated almost beyond endurance by the very thing that is
exasperating us’. Page (1959), 313—perhaps unsurprisingly—is exasperated.
149 Standing to speak appears to be the common posture: Arend (1933), 116–18.
There has been debate over whether Agamemnon really is sitting (since it is so odd), but
see Clay (1995), 72, nn. 1–8.
150 As Detienne (1996), 91–102 explains, putting goods into the middle (es meson) is
to put them into the common domain, rendering them common property and, there-
fore, ‘up for grabs’. The expression es meson is later applied to speeches. See n. 159 below,
with accompanying text; cf. the Prologue above.
151 Thornton (1984), 128–9 regards these gestures as those of a supplicant posture, a
view criticized by Taplin (1990), 75. M. Edwards (1991), 243–5, nn. 76–84 interprets
Agamemnon’s seated position as publicly demonstrating physical incapacity to contrast
with Achilles’ recent battle-shyness.
152 He avoids addressing Achilles directly (‘—Åº*6'fi Å . . . K&'*/5%#ÆØ’, 19.83), which
represents his strategy throughout; cf. 19.189. See M. Edwards (1991), 245, n. 83.
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in itself, Agamemnon’s pose seeks to maintain a hierarchical position,
exactly of the kind that was previously challenged in the assembly.
Even in this last assembly, then, Agamemnon still appears concerned
to cling on to his authority. First, he prefaces his speech by saying that ‘it
is good to listen to the man standing, nor is it right to interrupt him’
(‘9"!Æ,!%. #b& ŒÆºe& IŒ%2*Ø&, %P'b 7%ØŒ*& j (::$ºº*Ø&’, 19.79). The
only other occurrence of a cognate form of (::$ºº*Ø& is ()%:º+'Å&
(1.292), used of Achilles interrupting Agamemnon in the original
quarrel.153 Agamemnon’s generalization, then, appears pointedly
aimed at Achilles’ challenge to his authority. Second, Agamemnon
relates an example of the power of Deception (@!Å), which uniquely
among exempla told by characters quotes the words of gods and applies
the lesson to his own situation.154 By doing so Agamemnon aligns
himself to Zeus,155 as if this were his version of the Iliad !156 Yet, even
as he demonstrates Zeus’ deception,157 similarly the example escapes his
control, since he can also be regarded as playing Eurystheus to Achilles’
Heracles.158 Once more he fails conspicuously to control the narrative
and his authority is irrevocably undermined: his last words of the epic are
in this debate.
Yet the assembly escapes Achilles’ control as well, as his march to war
is halted by a third party, Odysseus.
153 Rabel (1991); cf. M. Edwards (1991), 244.
154 Vivante (1990), 99 suggests that Agamemnon has made the example up. Certainly
it is right to note the spin Agamemnon puts on it.
155 On understanding the concept of responsibility from this example, see Williams
(1993), 52–5. Lohmann (1970), 11–17 explores how Agamemnon interlaces his own
¼!Å with that of Zeus.
156 Rabel (1991). Agamemnon’s self-interested (and self-deluded) account of
the quarrel contrasts with Achilles’ self-abasing and mortified account of it earlier
(18.98–126).
157 Hera tricks Zeus into making a promise, the effect of which renders Heracles
subservient to Eurystheus. According to Heiden (1991), the exemplum demonstrates the
‘dialogic’ process of communication, which has implications for Agamemnon’s use of the
exemplum too.
158 It ‘ironically establishes him as a parallel to Eurystheus, and Achilles as a parallel to
Herakles. Agamemnon’s own ultimate inferiority to Achilles is then indirectly recog-
nised’: O. Davidson (1980), 200. Rabel (1991) maintains, however, that Agamemnon
comes off best in this match-up.
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Let us remember
Odysseus intervenes to insist on following formal procedure: first re-
conciliation, second eating. Agamemnon then replies to Odysseus,
Achilles answers Agamemnon, Odysseus Achilles—no two speakers in
this assembly respond directly to each other.159 At one level, the a–b,
b–c, c–a structure avoids replaying the contest between Achilles and
Agamemnon. At another, it allows tensions to remain latent. So, for
example, Odysseus’ address to Achilles resonates pointedly with Aga-
memnon’s first words to Achilles in the initial assembly.160 Further-
more, Odysseus’ intervention holds up the telling of the Iliad and
Achilles’ deeds. In reply to Agamemnon, Achilles exhorts: ‘now let us
remember battle’ (‘&F& 'b #&Å"-#*ŁÆ å$æ#Å. j ÆrłÆ #$º’’, 19.148–9).
When Odysseus objects, he stresses that nothing is of concern (#1#Åº*&)
to him but ‘murder and blood and harsh groans of men’ (‘Iººa ç,&%. !*
ŒÆd Æx#Æ ŒÆd IæªÆº1%. "!,&%. I&'æH&’, 19.214), a line which seems
almost to epitomize the Iliad ’s scenes of bloody warfare.161 Even so,
Odysseus insists on remembering to eat.162 In doing so, he not only
reduces the symbolic significance of fasting to the essentials—the im-
practicality of fighting on an empty belly; given the importance of the
belly to the Odyssean tradition,163 Odysseus’ obstruction could also be
159 There is a fundamental practical point here: as Detienne (1996), 93–5 explains,
Odysseus’ proposal that Agamemnon has his gifts of recompense carried into the
middle (‘%N"1!ø K. #1""Å& Iª%æ+&’, 19.173) equates to a redistribution of booty and
avoids placing Achilles under obligation to Agamemnon. This is not just about gift-
giving; Briseis has to be formally returned with an oath that she is intact for the
reconciliation to be perceived as effective. On the significance of ‘the middle’, see esp.
the Prologue above.
160 ‘Don’t, though you are noble, divine-like Achilles’ (‘#c 'c %o!ø., IªÆŁ,. )*æ
K-&, Ł*%*/Œ*º0 3åØºº*F’, 19.155¼1.131). There may also be something unsettling about
the way this hero, who is famous from the rival epic tradition for tricky persuasiveness,
(stage-)manages the assembly and keeps a powerful check on dissent. Cf. Hammer
(1997a) 358, who notes the importance of Odysseus’ manipulation of social ritual
(being aimed at co-opting Achilles back into the system), but does not regard it as
potentially aggressive.
161 In an imagined contest between ‘Homer’ and ‘Hesiod’, the king judges ‘Homer’
inferior on such a basis: Certamen 205–10.
162 ‘#*#&B"ŁÆØ ),"Ø%. ŒÆd K'Å!2%.’, 19.231.
163 The sentiment ‘for no man fasting can fight a whole day’ crops up in Odysseus’
tale at Od. 9.161, 556; 10.183, 475; 12.29. The practical importance of eating is also
stressed by Agamemnon (Il. 2.381), Diomedes (9.705–6) and, as we have seen, Nestor
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regarded as programmatic.164 Achilles’ resistance to Odysseus would then
be a rejection of the Odyssean tradition by using the memory of grief as a
stimulus to attaining glory.165 Even so, the telling of his tale is held up by
the intrusion of gift-giving and eating. It is the very strength of the Iliad ’s
strategy of dissent, however, that it accommodates a spectrum of diverse
perspectives, even those from a rival poetic tradition.166
The assembly of book 19 clearly does provide some sort of closure to
the disruption and strife that have gone before. Everyone is present;
Achilles and Agamemnon are not allowed to fall out again; Odysseus
employs due procedure to formalize reconciliation in the public gaze.
Nevertheless, counter-productive forms of dissent still pervade and
render the consensus precarious in many ways. The Iliad ’s final assem-
bly, in staging a debate over the efficacy of its narrative strategy of
managing dissent, enacts the very strength of that strategy by allowing
differences to remain.
This chapter began by remarking on the widespread interest in the
Iliad ’s position in a socio-political framework, as well as observing the
failed attempts at locating the Iliad with any certainty in that landscape.
Its objective has not been to consider whether or not the assembly existed
as an institution in Homeric society, but to explore the context, form and
structure of debate as it is represented in the Iliad. Paying special atten-
tion to the narrative, it has been suggested that the Homeric agora has
proven so controversial because scholars have approached the Iliad ’s
(9.65–73), who manipulates the need for food to establish a council of leaders. For
Odysseus’ appetite and its reception, see Stanford (1963), 67–70.
164 See Pucci (1987), esp. 165–208. For tension between Odysseus and Achilles in
the Iliad see Nagy (1979), 49–55 on the embassy of book 9. The conflict between the
rival epic traditions is taken up in the Odyssey with Achilles left in the Underworld
bemoaning his early death and anxious for news of his son, while Odysseus continues on
his journey home to reunite with his family: A. Edwards (1985).
165 Pucci (1987), 169–72. Achilles only ‘remembers eating’ after—finally—giving up
his wrath (24.601). Before then he is sustained by divine ambrosia (19.340–56)—
another marker of his affinity to the divine.
166 However that may be, the Iliad never shakes off the suspicion of unilateralism
entirely: Achilles’ retreat to his ships is a retreat into a unilateral assertion of his own
authority, in reaction to the failure of his open dissent in the public arena of debate—a
suspicion that the Odyssey appears to exploit to the hilt in its resonant interplay with its
rival, as we shall see.
Challenging authority in the Iliad 83
Barker 9780199542710_0029-0202_Barker_chap2-3 Final Proof page 83 29.4.2011 10:44am
institutions by looking for a ‘ready-made’ system,167 whereas this chap-
ter has shown that it is more fruitful instead to consider the assemblies as
part of a series of struggles that progressively explore the possibility for,
and value of, dissent in the community. When Achilles lays down the
challenge to Agamemnon in the first assembly, the structure does not
exist that can support such an action, which is why Athena must
intervene; but by the time of the assembly in book 9 Diomedes can
say that fighting talk in the assembly ‘is the custom’; the assembly of
book 19 invites reflection on that achievement.
This approach to debate in the Iliad differentiates this study from
previous attempts to place its narrative in an emerging institutional
framework. Richard Seaford, for example, emphasizes the poem’s ritual
ending as anticipating the fifth-century polis : with Achilles’ reception of
Priam in book 24, the poem outlines a different, ritualized conception of
relationships.168 Dean Hammer has suggested that the Iliad should be
regarded as a serious document of political thought by virtue of its
examination of authority as dramatized by Achilles’ withdrawal from
the group. He regards Achilles’ role in the funeral games of Patroclus as
founding a new kind of political relationship, based on ‘the recognition
and successful mediation of difference’.169 Hammer’s understanding,
167 See Introduction above, and Hammer (1997b), 3. See also Finley (2002), 69–72,
106; Donlan (1979), 65; Ruze´ (1997), 35; Ho¨lkeskamp (1998).
168 Seaford (1994), 176: ‘The reconciliation of Achilles and Priam is often said to
represent, as Macleod puts it, “the value of humanity and fellow-feeling” [(1982, 16)].
This is true as far as it goes. But the construction and the power of the scene derived not
just from the abstract consideration (natural for us) of shared humanity but from the
concrete role of death ritual in social practice, in creating solidarity between potential
enemies.’ Farenga (2006), who takes a similarly performative approach to speech as this
book (though not with the same focus on institutions), connects the communicative
dynamics of lament and death ritual of this scene with nascent citizenship (pp. 96–108).
He sees Achilles as fundamental to this process: ‘with increasing success in each scene
Achilles uses lament’s typical diction, performative attitude and illocutionary statements
to recode versions of the script “how leaders deliberate”’ (p. 68; italics in original).
169 Hammer (1997b), 21. He explains (p. 20): ‘Whereas Nestor is always able to
pronounce final judgement on a particular situation, we see in the situation with Achilles
[in the funeral games] a much more complex, interdependent politics in which decisions
give rise to new problems . . .We have, it seems, a new politics born of and immersed in
contending (and not easily resolvable) interests.’ In a similar manner to this chapter,
Hammer locates the source of the crisis in the struggle between Achilles and Agamemnon
in Iliad (pp. 4–6), but whereas he sees the funeral games as political re-enactment (pp.
13–21), in his view the agora remains the institution that cannot support dissent (p. 3).
Cf. Hammer (2002), 134–43, 153–60.
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therefore, of the Iliad ’s performance of political thought, privileges
Achilles’ performance in book 23. Gregory Nagy posits an even earlier
moment on Achilles’ shield in book 18 for the Iliad ’s allusion to a
political community.170 In contrast, this chapter has argued that the
Iliad initiates a process towards a political community from its very
beginning through the disruption caused by Achilles’ dissent in the
assembly, which takes place under divine patronage and which requires
the involvement of the audience themselves for its management.
Indeed, the scenes in both book 18 and book 23 can be seen as an
intrinsic part of this process. Achilles’ shield has attracted much com-
ment for its extended description of scenes of nature and civilization,171
and particularly for its representation of a trial scene (18.497–508), in
which claim and counter-claim are represented172 before an audience
actively engaged in the contest.173 Wemay note that the context for this
law court is, again, the agora, only this time the civic framework appears
as fully institutional, with various roles ascribed to different members of
the community.174 Moreover, as a representation of conflict, this scene
invites reflection on the narrative of the Iliad itself,175 which has been
all about conflict, both martial and political. Indeed, the conflict
170 ‘In the end . . . the logic of the litigation scene spills over, paradoxically, into the
logic of an ever-expanding outermost circle—that is, people who are about to hear the
Iliad. These people, I argue, are to become ultimately the people of the polis:’ Nagy
(1997), 206.
171 See esp. Schadewaldt (1991); Marg (1991); Reinhardt (1961), 401–11; Taplin
(1998); M. Edwards (1987), 278–86; Becker (1995); and now Farenga (2006), 117–33.
172 Gernet (1981), 189; Gagarin (1986), 19–50.
173 Loraux (2002), 99–100.
174 As well as the two claimants and watching crowd—both the de¯mos to whom one
claimant testifies ('+#øfi )ØçÆ2"Œø&, 18.500) as well as the people more generally (ºÆ%/,
502)—there is also an arbitrator (Y"!øæ, 501), heralds (Œ+æıŒ*., 503) and a panel of
elders (%ƒ ª1æ%&!*., 503). In addition, two talents of gold lie ‘in the middle’ (1& #1""%Ø"Ø,
507), to be awarded to whomever gave the straightest judgement. The lack of precise
articulation of these roles and the relationship between them embodies part of the
transformative power of the scene, since it can be interpreted in different ways by
different people. Farenga (2006), 119 equates the elders of this scene with kings, since
‘their goal was to render publicly a “straight” decision (dikeˆ) acceptable to the litigants’,
like Hesiod’s king (Hes. Th. 81–93—discussed by Farenga at pp. 113–16). This over-
looks the possibility that the shield scene portrays a more fully developed civic body,
particularly in terms of the institutional framework such as we see on the shield.
175 For the concept of ekphrasis, see esp. D. Fowler (1991); cf. Becker (1995), 1–50.
For the shield as a microcosm: Taplin (1998), 107–12. Farenga (2006), 138–44 explores
the shield’s relevance to the unresolved conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon.
Challenging authority in the Iliad 85
Barker 9780199542710_0029-0202_Barker_chap2-3 Final Proof page 85 29.4.2011 10:44am
represented by the Iliad here finds its ultimate realization in a scene that
reaches beyond epic.176 And this happens, it should be noted, on the
shield of Achilles—the figure who had precipitated this poem’s investi-
gation into dissent and who may ultimately be regarded as responsible
for the establishment of the assembly as a place that can accommodate
contest.177
If this appears too great a stretch of the imagination, Achilles’ role in
Patroclus’ funeral games is more clearly expressive of this new kind of
politics that the Iliad is (presenting itself as) founding.178 The act he
performs time and time again during this episode is to set up contests in
honour of his fallen comrade: ‘Achilles stayed the people there and sat
them in a wide ago¯n’ (ÆP!aæ 3åØºº*f. j ÆP!%F ºÆe& 7æıŒ* ŒÆd ¥ÇÆ&*&
*Pæf& IªH&Æ, 23.257–8). By this act Achilles establishes another insti-
tution, the games or the ago¯n, as he had similarly earlier set up the
Achaean assembly. In addition, this act gains significance in the light of
the earlier semantic use of the ago¯n to indicate the ‘contest’ over the
Achaean ships. That contest is now over: Achilles has killed Hector and
forever removed the threat from their ships.179 Instead, the ago¯n can
now be played out peacefully and cooperatively: this is the clearest
example of Achilles legitimizing contest.180 Indeed, three further points
176 Indeed, the whole scene resonates strongly with Hesiod’s Works and Days, which,
according to Graziosi and Haubold (2005), 56–60, 139, comes after the Homeric poems
in the epic construction of the cosmos.
177 The contemporary resonance of the hero’s shield is made emphatic in Virgil’s
reworking of this scene. His hero Aeneas carries into battle a shield that depicts Augustus’
victory at Actium (Verg. Aen. 8.625–731). For its teleological form, see Zetzel (1997),
198–9; for its future history, see Barchiesi (1997), 275–8.
178 Hammer (1997b; 2002), esp. 140. Farenga (2006), 145 connects the two scenes:
‘Like the ekphrasis on Achilles’ shield, the games describe scripts that are self-contained
narrative digressions from the Iliad ’s unresolved major conflicts, and by analogy the
scenes on the shield and the games offer an ideal solution to the intractability of those
conflicts.’ For Farenga, however, both scenes ‘dramatize ways a basileus may perform a
dikeˆ consistent with themis’ (p. 145): he does not regard the institutions that Achilles sets
up as the place where the people may find security. Christensen (2007), ch. 9 also
discusses the importance of the games to the political situation in the Achaean camp.
179 See Ellsworth (1974), with Prologue, n. 32 above.
180 On the formal institutions for judging in the games: Gernet (1955), 2–18. On
Achilles’ role as adjudicator: Hammer (1997b), 14–15. The games could be interpreted
as preparing for war, as they are later in Virgil (Aen. 5.103–603); but here they replace
martial conflict with an alternative means of achieving the kind of honour that so
preoccupies Achilles in Iliad 1. See Garvie (1994), 258–9 on the Phaeacian games
(Od. 8.104–32).
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may be noted. First, the Achaeans compete for prizes ‘in the middle’ in a
form of competition that rewards merit.181 Second, contest spills over
into the group looking on, which demonstrates the activity of the
audience in the ago¯n.182 Lastly, Achilles mediates in conflict, a conflict,
moreover, that recalls his own.183 Truly, a new kind of politics is born:
but one that has been possible by virtue of the audience’s experience of
the poem from its beginning.
By experiencing the assembly as a process—that is, as a series of
struggles, not as a closed system—the poem’s audience become impli-
cated in realizing it as an institution that makes use of disagreement. It is
for this reason that we never quite get to the polis in the narrative itself.
As the audience experience the assembly themselves, they come to
realize its potential as a central institution of the polis.184 In similar
terms Jean-Pierre Vernant describes a process by which the centring of
the city ‘on the agora, the communal space’ impacts upon how people
mentally view their world.185 Experiencing debate in the Iliad helps
construct an audience engaged in thinking about how people interact
with each other in the context of an arena in which public concerns are
raised and contested. By inviting its audience to reflect on the nature
and status of debate—where they are going to draw the lines, the issues
that are at stake, and so on—the Iliad surpasses any single (imagined
or real) performance context to operate as an aetiological—or
181 See Detienne (1996), 95, with nn. 150, 159 of this chapter, above, and Ch. 3,
n. 139 with text, below.
182 See esp. 23.482–7, where Idomeneus challenges the lesser Ajax to a contest of
spectating. W. Scott (1997), 221 observes that the ago¯n puts the emphasis on problems
of conduct for contestants and spectators alike, rather than on the skill of the former
alone. Hammer (1997b) argues that Achilles resolves the crisis by getting the two parties
to imagine themselves as onlookers to a quarrel (23.494). Farenga (2006), 150 talks of
the ‘intersubjective perspective’ that Achilles imposes on his peers.
183 See esp. 23.539–54, where Antilochus contests Achilles to award his prize to
somebody else in language that resonates with Achilles’ strife with Agamemnon. Achilles
smiles in response (23.555–6).
184 Morris (1996), 20 discusses a pre-democratic stage where members of a group,
who believe that ‘they are all about equally well qualified to participate in the decisions of
the group’, govern themselves ‘through some sort of democratic process’. He denies the
relevance of his ‘strong principle of equality’ to the Iliad (p. 31).
185 Vernant (1982), 47–8.
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foundational—narrative for a world of ‘today’.186 The text itself does
not perform politics; its audience are the ones performing politics.
Of course, politics is hardly ever exemplary of group decision-
making: debates within the Iliad have more than adequately shown
that. But, whereas a sense of achievement is felt nevertheless, in the
Odyssey that accomplishment comes under the severest examination.
186 The Iliad ’s heroic world of the past is exploited ‘for the way in which it can, as a
purely fictional world also can, cast light upon the structures of the present world’:
Osborne (1996), 33. Farenga (2006), 172 concludes: ‘despite the emergence in the Iliad
of prototypical forms of citizen communication and cognition centred around Achilles,
the poem’s representations of dispute settlement do not really enact roles and procedures
characteristic of citizen participation.’ Perhaps not: but the institutions have been
represented in such a way that enables citizen participation to take place among the
audience.
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2
Sidelining debate in the Odyssey
In his influential book on Homeric society, The World of Odysseus,
Moses Finley writes:1
Never in either the Iliad or theOdyssey is there a rational discussion, a sustained,
disciplined consideration of circumstances and their implication, of possible
courses of action, their advantages and disadvantages. There are lengthy argu-
ments, as between Achilles and Agamemnon, or between Telemachus and the
suitors, but they are quarrels, not discussions, in which each side seeks to
overpower the other by threats and to win over the assembled multitude by
emotional appeal, by harangues, and by warnings.
The first chapter has already shown that more is at stake in debate than
quarrelling leaders alone, and that looking for ‘a sustained, disciplined
consideration of circumstances and their implications’ betrays unwar-
ranted assumptions about how debate is represented and neglects its
performance in the narrative. On the other hand, it is notable that
Finley came to such a conclusion in a work largely devoted to the
Odyssey, where debate occupies a far less central role in the poem’s
story and narrative dynamics. Instead, studies on storytelling dominate
Odyssean scholarship: this chapter puts the focus back on debate and
attempts to explain just why its presence is far less noticeable.
Though scenes of Achaean assemblies in the Iliad tend to valorize, in
some measure at least, dissent from authority, at least two figures remain
largely opposed to that strategy, Agamemnon and Odysseus: Agamem-
non attempts to forestall opposition to his authority by overt displays of
1 Finley (2002), 106. Finley’s claim—that nowhere in Homer do the Greeks delib-
erate in the modern sense of a sustained rational discussion—particularly exercises
Farenga (2006)—at pp. 10, 32, 66 and 112. Schofield (1986) shows that rational
discussion (euboulia) does emerge as an important virtue of heroic society: but his
anaylsis is restricted to the Iliad.
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his power; Odysseus’ relationship to debate is far more complex and
nuanced. He prevents a ‘nostos beyond fate’ in the Achaean assembly
of book 2 (Il. 2.155); he leads the embassy to Achilles in book 9
(Il. 9.192), circumspectly omits Agamemnon’s demand of obedience
(9.158–61),2 and passes over the progress made in the negotiations
when he reports back (9.677–92);3 and he mediates in the debate between
Achilles and Agamemnon in book 19, holding up Achilles’ drive to war in
the process. His way with words fits Achilles’ initial rejection of Agamem-
non’s offer: ‘I hate like the gates of Hades the man who says one thing but
keeps another in his heart.’4 Odysseus’ rhetoric of consensus threatens
Achilles’ swiftness to—and the Iliad ’s valorization of—dissent.
Odysseus finds himself much more at home in his narrative tradi-
tion:5 more important to the success of this narrative than debating in
the public assembly is the hero’s ability to spin a yarn in the quasi-
private setting of the swineherd’s hut or royal palace.6 This shift in the
style of discourse that is valorized, and the kind of location that comes
into focus, has profound consequences for the way debate is conceived
2 Lynn-George (1988), 86–92 and 111–21 is particularly good on this. Slatkin
(2005), 316 suggests that the Embassy depicts Odysseus as ‘the tool of Agamemnon,
relaying to the alienated hero the king’s grandiose, overbearing offer of material riches’.
3 There is a rhetorical force in doing that: by stressing the worst possible scenario—
Achilles’ imminent departure—Odysseus succeeds in prompting the others to a great effort,
as represented by Diomedes’ rousing exhortation (Il. 9.697–711). On the other hand,
anxietiesmay remain: Scodel (1989) understandsOdysseus’ report as tragic irony asAchilles
and the group in general misread each others’ intentions; Stanley (1993), 118 suggests that
Odysseus rejects the understanding that has been reached between Achilles and Ajax.
4 ‘KåŁæe. ª$æ #%Ø Œ*E&%. ›#H. 36'Æ% )2ºfi Å"Ø& j ‹. å0 = !*æ%& #b& Œ*2Łfi Å K&d çæ*"/&,
¼ºº% 'b *Y)fi Å’, Il. 9.312–13. Ostensibly Achilles is talking about his own response, but
his words could equally apply to Odysseus: Nagy (1979), 52.
5 In his study of epic conflict, Nagler (1988), 81 draws a distinction between the two
Homeric poems on the basis of social order, the Iliad ’s ‘people’ (laos) and the household
(oikos) of the Odyssey: these competing groups ‘involve different networks of loyalty and
responsibility and can involve mutually contradictory values’. Scully (1990), 102–3
similarly comments: ‘The relative insignificance of Ithaca’s polis should not be surprising
since theOdyssey is primarily concerned with the reconstruction of the family and societal
order constructed around the extended family.’ This chapter will argue that the Odyssey’s
turn to home affects the way debate is conceived and represented. In doing so, it helps set
up the opposition between polis and oikos that comes to dominate the tragic stage.
6 On the Odyssey’s focus on disguise and deception, see Pucci (1979; 1987);
Murnaghan (1987a); Goldhill (1991), 1–68; Segal (1994). Slatkin (1986), 256 empha-
sizes ‘the importance of understanding recognition on Ithaca as a function of '/ŒÅ’ (italics
in the original).
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and represented. Viewed through Odysseus’ gaze, dissent no longer
appears as a profitable means of negotiating crisis: it is, instead, a source
of the problem that places the community, with the household at its
centre, under threat. Thus, what is usually regarded as the Odyssey’s
playfulness is in fact deadly serious: debates fracture along partisan lines;
detractors from theOdyssey’s tale of family reunion are marginalized and
silenced; the contest of battle amounts to slaughter behind closed
doors.7 At the same time this highly paradoxical narrative frequently
lays bare its highly manipulative strategy, revelling in its suppression of
dissenting voices even as it challenges the rival Iliadic tradition.8
This chapter explores theOdyssey’s more problematic vision of dissent
in four parts. The first section examines the assemblies that take place
in Ithaca. Although four assemblies are mentioned, only two are treated
in any detail,9 which already demonstrates the narrative’s different
approach to debate, borne out by their frame, structure and perfor-
mance. Though the narrative appears to concede the stage to malcon-
tents and gestures towards openness, it carefully frames those dissenting
voices and shows little interest in the assembly as an institution of social
cohesion. Section 2 considers a startling difference from the Iliad in
7 Slatkin (2005), 316 usefully summarizes the task facing the Odyssey thus: ‘How are
the cherished Iliadic ideals of loyalty and effective leadership to be conjured in a poem
centering on Odysseus, given his variegated history—especially if that history includes
traditions about Odysseus as the sole survivor of his band of men . . . , who is both
unsuccessful in protecting his companions from destruction and . . . is responsible for the
destruction of the youth of his city? . . .TheOdyssey thus, against real odds, has the task of
making Odysseus into a character with whom its audience sympathizes and whom it
wants to see succeed . . .To this end, the poem narrates his journey homeward and
depicts its destination in such a way as to generate in the audience a shared stake in
Odysseus’ hope of return.’
8 Though the relationship between the two Homeric poems has already been raised in
Act I, introduction, n. 1 above, and a methodology for approaching them set out, it is
worthwhile returning to that question at the beginning of this chapter, given the high
degree to which the Odyssey intersects with the Iliad. The general methodological
approach remains the same: particular story-patterns, themes and word units resonate
through a wide epic tradition, which includes the Iliadic and Odyssean narrative tradi-
tions. Yet, given that the Odyssey at least seems to play off the Iliad more directly, this
chapter will be concerned to draw out the significance of that interplay. It does not find it
necessary, however, to posit that either poem plays off an exact textual version of the
other. Pucci (1987), 18 is less worried by the distortions of approaching this relationship
through a literary lens: ‘Clearly, the Iliad and theOdyssey presume each other, border and
limit each other, to such an extent that one, as it were, writes the other’ (my italics).
Currie (2006) also analyses the epic tradition in terms of allusion between specific texts.
9 They occur at Od. 2.6–257; 16.342–408; 20.240–7; 24.421–64.
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the way in which assemblies are talked about, an issue that becomes
particularly acute when the hero himself takes over the telling of his tale.
The narration of debate has the effect of consolidating authority along
with the concomitant strategy of suppressing dissent. Section 3 focuses
on the end-game of book 22, when Odysseus and his son meet the
suitors head-on in battle. The battle scene serves as a useful extreme case
for thinking about the general representation of contest within this epic.
In its competition with the rival Iliadic tradition, the Odyssey’s narrative
succeeds in marshalling the forces to rally behind Odysseus and reduces
the opportunity for remaining neutral. The final section reconsiders the
Odyssey’s renowned self-reflexivity in the light of the enquiry into
dissent. Divine assemblies serve to frame the action of the poem. By
being so explicitly related to the poem’s structure, they expose the
constructedness of this particular account.
1. HOW TO RENDER DISSENT AS ANTISOCIAL
BEHAVIOUR (ODYSSEY 2, 24)
In contrast to the Iliad, only two human assemblies are represented in
any detail in theOdyssey, in books 2 and 24.10 As a result of their relative
positions at the onset and closure of the poem, they frame the events
that take place on Ithaca and invite reflection on them. Moreover,
neither assembly seems to achieve a great deal. Telemachus ostensibly
calls the first in order to complain of the suitors’ disgraceful behaviour
in his home; but he cannot, or does not, resolve that matter in this
institution. Nor do the suitors form any kind of cohesive opposition
through their collective dissent. The last assembly is convoked at a time
when rumour of the suitors’ deaths is abroad, but again the assembly
serves to mark the disunity of the group. Thus, the Odyssean assembly is
shown to be incapable of managing dissent properly, and resolution
occurs in battle instead. Unlike the Achaean assemblies in the Iliad, this
pair of assemblies does not open ‘a space in which the joint efforts of
10 Using the term Iª%æ+ provides six instances of assembly—two in Phaeacia (Od.
8.5–46, 109–256; cf. 7.44) as well as the four on Ithaca already mentioned in the
previous note. But all are mentioned only in passing, with the exception of the first and
last Ithacan assembly.
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shepherd and group are co-ordinated with the aim of ensuring the
success of social life’.11 Instead they expose the inadequacy of formal
debate as a means for containing and making use of opposing voices.
It’s not a public matter
The first Ithacan assembly establishes various points of contact with the
assemblies from the Iliad. Most obviously, the setting-up of the assem-
bly (Od. 2.6–9) exactly matches the lines with which Agamemnon
convokes the assembly of Iliad 2 (Il. 2.50–3).12 Not only does this
suggest a common formula for convoking an assembly; it also estab-
lishes a connection between the two scenes of assembly.13 But each
operates differently within its narrative. In the Iliad the elaborate con-
vocation of the assembly to some degree relies on the precedent estab-
lished by Achilles prior to it: the more formal tokens of its establishment
exist precisely because one has already taken place and established the
assembly as an institution that may accommodate dissent. That is not
the case in the Odyssey: this assembly is the first for the Ithacans. One
effect of the resonant pattern triggered by the elaborate formula is that
the audience have yet to ascertain what the assembly means to the
Ithacans.14
Another point of comparison occurs between the modes of the two
institutionalizing acts. In the first Achaean assembly of the Iliad,
Achilles calls the people to assembly after Hera had put it into his
mind (Il. 1.55). Here, Telemachus calls the people to assembly on the
advice of Athena. I noted above the prominence of Athena in the
opening episodes of the Iliad, when she intervenes to prevent Achilles
from striking down Agamemnon and to prompt Odysseus into restor-
ing order—both times at the behest of Hera.15 Her role in the Odyssey,
11 Haubold (2000), 35. Cf. scholars’ comments on the Iliad, discussed in Act I,
introduction, above.
12 ÆP!aæ › ŒÅæ2Œ*""Ø ºØªıçŁ,ªª%Ø"Ø Œ1º*ı"* j ŒÅæ2""*Ø& Iª%æ+&'* Œ$æÅ Œ%#,ø&!Æ.
3åÆØ%2.· j %ƒ #b& KŒ+æı""%&, !%d '0 Mª*/æ%&!% #$º0 tŒÆ, Od. 2.6–8¼Il. 2.50–2 (with
ÆrłÆ 'b replacing the ÆP!aæ › of the Iliad ).
13 Haft (1992), 228–9 compares the speeches of Agamemnon and Telemachus.
14 Knowledge of the assembly experience from the broader epic tradition, such as the
Iliad, could play a part in that assessment.
15 Il. 1.194–218; 2.156–82.
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then, comes as no surprise, especially given her close association with
Odysseus, of which the Iliad also shows awareness.16 The manner and
effect of her role, however, are rather different. In the Iliad Athena acts
as a conduit for Hera, whose interventions elicit little comment from
the Homeric narrator and have ambiguous results.17 Athena’s role in the
first Ithacan assembly, on the other hand, is extensively developed. She
broaches the subject in consultation with Zeus (Od. 1.90), before
appearing to Telemachus in the form of Mentes (1.271–3):
‘*N '0 ¼ª* &F& 5ı&/*Ø ŒÆd K#H& K#)$Ç*% #2Łø&·
ÆhæØ%& *N. Iª%æc& ŒÆº1"Æ. læøÆ. 3åÆØ%f.
#FŁ%& )1çæÆ'* )A"Ø, Ł*%d '0 K)d #$æ!ıæ%Ø 7"!ø&.’
‘Come, now, pay close attention to me and fulfil my instructions. Tomorrow
call the heroes of the Achaeans to assembly, declaring your word to all, and let
the gods be your witnesses.’
First, the level of Athena’s guidance may be noted: she carefully stage-
manages the first Ithacan assembly and directs its outcome, even before it
takes place. Athena not only determines the agenda of the assembly; she
also directs its outcome. Second, she does so in a way that underpins
Telemachus’ authority: he is to ‘declare his word to all’. The word here
is #FŁ%., that authoritative speech act used, as noted above, for denoting
both Hector’s advice before the Trojans and Agamemnon’s dismissal of
Chryses.18 Whereas Agamemnon fails to enforce his word due to the
actions of a god,19 Telemachus is invited to declare his word by a god.
The lines that follow his formal convocation of the assembly show
Telemachus in a similar light. He enters carrying a spear; Athena
showers grace over him; all the people gaze in wonder at him; he sits
on his father’s throne; the elders make way for him (Od. 2.9–14).
16 Given Athena’s closeness to Odysseus, as is demonstrated by her involvement in
both of his Iliadic achievements in the assembly of book 2, his night adventure of book
10, and the foot-race in book 23, then we may—retrospectively, at least—feel anxiety
about her tug on Achilles’ hair. Achilles takes it as a sign of her closeness to him
(Il. 1.201–5), but its ultimate fulfilment comes with the death of his best friend,
Patroclus, and his own.
17 In each case Hera responds to a crisis in the Achaean camp, but fails to resolve the
matter conclusively: Hom. Il. 1.194–6, 2.155–65; cf. 1.55–6.
18 See Ch.1, n. 119 above.
19 Agamemnon’s ‘mighty word’ (ŒæÆ!*æ,. #FŁ%., Il. 1.25). See Ch.1, sec.1 above.
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Everything is done to underline his authority. Only the interruption by
a third party threatens the peace: enter Aegyptius.
Just as the ground has been prepared for Telemachus to speak, the
narrative springs a surprise: an unheralded character is introduced as the
first speaker. Unlike all the other institutionalizing agents who convoke
assemblies in the Iliad, Telemachus does not speak first.20 The scenario
brings to mind Iliad 2, where the many narrative dislocations served to
destabilize Agamemnon’s authority.
Moreover, the narrator’s lengthy description of old man Aegyptius
recalls the Iliad ’s difficulty of incorporating Thersites into its narrative
body (Od. 2.15–24):
!%E"Ø '0 7)*ØŁ0 læø. `Nª2)!Ø%. qæå0 Iª%æ*2*Ø&,
‹. 'c ª+æÆœ Œıçe. 7Å& ŒÆd #ıæ/Æfi X'Å.
ŒÆd ªaæ !%F ç/º%. ıƒe. –#0 I&!ØŁ1øfi 0O'ı"Bœ
0 ”ºØ%& *N. *h)øº%& 7:Å Œ%/ºfi Å. K&d &Åı"/&,
@&!Øç%. ÆNå#Å!+.· !e& '0 ¼ªæØ%. 7Œ!Æ&* ˚2Œºøł
K& ")Bœ ªºÆçıæfiH, )2#Æ!%& '0 ›)º/""Æ!% ',æ)%&.
!æ*E. '1 %ƒ ¼ºº%Ø 7"Æ&, ŒÆd › #b& #&Å"!Bæ"Ø& ›#/º*Ø,
¯Pæ2&%#%., '2% '0 ÆNb& 7å%& )Æ!æ-œÆ 7æªÆ·
Iºº 0 %P'0 S. !%F º+Ł*!0 O'ıæ,#*&%. ŒÆd Iå*2ø&.
!%F ‹ ª* '$Œæı å1ø& Iª%æ+"Æ!% ŒÆd #*!1*Ø)*·
The first to speak to them was the hero Aegyptius, who was hunched over in his
old age and knew countless things. And—since his dear son went to Ilion rich
with horses with god-like Odysseus in hollow ships, Antiphus the spearman;
and wild Cyclops slew him in his deep cave, and the last whom he made his
dinner; and he had three other sons, one of whom, Eurynomos, was companion
to the suitors, while the other two looked after their father’s affairs; but he did
not forget Antiphus, lamenting and crying for him—it was in tears for him now
that he addressed the assembly and spoke.
The lengthy narratorial description offers several reasons for thinking
that Aegyptius presents a similar challenge to the authority of the king as
Thersites had done, though one with a great deal more potential. First,
Aegyptius is not only one of the elders of the community; he is also a ‘hero’
20 ‘Exceptionally, the first speaker of the assembly is not its convener’: de Jong
(2001), 47.
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(læø.), the highly marked term that evokes the glory of a past era.21 As a
figure who ‘knew countless things’, he is in fact more of a Calchas than a
Thersites. Second, his description resonates with the language used of
two powerful figures: the detail that ‘he did not forget’ his son recalls
Zeus’ assurance to Athena (made just prior to this scene) that he has
not forgotten Odysseus;22 his shedding of tears is a formula used of
Agamemnon in Iliad 9, and thus evokes the shepherd of the people
weeping for the predicament of his flock.23 It leaves an impression of a
speaker of some authority, who has good grounds to speak—not at all like
a Thersites, who could be literally beaten from the speaking arena.
Aegyptius is weeping for his son. The phrase ‘mourning for him’
suggests that his son is dead; indeed, an explanatory clause starting ŒÆd
ª$æ supplies the detail: ‘And, for his dear son had been killed, he wept for
him and spoke thus.’ In this way, the ª$æ-clause acts something like a
parenthesis.24 But there is more: Aegyptius has four sons, of whom two
were living with their father, one was living it up with the suitors, while the
fourth, the one for whom he sheds tears, was no longer living at all. This
son, Antiphus, having gone to Troy with Odysseus, has been eaten by the
Cyclops. The detail is remarkable, advertising the briefest trailer of future
events and posing some pretty awkward questions for the narrative to
come: how did Antiphus end up as someone’s dinner? And what has gone
wrong with Odysseus’ return home for this to have occurred?25 With
Aegyptius’ concern for his son uppermost in his mind as he rises to speak,
the assembly threatens to stage an almighty challenge to the son of
Odysseus—as had been the case in the first Achaean assembly of the
Iliad, when Achilles had sponsored a voice in dissent of Agamemnon.
21 See Act I, intro., n. 18 above.
22 ‘How could I forget godlike Odysseus?’ (‘)H. ¼& 7)*Ø!0 0O'ı"B%. Kªg Ł*/%Ø%
ºÆŁ%/#Å&’, Od. 1.65).
23 ‘Among them Agamemnon stood crying’ (i& '0 3ªÆ#1#&ø& j ¥"!Æ!% '$Œæı å1ø&,
Il. 9.13–14).
24 Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth (1988), 130 n. 17 comment: ‘the following
parenthesis should probably be taken as giving the reason why he was first to speak,
not as an explanation of [line] 16.’
25 No doubt the Homeric narrator can risk jolting his audience like this because
Odysseus’ encounter with Cyclops was so well known. For the popularity of Cyclops in
art, and its independence from Homer, see Snodgrass (1998), 89–100. For folklore in
the Odyssey more generally, see Page (1973). For the usual tactic employed by the
Homeric narrator of careful preparation, see S. Richardson (1990), 132–5.
96 Act I: Epic
Barker 9780199542710_0029-0202_Barker_chap2-3 Final Proof page 96 29.4.2011 10:44am
But there is a crucial point to make: Aegyptius does not know any of
this information, which has caused commentators some anxiety:26
‘According to the scholia these lines were athetized, presumably
by Aristarchus; we do not know why, but these details are a slight
distraction and we need to remind ourselves that we are being told
more than Aegyptius himself or anyone else in Ithaca knew.’ These
lines are a slight distraction and we need to remind ourselves that we are
being told more: far from presenting a challenge to authority, therefore,
this narratorial description invites the audience to play along with the tale
being told and become complicit with it. The gloss affords a glimpse of
an alternative story that would tell of Odysseus’ wanderings in chron-
ological sequence from a third-person perspective in which the victim is
named and his loss explored through his father. But the Odyssey
has another way of narrating that episode, through the eyes of the hero
himself. And, when he recounts the events of Cyclops’ cave, Odysseus
conspicuously avoids naming Antiphon or any of his other compa-
nions.27 In the case of this first Ithacan assembly, the prospect of dissent
is introduced in such a way as to threaten the story that is going to be told.
If only Aegyptius knew . . .Yet, when Aegyptius speaks, he doesn’t
mention the fate of his son because he doesn’t know. The parenthesis
shuts him out. Far from challenging Odysseus’ son when he speaks,
Aegyptius articulates a series of questions that in fact provide a frame-
work for Telemachus’ response.28 Thus Aegyptius’ tears, shed in ignor-
ance of his son’s fate, serve to draw a connection to Telemachus, tearful
and ignorant of his father’s fate. In addition, Aegyptius further discloses
that no assembly had taken place since Odysseus’ departure.29 Not only
does he fail to ask the difficult questions; he also suggests the reason why
he doesn’t: the Ithacan people have not been accustomed to debating
26 Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth (1988), 130 nn. 19–20.
27 Odysseus names only three of his companions, Polites, Elpenor and Eurylochus,
each of whom is in some way to blame for his own downfall—according to Odysseus. S.
Richardson (1990), 100 observes the ‘curious’ incident of the omission of Antiphus’
name when Odysseus narrates his adventures: he accounts for it by pointing to its
relevance here for Antiphus’ father. For the importance of naming in relation to
Odysseus, see Goldhill (1991), 1–5.
28 Od. 2.30–2, 42–4.
29 Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth (1988), 131 nn. 26–7 interpret the fact that no
assembly had been held for nearly twenty years as indicating ‘that the poet regarded the
institution as peripheral to the political organization of Ithaca’ (my italics). See also Scully
(1990), 101, with bibliography (pp. 195–6, nn. 5, 6).
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issues in public without their leader. This is a community still very
much dependent on its leader and lacking the institutional security of
the kind that an assembly should provide30—and that has been seen
actualized over the course of the Iliad.
Given the potential disruption Aegyptius could have caused, it is no
wonder that Odysseus’ son is pleased with the old man’s speech (Od.
2.45). In fact, the narrative frame carefully identifies Telemachus with
his people. As he enters the Iª%æ+, ‘all the people held him in admira-
tion’;31 after he speaks, ‘pity for him gripped all the people’.32
A consensus dominates the beginning of this assembly, as if Telema-
chus’ concerns exactly matched the concerns of the people.33
In fact, though, Telemachus states the contrary. In answer to Aegyp-
tius’ series of questions regarding the reason for their gathering, Tele-
machus announces that he has called an assembly ‘not out of any public
concern’ (%h!* !Ø '+#Ø%& ¼ºº%, 2.44) but for his own need (Iºº0 K#e&
ÆP!%F åæ*E%., 2.45): he is looking to find some relief from the suitors
who are eating him out of house and home. Ideally, private and public
affairs would match, particularly if the private dealings of the ruling
house were the issue. Yet, not only does Telemachus’ formulation of the
assembly’s business sound provocative—private need is expressed in
opposition to public concerns34—it is also difficult to ascertain the
level and nature of public support. In spite of the narrator’s passing
comment that all the people pitied Telemachus, what the people think,
or even who they are, remains something of a mystery as the assembly
progresses.35 So too, therefore, does the public value of this assembly.
30 ‘Ithaka has had no civic assembly, no ruler, and therefore no “government” for
twenty years. And one may well imagine that it had little enough before and will have
little enough in the future.’ Halverson (1985), 138. Elsewhere, Halverson argues that
political interpretations of the Odyssey are unwarranted, since ‘in fact there is no throne,
no office of king, indeed no real Ithakan state’: (1986), 119.
31 !e& '0 ¼æÆ )$&!*. ºÆ%d K)*æå,#*&%& ŁÅ*F&!%, 2.13.
32 %rŒ!%. '0 =º* ºÆe& –)Æ&!Æ, 2.81. See Haubold (2000), 111.
33 He addresses the assembled group using a series of second-person plural verbs: e.g.
&*#*""+ŁÅ!*, 2.64; ÆN'1"ŁÅ!*, 2.65; ()%'*/"Æ!*, 2.66; "å1"Ł* ç/º%Ø 2.70, etc.
34 Scully (1990), 103 draws an interesting comparison to Odysseus: ‘When respond-
ing to Alkinoos’ question: “Tell me your land [gaia], your district [de¯mos], and your city
[polis]” (8.555), Odysseus ignores the question about polis, choosing instead to speak
about his island . . . [and] continuing his reply, he speaks only of the oikos.’ According to
Scully, this is part of the Odyssey’s general reticence in citing Ithaca as a polis (p. 104).
35 Three suitors speak in the assembly, but just how representative they are of the people
is open to question, particularly when both Telemachus and Mentor appeal over the heads
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It is a far cry from the circumstances in which the first assembly of the
Iliad was established, when Achilles called an assembly on behalf of
the whole community precisely as a response to a wilful assertion of the
king’s.
After Aegyptius’ opening speech, nothing is heard of him again.
Instead two speakers rise to defend Telemachus and the house of
Odysseus; three suitors make their complaints, two of whom, Antinous
and Eurymachus, turn out to be the most prominent members of this
group. The sheer number of speakers already implies a degree of social
cohesion lacking within the community. Furthermore, the community
fractures along highly partisan lines, those with Telemachus, and those
against him.36
Those with Telemachus are Halitherses, the bird-interpreter, and
Mentor, overseer of Odysseus’ household. Both are introduced by the
formula, ‘with good intentions for them he addressed the assembly and
said’ (‹ "çØ& K€ıçæ%&1ø& Iª%æ+"Æ!% ŒÆd #*!1*Ø)*, 2.160¼ 2.228), a
formulaic line which is also used to introduce Nestor’s conciliatory
speech in Iliad 1 and which resonates more broadly with Nestor’s public
role.37 Telemachus’ supporters, then, gain sanction through association
with a character whose kindly words consistently aim at maintaining, or
restoring, group unity.38
Yet, like Aegyptius before him, Halitherses is introduced as a ‘hero’
(2.157). The fact that no fewer than two characters address the Ithacan
assembly as heroes suggests a context very unlike that of the assembly
in the Iliad, in which debate was instituted as an essential part of the
well-being of the community.39 Instead, the tag of ‘hero’ suggests an
of the suitors to the people at large: nn. 46, 47 below with accompanying text. For the
question of the people of Ithaca’s identity, see Haubold (2000), 100–44, esp. 111–14.
36 de Jong (2001), 45–6 provides a useful summary of the assembly’s rigidly opposi-
tional format. She comments: ‘the structure of the exchange is largely irregular, which
conveys the heated atmosphere’ (p. 45).
37 Il. 1.253. Of the fifteen instances of this formulaic line in Homeric poetry, no
fewer than five introduce Nestor (Il. 1.253; 2.78; 7.326; 9.95; Od. 24.53). From all the
other attributions, only Halistherses is introduced in this way more than once (the other
occasion is at Od. 24.453).
38 de Jong (2001), 57 notes how Mentor’s speech is ‘plugged’ by the narrator’s
commendatory speech introduction of l. 228.
39 No character addresses an assembled body in the Iliad as a hero, with the exception
of Agamemnon in book 2, when he is clearly trying to pursue his own goal of taking Troy
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individual unfettered by social ties, acting independent of, and in
opposition to, the communal institution.40 Similarly, Halitherses
speaks after Zeus has sent two eagles who, ‘upon reaching the middle
of the multi-voiced assembly’ (‹!* 'c #1""Å& Iª%æc& )%º2çÅ#%&
ƒŒ1"ŁÅ&, 2.150), tore at each other. Although Zeus frequently sends
bird signs in the Iliad, none occur in the context of an assembly.41 The
only comparable scene is Poulydamus’ interpretation of the divine sign,
when a snake is dropped by the eagle ‘in the middle’ (#1"øfi '0 K&Ø, Il.
12.206) of the Trojans—but that lacked any formal institutional con-
text.42 Unlike Poulydamas, moreover, Halitherses speaks from a posi-
tion of unassailable authority: his interpretation matches the reason the
narrator has already given us, that Zeus has sent his eagles in support of
Telemachus. There is no room for ambiguity here; this is no seer
speaking in enigmatic terms from the sidelines.
Just as Halitherses speaks up in the assembly to underline his (and
Zeus’) support of Telemachus’ rebuff of Antinous, so Mentor speaks on
behalf of Telemachus’ rebuke of Eurymachus. The narrator even more
closely identifies Mentor with Odysseus, as guardian of the household
and Odysseus’ ‘companion’ (9!ÆEæ%., Od. 2.225). Later, Odysseus
will narrate the fate of his companions, though their culpability in the
loss of their homecoming has already been introduced in the poem’s
opening lines;43 while we have even briefly heard of the fate of one such
that day: Il. 2.110–41. See Haubold (2000), 55–8, with n. 47. See Act I, intro., n. 18
above.
40 The success of Odysseus’ story is reliant upon him ridding himself precisely of this
bond between leader and ºÆ%/ , most of whom he will end up killing: Haubold (2000),
126–43.
41 In the assembly of Iliad 2 Odysseus himself relates an embedded prophecy: Haft
(1992). But the two assemblies are very different. In fact, that assembly of Iliad 2 in some
way foreshadows the problems of assembling in the Odyssey. Its prophecy (delivered by
Odysseus!) is coming to fulfilment.
42 See Ch.1, n. 121 above.
43 The narrator is unequivocal in the condemnation of the companions: ‘Odysseus,
though he desired it greatly, couldn’t save his companions, for they died by their own
recklessness, the fools’, (Iºº0 %P'0 S. 9!$æ%ı. Kææ2"Æ!%, ƒ1#*&,. )*æ· j ÆP!H& ªaæ
"ç*!1æfi Å"Ø& I!Æ"ŁÆº/fi Å"Ø& Zº%&!%, j &+)Ø%Ø, Od. 1.6–8). For the phrase ‘they died by
their own recklessness’, see Ch. 3, n. 132 below. According to de Jong (2001), 230,
&+)Ø%. ‘belongs to the character-language’—which makes its appearance in narrator-text
even more striking. Cf. Griffin (1983), 126; de Jong (1987), 86–7. It is striking that the
narrator’s judgement, so sparingly used in the Iliad, is immediately called in to use in the
Odyssey.
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figure.44 Significantly, however, the first sight of one of Odysseus’
companions portrayed in the narrative is not a member of the troubled
group whom we are yet to see, but a loyal retainer of the household. The
narrator carefully prepares us for assessing that group’s demise by first
demonstrating the service of a true companion of Odysseus, whose form
is even regularly assumed by Athena.45
Like Halitherses before him, Mentor addresses his speech to the
Ithacans in general:46 this, however, apparently does not mean the
whole group. In concluding his petition Mentor delivers his advice to
the ‘rest of the people’ (&F& '0 ¼ººøfi '+#øfi , 2.239) alone, by complaining
that they all sit there in silence while the suitors carry on with their
antisocial behaviour (2.240–1). Therefore, while appearing to direct his
speech towards everyone, Mentor appeals over the heads of the suitors
to the rest of the community, who are imagined as standing by and
watching the events unfold.47 There is no attempt to engage the suitors
in debate; rather, Mentor places emphasis on the broader community as
judges of the events on Ithaca. This assembly does not promote a
collective enterprise for resolving the crisis in the community; instead,
it sidelines the suitors and invites judgement to be cast upon them.
The marginalization of the suitors is confirmed by their representa-
tion in this assembly. At the end of Telemachus’ first speech in the
assembly, the narrator comments (2.80–1):
S. ç$!% åø,#*&%., )%!d 'b "ŒB)!æ%& :$º* ªÆ/fi Å,
'$Œæı 0 I&Æ)æ+"Æ.· %rŒ!%. '0 =º* ºÆe& –)Æ&!Æ.
So he spoke in anger, and he threw the sceptre to the ground, bursting out into
tears. And pity held the whole people.
While the line ‘he threw the sceptre to the ground’ ()%!d 'b "ŒB)!æ%&
:$º* ªÆ/fi Å) may well resonate within a broader epic tradition, in which
assembly scenes are similarly disrupted, this is one case in which a
44 Antiphus (2.19–20)—though he is not labelled as a companion at this point.
45 See e.g. 2.268; 22.206; 24.548.
46 ‘Hear me now, Ithacans’ (‘Œ1Œºı!* 'c &F& #*ı’, 2.229); cf. 161. Œ1Œºı!* is the
address used by Antenor and Priam, in their appeals to the Trojans: see Ch.1, nn. 108,
109 above.
47 This strategy mirrors Telemachus’ opening gambit, in which he tries to drive a
wedge between the Ithacans and the suitors by talking about the latter to the former: see
de Jong (2001), 48.
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comparison to the Iliad—or at least an Iliadic tradition in which
Achilles features prominently—may be worthwhile, for the language
and image of these lines powerfully resonates with the key moment in
the first Achaean assembly when Achilles expressed his utter disaffection
with Agamemnon and the group by throwing down the sceptre in their
midst.48 Telemachus’ act, then, replays the Iliadic Achilles’ symbolic act
of dissent. But the association of Telemachus with the figure of dissent
from the rival tradition is immediately corrected by the Odyssey: after
throwing down the sceptre, Telemachus bursts into tears. With his
message of restraint and compromise together with his youthfulness,
he does not really make an Achilles after all. Nevertheless, the resonant
pattern that has been established serves another function too. Picking up
the sceptre in the Iliad was Nestor.49 Yet here, in the Odyssey, the next
speaker exploits the crisis by presenting a story that is potentially
disruptive of the narrative: the honey-tongued voice of a Nestor is
replaced by the hectoring Antinous. If the audience were expecting a
figure of compromise, the suitor’s words would sound out of key from
the very beginning of his speech when he labels Telemachus ‘a lofty
orator’ ((łÆª,æÅ, 2.85).50
First of the suitors to speak, Antinous, presents the goal of their enter-
prise:marriage to Penelope. In his portrait of this lady, he paints a picture of
Penelope as tricky, weaving (and unweaving) tapestries.51 Significantly, this
view of the female threat to male dominance is, in fact, the norm in the
Odyssey. Odysseus and his men find themselves in constant danger from
female figures, such as Circe, the Sirens, Calypso, evenNausicaa; Agamem-
non provides the potential paradigm for Odysseus—murdered on his
48 ‘So spoke the son of Peleus, and he threw to the ground the sceptre studded with
golden nails, and sat himself down’ (S. ç$!% —Åº*6'Å., )%!d 'b "ŒB)!æ%& :$º* ªÆ/fi Å j
åæı"*/%Ø. lº%Ø"Ø )*)Ææ#1&%&, =Ç*!% '0 ÆP!,., Il. 1.245–6). See Jaeger (1939), 27.
49 Again, we need not posit an actual allusion to the Iliad here, since it makes sense for
a figure of reconciliation, such as Nestor, to speak after such an act. Knowledge of the
assembly experience from the broader epic tradition, such as the Iliad, could play a part
in that assessment.
50 This contrasts to the narrator’s comment that all are sympathetic (2.81). Antinous’
very name already marks him out as an enemy of reason: he is ‘Anti-mind’: N. Austin
(1975), 206.
51 On (çÆ/&ø, see Rutherford (1992), 151 (on Od. 19.139–56) especially for this
word’s assocation with trickery.
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return home by his wife. Antinous’ depiction of Penelope, therefore,
correlates with the narrative’s presentation ofwomen elsewhere. The suitors
have a genuine case to present: Penelope is a tricky woman:52 the wooing of
a woman can be the subject of epic song.53
Along these lines, recalling the language used to denote the Greek
forces at Troy, the suitors consistently present themselves as engaging in
a heroic endeavour to rank alongside the Iliadic tradition of the war at
Troy. Antinous refers to the suitors as ‘the sons of the Achaeans’ (ıxÆ.
3åÆØH&, 2.115) or even as ‘the suitors of the Achaeans’ (#&Å"!Bæ*.
3åÆØH&, 2.87)!54 The next suitor to speak, Eurymachus, goes still
further (2.196–207):
‘%ƒ 'b ª$#%& !*25%ı"Ø ŒÆd Iæ!ı&1%ı"Ø& 7*'&Æ
)%ººa #$º 0 , ‹""Æ 7%ØŒ* ç/ºÅ. K)d )ÆØ'e. =)*"ŁÆØ.
%P ªaæ )æd& )Æ2"*"ŁÆØ O6%#ÆØ ıxÆ. 3åÆØH&
#&Å"!2%. IæªÆº1Å., K)*d %h !Ø&Æ '*/'Ø#*& 7#)Å.,
%h!0 %s& <Åº1#Æå%&, #$ºÆ )*æ )%º2#ıŁ%& K,&!Æ·
%h!* Ł*%)æ%)/Å. K#)ÆÇ,#*Ł0 , m& "f, ª*æÆØ1,
#ıŁ1ÆØ IŒæ$Æ&!%&, I)*åŁ$&*ÆØ '0 7!Ø #Aºº%&.
åæ+#Æ!Æ '0 Æs!* ŒÆŒH. :*:æ-"*!ÆØ, %P'1 )%!0 r"Æ
7""*!ÆØ, ZçæÆ Œ*& l ª* 'ØÆ!æ/:fi Å"Ø& 3åÆØ%f.
n& ª$#%&· B#*E. '0 Æs )%!Ø'1ª#*&%Ø X#Æ!Æ )$&!Æ
*¥ &*ŒÆ !B. Iæ*!B. KæØ'Æ/&%#*&, %P'b #*!0 ¼ººÆ.
Kæå,#*Ł0 , L. K)Ø*ØŒb. O)ıØ1#*& K"!d& 9Œ$"!øfi .’
‘Let him urge his mother to go back to her father’s, and they will arrange the
marriage and sort out the wedding presents, many of them, as is fitting for a
beloved daughter. For I don’t think that the sons of the Achaeans will give up
on their harsh courtship, since we don’t fear anyone and certainly not Tele-
machus though he speaks a lot. Nor do we care for any prophecy, which you,
old man, may tell us, which won’t be accomplished, and will make you even
more hated. And his possessions will be eaten away badly, nor will there be any
compensation, while she delays the Achaeans for her marriage, and while, we
52 Recent scholars have indeed unveiled a tricky Penelope. See Murnaghan (1987a),
118–47; Winkler (1990a); Katz (1991); Thalmann (1998), 193. Felson-Rubin (1994)
shows how Agamemnon (typically) misreads Penelope as rather simplistically a faithful
woman.
53 If the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women is anything to go by, in which we see the long
list of Helen’s suitors. See R. Hunter, ed. (2005). Cf. Pind. p. 9.111–18; Hdt. 6.126–30.
54 Cf. 2. 90, 106, 112, 128. Eurymachus: ıxÆ. 3åÆØH&, 2.198; cf. 204.
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waiting in expectation every day, strive for the sake of excellence, nor do we go
after any others, who would be fitting for any of us to marry.’
Eurymachus’ description of how they ‘strive for the sake of Iæ*!+’
(2.206), in their desire not ‘to cease from ‘painful suitoring’ ()Æ2"*
"ŁÆØ . . . #&Å"!2%. IæªÆº1Å., 2.199), resonates with the language of the
Iliad. In the Iliad the adjective IæªÆº1%. qualifies war, strife, fear, and so
on.55 Its application to ‘suitoring’ is not as surprising as it may at first
seem, given that even in the Iliad many characters relate the fighting at
Troy to a battle over a woman.56 Here, by reworking Iliadic language
and motifs, Eurymachus aligns the suitors with the Achaean group
fighting at Troy. From his perspective we get a glimpse of the suitors
displaying their heroic credentials in an Iliadic guise. At another level,
however, the comparison fails to hold. It is a particularly narrow reading
of the Iliad that reduces it to a battle over a woman; it is equally true that
it is somewhat perverse to accept the suitors’ characterization of them-
selves as the ‘sons of the Achaeans’. Because of the way in which this
narrative has already marginalized the suitors,57 the audience are invited
to see through their game and reject the presumption that they are the
equivalent of an Iliadic group; by doing so, these voices of dissent are
rejected and their suppression sanctioned.
This is an important point. The Odyssey’s display of its contest with a
rival epic tradition is no idle play: its playfulness conceals, or rather
defers, the question of what is really at stake. The Iliadic resonances
serve to distance the suitors and mask theOdyssey’s aggressive persuasion
55 )%º1#%. 14.87. Related evils: 7æª%& 4.471; å,º%. 10.107, 15.121, 18.119; ç%&+
10.521; 7æØ. 11.4, 17.385, 21.386; ç2º%)Ø. 11.278; 7ºŒ%. 11.812, 16.528; ŒÆ#$!%.
13.85; &%2"%. 13.667; ç,:%. 17.667; "!,&%. 19.214; cf. Łø+ 13.669; ÆY"Å 22.61;
("#/&Å 17.544.
56 See esp. Achilles, as he makes explicit the connection between Agamemnon taking
his woman and Paris’ rape of Helen (Il. 9.337–43).
57 The suitors have already been marginalized authoritatively by Athena, who calls
them (:æ/Ç%&!*. ()*æçØ$ºø., 1.227: they display a marked lack of hospitality to the new
arrival (Athena in disguise) and belated curiosity only after (s)he has gone. Similarly,
Slatkin (2005), 319 observes that, while the suitors think they are entitled to court
Penelope, ‘the poem puts its audience in the position of knowing that Odysseus is very
much alive, thus reinforcing our sense of the suitors’ behavior as inappropriate and
pernicious’.
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of its audience. The suitors find themselves in the wrong narrative. They
are wooing a woman who already has a man.58
The suitors’ repeated rejections of Telemachus’ attempts at mediation
serve to underline their obdurate self-regard. In marked contrast to the
cohesive support for Odysseus, they consistently represent themselves as
individuals contesting for the right to marry Penelope: a different suitor
speaks each time; individually they try only to silence the previous
speaker, and fail to appeal to the people. In the words of Johannes
Haubold, the suitors ‘resist social formation’.59 In fact, it is left to one
last and otherwise anonymous suitor, Leocritus, to dissolve the institu-
tion of assembly.60 Even the suitors aren’t that interested in dissent, at
least not in the Iliad ’s terms of institutional progress.61 They comprise a
group badly disunited and radically marginalized from sympathy.
So far our analysis of the first Ithacan assembly has shown its utter
lack of effectiveness: the debate fractures along partisan lines; opinions
become entrenched; prospects of resolving the crisis are shattered.
While sharing some of these features, the opening Achaean assembly
in the Iliad demonstrated the need for and value of dissent, even if it also
explored its problems. No such valorization is evident here. Instead, it is
precisely those struggling to consolidate the authority of Odysseus’
family who receive sympathetic treatment from the narrative’s repre-
sentation of debate: the dissenting voices are configured as the problem.
One proposal is made, which gets to the heart of the matter. In his
speech Antinous champions an immediate, open decision: ‘send away
your mother and command her to wed whomever her father bids’
(‘#Å!1æÆ "c& I),)*#ł%&, ¼&øåŁØ '1 #Ø& ªÆ#1*"ŁÆØ j !fiH ‹!*fi- !*
)Æ!cæ Œ1º*!ÆØ’, 2.113–14). But the son of Odysseus avoids taking up
the challenge at this time. Instead, very deliberately he defers contest.62
58 On the ‘difficulty of choosing between “a man”, “the man” or even “man”’ as an
adequate translation of ¼&'æÆ—the first word of the Odyssey—see Goldhill (1991), 1–5
(quotation from p. 1); cf. Slatkin (1986), 262–3; Kahane (1992).
59 Haubold (2000), 111.
60 Leocritus appears only once more, killed at the hands of Telemachus (22.294).
61 Haubold (2000), 111. Cf. Ritoo´k (1999).
62 Telemachus refuses to throw his mother out of his home with his father still
possibly alive, especially since he would have to pay back Ikarios and would provoke
his mother’s furies (2.130–45).
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That is not all. While it is left to a suitor to dissolve the assembly,63
Telemachus has already introduced a new narrative direction (209–13):
‘¯Pæ2#Æå 0 M'b ŒÆd ¼ºº%Ø, ‹""%Ø #&Å"!Bæ*. IªÆı%d,
!ÆF!Æ #b& %På (#1Æ. 7!Ø º/""%#ÆØ %P'0 Iª%æ*2ø·
fi X'Å ªaæ !a Y"Æ"Ø Ł*%d ŒÆd )$&!*. 3åÆØ%/.
Iºº 0 ¼ª* #%Ø ',!* &BÆ Ł%c& ŒÆd *YŒ%"0 9!Æ/æ%ı..’
‘Eurymachus and all you other suitors, I no longer entreat you in these matters
nor do I speak about them. For the gods and all the Achaeans know it already.
But, come, grant me a swift ship and twenty companions.’
With these words Telemachus overtly shies away from direct confronta-
tion.64 Done with all this assembly talk, he will instead sail off with his
own set of companions in search of news of his father’s return (&,"!%&
)*ı",#*&%., 2.215):65 in so doing, the son will return home like the
father. This is, after all, what Athena had countenanced when prompt-
ing Telemachus to convoke the assembly in the first place (1.279–305).
The first Ithacan assembly, therefore, represents just how the Odyssey
will be different from the Iliadic tradition: in place of open dissent in the
institution of the assembly, this narrative demonstrates the futility of
debate and the need for more subtle arts. Whereas the Iliad ’s assembly
becomes the institution in which the young men of the Achaeans can
prove themselves as men by contesting with each other, Telemachus’
maturation lies elsewhere: he must travel in the footsteps of his father.
The assembly proves to be a dead end.
The first human assembly, carefully prepared under the guidance of
Athena, sets in motion the twin narrative goals of Odysseus’ home-
coming and Telemachus’ maturation.66 The narrative sets up Aegyptius
as someone who legitimately and authoritatively could criticize the
ruling house; but it displaces all the critical arguments to the suitors,67
who are disqualified by their own recklessness from passing comment,
63 Leocritus ‘broke up the assembly suddenly’ (ºF"*& '0 Iª%æc& ÆNłÅæ+&, 2.257).
64 Montiglio (2000), 270.
65 Contrast this to Agamemnon’s near-catastrophic introduction of the ‘returns’
theme in Iliad 2: see Ch.1, sec. 2 above.
66 Jaeger (1939), 30 observes that the narrator labels Athena’s advice to Telemachus
as teaching (()%!/Ł*"ŁÆØ, Od. 1.279). Cf. Murnaghan (1987a).
67 The tale that they try to tell about Penelope is one such case. As Schein (1996), 30
notes, they are not entirely contradicted by Telemachus’ reply (2.130–7).
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and whose dissent actually aligns them with the rival epic tradition. The
structure, in which the suitors are set against figures of authority,
indicates how this narrative figures debate and dissent, not as a necessary
and cohesive part of society as in the Iliad, but as a threat to its telling.
There is a glimpse of an alternative rival story, but its presence and effect
are limited radically. There can be no debating with the suitors.
More than half were not going to return
We saw in the Iliad that the first Achaean assembly initiated a progres-
sive exploration of debate culminating in the institutionalization of
dissent within that arena. The first Ithacan assembly also marks the
beginning of a process, but one that leads to an increasing margin-
alization of contest. The fact that only one other debate on Ithaca
attracts anything like the narrative attention of those we studied in
Chapter 1 shows the Odyssey’s lack of interest in the assembly.
The next Ithacan assembly actually occurs in book 16, though it is
prematurely cut short.68 Upon hearing of Telemachus’ imminent return,
the suitors convoke an assembly (ÆP!%d '0 *N. Iª%æc& Œ/%& IŁæ,%Ø, 16.361).
Following the same trend of social division, they ‘did not allow any of the
young men or any of the elders to sit with them’ (%P'1 !Ø&0 ¼ºº%& j *Yø&
%h!* &1ø& #*!Æ6Ç*Ø& %h!* ª*æ,&!ø&, 16.361–2). This is an assembly that
does not aim to bring on the young men in rivalry or lay down the
conditions bywhich the communitymay benefit.69 It is just for themselves.
Yet, their deliberations over how to prevent Telemachus’ return have
already been rendered futile by the narrative’s pre-emptive strike: news
of his return has already been relayed to Penelope by the herald, who
‘spoke in the middle of the serving maids’ (#1"fi Å"Ø #*!a '#øfi fi B"Ø&
7*Ø)*&, 16.336) to deliver his one-line announcement (relayed in direct
speech). Eumaeus then takes Penelope to one side (¼ªåØ )ÆæÆ"!a.,
16.338) to whisper in her ear the details. Important communication
now takes place ‘in the middle’, not of the assembly, but of female
68 The suitors do meet soon after the first Ithacan assembly (4.658–74) to plot an
ambush against Telemachus. But not only is the language of the assembly absent from
this scene; their meeting serves only to show that events have bypassed them—Tele-
machus has already sailed off in search for his father without their knowledge.
69 Cf. e.g. Il. 14.281–300.
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servants, and critical information is relayed in hushed tones, not in
direct speech before the people. It is with such secret meetings and
whispered asides that the battle for control in the Odyssey will be
determined. The real arena of power lies away from the public forum,
in the private conference. The suitors will never again enjoy such a
public arena as the assembly to express their dissent; its belated and
curtailed convocation here demonstrates the marginalization of debate
in this narrative.
Although the suitors meet once more,70 the remaining Ithacan as-
sembly to be treated in any detail occurs only after the suitors have been
finally and decisively removed from the scene. Coming already too late,
its place in the narrative relates to this poem’s paradoxical display of its
authorizing strategies even as it undertakes the violent suppression of
dissent. The significance of that final assembly is evident from its
framing. The people gather to assemble in grief at the news of their
sons’ deaths (24.412–21). It is Rumour herself that acts as the institu-
tionalizing agent who sets up the assembly. Running amok, Rumour
performs in a similar manner to what she had done when wresting
control from Agamemnon in the Iliad ’s second Achaean assembly.
Rumour’s role as a corrosive discourse is no less threatening here, as
she carries news of the suitors’ deaths throughout the polis. This assem-
bly is set up as if it will explore the consequences of the leader’s slaughter
of his people.71
The first speaker whom the narrator introduces promises as much
(24.421–5):
70 See the note by Rutherford (1992), 224 on ll. 240–7: ‘This short and curious
episode, which ends so inconclusively, provides the final example of a meeting of the
suitors: these have formed a series in which the effective action of the suitors has steadily
diminished.’ He relates the ‘abortive conference’ to the inversely increasing respect with
which Odysseus (disguised as a beggar) and his son are held. The narrative demonstrates
‘the authority of Telemachus and his family’ and the fact that ‘the suitors are losing
control of the situation’.
71 Nagler (1988), 81 locates the climax of the Odyssey with the reunion between
Penelope and Odysseus: ‘the restoration of the oikos, as an economically and socially
functioning institution, capable of continuing to build and service the network of social
bonds with other such institutions through xenia, is the theme of return and its hero.’
This is true up to a point: but the last book explores the political aftermath of Odysseus’
return in such a way that brings the public forms of negotiating crisis—the assembly,
battle—into collision with the restoration of Odysseus’ oikos.
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ÆP!aæ K)*/ Þ 0 Xª*æŁ*& ›#Åª*æ1*. !0 Kª1&%&!%,
!%E"Ø& '0 ¯P)*/ŁÅ. I&$ Ł0 ¥"!Æ!% ŒÆd #*!1*Ø)*·
)ÆØ'e. ª$æ %ƒ ¼ºÆ"!%& K&d çæ*"d )1&Ł%. 7Œ*Ø!%,
3&!Ø&,%ı, !e& )æH!%& K&+æÆ!% 'E%. 0O'ı""*2.·
!%F ‹ ª* '$Œæı å1ø& Iª%æ+"Æ!% ŒÆd #*!1*Ø)*&·
But when they were all assembled and gathered in one place together, then
Eupeithes stood up among them and spoke. For there lay unforgettable sorrow
on in his mind for his son Antinous, the first whom divine Odysseus slew.
Shedding tears for him now he addressed the assembly and spoke.
Unusually, the narrator intrudes after the verb of speaking, #*!1*Ø)*, to
explain Eupeithes’ reasons for speaking: his son, Antinous, has just been
killed. Both structure and sentiment recall the introduction of Aegyp-
tius in the first Ithacan assembly,72 though the differences are important
too. On the one hand, in this case the audience have experienced the
narrative of the son’s death: they are in a position to assess the extent and
merit of the father’s loss. On the other, Eupeithes poses an even greater
threat, by presenting an alternative version of those events.73 His
narrative is far from absurd, since not only does it chime with the
(paradigmatic) doomed return of Agamemnon, but it also resonates
with Agamemnon’s failure as a leader in the Iliad: according to Eu-
peithes, Odysseus has ‘lost his people’, by which he means both the men
with whom Odysseus went to Troy and his folk at home (‘þº*"* #b&
&BÆ. ªºÆçıæ$., I)e '0 þº*"* ºÆ%2.’, 24.428).74 Whereas the Odyssey
itself differentiates these two groups from the ‘people’ by labelling them
as ‘companions’ and ‘suitors’, Eupeithes collapses the distinction by
associating both with the group at large. In this light, Odysseus is seen
not so much as the hero ‘who experiences pain’, as the leader ‘who
72 See Heubeck (1954), 40 for parallels between the two assemblies.
73 Eupeithes’ death is required so that the ‘triumphant “true” tale’ may then be
complete. Along with the silencing of Eurymachus, ‘in each case the proposition is
rejected by authorised speakers and the proponent is killed’: Haubold (2000), 108, 125.
74 The phrase I)e '0 þº*"* ºÆ%2. can also indicate the agency of the subject, as if
Eupeithes is saying that Odysseus has ‘destroyed’ his people. There is similar key
narrative ambiguity in the Iliad at 18.82 (Achilles bemoans ‘losing’ Patroclus) and
22.104, 107 (Hector imagines the Trojans blaming him for ‘destroying’ his people).
The last example is particularly interesting, since Hector admits ‘I have lost the people
because of my own recklessness’ (‘þº*"Æ ºÆe& I!Æ"ŁÆº/fi Å"Ø& K#fi B"Ø&’, Il. 22.104)—a
description that resonates strongly with the Odyssean suitors. See Ch. 3, n. 132 below.
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causes pain’ for his people.75 Interestingly, Eupeithes even deprives
Odysseus of his name, labelling him simply ‘this man here’ (I&cæ ‹'*,
24.426). Not only is this a threat to Odysseus’ epic renown—one needs
a name to be able to gain glory;76 by evoking the narrative’s first word,
¼&'æÆ, this narrative threatens to unravel the Odyssey’s depiction of its
hero as a, or rather the, paradigm.77
The narrative frame puts that threat into context by its resonance
with other highly charged passages within the broader epic tradition.
Eupeithes addresses the assembly as Agamemnon also does, in tears (!%F
‹ ª* '$Œæı å1ø& Iª%æ+"Æ!% ŒÆd #*!1*Ø)*&, 24.425);78 Eupeithes’ tears,
however, have the same unifying effect as Telemachus’ had done (S.
ç$!% '$Œæı å1ø&, %rŒ!%. '0 =º* )$&!Æ. 3åÆØ%2., 24.438).79 The shift
in paradigm, from doomed Iliadic leader to sympathetic heir-apparent,
marks out the potential danger of his speech.
Howmuch of a threat is ‘Mr Persuasive’ going to pose? Just as it looks
as if a crisis-point has been reached, as ‘pity took hold of all the
Achaeans’, two other characters suddenly appear. Medon, accompanied
by the divine bard, offers unqualified backing for Odysseus: as he puts
it, he has seen a ‘god’ (‘ÆP!e. Kªg& *r'%& Ł*e& ¼#:æ%!%&’, 24.445). With
one exception, nowhere else in Homeric epic does a character turn up
while an assembly is in session and address the assembled group.80 By
doing so, Odysseus’ herald assumes control over both the public assem-
bly and the narrative space, in a gesture that is particularly marked:
75 See Stanford (1952) and Rutherford (1986), 157, n. 63 for a discussion of
Odysseus’ name and its significance within the Odyssey’s narrative. See also Rutherford
(1992), on Od. 19.406–9, where the hero’s name is explicitly etymologized.
76 That is what is at stake in the famous Cyclops episode: having given Cyclops the
name of ‘no man’ in order to trick his way out of the cave, Odysseus feels the need—as
the Iliadic hero still—to broadcast his name (Od. 9.502–5). He does so in order to gain
renown. The result, in which Odysseus barely escapes from Cyclops’ rock and curse,
valorizes the hero’s strategy of deceit and disguise he employs on Ithaca.
77 Goldhill (1991), 2. On Odysseus as ‘every man’: Stanford (1963). Kahane (1992)
observes that this is one of the ways in which the theme of disguise and recognition is
developed. Cf. Murnaghan (1987a).
78 i& 3ªÆ#1#&ø& j ¥"!Æ!% '$Œæı å1ø&, Il. 9.13–14. The same hexameter line,
however, is used of the sympathetic figure of Aegyptius (Od. 2.24).
79 Od. 2.81.
80 The only other example of a character turning up to address an assembled group
occurs when the Trojan herald, Idaios, arrives in the Achaean assembly while it is in
session to deliver the official Trojan response to Achaean demands (Il. 7.382–411).
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Medon takes centre-stage (K& #1""%Ø"Ø, 24.441), having come directly
from the house of Odysseus (KŒ #*ª$æø& 0O'ı"B%., 24.440). Further-
more, Medon gains immediate support from Halitherses, the bird
interpreter who had shown his allegiances in the first Ithacan assembly,
and who also happens to turn up during the course of this assembly. He
reinforces the point by pronouncing a clear prohibition—‘let us not
go’—in answer to Eupeithes’ call-to-arms.81 Along with the (silent)
bard, these two rescue Odysseus’ tale from its opponents, by configuring
dissent as not only inappropriate but just plain wrong.
The outcome of the assembly, therefore, seems rather perverse.
Although ‘green fear’ had gripped them all at Medon’s account of
events,82 even so, ‘more than half leapt up with a great shout’ (%ƒ '0 ¼æ
0 I&+œ5Æ& #*ª$ºøfi IºÆºÅ!fiH j B#/"*ø& )º*/%ı., 24.463–4), and go off to
join Eupeithes’ revolt.83 The omens do not bode well, however. Sin-
gling out Eupeithes at their head, the narrator adds that he ‘was not
going to return’ (I)%&%"!+"*Ø&, 24.471). The brief and subtle fast-
forward to the fatal outcome of this act of dissent leaves us in no
doubt as to its lack of wisdom. Moreover, the explicit mention of no
return is highly charged. Since the Odyssey presents a ‘return’ narrative,
we might expect the word ‘return’ to be on everyone’s lips. Yet, in actual
fact, this is only the second and last deployment of the compound verb
I)%&%"!1ø in the entire epic.84 Intriguingly, its only other occurrence
describes Alcinous’ reassurance that the Phaeacians will see Odysseus
81 #c Y%#*&, Od. 24.462 answering Eupeithes’ repeated Y%#*&, 24.432, 437.
82 !%f. '0 ¼æÆ )$&!Æ. ()e åºøæe& '1%. fi læ*Ø, 24.450.
83 The narrator brings out the success—and potential danger—of Eupeithes’ speech
by a pun on his name: ‘they were persuaded by Mr Persuasive’ (Iºº0 ¯P)*/Ł*Ø j )*/Ł%&!0 ,
24.465–6). See Scully (1990), 196, n. 6.
84 While words based on the root &%"!- are unsurprisingly common in Homeric
poetry (some 132 instances), there are only six examples of &%"! plus the prefix I)%. Of
these four occur in the Iliad, all of which relate somehow to not returning: Il. 1.60
(Achilles wonders whether they will return home without having accomplished their
expedition); 8.499 (Hector thought they were going to return after having defeated the
Achaeans; 12.115 (Asius was not going to return); 17.406 (Achilles thought that
Patroclus would return again). Moreover, both Herodotus and Thucydides use the
verb in significant contexts: Herodotus at the close of his Themopylae narrative
(7.229.2, 31; cf. 1.82.8; 4.159.6; 6.27.2); Thucydides’ solitary usage comes at the end
of his Sicilian narrative to emphasize the Athenians’ loss of their collective nostos: Allison
(1997b) 512–14.
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home (13.6).85 In this version of the ‘returns’ it is only Odysseus who
makes it home safely.86 The point of no return has been reached for
opponents of Odysseus and his tale.
Debate appears far less central to the narrative of the Odyssey than it
had been in the Iliad. Only two human assemblies occur in the entire
epic that are explored in any detail. Moreover, the ways in which they
are framed, structured and developed show the limitations of this arena.
Neither assembly resolves the crisis in the community or, indeed, shows
much interest in resolving the crisis: they serve as little more than a
forum in which the battle-lines may be drawn up and support for
Odysseus be made manifest. Telemachus begins the epic with much
to learn: he learns that his path to maturation lies elsewhere than in the
assembly, in which his attempts to rid his house of the suitors fail. He
must learn instead to use speech in a different, less open way, and
become more like his father, the figure who says one thing while keeping
another in his heart. This is crucial: concealment and suppression of real
opinions—recognized traits of both the hero and his narrative, and
illustrated here by his son—sit ill with the idea of open debate.87 On
the other hand, the suitors, who to some extent sponsor a more open
contest and like to think of themselves as akin to the great heroes from
Troy, also fail to socialize their dissent: their opposition to Telemachus
takes place on an individual, or at any rate, a factional basis with little
interest in the wider community. Indeed, resonances with scenes of
assembly from the Iliadic tradition of the war at Troy serve to under-
85 Alcinous tells Odysseus, ‘I think that you will go back home and not be forced back
again’ (‘!fiH "0 %h !Ø )$ºØ# )ºÆªåŁ1&!Æ ª0 O6ø j ił I)%&%"!+"*Ø&’, 13.5–6). This
reassurance strikingly resonates with Achilles’ first words in the Iliad, when he tells
Agamemnon, ‘I think that now we will be forced to go back home’ (‘&F& ¼##*
)ÆºØ)ºÆªåŁ1&!Æ. O6ø j ił I)%&%"!+"*Ø&’, Il. 1.59–60). Of course, Achilles is the
paradigmatic hero who never does make it home.
86 Scully (1990), 102–3.
87 Rutherford (1996), 67 similarly comments on the difference in speech between the
two epics: ‘Men in the Iliad deal with one another openly and in full awareness of each
other’s status and strength . . . In the Odyssey, where the mortals do not deal so honestly
with one another, the characters dwell in a state of uncertainty.’ Interestingly, he also
observes that, ‘although the Odyssey has a public dimension . . . it is arguable that the
central family relationships are more important’ (p. 69). The Odyssey’s different strategy
towards dissent has much to do with its more family-centred orientation.
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mine support for them, while the narrative itself further puts strict limits
on the value of their dissent. Not only do the suitors fail to form a
cohesive group in the institution of assembly in order to speak on behalf
of the community; the narrative frame and structure of the assemblies
present the suitors and their relations in a particular light, as enemies of
the tale being told.
2. HOW TO AUTHORIZE DEBATE
(ODYSSEY 3, 8, 9–12)
So far we have been exploring the ways in which debate is portrayed
within the institution of the Ithacan assembly, in which the commu-
nity fractures along partisan lines, with one side, the group supporting
Telemachus and Odysseus, clearly favoured over their opponents, the
suitors and their families. This section focuses on the form of repre-
sentation that scenes of assembly take in the Odyssey. As we saw, the
author of On the Sublime claims that the Odyssey was more ‘diegetic’
than the Iliad. Modern scholars tend to read this stress on narrative in
the light of the Odyssey’s self-reflexivity. But what happens to debate in
these circumstances? Dramatized assembly scenes loom large in the
Iliad; few assemblies are narrated, and even those that are tend to be a
character’s reflection on a debate that has already been dramatized. In
the Odyssey, however, debate is talked about on several occasions.
Nestor and Demodocus recall the Trojan War in presenting an alter-
native vision of debate from that of the Iliad. When Odysseus himself
takes up the story, he emphasizes the threat of debate to his journey
home.
We were always with the same mind
The assembly is not the place it was in the Iliad, where contest dom-
inates and the young prove themselves men; Telemachus must prove
himself a man—his father’s son—by going on a journey. His ‘Odyssey’
takes him first to the court of Nestor, where he learns about the
disastrous returns of the Achaeans, which, contrary to more common
extant versions, is precipitated by internal conflict, not by Achaean
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sacrilege at Troy’s fall.88 Athena, who plays a key role in punishing the
Achaeans in other accounts, sends 7æØ. on the two sons of Atreus
(3.136–50). Their strife manifests itself in an assembly.
The details of a god sending 7æØ., an internal crisis within the
Achaean camp, an assembly in which contesting views are expressed,
two speakers joined together in ‘painful words’—all of these elements
resonate with the first Achaean assembly that opened the Iliad. But the
Iliad depicts the assembly being set up for the benefit of the community:
Achilles provides the means by which a solution to the Achaeans’ crisis
may be found, by sponsoring Calchas’ words, even though that is to
challenge Agamemnon’s authority. Here, however, Nestor relates how
strife leads not to the construction of a political community but to social
disintegration and a catastrophic division of the Achaean army. He gives
a view of dissent as it looks like from the perspective of one of the
leaders.
It is significant that the description of the Achaean assembly misfiring
comes from Nestor. I suggested above that, while performing the role of
chief negotiator and social stabilizer among the Achaeans, Nestor can
appear rather too close to Agamemnon; he does everything he can to
shore up Agamemnon’s authority and keep the group at large united
behind their leader.89 That is the case here too—and it impacts upon his
representation of the Achaean assembly. Nestor emphasizes the pro-
blems of dissent as he relates how the two sons of Atreus pursue different
courses,90 which contrasts, in Nestor’s view, with the previous conduct
88 In the so-called Sack of Troy. Cf. M. Davies (2003), 72–3. He elides different
accounts in his description of the strife between the sons of Atreus: ‘At the start of
Proclus’ re´sume´ [of the Returns Home] we read that Athena caused a quarrel to break out
between the two brothers Menelaus and Agamemnon over the question of sailing off
from Troy. The tradition of this quarrel also occurs in Od. 3.135 ff., where we are told
that Menelaus was for sailing home straight away, while Agamemnon wished to keep the
army back and appease Athena by a sacrifice of hecatombs. The hostility of this goddess
(which underlies both accounts) is to be explained, of course, in terms of Ajax’s earlier
crimes’ (p. 77).
89 See Ch. 1, nn. 90–4, with accompanying text.
90 Everything is wrong with this assembly: ‘When these two called all the Achaeans to
assembly, wildly, in no due order, as the sun was setting, and the sons of the Achaeans
arrived heavy in drink, these two spoke their commands, on account of which they
assembled the people’ (‘!g 'b ŒÆº*""Æ#1&ø Iª%æc& K. )$&!Æ. 3åÆØ%2., j #$ł, I!aæ %P
ŒÆ!a Œ,"#%&, K. M1ºØ%& ŒÆ!Æ'2&!Æ, j %ƒ '0 qºŁ%& %Y&øfi :*:ÆæÅ,!*. ıx*. 3åÆØH&, j #FŁ%&
#ıŁ*/"ŁÅ&, !%F *¥ &*ŒÆ ºÆe& ¼ª*ØæÆ&’, Od. 3.137–40).
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of the assembly under his and Odysseus’ management. The two of them
at any rate never dissented from each other in the assembly (‘%h!* )%!0
*N& Iª%æfi B '/å 0 K:ÆÇ,#*& %h!0 K&d :%ıºfi B’, 3.127); they were always of the
same mind (‘Iºº0 = &Æ Łı#e& 7å%&!* &,øfi ŒÆd K)/çæ%&Ø :%ıºfi B’, 3.128).91
In Nestor’s eyes, precisely the problem with the Achaean assembly is the
potential for contesting views to be heard.
Both Homeric assembly scenes—the assembly of Iliad 1 and the
reported assembly of Odyssey 3—represent the institution as a place of
strife and potential disorder. But, whereas the Iliad stresses the impor-
tance of dissent, Nestor focuses on its negative consequences.92 The
difference in perspective extends to representation: the comparable first
Achaean assembly scene is played out before the audience’s eyes; this
scene in the Odyssey is narrated by one of the characters who is involved
in it, and who inevitably puts his own spin on it. Furthermore, Nestor’s
narration has relevance for Telemachus. We have just witnessed the
failed experiment of debate on Ithaca; here Telemachus is being shown
in no uncertain terms the disastrous consequences of allowing open
discussion of critical issues; he learns, in addition, that his own father
never used to allow such loose talk. Nestor’s story demonstrates to
Telemachus the importance of keeping a tight control over public
discourse. The management of dissent is an important part of his
maturation to become more like his father.
His father paints a similar picture of debate on his travels. Upon
Odysseus’ arrival in the city of the Phaeacians, the narrator describes the
distinctive features of the urban space which catch his hero’s eye,
including ‘assemblies of heroes’ (Bæ-ø& Iª%æÆ/, 7.44). This remarkable
description of the assembly, with its association to the prior race of men
(the heroes), fits with the image of Phaeacia as being some kind of
Golden Age society.93 Moreover, it suggests a world before the estab-
91 Hammer (1998), 338 interprets this report of the assembly literally: he concludes
that such a division happens when people use the forum of assembly to argue their own
interests. But that is exactly what Nestor is doing here when he gives a report of that
assembly.
92 The context of the assembly—its timing and place—must be important here; but it
is significant that Nestor emphasizes the value of consensus not just for this occasion but
for any.
93 ‘[I]t is the sort of toilless world for which Hesiod yearned (Op. 111 ff., 227 ff.,
Ehoeae fr. 1 Merkelbach–West 6 ff., cf. Od. vii. 81–132n)’: Heubeck, West, and Hains-
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lishment of an institutional framework, such as that which we saw
mapped out in the Iliad.Most striking of all, however, is the subsequent
absence of debate in the account of Odysseus’ stay in Phaeacia, in spite
of this institutional form.94 Instead, the assembly is used for other
functions. While Alcinous takes his guest to the assembly, it is Athena
who is responsible for gathering the Phaeacians en masse, with the
explicit purpose of securing Odysseus’ return home.95 After announcing
his intention to see Odysseus home, Alcinous then breaks up the
assembly so that they can all get back to feasting and listening to their
bard (8.40–5). Directly after Demodocus’ first song (on the quarrel
between Achilles and Odysseus, 8.73–82), Alcinous takes the Phaea-
cians back to the assembly (8.109) to display their athletic prowess to
their guest in games. Given the charge of the word Iª-& for signifying
contest in the Iliad, particularly when Achilles institutionalizes the
games in the Achaean camp, its omission here is arresting: contest is
largely absent from Phaeacian life; the assembly is a continual place of
wonderment.96
There are two exceptions when the term Iª-& is used. The
first occurs, as it happens, in the games. Odysseus has just endured
taunts from one of ‘the best of the Phaeacians’ (8.116), Euryalus,
about his lack of athletic prowess (8.159–64), and has proven his
worth not only with a powerful speech (8.166–85) but also in deed
worth (1988), 342; cf. Slatkin (2005), 321. See also N. Austin (1975), 153–62, who sees
Phaeacia as ‘the paradigm of the ideal community, in which human craftsmanship is
united with natural advantages’ (p. 156); and Garvie (1994), 22–7, who discusses the
Phaeacians’ position as the fulcrum of Odysseus’ story, easing his passage from a fantasy
world to human society.
94 As R. Martin (1951), 29–30 remarks: ‘Pas de discussions, pas de protestations; le
roi parle en maıˆtre, donne ses instructions, et se retire’; cf. Deneen (2000). Havelock
(1978), 92–3 suggests that the Phaeacians possess an assembly because that is what
civilized societies are supposed to have.
95 ‘[Athena] was devising the return of great-hearted Odysseus’ (&,"!%& 0O'ı""Bœ
#*ªÆº+!%æØ #Å!Ø,ø"Æ, 8.9). The goddess’ role in convoking this assembly suggests once
again the appropriation of public space for the privileging of Odysseus or his household.
Indeed, in this case, that gesture is quite explicit: Athena heralds the arrival of a stranger
who ‘is like the gods in form’ ('1#Æ. IŁÆ&$!%Ø"Ø& ›#%E%., 8.14). Athena herself con-
tributes to achieve this desired effect (8.17–23).
96 Odysseus is ‘amazed’ when he first spies the Phaeacians’ assemblies (ŁÆ2#ÆÇ*& '0
0O'ı"*f., 7.43); the gathered Phaeacians ‘gaze in wonder’ at Odysseus ()%ºº%d '0 ¼æÆ
ŁÅ+"Æ&!% N',&!*. j ıNe& ¸Æ1æ!Æ% 'Æ6çæ%&Æ, 8.17–18); the best men of the Phaeacians
went to wonder at the contests (%ƒ ¼æØ"!%Ø I1ŁºØÆ ŁÆı#Æ&1%&!*., 8.108).
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(8.186–198)—aided and abetted by Athena’s guiding hand and an-
nouncement of victory. In this context, the narrator comments that
Odysseus rejoiced at seeing ‘a friendly companion in the contest’
(9!ÆEæ%& 9&Å1Æ º*F""0 K& IªH&Ø, 8.200).97 The one occasion when the
ago¯n is mentioned, then, is in relation to possible dissent breaking out.98
But Athena’s involvement, Odysseus’ swift and conclusive answer and
Alcinous’ verdict99 all serve to marginalize this one dissenting voice,
who soon after makes amends himself in word and deed (8.401–5).
Even in the games there are no contests, and certainly no possibilities for
dissent.
With the games having almost got out of hand by portraying real
contest, Alcinous intercedes and moves the group back to the sympo-
sium. It is here that the only other instances of Iª-& occur in the entire
narrative, all in relation to the dancing that accompanies Demodocus’
singing.100Whether or not this usage indicates a heightened awareness of
the rivalry of poetic performance, it is striking that Demodocus’ final
song about the Trojan horse—in response to Odysseus’ request—dwells
on a negative portrait of the assembly.101 The Trojans are represented as
debating whether to throw the horse from the cliffs, set it on fire or bring
it inside the walls (8.506). Unlike scenes of Trojans debating in the Iliad,
no members of the royal house are represented as intervening; a genuine
debate ensues, in which the Trojans as a groupmake a collective decision.
Yet, though the Trojans debate a lot (),ºº 0 Iª,æ*ı%&, 8.505), they agree
on the wrong course of action. In the end, according to this song,
Odysseus’ ruse works only because the Trojans debate. How the master
of deception must have loved the irony of that.
97 The description of Athena as a ‘friendly companion’ again serves to marginalize
the problematic group whom we are yet to see.
98 The confusion of the ago¯n with the assembly seems to show the lack of interest in
public institutions among the Phaeacians. Instead, they seek refuge in the alternative, and
quasi-private, institution of the symposium (8.250–5). On the phrase K& IªH&Ø, Garvie
(1994), 279, comments: ‘“in the assembly”, i.e. “among the assembled crowd”, rather
than “in the place of contest”; cf. Il. 23.273, 448, 495, etc.’
99 In the coda to this episode, Alcinous judges that Odysseus has ‘shown his
excellence’ (Iæ*!c& çÆØ&1#*&, 8.237), after Euryalus had ‘abused him in the games’ (K&
IªH&Ø j &*/Œ*"*&, 8.238–9).
100 8.259, 260; cf. 380.
101 As de Jong (2001), 216 comments: ‘the angle chosen here is that of the Trojans,
looking at the Horse from the outside.’
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I set up an assembly
Directly after the Trojan-horse story, Odysseus takes over the telling of
his tale,102 in the course of which he describes the convocation of three
assemblies.103 All are introduced by the same formula: ‘And at that time
I set up an assembly and spoke among them all’ (‘ŒÆd !,!0 Kªg& Iª%æc&
Ł1#*&%. #*!a )A"Ø& 7*Ø)%&’, 9.171; 10.188; 12.319). Odysseus sets up
all three assemblies; only he speaks; nothing is heard from his men,
other than the description of them carrying out his orders. This portrait
of the assembly recalls Hector’s domination of the Trojan assembly in
the Iliad. Indeed, when Odysseus’ men do gather to deliberate together,
their debates take place impromptu with Odysseus asleep, external to
any recognizable formal structures. And they always end with disastrous
consequences—for themselves.104
One example that is quite typical occurs when Odysseus returns to
his men after having overcome the witch Circe (10.414–23):
‘ . . .S. K#b Œ*E&%Ø, K)*d Y'%& OçŁÆº#%E"Ø,
'ÆŒæı,*&!*. 7å%&!%· ',ŒÅ"* '0 ¼æÆ "ç/"Ø Łı#e.
S. 7#*& ‰. *N )Æ!æ/'0 ƒŒ%/Æ!% ŒÆd ),ºØ& ÆP!c&
!æÅå*/Å. 0I Ł$ŒÅ., ¥ &Æ !0 7!æÆç*& M'0 Kª1&%&!%.
ŒÆ/ #0 Oº%çıæ,#*&%Ø 7)*Æ )!*æ,*&!Æ )æ%"Å2'ø&·
“C%d #b& &%"!+"Æ&!Ø, 'Ø%!æ*ç1., u. Kå$æÅ#*&,
‰. *Y !0 *N. 0I Ł$ŒÅ& IçØŒ%/#*ŁÆ )Æ!æ/'Æ ªÆEÆ&·
Iºº 0 ¼ª*, !H& ¼ººø& 9!$æø& ŒÆ!$º*5%& Zº*Łæ%&.”
S. 7çÆ&· ÆP!aæ Kªg )æ%"1çÅ& #ÆºÆŒ%E. K)1*""Ø·
“&BÆ #b& ¼æ )$#)æø!%& Kæ2""%#*& X)*Øæ,&'* . . . ”’
‘So these men, when they saw me with their eyes, in tears held me. And the
spirit in them made them feel as if they had arrived back to their fatherland and
the very city of rugged Ithaca, where they were born and raised. And in tears
they addressed me with winged words: “With your return, o divine-nurtured,
102 For considerations of what changes in a first-person narrative, see esp. de Jong
(1992) and (2001), 223–7; Slatkin (1996); cf. Genette (1980), 243–59. Most (1989)
shows how Odysseus’ narrative functions within the immediate context of getting him
home.
103 9.171–7; 10.188–201; 12.319–24.
104 10.31–55; 12.338–65. The last example ends with Odysseus’ men explicitly
having their homecoming taken away from them by a god (Ł*e. '0 I)%Æ/&ı!% &,"!%&,
12.419).
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we are as happy as if we should have arrived back in our fatherland. But come,
recount the destruction of our other companions.” So they spoke; and I
addressed them with soft words: “Let’s drag the ship up the land . . . ”’
When his men see him they are happy—in the words of the narrator
(Odysseus himself )—‘as if they themselves had arrived back in Ithaca’.
Immediately, Odysseus allocates his men direct speech that repeats this
sentiment verbatim. With the idea of ‘return’ very much brought to the
forefront of the audience’s attention and on the lips of his men,
Odysseus’ reply is pointed: he orders his men to ‘haul the ships onto
land’ and follow him to Circe’s dwelling. In contrast to his men’s
thoughts of a return to Ithaca, Odysseus’ exhortation to ‘haul the
ships up the land’ marks exactly the opposite direction to a communal
return. And yet, the crew ‘immediately obey’ (%ƒ '0 tŒÆ )/Ł%&!%) their
leader, who had spoken ‘with soft words’ (#ÆºÆŒ%E. K)1*""Ø).
Only Eurylochus dissents from Odysseus’ command, and with good
reason. First, the disjunction between the group’s expressed desire and
their immediate compliance with Odysseus’ command suggests both his
persuasive ability, and its threat; after all, Circe herself had given
Odysseus these instructions (10.401–5),105 and his use of ‘soft words’
suggests, if not outright deception, at least the power of his persua-
sion.106 Second, Eurylochus is the most sceptical and reliable of the
companions, the man who had seen with his own eyes his men turn into
pigs (10.229–60); it is, therefore, no surprise that he should remain
unconvinced. Eurylochus’ dissent appears legitimate.107
Yet, the audience know that his fears are misplaced. They know that
Odysseus has vanquished the witch and rescued his companions. They
know that his soft words carry no threat. They have witnessed the
105 ‘Odysseus-narrator faithfully records the execution of Circe’s orders’: de Jong
(2001), 264.
106 Odysseus speaks with ‘soft words’ to his men twice in this episode (10.70, 442).
Back on Ithaca, he instructs his son Telemachus to use ‘soft words’ on the suitors
expressly in order to beguile them (16.286; 19.5). The only other instances occur in
the Iliad, when Achilles asks his mother to supplicate Zeus (Il. 1.582), and when Paris
explains that Helen had persuaded him to return to battle (Il. 6.337).
107 In particular, Eurylochus’ subsequent accusation (Od. 10.431–7) not only iden-
tifies Circe’s threat but also recalls Odysseus’ misjudgement in leading his men into
Cyclops’ cave. Rutherford (1986), 151 observes: ‘we may well feel that there is some
truth in what the rebellious Eurylochus says.’
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narrative from which Eurylochus and the rest of the companions have
been shut out (when Odysseus, using protection provided by Hermes,
beds the witch). What this knowledge does is to render Eurylochus’
anxiety misplaced. His dissent is reasonable,108 but—crucially—wrong.
Even before we hear it, the narrative marginalizes the question that
threatens to open up the narrative, Eurylochus’ ‘ah, fools, where are we
going?’ (‘p '*Øº%/ , )%"0 Y#*&’, 10.431). Everyone else is going off with
Odysseus.
Angered by Eurylochus’ dissent, Odysseus contemplates drawing his
sword (10.438–42):
‘S. 7çÆ!0 , ÆP!aæ Kª- ª* #*!a çæ*"d #*æ#+æØ5Æ,
")Æ""$#*&%. !Æ&2ÅŒ*. ¼%æ )Æå1%. )Ææa #Åæ%F,
!fiH %ƒ I)%!#+5Æ. Œ*çÆºc& %s'$"'* )*º$""ÆØ,
ŒÆd )ÅfiH )*æ K,&!Ø #$ºÆ "å*',&· Iºº$ #0 9!ÆEæ%Ø
#*ØºØå/%Ø. K)1*""Ø& Kæ+!ı%& ¼ºº%Ł*& ¼ºº%..’
‘So he spoke, but I was divided in my mind, whether to draw my sword from
my thick thigh, and cut off his head and throw it on the ground, even though he
was nearly related to me by marriage; but my companions, first one and then
another, held me back with soft words.’
In the epic tradition that has come down to us, these lines resonate
powerfully with the beginning of the Iliad, when Achilles angrily drew
his sword in dissent from Agamemnon.109 Once again, we can imagine
that this image, while only now extant in the Iliad, may have had much
greater currency throughout the oral tradition. But while, for metho-
dological reasons, one would not want to see this as a quotation from
the Iliad (as we have it),110 the comparison between the two scenes is
108 ‘We are left to assume that Eurylochus has drawn the right conclusions from
his previous observations (212ff., 259ff.) and forebodings (232, 258)’: Heubeck and
Hoekstra (1989), 66.
109 Heubeck and Hoekstra (ibid. 66) gloss Odysseus’ reaction as ‘modelled on Il.
i.189–92)’. The relevant lines from the Iliad, with verbal correspondences underlined,
are as follows (1.189–94): S. ç$!%· —Åº*6ø&Ø '0 ¼å%. ª1&*!0 , K& '1 %ƒ q!%æ j "!+Ł*""Ø&
ºÆ"/%Ø"Ø 'Ø$&'ØåÆ #*æ#+æØ5*&, j j ‹ ª* ç$"ªÆ&%& O5f Kæı""$#*&%. )Ææa #Åæ%F j !%f.
#b& I&Æ"!+"*Ø*&, › '0 3!æ*6'Å& K&Ææ/Ç%Ø, j q* å,º%& )Æ2"*Ø*& KæÅ!2"*Ø1 !* Łı#,&.
110 See n. 8 above. Interestingly, Sophocles’ Ajax begins in the wake of a similar
gesture from the hero: Ajax has reached for his sword to strike down the Achaean
leaders—which would seem to suggest that such an epic event achieved a certain fame
in the popular imagination, perhaps occasioned by the Iliadic version. Again, the
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suggestive of their different narrative strategies towards dissent, and the
possibility of resonant interplay between the two traditions unmistak-
ably remains. While in the Iliad it is Athena who intervenes to check
Achilles as he reaches for his sword, and who personally negotiates a
contract with the dissenting figure, the goddess is notably absent from
the scene in the Odyssey. Here, instead—according to Odysseus—‘all
the other companions’ hold the hero back. The significance of Athena’s
absence derives not only from the general absence of named gods in
Odysseus’ narration; it is important that we see Odysseus’ men—to a
man—step in to check their leader. If an Iliadic tradition is being
activated here, that gesture is all the more pointed. This is a hero who
does not require a god to check a rash act; he listens to his men and
allows himself to be persuaded. Odysseus—he is the narrator at this
point, it should not be forgotten—allows a figure of dissent to intrude
briefly into his narrative, before reasserting his majesty through the
response of the group at large: he doesn’t silence the dissenter, his
men do; and he is man enough to check his anger without recourse to
divine intervention. Thus, while there seems room for constructive
debate and persuasion after all, the outcome serves to cast Odysseus in
a better light and leave Eurylochus out in the cold.
Frozen out of the narrative plan, the latter is obliged to follow meekly
along, fearful of Odysseus’ reproaches (10.447–8). Ironically, it will be
Eurylochus’ dissent from Odysseus’ instructions that finally condemns
all of Odysseus’ men to death (12.339–52). Eurylochus is preserved in
order to account for the loss of all Odysseus’ men: his dissent has a value
after all.
The different perspective on debate that the Odyssey offers is nowhere
clearer than in its many scenes of narrated assembly: the ways in which
the assembly is represented are inevitably influenced by the speaker’s
own focalization and situation. This introduces an important feature to
our investigation. We had previously seen how the Ithacan assemblies
were set up in such a way as to confirm support for Odysseus and his
house: this section has extended that idea by exploring the cases in
which characters themselves talk about the assembly. Not only is this in
important point for our study is what this gesture says about dissent. Indeed, Sophocles
maximizes the disruptive potential of dissent, by having Athena (who intervenes again)
merely deflect, rather than prevent, the blow. See Ch. 5 below.
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itself a departure from the Iliad ’s series of dramatized assemblies; the
Odyssey explores the tension between the communal act of assembly and
the personal stake the focalizing agent has in representing it. Seen
through the eyes of someone engaged in debate and who has had to
suffer the consequences of it, assemblies are configured as ineffectual
and damaging. It is as if that first Achaean assembly in the Iliad were
being seen through the eyes of an Agamemnon. In this way, the Odyssey
exposes the fiction of openness in (any) debate: there are always con-
trolling forces at work.
3. HOW TO KILL YOUR PEOPLE AND GET
AWAY WITH IT (ODYSSEY 22)
When faced by Eurylochus’ opposition, Odysseus described himself as
‘being in two minds’ whether to check his wrath or draw his sword. This
kind of formula, to do x or y, also occurs in the Iliad; but there is a
marked difference of usage between the two epics that sheds light on the
Odyssey’s thematization of dissent.111 The first and paradigmatic case in
the Iliad depicts Achilles’ hesitation to check his anger or strike down
Agamemnon (Il. 1.188–92). Only Athena’s timely intervention pre-
vents him from transgressing the boundaries of the assembly; yet, it still
precipitates a series of events far from that which Achilles imagined
(such as the death of his best friend). Being in two minds has real
consequences for Achilles and represents a real choice—one, moreover,
that is inherently unstable and produces unforeseen and calamitous
results.112 No such uncertainty inhibits Odysseus’ self-addresses in the
Odyssey.113 Where the choice had been a real one in the Iliad, Odysseus
111 For monologues in direct speech, see Arend (1933), 106–15; Sharples (1983).
112 All instances of this type of internal monologue in direct speech in the Iliad, bar
one, occur in the context of divine presence (Il. 5.671; 8.167, 169; 10.502; 12.199) or
else are divinities themselves deliberating (2.3; 14.159; 16.647; 20.17). The exception is
Deı¨ophobus, who chooses a ‘third’ way (13.455). Russo (1968), 290 draws a distinction
between the Iliad and Odyssey: ‘the sub-patterns that tend to dominate the scenes of
pondering in the Iliad are not carried over intact into the Odyssey . . .Gods never
intervene to solve a mortal’s dilemma of choosing between two alternatives’ (emphasis
in the original). Cf. Barnouw (2004), 109–20.
113 Odysseus endures at Od. 17.235; 18.90; 20.10; Telemachus at 16.73. See
Barnouw (2004), esp. 2–3, who interprets Odysseus’ division of mind as ‘visceral
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will, eventually, get to do both x and y : he swallows down his anger and
endures numerous insults from the suitors precisely in order to gain a
vantage-point from which to strike down his opponents.114
Odysseus’ deliberations frame my final analysis of contest in two
important ways. First, it shows the lack of a real crisis for Odysseus: in
spite of indications to the contrary, he has his cake and eats it. Second,
resonant echoes in the Odyssey of the rival Iliadic narrative tradition of
the war at Troy pave the way for Odysseus’ triumph over opponents to
his tale.
Looking darkly at him
Events come to a head in the fallout from the trial of the bow, when
Odysseus reveals himself to the suitors. The scene that follows, de-
scribed by Pietro Pucci as ‘Iliadic’,115 is remarkably anti-Iliadic in its
context. Whereas physical conflict in the Iliad remains restricted to the
battleground, as one would expect, here in the Odyssey it breaks out in
practical thought’ (p. 3). There are four occasions when Odysseus does appear to have to
make a choice. One occurs within Odysseus’ first-person narrative: the choice whether or
not to leap overboard when his ship is cast back by the winds (10.50–5) is not really an
option, since to jump overboard would mean certain death. Two other examples occur at
the moment of meeting Nausicaa (6.141)—when he considers how to supplicate her (on
which see Barnouw (2004), 110–11)—and his father (24.235)—when he debates
whether to test him too. Scholars find the last example particularly troubling: see esp.
Page (1955), 111–12. For subtle analyses (albeit of very different kinds) that give
meaning to this difficult scene, see Rutherford (1986), 161–2; Henderson (1997).
The closest Iliadic example is provided by the bard, pondering whether to supplicate
Odysseus (Od. 22.336): see the end of this section.
114 Odysseus’ inner deliberations, as well as his many sufferings, have lent themselves
to the picture of this hero undergoing a moral transformation, particularly with a view to
exacting justice: see Rutherford (1986); Segal (1994), 195–227; Barnouw (2004), 37–
74; Farenga (2006), 174–261. Rutherford’s discussion begins with a survey of the
ancient evidence for the moralistic reading of Odysseus’ character. The popularity of
Odysseus among later philosophers (see Buffie`re (1956), 365–91; Stanford (1963), 118–
27; Barnouw (2004), 121–48) is suggestive of the Odyssey’s most striking difference from
the politics of the Iliad: the ‘philosophy of the Odyssey’ in Rutherford’s words. See n. 152
below.
115 See Pucci (1987), 128–38. See also Rutherford (1991–3), 44, who describes
Odyssey 22 as ‘“Iliadic” warfare transferred to the domestic setting’. He discusses parallels
between three scenes, Il. 9.378–87, Il. 22.349–54 and Od. 22.61–4.
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the halls of the returning king.116 The shift from public to private space
continues the Odyssey’s trend in marginalizing open conflict and bring-
ing it within the bounds of Odysseus’ control.
In fact, the suitors are so comfortable feasting in Odysseus’ palace that
they imagine themselves to be in a sympotic setting.117 Even after Odys-
seus has shot Antinous through the neck (as he was drinking his wine), and
he stands, stripped of his beggar’s garb, on the threshold of his palace, the
suitors chastise ‘the stranger’ (5*E&*, 22.27) as if he had not meant to kill
Antinous! Thus, even with Odysseus in his naked glory before them, they
still do not recognize him, nor the kind of narrative they are in. They have
been so far marginalized from the narrative focus that they don’t realize
that they are in an epic, where contest is deadly, and the playful games of
the symposium will lead to death and slaughter.118
One primary means by which the audience are aligned with
Odysseus’ point of view is through the Odyssey’s interplay with the
Iliadic tradition of the war at Troy.119 Once the suitors have come to
116 While Lowenstam (1993), 164 puts it too strongly when he comments: ‘the palace
and not the agora becomes the place for contest (Iª-&) of the bow and the subsequent
slaughter and revenge’ (since when is the agora ever a place for slaughter?), he rightly
identifies the critical shift in location, from public to private.
117 The narrator makes the contrast between the occasion and the events to take place
explicit, when he describes Antinous as having ‘no thought of murder’ as he drank his
wine (ç,&%. '1 %ƒ %PŒ K&d Łı#fiH j #1#:º*!%, 22.11–12). He continues: ‘For who would
believe that one man among many dining, even if he were especially strong, could work
his death and black fate?’ (!/. Œ0 %Y%Ø!% #*!0 I&'æ$"Ø 'ÆØ!ı#,&*""Ø j #%F&%& K&d
)º*,&*""Ø, ŒÆd *N #$ºÆ ŒÆæ!*æe. *YÅ, j %x !*25*Ø& Ł$&Æ!,& !* ŒÆŒe& ŒÆd ŒBæÆ #1ºÆØ&Æ&;
22.12–14).
118 This helps to develop Murnaghan’s (1987a) insight that the suitors fail to read the
signs of this narrative properly. For the suitors as thinking that they are at a symposium
and not in an epic, see Barker and Christensen (2006), 30–2.
119 In a line omitted from many manuscripts, the narrator describes the suitors’
panicked reaction to Antinous’ death: ‘each man looked about for how he could escape
sheer death’ ()$)!Å&*& 'b =ŒÆ"!%. ‹)fi Å ç2ª%Ø ÆN)f& Zº*Łæ%&, 22.43). In order to explain
its common omission, Russo, Ferna´ndez-Galiano, and Heubeck (1992), 207 point to
Eurymachus’ sceptical response: they conclude that this line, taken from the Iliad,
‘overplays the suitors’ fears, when they still think a deal is on the cards’. But that is
part of the point: the disjunction between the narrator’s description of doom and
Eurymachus’ offer of recompense displays how far removed the suitors are from the
reality of their situation. Furthermore, this line is used of the Trojan reaction to
Patroclus, whom they wrongly think is Achilles returning to battle (Il. 16.282; cf.
14.507): in the Odyssey the suitors would be right to fear since it is (an Achilles-like)
Odysseus.
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the belated recognition that Odysseus really has returned, Eurymachus,
the most prominent suitor after Antinous, offers recompense, as
Odysseus and his two companions had similarly done in the embassy
to Achilles in Iliad 9.120 Odysseus, however, firmly rejects the proposal
by adopting an Achillean pose. First, the narrator prepares the ground
by tagging Odysseus’ reply to Eurymachus with the description, ‘look-
ing darkly at him’ (!e& '0 ¼æ 0 (),'æÆ N'g&, 22.60), just as Achilles had
done with Agamemnon in their verbal confrontation in Iliad 1.121Next,
as Russo, Ferna´ndez-Galiano, and Heubeck have observed, ‘the con-
struction [of Odysseus’ response (22.61–3)] %P'0 *N . . . %P'1 . . .u. . . .
occurs, for example, in Achilles’ similar rejection of Agamemnon’s offer’
(Il. 9.379–85). In addition, they note that Achilles’ following lines (Il.
9.388–91) ‘continue with expressions of contempt for the proposals
related by Odysseus’.122 Here, it is Odysseus himself who contemptu-
ously dismisses any prospect of reconciliation. Lastly, Odysseus’ rejec-
tion of ‘paternal possessions’ ()Æ!æ-œÆ )Ø$&!Æ0 , Od. 22.61) resonates
with the rejection by Achilles of Agamemnon’s attempt to assert his
120 The general context of offering material recompense for salvation connects these
two scenes, but more particularly: (a) Eurymachus’ acknowledgement that, without such
gifts, ‘one could not blame you for being angry’ is the same line used by Phoenix in his
appeal to Achilles ()æd& '0 %h !Ø &*#*""Å!e& Œ*å%ºH"ŁÆØ,Od. 22.59¼Il. 9.523), the only
other time this phrase is used; (b) Eurymachus’ language of reparation that the commu-
nity will offer, Iæ*""$#*&%Ø, occurs in exactly the same line position as Nestor’s proposal
to Agamemnon that he offer recompense to Achilles (Il. 9.112; cf. 19.138): Russo,
Ferna´ndez-Galiano, and Heubeck (1992), 230. According to Haubold (2000), 119–23,
Eurymachus’ offer of recompense confronts the potential problem of Odysseus’ ven-
geance: not only could the killing of all the suitors be interpreted as excessive; from an
epic perspective, it would represent the leader losing all of his people.
121 This formula appears to have an Achillean tonality to it. It first occurs at Il.1.148
to introduce Achilles’ verbal assault against Agamemnon. It is applied to: (1) Achilles on
four further occasions (Il. 20.428; 22.260, 344; 24.559); (2) Odysseus and Diomedes
three times each, resonating with the initial example of Achilles (Il. 4.349 and 411; cf.
2.245; 5.251; 10.446; 14.82); (3) Glaucus, in reaction to Hector (Il. 17.141); (4)
Hector, trying to silence Poulydamas (12.230; 18.284; cf. 17.169); (5) Zeus, silencing
Hera (Il. 5.888; 15.13). In the Odyssey, the phrase is used only of Odysseus (Od. 8.165;
18.4, 337, 19.70; 22.34, 60, 320), with the exception of Antinous (17.459) and
Eurymachus (18.388), whose Achillean-like reactions give them away to Odysseus’
teasing questioning. Holoka (1983) interprets this phrase as denoting the class status
of the speaker.
122 Russo, Ferna´ndez-Galiano, and Heubeck (1992), 232 (my italics).
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authority over Peleus.123 Thus, at the point of crisis, when Eurymachus
speaks like an Odysseus with words of compromise, the narrative
answers back with Odysseus’ Achilles-like response. But this ‘Achilles’
conforms to an Odyssean world of order and control: Odysseus’ evoca-
tion of Achilles silences dissent. The Odyssey invites its audience to
recognize its resonant interplay with its rival tradition, but playing the
game of allusion-spotting risks—like the suitors—overlooking what is
at stake in the contest.
He cut off his head while he was still talking
The end of the contest forcefully brings the question of its representa-
tion to mind by means of a series of parallel supplications made by
Leiodes, Medon and the bard respectively. The theme of supplication
dominates the Iliad, which is framed by parallel examples of an elderly
figure entreating a powerful king, the first of which is rejected, while the
latter example is accepted.124 The Odyssey briefly reprises that series in
this episode, as Odysseus first rejects and then accepts supplication.
The first supplication is by Leiodes, the one surviving suitor, who, as
he supplicates Odysseus, draws attention to his status as some kind of
seer (Łı%"Œ,%., 22.318)—as if he should be spared for this reason. The
clash of seer and leader in the context of a supplication resonates
strongly with the beginning of the Iliad, where Agamemnon spectacu-
larly failed to silence either the suppliant (Chyrses) or the seer (Calchas)
with his exercise of authority. The situation turns out to be rather
different for Odysseus (Od. 22.326–9):
S. ¼æÆ çø&+"Æ. 5/ç%. *¥ º*!% å*Øæd )Æå*/fi Å
Œ*/#*&%&, ‹ Þ 0 3ª1ºÆ%. I)%)æ%1ÅŒ* åÆ#AÇ*
Œ!*Ø&,#*&%.· !fiH !,& ª* ŒÆ!0 ÆPå1&Æ #1""%& 7ºÆ""*.
çŁ*ªª%#1&%ı '0 ¼æÆ !%F ª* Œ$æÅ Œ%&/fi Å"Ø& K#/åŁÅ.
123 For example, Agamemnon’s offer of his daughter in marriage (Il. 9.141–8; cf.
283–90) is countered by Achilles’ assertion that his father will find him a bride (9.388–
400). Deneen (2000), 65 observes that Odysseus must become more like Achilles.
124 In the human realm, no supplication is successful during the course of the
narrative until Achilles receives Priam’s entreaty. That scenario was not always the
case, however: Achilles had been willing to accept supplication prior to the narrative of
the Iliad, as the episode between Achilles and Lycaon makes clear (Il. 21.34–135). Cf. Il.
11.123–48.
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So speaking Odysseus took in his thick hand a sword that was lying on the
ground, which Agelaus had dropped to the floor when he was killed. With this
sword then he cut through the middle of Leiodes’ neck. And while he was still
speaking his head fell to the floor and mixed with the dust.
The image is both memorable and shocking: Odysseus cuts off Leoides’
head while he is still talking. Furthermore, the instrument he uses is the
sword of Agelaus: the weapon of ‘the leader of the ºÆ,.’125 is used to
silence the last remaining suitor. In a supreme authorial gesture, the
Odyssey definitively, and brutally, silences dissent. But—and this is equally
important—it does not shy away from doing so. It confronts the ugliness
of Odysseus’ victory, even as it has shown the value and necessity of it.126
Following this unfavourable precedent, not surprisingly the bard
hesitates to carry out his supplication. Fortunately for all concerned,
Telemachus intervenes and the bard is spared.127 As the doors close on
the slaughter,128 Odysseus silences Eurycleia’s victory-song: by doing so
he paradoxically advertises his famed deceptiveness.129 Odysseus’ con-
trol over the production of fame is symptomatic of a narrative that
marginalizes dissenting voices, even as it reveals, and revels in, its
strategy of suppression.
4. HOW TO STAGE-MANAGE EPIC
(ODYSSEY 1, 24)
The Odyssey’s control over dissent most startlingly comes to the fore
with the divine framing of the poem: Zeus and Athena act as a catalyst
125 Haubold (2000), 125.
126 Commenting on the breathtaking ‘unprecedented gesture of social and narrative
violence’ Haubold (ibid. 125) captures something of the paradox being described here:
‘We cannot be appalled by what we hear without feeling relieved.’
127 To sing the Odyssey, wonders Pucci (1987), 228–35. While he is at it, Telemachus
also spares Medon, the faithful retainer from the beginning of the Odyssey, and who still
has work to do.
128 As Lowe (2000), 136 puts it: ‘Here the endgame action of (XXII) is literally sealed,
by closure and control of all the narrative entrances.’
129 22.407–16. Odysseus also issues instructions to start up (fake) wedding celebra-
tions to cover the noise of the slaughter (23.130–40). Again, the Odyssey paradoxically
represents the production of Odysseus’ fame in his very act of suppressing it. Cf. Segal
(1994), 106–9.
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for, and bring to an end, the narrative. In the Iliad the divine assembly
acts as an important extreme-case scenario that shows the extent of the
progress made by the Achaeans. The assembly scenes on Olympus are
contrasted with the assemblies performed by the Achaeans: Zeus does
not, and cannot, brook dissent, since the stability of the cosmos depends
on it; on the other hand, the activity of his potential cosmic usurper,
Achilles, by standing up to Agamemnon, confirms Zeus’ ultimate and
everlasting authority. The Odyssey explores the tensions within this
model by substituting the divine assembly as the yardstick by which
to measure all other assemblies in the narrative.
Zeus calls an assembly
The first words in direct speech of the Iliad had been uttered by Chryses,
a marginal figure whose plea before the collected Achaeans leads to a
crisis in Agamemnon’s leadership and prompts Achilles’ response—to
call an assembly. The Odyssey also opens with a programmatic first
speech and assembly, but inverts the dynamic between authority and
dissent. The first speaker of the Odyssey is Zeus, the ‘father of gods and
men’ himself—the authority. He too convokes an assembly in response
to a crisis. But the security of his community is not at stake (for how
could it be, when he is in charge?); rather, the issue is one of interpreta-
tion. Humans, Zeus complains, fail to interpret the signs given to them
properly and come to a bad end as a result; then, they have the gall to
blame the gods!130 Read in the light of Achilles’ consolation to Priam
that all humans receive a portion of ills from the jars of Zeus (Il.
24.522–33), these words act programmatically to distance the Odyssey
from the Iliadic narrative tradition.131 This epic is going to lay stress on
mankind’s pains being self-inflicted: Odysseus’ companions, Aegisthus
here, the suitors later on—all come to a bad end ‘because of their own
recklessness’ ("çfi B"Ø& I!Æ"ŁÆº/fi Å"Ø&, Od. 1.34).132
130 ‘J ),)%Ø, %x%& '+ &ı Ł*%f. :æ%!%d ÆN!Ø,ø&!ÆØ. j K5 B#1ø& ª$æ çÆ"Ø Œ$Œ0 7##*&ÆØ’,
Od. 1.32–3.
131 See Dodds (1963), 32–3; Lloyd-Jones (1983), 28–32; Segal (1994), esp. 195–7.
Cf. Clay (1983), 213–39, with 216, n. 2.
132 This idea, announced right at the beginning of theOdyssey in relation to the loss of
Odysseus’ companions (1.7) and made generic of mankind by Zeus, introduces an
important theme. Eurylochus tries to make Odysseus responsible for their troubles
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As an example Zeus cites Aegisthus’ demise at the hands of Orestes,
which acts as a counter-model to the Odyssey’s story over the course of
narrative.133 In its first manifestation here, Zeus entirely empties it of
the moral trauma that will infect its tragic later representations: the
focus on Aegisthus makes it a case of revenge pure and simple.134 And so
it must be, if it is to act as the paradigm for Odysseus’ vengeance on the
suitors: for the Odyssey, the slaughter of the suitors needs to be con-
structed as (morally) unproblematic and inevitable. Furthermore,
Aegisthus is introduced as a paradigmatically poor listener: he failed
to interpret his warnings properly, which is why he perishes. Zeus’
speech is aimed at an audience of the events as a warning to get
interpretation right.
Zeus thereby establishes the assembly, not as an arena that allows
dissent, but as the stage for displaying authoritative interpretations of
the events.135 Indeed, the subsequent exchanges between Zeus and
Athena bear this impression out. Athena immediately concedes
(10.437), but he is answered decisively by Odysseus at 12.300 with a warning that
anticipates their self-inflicted downfall. The description then transfers to the suitors in
the aftermath of their destruction (22.317, 416; 24.438). See Rutherford (1986), 151
with n. 37, and de Jong (2001), 12, who notes that the root I!Æ"ŁÆº- occurs only
once—Od. 1.7—in narrator-text, while of the twenty-eight occasions it is used in
character-text the majority (fifteen) refer to the suitors. Particularly significant is
22.416 for the way Odysseus’ indictment recalls Zeus’ opening speech: ‘Gods’ fate and
their own wicked deeds conquered these men: for they paid no attention to any mortal
on earth, whether base or noble, who came their way. So by their own recklessness they
met a shameful end’ (‘!%2"'* 'b #%Eæ 0 K'$#Æ""* Ł*H& ŒÆd "å1!ºØÆ 7æªÆ· j %h !Ø&Æ ªaæ
!/*"Œ%& K)ØåŁ%&/ø& I&Łæ-)ø&, j %P ŒÆŒe& %P'b #b& K"Łº,&, ‹!Ø. "ç1Æ. *N"Æç/Œ%Ø!%· j
!fiH ŒÆd I!Æ"ŁÆº/fi Å"Ø& I*ØŒ1Æ ),!#%& K)1")%&’, 22.413–16). Its two occurrences in the
Iliad are also significant: the first describes the failed heroes from the competing tradition
of the ‘Seven against Thebes’ (Il. 4.409); the second is used by Hector to describe his own
errors (Il. 22.104) as he faces death.
133 The details change according to the context of the story and its point. See de Jong
(2001), 12. For the paradigmatic nature of Aegisthus, see Segal (1994), 215–27; Cook
(1995), 33–48; Barnouw (2004), 37–52.
134 As Slatkin (2005), 318 comments: ‘By recalling this story [of Aegisthus]
Zeus links the goal of return to that of revenge, bringing to the fore the ethical and
political dimensions of homecoming . . .Considerations of culpability, and larger ques-
tions of theodicy largely downplayed in the Iliad, are put squarely on the table in this
poem.’
135 As Kullmann (1985), 5 puts it: ‘Taking the fate of Aegisthus, the adulterer, as an
example, Zeus, in a kind of cabinet meeting of the gods, expounds the principles of his
rule over the world.’
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her father’s complaint against mankind, but denies its relevance to
Odysseus, whom she upholds as a man who does listen.136 Zeus
agrees, and sets in motion the narrative that will lead to his return.
The result is an assembly bereft of tension or of contesting points of
view. ‘[D]ans l’Odysse´e,’ Roland Martin comments, ‘nous entrons dans
une atmosphe`re politique assez diffe´rente,’137 one in which consensus
reigns.
A further point to bring out relates to the narrative’s orientation
towards its external audience. Some four books later, after taking us on
Telemachus’ journey abroad to visit Nestor and Menelaus, the narrator
returns us more or less to the self-same scene on Olympus. Speaking
first this time, Athena complains that ‘no one remembers divine-like
Odysseus’ (‘‰. %h !Ø. #1#&Å!ÆØ 0O'ı""B%. Ł*/%Ø%’, 5.11)—which is
precisely the concern one is likely to raise after four books of an Odyssey
without Odysseus!138 Once again, Athena’s question fails to stimulate a
debate: Zeus is whole-hearted in his support, merely pausing to com-
ment: ‘Did you yourself not plan this?’ (‘%P ªaæ 'c !%F!%& #b&
K:%2º*ı"Æ. &,%& ÆP!+’; 5.23).139 Once again the divine assembly ap-
pears to be more of a management committee than a debating chamber,
even as the doublet of assembly scenes on Olympus draws attention to
the artificiality of the narrative. Debate here is not represented in terms
of reproducing dissent, but instead works to reveal the constructedness
of this account.
136 Athena’s question, ‘Did not Odysseus please you with sacrifice . . . ?’ (Od. 1.60–1),
opens a comparison to the Iliad, where Zeus similarly enjoys Hector’s sacrificial ob-
servance. While Zeus does not save Hector from the consequences of conflict, he does
manage the return of his body for burial, in recognition of Hector’s piety (Il. 24.34,
69–70). See Rutherford (1986), 148, n. 19.
137 R. Martin (1951), 27. In his view, ‘nous assistons au progre`s du logos’. This
chapter lays emphasis instead on the impression that dissent has no place in the Odyssey’s
divine assembly. In fact, from the beginning dissent has been marginalized: Poseidon,
who alone opposes Odysseus’ return, is absent (Od. 1.17–21). Furthermore, as de Jong
(2001), 14 shows, Athena’s opening speech (1.48–62) plays on the connection between
Odysseus’ name and his suffering.
138 Segal (1994), 124.
139 On Athena’s facilitating role in the Odyssey, see Clay (1983). Cook (1995)
associates Athena’s prominence with Athens, exploring the interpenetration of the
Odyssey with Athenian cult. He concludes that ‘the authorial perspective is consistently
that of Zeus and Athene as guarantors of justice’ (p. 180).
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Let us forget
At one level, then, the Odyssey strips away any pretence of debate in the
divine assembly, reducing it to little more than a setting out of objec-
tives between Zeus and Athena. At another, however, it displays their
control, not only over the machinations of the wider mythological
cosmos, but also over the direction and shape of this narrative. This
could suggest that the Odyssey stands at a later stage of cosmos construc-
tion, when no dissenting voices from Zeus are even heard,140 and/or
that it is more self-conscious than the Iliad about the necessity of power.
Either way, it presents a narrative highly aware of its own construction
and of its influence over its own reception.
The third and last meeting between Zeus and Athena occurs as the
narrative itself draws to a close, and dissent (in the form of the suitors’
relatives) has finally broken out on stage (24.471–88). With civil conflict
looming large on the horizon, Zeus repeats his earlier assurance that every-
thinghashappened asAthenahadplanned,underlining their dualmanage-
mentof thenarrative.141Hethen issues a series of edicts: ‘let [Odysseus] rule
always’ (‘› #b& :Æ"Øº*ı1!ø ÆN*/ ’, 24.483); ‘let them be friends with each
other’ (‘!%d '0 Iºº+º%ı. çØº*,&!ø&’, 24.485). Zeus’ sentiment here reso-
nateswith the end of the Iliad, inwhichwarrior and victim form some kind
of bond of reconciliation and a truce allows the burial ofHector—all under
Zeus’guidance.142Yet, forall thatZeus engineers themeetingbetweenhero
and suppliant, Achilles asserts that he will return Hector’s body because he
wills it so.143 The Odyssey’s manufacture of an ending is far more explicit:
Zeus’ exhortative ‘let them be friends with each other’ glosses over some
rather stark and fundamental differences within the community that, up
140 This would be in line with the view that ancient Greek hexameter poetry charts
out a history of the cosmos: Graziosi and Haubold (2005).
141 24.478–80. It should be noted that all indications of an institutional space are
absent from this scene on Olympus. We are now in the realm solely of narrative
manipulation.
142 Heubeck (1954), 40–54. Nevertheless, the truce there had been uneasy: even as
Achilles promises a pause from fighting (Il. 24.657–70), he disrupts the conciliatory
mood by ushering Priam out of his tent with the threat of Agamemnon’s anger should
Priam be seen (24.650–5); and the Trojans still post guards just in case the Achaeans
attack (24.799–800). See Lynn-George (1988), 230–76.
143 Il. 24.560–70, esp. 560–1: ‘I myself am minded to release Hector to you’ (‘&%1ø
'b ŒÆd ÆP!e. j @‚Œ!%æ$ !%Ø ºF"ÆØ’).
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until this moment, had been represented along partisan lines: just how are
thesuitors’ andOdysseus’ families expected togetalongnow?Intheabsence
of explanation, Zeus enjoins: ‘Let us put oblivion on the slaughter’ (‘ç,&%Ø%
7ŒºÅ"Ø& Ł1ø#*&’, 24.484–5). Where Priam had brought about a connec-
tion between himself and Achilles by asking the Iliad ’s protagonist to
remember (#&B"ÆØ, Il. 24.486), Zeus asks us all to forget. His orders display
the desire to control both the narrative and interpretation of it.
Yet it does not end there. It is only after Eupeithes, that last dissenting
voice, has been done away with—and god knows how many others with
him144—that Athena finally intercedes to halt the slaughter: she calls out
to the Ithacans to ‘hold back from grievous war’ (‘¥"å*"Ł* )!%º1#%ı,
0I ŁÆŒ+"Ø%Ø, IæªÆº1%Ø%’, 24.531).145 Even then, this is not the end of the
story, as Odysseus continues his slaughter of the dissenters until, finally,
Zeus’ thunderbolt and yet another intervention by Athena halt his pursuit.
WhenAthena held Achilles back by the hair at the beginning of the Iliad it
precipitated his withdrawal and a narrative based on dissent; here, Athena
is barely able to hold Odysseus back, prevent further slaughter and bring
an end to his return.146 At its conclusion, the narrative paradoxically
suggests the precariousness of its control over alternative voices; in the
end, it presents itself as just one version of Odysseus’ return.147
144 The narrator merely mentions that ‘Odysseus would have killed them all and
taken away their homecoming’ had not Athena intervened (ŒÆ/ &2 Œ* 'c )$&!Æ. Zº*"Æ&
ŒÆd 7ŁÅŒÆ& I&,"!%ı., 24.528).
145 In fact, not only does Athena desist from intervening right away; on the contrary,
she actively incites Odysseus and his followers into battle against the suitors’ families
(24.502–4, 516–20). Critics, however, tend to elide the assembly that asserts the truce
with Athena’s final intervention. See e.g. Schein (1996), 9, who comments: ‘Zeus and
Athene impose a truce . . . after Laertes kills Eupeithes’ (my italics).
146 The end of theOdyssey has much troubled scholars since Aristarchus, who puts the
end at Od. 23.296: see S. West (1989), 118. See esp. Page (1955), ch. 5. For a defence of
the ending as we have it, see Erbse (1972); Moulton (1974); Wender (1978); de Jong
(2001), 565–6. For a judicious weighing up of the arguments, see Rutherford (1996),
74–7, who thinks much of book 24 is likely to be the work of a later poet, though he
concedes that ‘it is hard to believe that nothing was said about the reclaiming of the
kingdom’ (p. 77). We might note that the Odyssey goes some way to anticipating and, to
a certain extent, to setting up this crisis by having Teiresias prophesy that Odysseus’
homecoming will not end on his arrival back home—a prophecy made roughly halfway
through the poem (11.90–137).
147 In certain scenes (see esp. 13.221–439, but also e.g. 20.30–53) Odysseus enjoys
an almost exclusive direct vision of divinity of the kind he is refused in the Iliad (where he
only hears Athena at Il. 2.182; cf. Il. 10.512) in comparison to e.g. Achilles, who
‘immediately recognized Pallas Athena’ (ÆP!/ŒÆ '0 7ª&ø j —Æºº$'0 '0 3ŁÅ&Æ/Å&, Il.
1.199–200). See Pucci (1987), 42.
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TheOdyssey narrates quite a different vision of the assembly from the Iliad.
Debate is seen through the eyes of a figure involved in it and trying to exert
control over it. More generally, agonistic confrontations are displaced
from the Iliadic arenas of social cohesion and differentiation (the assembly,
games, even the battlefield) to the more intimate surroundings of the
palace, the swineherd’s hut and the bedroom.148 Dissenting voices are
marginalized from arenas of power and, subsequently, suppressed.149
Contrary to the Iliad ’s model of institutional dissension, the Odyssey
performs a narrative of Odysseus’ return. It insists upon a self-conscious
awareness of a self-authorizing strategy, implicating the audience in the
celebration of Odysseus’ tale at the expense of competing narratives.
Faced with such a performance, critics tend to adopt self-contradictory
positions. On the one hand, they note the text’s powerful ethical drive
whereby Odysseus returns to slaughter all his enemies. On the other, they
celebrate its playfulness and its openness in allowing different interpreta-
tions—typically in comparison to the Iliad.150 Like Odysseus, the audi-
ence are invited to hear the Iliad (or the Iliadic tradition of the war at Troy
at least) as a Siren song, as Odysseus sails on to Ithaca and home.151
This epic Act began with Longinus’ distinction between contest in the
Iliad and the Odyssey’s focus on storytelling. That distinction has been
confirmed by the present analysis of debate, in which it has been shown
that the Iliad privileges dissent as necessary and desirable to the institution
of the Iª%æ+, even given its potentially troubling repercussions, and while
148 On the intimacy of scenes in the Odyssey, see Lowenstam (1993); Felson-Rubin
(1994).
149 Haubold (2000) talks of the ‘official version’ of the tale (p. 108) and its ‘author-
ised speakers’ (p. 125).
150 Schein (1996): ‘Odysseus overcomes his enemies completely and unambivalently’
(p. 9) versus ‘The Odyssey [in contrast to the Iliad], like its cunning, shifty, adaptable
hero, is harder to get a handle on’ (p. 39). Deneen (2000), 65: ‘It is ultimately
[Odysseus’] ability to act apolitically and even amorally that will restore justice to Ithaca’.
Rose (1999) criticizes Thalmann (1998) precisely for arguing that the Odyssey requires a
relatively closed reading. Rose is right—if we take only the view of the social order. But
this is to neglect the fact that, in the Odyssey, ‘low’ social characters have a voice because
they have a role to play. The accommodation of ‘alternative possibilities’ (Rose (1999),
338) is, like everything else, a ploy.
151 The Sirens’ song as Iliadic: Pucci (1987), 209–13. For the Odyssey as replacing all
other epics: Danek (1998), 231; Doherty (1995). Goldhill (1993), 142–4 interprets the
Siren song as a sign of self-reflexive poetics that problematize the Odyssey’s ‘interweaving
of seduction and authority’ (p. 144).
Sidelining debate in the Odyssey 133
Barker 9780199542710_0029-0202_Barker_chap2-3 Final Proof page 133 29.4.2011 10:44am
recognizing the need for good management of it. In the Odyssey, by
contrast, dissent is marginalized, as the narrative instead privileges
Odysseus’ return. This observation concerning the thematization of dis-
sent extends to an understanding of the differing narrative strategies of
each epic. By being invited to witness and experience the institutional
possibilities for dissent, the audience of the Iliad plays a part in realizing
a political community. On the other hand, the demands placed on an
audience of the Odyssey turn out to be paradoxical and troubling: little
opportunity is given to heed the virtues of dissent; yet it is equally difficult
to ignore the violence with which dissenting voices are suppressed.
The ago¯n between the Iliad and Odyssey bequeaths to the tradition
two alternative ways of thinking about the dialectic between authority
and dissent which explores the problems of Achilles’ challenge to
Agamemnon or the allurements of Odysseus’ speech.152 Act II will
confront the problem of dissent in the construction of a historical
narrative, when being an authority matters, as we have seen in Odysseus’
narration of debate. Act III then considers the responses of tragedy to
the fallout from Achilles’ dissent, in the fully institutionalized environ-
ment of the dramatic festival in Athenian democracy.
As we leave the epic debate, however, spare a thought for the losers,
Thersites and the suitors. By making a big deal out of asserting author-
ity, the Iliad leaves open the possibility that the principle of dissent may
be extended. It may even be said that the Iliad provides the basis for
dissent that will give a platform for later Thersiteses to enter the
debate.153 Defending Thersites in fact becomes something of a topos
in rhetorical treatises.154 No one is heard defending the suitors.
152 Imhoof (1990) explores this relationship from a philosophical perspective, and
notes how Odysseus’ polytropic form proves a suggestive, and successful, model for a
wide range of intellectual groups. Cf. Deneen (2000), esp. 11, 54; Barnouw (2004). The
trend may be traced back to Plato’s Hippias Minor, where Socrates argues that it is
Odysseus—paradoxically—who is the most honest of the two heroes: see esp. Pl.Hi. Mi.
369–371. Cf. this chapter, n. 114 above.
153 ‘Each time these lines are read, other possibilities emerge, and if Thersites’ tears
rendered him ridiculous to the Achaeans, they have come to evoke rather more sympathy
from many modern readers’: Lincoln (1994), 88.
154 Libanius Progymnasmata, Encomium 4. See Gibson (2008), 229–31, n. 162, who
cites: Polybius 12.26b.5; Favorinus frg.1 (A. Barigazzi, ed., ‘Favorino di Arelate: Opere’
(Firenze, 1966), 139–41); Aulus Gellius ‘Noct. att.’ 17.12.1–2
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ACT II
HISTORIOGRAPHY
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Introduction: writing in dissent
In Act I I explored the varying representations of debate in Homeric epic,
reaching the conclusion that the two narratives adopt very different
strategies towards dissent. From the beginning of its narrative, the Iliad
presents debate as part of a collective enterprise to be undertaken in the
Achaean assembly. As the narrative progresses, dissent becomes institu-
tional in a way that intersects with the poem’s broader movement from a
time of heroes to a world which prefigures that of the poem’s audience,
however that is conceived. On the other hand, theOdyssey explores debate
from the perspective of the authorizing agent and exposes fault-lines in its
establishment and performance. In so doing, the Odyssey’s representation
of debate stresses responsibility: not only are the characters within the
narrative held to account for their dissent, but the audience too are made
to reflect on their process of judgement, lest they find themselves on the
side of suitors or companions ‘who perished through their own reckless-
ness’ ("ç*!1æfi Å"Ø& I!Æ"ŁÆº/fi Å"Ø& Zº%&!%, Od. 1.7, etc.).
Act II considers how debates work in historiography, taking as case
studies two forerunners of this genre, the histories of Herodotus and
Thucydides.1 Since antiquity these two authors have been regarded not
only as founding the genre but also as bequeathing to it starkly con-
trasting metholodogical practices.2 For a long time considered a naive
1 For the different stages of history’s reinvention, see Iggers (1993). For discussions of
the problem of writing history, see: White (1978); Barthes (1986), 127–54; Ankersmit
and Kellner, eds. (1995).
2 See esp. Marincola (2001). On the relationship between Herodotus and Thucydides
see Hornblower (1996), 19–37, 122–45; cf. Hornblower (1992). See also Scanlon
(1994); Allison (1997b); Rood (1998b ; 1999); Greenwood (2006), 1–18. Jacoby
(1913) configures that relationship in terms of a teleological development towards
history writing: see Marincola (1999) for a discussion and critique. R. Fowler (1996)
collates and analyses possible predecessors to Herodotus; cf. R. Fowler (2006). On
Herodotus’ influence in antiquity, see Hornblower (2006). For ancient testimony, see
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compiler of outlandish stories, Herodotus’ more open compositional
style, in which he frequently juxtaposes different accounts of the same
event, has won increasing favour with contemporary critics.3 His rival
accounts, it is said, unsettle an authoritative narrative and empower the
reader, thus opening up a dialogue between the text and its readers.4 On
the other hand, by giving his sources no voice in his narrative, Thucy-
dides, once upheld as the archetypal historian for his perceived ‘objec-
tive’ approach to history, is now regarded as allowing his readers no way
in to his narrative; he is the controlling author; his word is final.5 If we
apply our focus on debate and our methodology from Act I, however, a
rather different picture of both authors emerges.
As composers of an extended narrative that, at least in part, seeks to
document the progress and outcome of a war, both Herodotus and
Thucydides work within the context established by the Iliad ’s poem of
Dionysius of Halicarnassus,On Thucydides and Lucian,How to Write History. One of the
ways in which the relationship between the two authors may be reconfigured is in terms
of perspective: Herodotus enquires into past events, Thucydides writes up a war he was
recording from its beginning. It is interesting to note, for example, that, when he writes
about the past, Thucydides seems to adopt a Herodotean voice-print: see R. Fowler
(1996), 76–80; cf. Pelling (1999a), 327. V. Hunter (1973), suggestively describes
Thucydides as a reporter; Greenwood (2006), 129 notes in passing that Thucydides
writes ‘a factual narrative about contemporary events’. While not the subject of this
book, it is questionable whether Thucydides would have regarded himself as writing
history.
3 Dewald and Marincola (2006), 1–7 survey the twentieth-century rehabilitation of
Herodotos.
4 For Herodotus’ ‘dialogism’, see esp. Dewald (1998; 1999). According to Dewald
(1987), these interventions combine to obstruct reading and make the reader aware of
the problems of composition. See also Gould (1989); Thomas (2000); Dewald (2002);
Pelling (2006a); Griffiths (2006). Pelling (2000), 83 puts this most succinctly, and
makes the comparison to Thucydides explicit: ‘Herodotus’ text is “dialogic” . . . . Multi-
ple viewpoints and interpretations co-exist in the text; and the interaction between text
and reader is itself a two-way “dialogue”, with each continually putting questions to the
other . . . . That is not Thucydides’ way. Where Herodotus opens questions up, Thucy-
dides’ tendency is to close them down, to impose a single “monologic” view imperiously
on his readers.’ This chapter will try to complicate that opposition by interpreting
Herodotus’ openness as a tactic to gain authority and Thucydides’ assertions as provo-
cative challenges. For a different approach to the potential ‘responsible dialogism’ of
Thucydides’ narrative, see now Dewald (2005), 22.
5 See esp. Loraux (1980; 1986b); cf. Gould (1989); Ober (1998); Dewald (1999).
Kurke (2000), 115, however, argues that ‘none of these modern stereotypes does justice
to Herodotos and Thoukydides’. See also Rood (1998a), 18 on the danger of neglecting
the way ‘passages function within Thucydides’ text’.
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conflict.6 The Iliad too is important for thinking about the composi-
tional fabric of both narratives and their use of direct speech: though
debates feature most prominently in Thucydides, and in a highly
stylized way, they are present too in Herodotus, along with other
kinds of less formal speech act.7 Given the high degree of direct speech
in Homeric epic generally, it may just be the case that this was the way
one composed a narrative of extended length. Yet, the extent and variety
of direct speech is still a feature that sets the histories of Herodotus and
Thucydides apart from later manifestations of this genre and thus
requires comment. On the other hand, there are two basic, and inter-
related, points which distinguish both Herodotus and Thucydides from
Homeric epic: they are writers and they are self-styled authorities.8
First, the use of writing radically severs the historians from both the
tradition of narrative composition, which they inherit from Homer, and
their own cultural environment, which was dominated by oral public
performance.9 ‘To write, in the landscape of Herodotus and other con-
temporary authors,’ argues Debbie Steiner, ‘is to enter the world of the
tyrant, to set oneself on the side of the autocrat, the oppressor, the
enslaver.’10 Steiner here is thinking about the representation of tyrannical
figures in the histories as using writing;11 but her argument has clear
application to the historians themselves.12 By writing prose accounts of
their great wars, both Herodotus and Thucydides occupy a position of
6 For the influence of Homer on Herodotus, see Strasburger (1982), 1057–97;
Fornara (1983), 62–3, 76–7; Griffin (1990); Boedeker (2002); Pelling (1999a), 332–
5, and esp. (2006c); Marincola (2006); Gray (2007), 207–9. On Thucydides: Woodman
(1988), ch. 1; Hornblower (1996), 38–61 (on Brasidas); C. Mackie (1996); Allison
(1997a), 88–91, (1997b). Rood (1998b) explores connections to various genres, not just
epic. On the Homeric influence on ancient historiography more generally, see Marincola
(2007).
7 Boedeker (2002), 104, 106; Marincola (2006), 14; Pelling (2006a), 104. Cf. Lang
(1984).
8 Goldhill (2002), 10–44 on authority through (prose) narrative; cf. Kurke (2000).
9 Though we know little about the ‘original’ context of performance for the Homeric
poems, we do know that they were later put on at grand public festivals, such as the Great
Panathenaia: see Act III, intro., n. 1 below.
10 Steiner (1994), 128.
11 Darius, for example, undertakes a policy of inscribing his reign, in which he
(literally) maps out his territory: he takes with him, on his conquests, a group of scribes:
Steiner (1994), 142–9.
12 Ibid. 142 notes in passing that Herodotus’ modus operandi is similar, in the sense
that his practice of observing and recording mirrors the project of conquest and
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some ambivalence in their respective societies, ideologically at least on
the margins of a society that privileged the spoken word in the polis’
public institutions.13 Moreover, in Homeric epic direct speech is the
compositional element the poet himself uses, and the public context of
debate matches the performance context of the poem itself. In written
discourse, however, debate represents an alternative, competing form of
expression; and when a historian narrates an assembly, that context differs
fundamentally from the one in which he himself composes. This should
prompt us to ask what effect writing down debate has on its representa-
tion, and what happens to the production, and management, of dissent as
a result. In turn, this question introduces a second point that distinguishes
the historians from Homer: the issue of authority.
Although both Herodotus and Thucydides are indebted to Homeric
narrative in a number of ways, such as in the extended use of direct
speech, the narratives they generate represent a radically different sce-
nario: they are authors of their own narratives in a way that a Homer,
whose authority derives from the Muse and whose compositional ele-
ments are largely inherited from an oral tradition, is not.14 The histor-
ian is personally responsible for his text: his authority is constructed by
his own testimony and by the manner in which he delivers his evi-
dence.15 The place of debate, then, can be a key moment of anxiety in
possession by the kings. Christ (1994) and Thompson (1996), 79–111 both stress how
Herodotus differs from the despot in the nature of his investigation.
13 See Thomas (1989; 1992) for evidence of the dominance of orality even in fifth-
century bc culture. See also Kurke (2000) and Goldhill (2002) for the radical departure
from the tradition signalled by the historians’ prose accounts; cf. Fehling (1989), 11. On
the importance of the cultural milieu for understanding Herodotus’ work, see esp.
Fornara (1971); Thomas (2000), (2006); R. Fowler (2001). Greenwood (2000) stresses
the need for the prose writer to find a place within his community.
14 Most (1990), 47–8 identifies the role of writing as being crucial in marking
authority: by naming himself, ‘the author identifies the text as his text, the one he has
produced and which can now, since it is written, be compared word for word with other
people’s texts’. For prose as a genre of argument and the mode of expression favoured by
the natural scientists, see: G. E. R. Lloyd (1987); Thomas (2000). On the historian’s
authority, see Marincola (1997); cf. (2001). For a survey and discussion of cause,
responsibility, origin (ÆN!/Æ): Darbo-Peschanski (1997).
15 For authorial voice in Herodotus: Dewald (1987; 2002); Marincola (1987);
Calame (1995), 75–96; de Jong (1999); Brock (2003). In Thucydides, see esp. Rood
(1998a), 3–23; Gribble (1998); Dewald (2005). The issue is nicely summed up by
Marincola (2006), 15: ‘Whereas the poets rely for the authoritativeness on the god or
muse who is invoked at the beginning of their poems, Herodotus has no appeal to the
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the historian’s text, since it marks the point when voices other than the
author’s are drawn upon and incorporated somehow in the broader
narrative, while remaining the responsibility of the author’s as much as
his own narratorial voice.16 Josiah Ober, for example, understands
Thucydides’ representation of debate in the form of an ago¯n—the
typically Athenian means of representing difference of opinion and
coming to judgement—as a response to and criticism of the formation
of democratic knowledge: in contrast to assembly debate, with all of its
deficiencies and flaws, stands Thucydides’ narrative.17 Yet, while there is
much to commend this approach, not least its recognition of Thucy-
dides’ appropriation of the ago¯n for his own means, it overlooks the
performance of debate within the narrative, and fails to take into con-
sideration the historian’s investment in his representation. From this
perspective, Herodotus and Thucydides find a precedent for their
composition in the other Homeric poem, the Odyssey, when for three
books Odysseus takes over the telling of his tale.18 And, just as we have
seen that Odysseus’ relationship to debate was compromised by his
narration of it, so the historians similarly cannot remain outside debate
or untouched by the issues it raises: they are already implicated in debate
by their personal involvement in its construction within the narrative
they tell.
Since direct speech represents the one moment in a historian’s
narrative—apart from source citation—when voices other than the
author’s are incorporated, and since debate represents the most stylized
manifestation of direct speech, in the form of a contest of voices, an
Muses, and consequently informs his audience of the restricted parameters of his knowl-
edge, often expressing uncertainty, conjecture, or outright ignorance.’
16 Thucydides’ methodological statement (1.22.1–2) acutely demonstrates the
author’s anxiety about including these alien voices. On the theory of dialogism, which
tries to assess the dynamic between the narrator’s voice and those of his or her characters
see Prologue, n. 68 above. While Bakhtin’s theory derives from the study of the modern
novel, his broad analysis is especially relevant for thinking about the historian’s bind,
whose very authority rests on the incorporation of voices other than his or her own into
the narrative.
17 Ober (1998), 52–121.
18 On the influence of Odysseus on ancient historiography, see Marincola (2007),
whose study explores five aspects of Odysseus’ persona that prefigure the historian: as
explorer, sufferer, leader, narrator, and liar. Hartog (1998), 132–3 consider whether
Odysseus is ‘un historienne avant la lettre’.
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analysis of debate offers a unique opportunity to think anew about the
historian’s authority.19 In particular, debates have been considered
problematic in Herodotus and Thucydides respectively for two reasons.
First, why do more formal debates seem to take place among the
Persians than among the Greeks, though Herodotus’ narrative elsewhere
criticizes despotic (barbarian) regimes and celebrates (Hellenic) free-
dom? And second, why does Thucydides represent debates in a much
more formal way, and yet then show that they achieve nothing?
The aim of the next two chapters, then, is to explore how the
strategies familiar to us from epic get reworked as a result of the
historians’ peculiar engagement with debate. Chapter 3 argues that
Herodotus inherits the narrative model of a war between east and
west from Homeric epic but represents debate differently. The Greeks,
for the most part, are shown to cherish and pursue the values of free-
dom: but its performance and achievement happens in spite of debate;
the institutional arena of the assembly is no longer the privileged place
for dissent to be expressed and managed, but an arena dominated by
self-interest and fraught with division. On the other hand, the Persians,
though lacking an adequate institutional framework in which to express
dissent like their Trojan counterparts, are represented as conducting the
most formal debates: this challenge to the readers’ assumptions about
freedom is underpinned by Herodotus’ framing of debate, in which he
turns back the question of debate on to his readership. At every turn,
then, Herodotus prompts dissent from his representation, reproducing
an Odyssean enquiry into the inadequacies of public debate. In turn, his
sketch of the decision-making processes of the various communities
lends authority to his narrative: here the author’s dissent from institu-
tional debate acts as a lure for eliciting authority from the readers as the
narrative positions itself as a place to rank alongside the public space of
assembly.
Thucydides’ narrative, Chapter 4 argues, takes over Herodotus’
appropriation of debate. In this light Thucydides’ more explicit author-
ial voice may be read as a self-conscious gesture of his self-positioning in
19 Studies of source-citation, especially in Herodotus, have been the subject of much
interest in recent years: Fehling (1989); Darbo-Peschanski (1987); Dewald (1987; 2002);
Lateiner (1989); R. Fowler (1996, 2006); O. Murray (2001a, b); Luraghi (2001, 2006);
Griffiths (2006).
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dissent from his polis’ institutions. Fundamental to this move is his
representation of debate as ago¯n. As many have observed, Thucydides’
portrayal of debates is remarkably formal; yet, they rarely seem to
achieve anything. It will be argued that, crucially, Thucydides does
not reveal what the decision should have been, but rather presents his
readers with a reconstruction of the two most opposed opinions given at
the time of speaking. Thus the act of writing down debate accurately
empowers his readers by giving them the means of analysing political
discourse. At the same time, however, the narrator also draws attention
to his role in the reconstruction of the debate, particularly when debate
appears to malfunction. By entering the debate, Thucydides takes a
stand, like an Achilles. His challenge is to his readers to dissent properly:
using his representation of debate, they can come to a better’ under-
standing of how politics works.
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3
Herodotus’ Odyssean enquiry
Herodotus begins his enquiry in the tradition of the Iliad, with not only
his promise to record deeds so that they should not be ‘without glory’
(IŒº Ð*Æ), and his opening question of the cause of conflict, but also his
even-handed approach to both Greeks and barbarians.1 Homeric epic
influence is clear too from his narrative composition, in which Herodotus
employs the medium of direct speech at regular intervals as a way of
enlivening his narrative, and as a means to investigate the conflict between
Greek and barbarian.2 At the same time, however, Herodotus signals his
difference from previous traditions by signing his work: ‘This is the
display of the enquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus’ (0˙æ,'%!%ı
<ºØŒÆæ&Å""1%. ƒ"!%æ/Å. I),'*5Ø. l'*, 1.1).3 It is the thesis of this
chapter that Herodotus’ personal involvement in the construction of his
text fundamentally alters the dynamics between dissent and authority—
whichmanifests itself in the way debate is represented. That personal stake
in his narrative recalls the precedent established by the other Homeric
poem, the Odyssey, the opening lines of which Herodotus also reworks at
the end of his proem as he reconfigures his narratorial persona in the shape
of an Odysseus, ‘who saw the cities of many men and knew their minds’.4
1 Kurke (2000), 120; M. Flower (2006).
2 Drawing attention to Herodotus’ use of speeches, Flower and Marincola (2002), 7
comment: ‘their very number and variety show H[erodotus] an imitator of Homer and
the product of a primarily oral society.’
3 On interpreting this opening line, see Bakker (2002). On ƒ"!%æ/Å, see Thompson
(1996), 53–4. On its Homeric resonances: Goldhill (2002), 11–15.
4 )%ººH& '0 I&Łæ-)ø& Y'*& ¼"!*Æ ŒÆd &,%& 7ª&ø, Od. 1.3; cf. Herodotus: ‘I will
proceed with my account, coming upon cities of men both small and great alike’
()æ%:+"%#ÆØ K. !e )æ,"ø !%F º,ª%ı, ›#%/ø. "#ØŒæa ŒÆd #*ª$ºÆ ¼"!*Æ I&Łæ-)ø&
K)*5Ø-&, 1.5.3). Marincola (2006), 14 suggestively comments: ‘Like Odysseus, Hero-
dotus goes through the “cities of men” examining and testing them, and telling their
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At one level Herodotus’ difference comes to the fore in his display of
the sources on which his enquiry is based. In the very first section of his
work, the so-called ‘false proem’,5 Herodotus demonstrates his histor-
ical method by citing competing versions of the origins of the conflict
with the barbarians, all relayed in the indirect discourse that shows that
these accounts represent the views of other peoples, and capped by the
narrator’s steadfast refusal to cast judgement either way. Herodotus’
citation of rival accounts creates an open texture to the narrative, which
Leslie Kurke describes when she talks of the ‘jostlings and uneasy
juxtapositions of different perspectives’ as ‘competing within a kind of
open agora of logoi’.6 She is not the only critic to draw a connection
between the composition of Herodotus’ narrative and the external
world of the Greek polis. Deborah Boedeker puts that even more
strongly when she writes: ‘Herodotus’ new genre reflects in essential
ways the politics he explicitly admires . . . [H]is account—like the free-
dom of speech (N"Åª%æ/Æ) that he says made Athens successful (5.78)—
gives many different voices their say, even while showing that not all
speak with equal veracity and wisdom.’7 The emphasis of these critics,
and others who have studied Herodotus’ narrative composition, is that
Herodotus’ text somehow corresponds to the ideological context of the
political culture from which it ultimately derives, a context which
privileges rival speeches in the public space of the assembly.8
stories.’ See also Marincola (2006), 26, n. 13, and (2007), esp. 2–3, 13–15, 35–7;
Redfield (1985), 98; Woodman (1988), 1–3; Moles (1993), 92–8; Pelling (1999a),
332–3, (2006a; 2006c), 79; Griffiths (2006), 135–6. Interestingly, Thucydides uses the
same verb K)*5Ø-& (in the form K)*5*ºŁ-&, Thuc. 1.22.2) to describe his own pursuit of
the facts: see Ch. 4 n. 46 below.
5 See e.g. Lateiner (1989), 38; Pelliccia (1992); Pelling (1999a), 334–5; Thomas
(2000), 268–9; Wec¸owski (2004), 153. See most recently Bakker (2006), 95–101;
Dewald (2006), 145–8; Griffiths (2006), 130–2.
6 Kurke (1999), 29.
7 Boedeker (2000), 114.
8 Fowler (1996), 80 also draws attention to how Herodotus’ language ‘shows him to
be a man of his day’. As he puts it: ‘In the world of the city-state, especially in the
developed democracies, citizens had long been used to hearing alternative points of view
expressed, and to adjudicating between them when they cast their votes in the law-courts
and assemblies.’ (p. 79) Marincola (2001), 42 similarly comments: ‘Herodotus’ intrusive
narrator must be seen in the context of late-fifth-century oral performance culture.’
Thomas (2000) discusses the broader cultural milieu in which Herodotus should be read,
particularly in relation to the developments in Ionian science. See also G. E. R. Lloyd
(1987); R. Fowler (2006); Thomas (2006).
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The image both scholars draw upon acknowledges the particular
cultural environment in which Herodotus operated: for Kurke, it is
the agora; for Boedeker, the notion of freedom of speech.9 But the claim
that Herodotus’ text represents an agora or reproduces freedom of
speech requires more careful consideration.10 As we have seen in
Homer, the Achaean agora is the place where disagreement among the
heroes and dissent from the authority of Agamemnon’s leadership is
accommodated and made institutional for the benefit of the community
at large. In Herodotus’ day that ideal is realized in the Greek polis—
whether in the form of oligarchy or democracy—as citizens group
together to debate publicly issues affecting the community and to
carry out the decisions that are made. Ideologically at least, Herodotus’
written text is on the margins of such an environment.11 Lacking the
communal sanction that the assembly—or, for that matter, Homeric
poetry—enjoys, Herodotus’ composition cannot be automatically pre-
sumed to replicate exactly the public structures embedded in the culture
at large.
The moment when such an anxiety arguably most comes to the fore is
when Herodotus represents debate. As we have already seen, scholars
tend to regard Herodotus as admiring and showing a commitment to
freedom; and many have put that in terms of an ideological polarity
between free Greeks, on the one hand, and slavish or despotic barbarians,
on the other hand.12 It is certainly true that Herodotus’ narratorial voice
more often than not overtly supports the cry for freedom, while his
narrative bears out the challenge to autocratic regimes. Yet, such a view
9 On freedom of speech in Herodotus: Hohti (1974). In antiquity more generally,
see Sluiter and Rosen, eds. (2004), with prologue, n. 47 above and Act III, intro. below.
10 For a useful warning against overplaying Herodotus’s oral style: Thomas
(Cambridge, 1992), 102–4. Cf. R. Fowler (2001).
11 Certainly, by virtue of coming from the margins of the Greek world, and writing in
prose, Herodotus should not be regarded as uncomplicatedly reproducing democratic
values. For Herodotus on the margins of his culture: Kurke (2000); Goldhill (2002), 10–
15. See also Redfield (1985) for a discussion of the link between travel and knowledge in
Herodotus.
12 According to Lateiner (1989), 170: ‘the narrative of Herodotus records the internal
strains and external errors of policy of autocratic governments much more often than of
governments structured by institutions.’ Cartledge (2002), 76 is even more explicit:
‘Time and again, implicitly and explicitly, Herodotus draws a polar contrast between
what we might call Greek republican freedom and self-government and Persian oriental
despotism.’ Cf. E. Hall (1989), 19–47; Harrison (2000b).
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rather overlooks a certain fuzziness in moral and political categories
that cannot be neatly assigned to a strict Greek and barbarian polarity:
it is quite clear that Herodotus is no straightforward champion of
Greek ideals.13 Moreover, it is the curious feature of Herodotus’ repre-
sentation of debate that it does not conform to the ideological division
already identified in the History between free Greeks and despotic
barbarians, though that depiction could quite easily have been drawn
from debates in the Iliad. Instead, Herodotus represents the Persians
debating as frequently as—if notmore than—theGreeks. Indeed, debate
among the Greeks lacks that sense of achievement which had been so
important to the narrative of the Iliad. Rather, it is precisely in the
institutions of the Greeks where debate goes awry and fails to resolve
the issues.
The investigation into debate, then, has the potential to rethink the
extent and nature of the Greekness of Herodotus’ narrative; it also has
implications for thinking about his dialogism. As I mentioned above,
the recent scholarly trend has been to regard Herodotus as a dialogic
author on the basis of the open texture of his narrative composition: he
displays his sources to his readers to assess, accept or reject according to
their judgement. In itself this may rather oversimplify the matter: recent
scholars have reframed Herodotus’ open-source presentation as a lure,
by which means the narrator gains authority for his voice.14 But this
chapter will suggest a similarly nuanced portrayal of Herodotus’ repre-
sentation of debate and relationship to dissent. One reason why debate
in Herodotus does not conform simply to the Iliad ’s precedent is
13 Dewald (2003) argues that the Greeks too suffer from despotic regimes, in the
form of tyrants. It is the thesis of Pelling (1997b) that the Greek–other stereotype is
difficult to sustain over the course of the narrative. Plutarch, at any rate, did not view
Herodotus as straightforwardly pro-Greek, if his On the Malignity of Herodotus is any-
thing to go by. For other studies that complicate the simple Greek–barbarian polarity,
see Moles (1996); Flower and Marincola (2002); M. Flower (2006); Forsdyke (2006).
See also Irwin and Greenwood (2007), 29–33; Osborne (2007); Fearn (2007);
J. Henderson (2007).
14 ‘The author’s refusal to pass judgement becomes a lure for the reader to adopt a
critical position, to engage in the process of historieˆ ’: Goldhill (2002), 28. For similar,
though more reserved, comments, see Boedeker (2000), 113: ‘All these rhetorical
characteristics contribute to give theHistories its uneven, anything-but-seamless character
that places the audience in the position of confidante and even collaborator with the speaker’;
Dewald (2002), 287: ‘We are inclined to trust this voice because it is so open in its own
firm declaration of tentative provisionality’ (all my italics).
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because of the author’s personal stake in its construction and presentation.
Since written debate can never represent exactly the real-life conditions
of debate on the ground in the polis agora, it remains for us to investigate
its role within the historian’s narrative in terms of its impact on the read-
ing process.15
In this context it is worthwhile noting a point made by Jacoby almost
a century ago. While Herodotus’ use of direct speech is highly varied,
with speeches ranging from pithy sayings and conversations to full-
blown formal debate,16 Jacoby distinguished between what he termed
‘novelistic’ speeches of books 1 to 6 and ‘political-historical’ speeches of
books 7 to 9.17 Though such a distinction may not be quite so clear-cut,
and unarguably rests on anachronistic terminology, nevertheless it
provides a useful framework for thinking about the potential perfor-
mance of speech in the narrative, particularly given the results of the
analysis of the Iliad, which had suggested that the assembly underwent a
kind of evolutionary development over the course of the narrative.
Certainly, it is striking that the early examples of direct speech in
Herodotus tend to be conducted in private circumstances among no-
table individuals, the later exchanges in public among citizen bodies. In
this way Herodotus’ narrative mimics the progression of historical time,
as the reader moves from an elite culture to the world of the polis.18
Moreover, Jacoby’s distinction between novelistic and political speeches
15 While taking a somewhat different approach, Pelling (2006a) intersects in a number
of ways with this chapter, including his concern to analyse ‘how deliberation works’ (p. 103,
his italics) and document the different way of speaking ‘in different political systems’
(p. 103). In this way it is hoped that the present study may go some way to answering
Pelling’s call for a more detailed analysis of Herodotus’ speeches (p. 104). Thompson
(1996) has similarly prepared the ground by discussing Herodotus’ insights ‘regarding the
creation and evolution of political community’ and ‘international relations’ (p. 3)—though
the present discussion will emphasize Herodotus’ role in that construction.
16 On efforts to define speech in Herodotus: Hohti (1976), 7, 139; Heni (1976),
18–22.
17 Jacoby (1913), 492.
18 Solon is an interesting figure to use given his connections to Athenian democ-
racy—as Herodotus himself makes clear (1.29): see sec. 3 of this chapter below and Irwin
(2005), who shows how Solonian elegy intersects with Athenian politics. On Herodotus’
Solon echoing Solon’s poetry of the symposium, see Chiasson (1986); Erbse (1992),
12–15; Harrison (2000a), 36–8; Pelling (2006a), 118, n. 11. The confrontation between
Solon and Croesus also represents speaking back to power: Payen (1997); Greenwood
and Cartledge (2002); Pelling (2006a), 104–6 and esp. (2006b). Solon’s disruptiveness
in the court of Croesus is perhaps already suggestive of how Herodotus’ narrative departs
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may even be reconfigured as a movement from competitive exchanges in
and over knowledge, such as we might find in the symposium, to the
kind of public debate witnessed in the Iliad. Significantly, as I have
already pointed out, Herodotus’ text stands at this divide between the
private and public: it will be argued that lacking an equivalent publicly
sanctioned performative context of its own, its narrative attempts to
construct a place for itself in the community in the way it represents
speech.19
The present chapter is structured around Herodotus’ self-positioning
within the publicly oriented culture of his time, taking first his repre-
sentation of Greeks debating, then comparing those scenes to examples
of Persians debating, and finally assessing the narrator’s own role in
framing debate. Section 1 catalogues and examines the ways in which
debate is represented as being carried out among the various Greek
communities. Scholarship tends to focus on Herodotus as a supporter of
freedom and of the Greek cause; but representations of debate do not
always unequivocally bear out this analysis. One example that demon-
strates this point particularly well is when the Ionian tyrant Aristagoras
persuades the assembled Athenians to support his rebellion—a decision
that Herodotus explicitly identifies as ‘the beginning of evils for Greeks
and barbarians alike’. More arrestingly, given the success of the Helle-
nistic coalition’s repulse of the Persian invasion, Herodotus continues to
demonstrate the flaws in debate. The major problem appears to be the
lack of any inter-polis means of accommodating dissent. As a result, the
crucial decision to stay at Salamis is only hit upon, Herodotus shows, by
the actions of an individual operating outside the formal institution of
debate.
Section 2 compares these results with the scenario of Persians debat-
ing. The very fact of Persians debating already shows an extension to,
and departure from, the Iliad ; more significantly, it also appears to
from sympotic traditions in the process of constructing a politicized community: see esp.
Solon’s insistence on men of the polis as those happiest (1.30–1).
19 Greenwood (2006), 3 similarly draws attention to the ‘complex entity that is
Herodotus’ text, for which there is no precedent’. On Herodotus’ invention of his
genre, see also Lateiner (1989), 13–51; R. Fowler (1996); Kurke (2000); Boedeker
(2002); Goldhill (2002), 10–15.
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contradict Herodotus’ narratorial persona, which promotes Greek free-
dom in the face of Persian despotism. To a certain extent this depiction
can be explained—in the terms established by the analysis of the Iliad
above—as exploring the difficulties of dissent under the influence of an
all-powerful individual, who occupies a position that in itself is not
contested.20 Yet, that description fails to account adequately for Her-
odotus’ insistent representation of Persians not only debating but con-
ducting debate in the most formal terms of the History. Furthermore, it
is not so easy for the reader to judge exactly where debate goes wrong,
even when they patently lead to wrong decisions (both practically and
morally) being made—such as the invasion of Greece. This section
concludes with an examination of the notorious debate on the constitu-
tions, in which a group of Persian nobles discuss particular forms of
government, before choosing to elect a monarch. An analysis of the ways
in which the strategies of each speaker intersect with its context in
Herodotus’ narrative will show how this episode challenges Greek
assumptions of the superiority of their political practice by presenting
a Persian perspective on freedom.
The final section hones in on a further, and even more notorious,
aspect of the Constitutional Debate: anticipating the disbelief of his
(Greek) readership, Herodotus, as narrator, insists that it really did
happen. The author’s critical, and contentious, entry into the debate
demonstrates in the clearest terms yet the difference of this narrative
from its Homeric counterpart of the Iliad. Unlike the Homeric narra-
tor, the historian is a player in his text, with the result that the role of the
narrator in framing debate becomes much more influential and more
highly charged. Where there tends to be minimum narratorial gloss on
debates in Homer, in Herodotus the frame receives far greater attention:
this is the moment when he introduces into his text first-person voices
other than his own. Thus representations of debate do not stand alone
in the History: instead, the historian’s voice becomes implicated in the
debate and, in turn, complicates assessment of the scene of judgement.
Drawing a connection between Herodotus’ representation of debate
20 See Prologue, nn. 33–6 with accompanying text. For the pressure authority exerts
over speaking frankly: Pelling (2006b). For a discussion of thinking big, see D. Cairns
(1996).
150 Act II: Historiography
Barker 9780199542710_0029-0202_Barker_chap2-3 Final Proof page 150 29.4.2011 10:44am
and the role of notable individuals operating outside their political
institutions, it will be argued that Herodotus represents debate in such
a way that reveals the benefit of his enquiry in a common culture that
lacks common, inter-poleis institutions.
1. GREEKS DEBATING BADLY
(HERODOTUS 5, 7, 8)
The portrait of Greeks debating is familiar to us from the Iliad, where
the assembly as the place for debate had been set up as a response to a
crisis in the Achaean camp precipitated by the autocratic behaviour of
the king. At first sight it would appear that representations of debate in
Herodotus evoke such a world, as moments of crisis in a war against an
eastern enemy are marked by scenes of Greeks debating in the assembly,
such as when the Athenians discuss various interpretations of an oracle
they receive on the eve of war in their assembly. Yet, for all the
narrative’s emphasis on Greek claims to and the importance of com-
munal decision-making, debate fails to play a decisive role in the story of
Greek self-determination, and in fact often runs counter to it: a series of
debates in book 5 explore the Athenians’ newly won freedom in relation
to their role in the Ionian revolt—‘the beginning of evils for Greeks and
barbarians’. Instead, limitations to and fault-lines within debate come to
the fore on a regular basis; the progress of formal debate over the course
of the narrative appears more disjointed and fragile; and no institutional
framework seems capable of accommodating dissent on a Panhellenic
scale. All of these issues come to a head in Herodotus’ extended
narrative of the infighting in the Greek camp before Salamis.
They reported the oracle to the people (7.141–3)
Herodotus’ departure from the Iliad ’s representation of debate is
evident from his narrative structure. Although many different forms
of direct speech occur in the Iliad, ranging from the informal to more
formal modes of communication, such as prayer, exhortation, battle-
field flyting and political advice, set-piece debate dominates from the
beginning of the narrative. Set-piece debates and assembly scenes,
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however, are almost entirely absent from the first half of Herodotus’
History, during which communication is figured on a more ad hoc basis
according to personal relations in private locations.21 In this way
Herodotus’ narrative re-creates the impression of an early history,
when key institutions such as the assembly had yet to be founded and
speaking in public was the preserve of elite individuals.
A good example of the institutional progress reproduced by
Herodotus’ narrative comes to light through a study of the stories told
about the Delphic oracle.22 During the narration of Croesus’ consulta-
tion of the oracle, Herodotus gives a detailed account of the Spartans’
rise to dominance in Greece (1.65–9). By means of this structure he
juxtaposes the personal exchange between the eastern despot and the
god,23 which sees Croesus fail to grasp the oracle’s ambiguity, with the
Spartans’ own successful interpretation of the oracle through collective
response: more than one man is engaged in the enquiry.24 Still, we
remain at an early stage of polis development here:25 Herodotus
21 The dialogue form is particularly prominent in the exchange between Croesus and
Solon (see Pelling 2006b), which may also suggest an echo of a sympotic context. See
n. 18 above.
22 The standard works on the Delphic oracle have establishing authenticity as their
aim: Parke and Wormell (1956); Crahay (1956); Fontenrose (1978). But see Maurizio
(1997), who identifies the role of the audience in authorizing oracles; Harrison (2000a),
esp. 122–57, who explores the mechanisms by which belief was sustained and reinforced;
and Kindt (2003), who proposes a narratological approach that understands the use of
obscure language as a strategy ‘that draws the reader into the search for meaning in the
story’ (p. 64), and (2006), where she argues that Herodotus draws upon oracular
obscurity to authorize his own project. Barker (2006) attempts to make the case that
Herodotus represents the oracle in such as way as to turn back the enquiry onto his reader
to perform as a self-critical citizen when reading. On the importance of the self in
citizenship, see Farenga (2006).
23 ‘Kroisos presumes an unproblematic gift exchange between his dedicatory offerings
to Apollo at Delphi and the god’s oracular responses, only to discover too late that the
two represent discrete and incommensurable “economies”’. Kurke (1999), 152. Lateiner
(1989), 184–5 contrasts the despot’s law with the self-discipline promoted by self-
governing institutions, such as those of Greek poleis: but this explanation fails to
consider the marginality of Herodotus’ own prose. See Kindt (2006), 48, who explains
the oracle’s prominence at the beginning of the History on the basis that ‘Herodotus has
to establish his authority as the narrator of a text outside the conventional contemporary
genres’.
24 Kurke (1999), 154 suggests that ‘the oracle seems to align itself with civic structures’.
Kindt (2003), 106–7, however, emphasizes Lichas’ isolation.
25 Quite literally: at the beginning of his account, when the Spartan’s were the worst
governed of all the Greeks, Herodotus relates an oracle which heralds Lycurgus as a god
(1.65.2), after which Herodotus relates the founding of the Spartan constitution under
his guidance (1.65.3–4). See Crane (1998), 79–81.
152 Act II: Historiography
Barker 9780199542710_0029-0202_Barker_chap2-3 Final Proof page 152 29.4.2011 10:44am
concentrates on the act of one (named) individual and his working out
of the puzzling text. The oracle itself is not represented as being the
subject of debate.
That happens only as Herodotus’ narrative journey nears its culmi-
nation in the Persian Wars. Faced by the Persian invasion, the Athe-
nians consult the Delphic oracle (7.139.6–140.1).26 Uniquely, having
received an oracle foretelling disaster in unoracular-like blunt terms, the
Athenians are encouraged to consult the oracle for a second time.27
Though only slightly less doom-laden, this oracle is taken back to
Athens, where it is debated by the people in assembly (7.142.1). It is
striking that the consideration of and deliberation over the oracle’s
ambiguity is formalized by its reception in the Athenian assembly and
the process of debate that ensues.28 Moreover, the debate works: the
recognized authorities on oracles countenance a course of action that
proves to be disastrous;29 but a prominent Athenian, a man called
Themistocles, gives an explanation of the oracle that the Athenians
find more convincing than that of the experts, and advises a course of
action that proves to be successful.
Many scholars have taken this episode to show the benefit of de-
bate;30 but, while that may be one of the points which this episode
26 This oracle has typically prompted the question of its authenticity: e.g. Robertson
(1987). For a critique of this approach, see Maurizio (1997), 308, 329–30.
27 Unlike most critics, Maurizio (1997) reads the two oracles alongside each other,
concluding that ‘these two oracles reflect a crisis in the very definition of Athens as a city’
(p. 331).
28 By noting that ‘there were many other opinions’ (ª&H#ÆØ ŒÆd ¼ººÆØ )%ººÆd
Kª/&%&!%, 7.142.1), before narrowing his focus to the two he records, Herodotus displays
a self-consciousness in his structuring of this episode normally ascribed to Thucydides
(e.g. 3.36.6).
29 Herodotus goes on to describe the payback for those who insist on the literal
meaning of the ‘wooden walls’: still believing that the wooden walls of the Acropolis
would save them (8.51.2), all are killed when the Persians storm the barricades (8.53.2).
Bowie (2007), 137 observes the reminiscences between the storming of the Acropolis and
the battle at Thermopylae.
30 Manetti (1993), 34 comments: ‘The discrete binary logic of the dialectic alternative
gives way to the continuum of the gradated logic of the preferable. It could well be that
the discussion so far has caused us to lose sight for a moment of the fact that the object in
debate is a prophecy of Apollo. This is significant, for the logic applied to the inter-
pretation of the divinatory response is precisely the same as that which governs political
assemblies’ (italics in original). For democratic debate as contesting notions of priestly
authority, see Detienne (1996), 89–106; Vernant (1991), 303–17.
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raises, it is not the main thrust of the narrative. First, Herodotus does
not represent the assembly as a set-piece debate: that is, as a pair of
formal speeches in direct discourse set in opposition to each other, such
as is found in Thucydides. Second, he focuses again on the skill with
which the riddle of the oracle is solved and the individual brilliance of
the man interpreting it. It is true that Themistocles acts within the
communally sanctioned context of the assembly, which is essential for
the successful challenge to the ‘official’ versions of the oracular inter-
preters; but it is his clever, less literal interpretation which Herodotus
dwells on; the assembly seems incidentally important for ‘putting
together’ the oracle in the right way.31 Third, Herodotus’ introduction
of Themistocles as a ‘man newly prominent among the Athenians’ (q&
'b !H& !Ø. 3ŁÅ&Æ/ø& I&cæ K. )æ-!%ı. &*ø"!d )ÆæØ-&, 7.143.1) picks
up on the first word of the Odyssey, which notoriously introduces its
hero as a/the ‘man’.32 As we shall see, Herodotus’ representation of
Themistocles seems to draw heavily on the Homeric Odysseus; and, in
the light of the conclusions made above about Odysseus’ problematic
role in the assembly, this is just one other means by which Herodotus
draws attention away from the institutional framework to the action of
individuals operating within it. Indeed, there have already been indica-
tions in the narrative that debate among the Greeks is less of a clear-cut
benefit to the community at large.
For, it seems, it is easier to deceive the many (5.49–97)
The first assembly portrayed in Athens occurs when the tyrant of
Miletus, Aristagoras, comes seeking help for a rebellion against Persia
in Asia Minor (5.97; cf. 5.55). Book 5 in general hones in on current
affairs in Greece, from which point speeches become more frequent and
31 The description of Themistocles ‘putting together’ ("ı#:$ºº*"ŁÆØ, 7.143.1, 2) the
pieces of the oracular jigsaw recalls Herodotus’ earlier description of the Spartan Lichas
(1.68.3, 68.3, 68.5), and appears to be a key index to his own reasoning (at 2.33.2,
112.2; 4.15.1, 45.2, 87.2; 6.80; 7.24, 184.1, 187.2; 8.30.1) and to the reasoning of
others (2.33.2; 3.68.2; 5.1.3; 6.107.2, 107.2, 108.1; 7.10, 142.2, 189.2; 8.94.2). For
"ı#:$ºº*"ŁÆØ as ‘the intellectual process promoted by the narrator of the Histories’, see
Irwin and Greenwood (2007), 7. See also Hohti (1977); Munson (2001), 83–5; Barker
(2006), 16–17, 21–2; Irwin (2007), 47–56.
32 ¼&'æÆ, Hom. Od. 1.1. See Goldhill (1991), 1–5 and Ch. 2, n. 58 above.
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more formal, as Herodotus begins to investigate the kinds of discourse
which are heard in the civic context. The example of Aristagoras is
telling because his speech to the Athenian assembly is read in the
context of his earlier attempt to persuade the Spartan king Cleomenes
to come over to his cause (5.49–55); the two episodes, furthermore, are
separated by a digression on the rise of Athenian democracy (5.55–96),
during which a certain Soclees of Corinth speaks in favour of freedom
(5.92). The deliberate and nuanced interlocking structure suggests some
uncomfortable insights into the excesses and limitations of freedom.33
Aristagoras’ attempts to solicit support for the Ionian revolt take
him to the two greatest Greek powers, Sparta and Athens.34 Herodo-
tus’ description of Aristagoras’ speech in Athens makes the connection
to his earlier speech in Sparta explicit: ‘coming before the de¯mos
Aristagoras said the same things as he had done in Sparta about all
the good things in Asia’ (K)*ºŁg& 'b K)d !e& 'B#%& › 3æØ"!Æª,æÅ.
!ÆP!a 7º*ª* !a ŒÆd K& !fi B C)$æ!fi Å )*æd !H& IªÆŁH& !H& K& !B 3"/fi Å,
5.97.1). Only this time his arguments, which included promising the
earth,35 meet with a favourable response, leaving the narrator to
conclude (5.97.2):
)%ºº%f. ªaæ %rŒ* *r&ÆØ *P)*!1"!*æ%& 'ØÆ:$ºº*Ø& j =&Æ, *N ˚º*%#1&*Æ #b& !e&
¸ÆŒ*'ÆØ#,&Ø%& #%F&%& %PŒ %x%. !* Kª1&*!% 'ØÆ:$ºº*Ø&, !æ*E. 'b #ıæØ$'Æ.
3ŁÅ&Æ/ø& K)%/Å"* !%F!%.
For, it seems, it is easier to put one across the many than the one, if he couldn’t
put one across Cleomenes the Lacedaemonion, one single man, but the thirty
thousand Athenians he could.36
33 See Irwin and Greenwood, eds. (2007) for a study dedicated to analysing the
complex interlocking structure of book 5. On the speeches in Herodotus’ account of the
Ionian revolt, see L. Solmsen (1943).
34 Interestingly, Croesus had consulted the same two powers when he was
looking for an alliance to launch a pre-emptive strike against Persia (1.59–69). See
Gray (1997); Moles (2002), 37–8, 52; J. Henderson (2007), 293. Cf. Pelling (2007),
192–4.
35 ŒÆd %P'b& ‹ !Ø %PŒ ()/"å*!% %xÆ Œ$æ!Æ '*,#*&%., 5.97.2.
36 See Pelling (2007), 179, 183–5 for the translation of 'ØÆ:$ºº*Ø& as ‘putting one
across [x]’ or ‘throwing words about’. As Pelling comments, ‘*P)*!+. [how easy every-
thing is] and 'ØÆ:$ºº*Ø& are almost Aristagoras’ signature tunes’ (179).
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Something of that ease is reproduced by the narrative, which relates his
persuasion of the Athenians in one line: the absence of direct speech
emphasizes the lack of discussion in the assembly. The speed with which
the Athenians are persuaded is particularly noticeable after the lengthy
and drawn-out episode of Aristagoras at Sparta. Here Aristagoras cer-
tainly lives up to his name, ‘the best at public speaking’.37
Not that Cleomenes’ rejection of Aristagoras’ overtures is quite so
simple. The protracted discussions involve three stages. In the first
Aristagoras, ‘entering into discussion’ (I)ØŒ&*,#*&%. 'b K. º,ª%ı.,
5.49.2) with Cleomenes, stresses the suffering of the Ionian Greeks
and their slavery at the hands of foreigners,38 and then offers Persia as
an enticement, supplementing his argument with a map he has brought
to display visually her riches.39 Next, after a two-day delay, Cleomenes
simply asks Aristagoras how long it takes to get to Susa.40 Here,
Herodotus points out, Aristagoras makes the fatal error of telling the
truth (it was a thirty-day journey from the sea, 5.50.2), presumably
reasoning that by stressing Persia’s size he would make its conquest all
the more attractive. He did not reckon with conventional Spartan
conservatism, however, and his protestations are spurned. Yet even
that is not quite the end of the matter, since Aristagoras pursues
Cleomenes as a suppliant until, finally, Cleomenes’ daughter suddenly
exclaims: ‘Father, the stranger will corrupt you if you don’t get up and
leave’ (‘—$!*æ, 'ØÆçŁ*æ1*Ø "* › 5*E&%., j& #c I)%"!a. Yfi Å.’, 5.51.2).
Thus Cleomenes successfully resists being persuaded ultimately as a
result of the intervention of his daughter, a figure who in the male
world of the Greek polis would not even have a voice: she only has a say
37 See Pelling (ibid. 180, n. 5—who notes, however, that this does not mean that
Aristagoras’ name is fictional. Cf. Moles (2007), 259. We might be reminded of the
significance of Eupeithes’ name—another figure who was good at public speaking and
persuades people to adopt a disastrous course of action: see Ch. 2, n. 83.
38 ‘0I-&ø& )ÆE'Æ. '%2º%ı. *r&ÆØ I&!0 Kº*ıŁ1æø& Z&*Ø'%. ŒÆd ¼ºª%. #1ªØ"!%& #b&
ÆP!%E"Ø B#E&’, 5.49.2.
39 '*ØŒ&f. 'b 7º*ª* !ÆF!Æ K. !B. ªB. !c& )*æ/%'%&, !c& Kç1æ*!% K& !fiH )/&ÆŒØ
K&!*!#Å#1&Å&, 5.49.5. How and Wells (1912), ii. 21 interpret Herodotus’ map as filling
in the details of Aristagoras’ map, whereas Thomas (2000), 235 sees the narrative as
corrective of it. Cf. Pelling (2007), 195–201.
40 Nenci (1994), 227 interprets the delay in Cleomenes’ favour. But see Forsdyke
(2006), 533 and Pelling (2007), 190 for more sceptical responses. Cleomenes gives it
some thought at least . . .
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in Herodotus’ text. From this perspective the Aristagoras episode ap-
pears to be less about the ease with which the many are persuaded than
about the role of the individual—even one so marginalized as the king’s
daughter—in political affairs. Significant too is the difference in con-
text: Aristagoras persuades the Athenians in their assembly, but is
thrown out of Cleomenes’ home. Politics in Herodotus is not straight-
forwardly carried out in formal public institutions.
Aristagoras’ persuasion of the Athenians hardly counts as trivial. By
promising aid for the ‘free Ionia’ cause, the Athenians set themselves on
a collision-course with Persia: as Herodotus headlines, ‘these ships were
the beginning of all evils for Greeks and barbarians’ (Æy!ÆØ 'b Æƒ &1*.
Iæåc ŒÆŒH& Kª1&%&!% @‚ººÅ"Ø !* ŒÆd :Ææ:$æ%Ø"Ø, 5.97.3). This line, a
near quotation of the Iliad ’s description of the beginning of the Trojan
War (Iæå1ŒÆŒ%Ø, Il. 5.62–3),41 has a powerful and provocative effect:
far from blindly supporting the cause for Greek freedom, Herodotus
exposes the inconsistencies and fault-lines within the rhetoric of free-
dom, which makes the Athenians’ lack of proper discussion in their
assembly of the issues at stake the cause of all evils.42 After all, the
paradox of hearing a tyrant wax lyrical on freedom seems to have
escaped the notice of all involved—bar, one cannot help thinking, our
narrator.
Herodotus gives good reason for worrying about the idea of
freedom and its manifestation in debate by the manner in which he
has structured this episode. Separating Aristagoras’ two scenes of at-
tempted persuasion, Herodotus digresses to consider the establishment
41 Pelling (2007), 186 comments on the ever-increasing frames of reference brought
into play by the resonance with the Homeric word: ‘Look at [the situation] a different
way again, and it may even go back to those Homeric ships themselves.’ See also: Pelling
(2006c), 79–80; Irwin and Greenwood (2007), 10–11; Munson (2007), 153–4; Horn-
blower (2007), 171–2; Haubold (2007), 234; J. Henderson (2007), 305.
42 How andWells (1912), ii. 57, following Macan, call this remark ‘a glaring instance
of the political naı¨vete´ of Herodotus’. But see Pelling (2007), 186, who suggests that, in
the light of Herodotus’ previous digression, there is a good case for the Athenians to
accept Aristagoras’ argument as a pre-emptive strike. He notes too the closeness of this
idea of fear to Thucydides’ ‘truest’ explanation for why the Spartans and Athenians came
into conflict (on which see Ch. 4, sec. 1 below). This is also one of the reasons Herodotus
gives for Croesus’ pre-emptive strike against Persia (1.46). On Aristagoras’ speech as
intersecting with contemporary debates on Panhellenism and its directions, see
M. Flower (2000), 69–76.
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of Athenian democracy.43 ‘Driven out from Sparta,’ Herodotus narrates,
‘Aristagoras went to Athens, which had become free from tyrants in the
following way’.44On the agenda is the issue of freedom, the verymessage
Aristagoras has been trying to peddle. Indeed, Herodotus enters his text
to comment on the growth of Athens, which, he argues, ‘makes clear’
('Åº%E) that ‘equality in speaking is a good thing, seeing that while the
Athenians were being tyrannized they were no better in war than any of
their neighbours, but when they had been freed from tyranny they were
by far the best’.45 According to Herodotus, ‘this shows that while they
were oppressed they were willing to fare badly, since they were working
for a master, but when they were freed each man was eager to work
hard for himself’.46 Here is the Herodotus familiar to many readers of
the History: Herodotus the freedom-fighter and supporter of Greek
ideals in the face of foreign despotism.47 But the way Herodotus ex-
presses that freedom already suggests a more complex picture: being free,
the Athenians fought better than their neighbours. Herodotus’ comment
marks a shift in the narrative, from treating Athenian internal affairs to
exploring their conflicts with other Greek cities, first Thebes, then
Aegina, finally Sparta itself.48
The Spartans had initially helped the Athenians throw off their yoke
of tyranny. Yet, as Herodotus explains, when they saw the growth of
Athenian power, ‘they realised that a free Attica would be a match for
them, and that the only way of weakening their rivals and making them
43 On this episode and the significance of its structure, see Gray (2007). Cf. de Jong
(2002).
44 I)*ºÆı&,#*&%. 'b › 3æØ"!Æª,æÅ. KŒ !B. C)$æ!Å. XØ* K. !a. 3Ł+&Æ. ª*&%#1&Æ.
!ıæ$&&ø& z'* Kº*ıŁ1æÆ., 5.55.
45 B N"Åª%æ/Å ‰. 7"!Ø åæB#Æ ")%ı'ÆE%&, *N ŒÆd 3ŁÅ&ÆE%Ø !ıæÆ&&*ı,#*&%Ø #b&
%P'Æ#H& !H& "ç1Æ. )*æØ%ØŒ*,&!ø& q"Æ& !a )%º1#Æ I#*/&%ı., I)ÆººÆåŁ1&!*. 'b
!ıæ$&&ø& #ÆŒæfiH )æH!%Ø Kª1&%&!%, 5.78. Moles (2002), 39 considers this a general-
ization that is inclusive, rather than exclusive, of Athens. Cartledge (2002), 110–12 reads
N"Åª%æ/Å here as a reference to Athenian democracy. Cf. Forsdyke (2001), 333, n. 13.
46 'Åº%E t& !ÆF!Æ ‹!Ø ŒÆ!*å,#*&%Ø #b& KŁ*º%Œ$Œ*%& ‰. '*"),!fi Å KæªÆÇ,#*&%Ø,
Kº*ıŁ*æøŁ1&!ø& 'b ÆP!e. =ŒÆ"!%. 9øı!fiH )æ%*Łı#1*!% ŒÆ!*æª$Ç*"ŁÆØ, 5.78.
47 So Lateiner (1989).
48 See Pelling (2007), 186–9 on the ambiguity of the cry for freedom and its
interconnectedness with other episodes in Herodotus’ narrative, such as the Samians’
brief foray into popular rule (3.142–8). On Herodotus’ critical evaluation of Athenian
democracy more generally, see Raaflaub (1987); Moles (1996), (2007); Dewald (1997);
Irwin (2007).
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obedient to authority was to establish a tyranny in Athens’.49 With this
in mind, they summon the former tyrant Hippias along with their allies,
and set up an assembly. This is the first time in the History that an
assembly is formally convoked among the Greeks: like its Homeric
precedent, the assembly is set up in response to a crisis in the wider
Greek community; but far from demonstrating the importance of
speaking freely and resisting authority, the Spartans convoke this as-
sembly precisely in order to suppress Athenian freedom and reassert their
authority over the Greek world.50 As they put it: ‘we gave up the city
to an ungrateful people, who once they had gained their freedom flung
us out’ (‘'+#øfi IåÆæ/"!øfi )Ææ*'-ŒÆ#*& !c& ),ºØ&, n. K)*/!* 'Ø 0 B#1Æ.
Kº*ıŁ*æøŁ*d. I&1Œıł*’, 5.91.2). This is not the language of a straight-
forward encomium of Greek freedom versus. foreign despotism; rather,
here the Spartans play the role of an Agamemnon responding to the
dissent of an Achilles or, from their perspective, an unworthy Thersites.
So it is that they recommend to the assembled group that they restore
Hippias as tyrant of Athens. The assembly, one of the achievements of
the Iliad ’s foundational narrative, becomes a tool for the reassertion of
authority by the would-be rulers of the Greek world.
Having set up an assembly, however, the dynamics of debate cannot
be so easily controlled by the Spartans. Silence greets the Spartans’
speech, but Herodotus is careful to indicate that this signalled disap-
proval, not agreement: ‘most of the allies did not welcome the speech’
(!H& 'b "ı##$åø& !e )ºBŁ%. %PŒ K&*'1Œ*!% !%f. º,ª%ı., 5.92.1). Thus
the narrator himself affirms the principle of dissent on which an
assembly is founded. With the rest keeping silent (%ƒ #1& &ı& ¼ºº%Ø
B"ıå/Å& qª%&, 5.92.1), however, it is left to one Soclees of Corinth to
speak up. As has been noted recently, the gesture of speaking up when
49 &,øfi ºÆ:,&!*. ‰. Kº*2Ł*æ%& #b& Ke& !e ª1&%. !e 3!!ØŒe& N",ææ%)%& !fiH 9øı!H& i&
ª/&%Ø!%, ŒÆ!*å,#*&%& 'b ()e !ıæÆ&&/'%. I"Ł*&b. ŒÆd )*ØŁÆæå1*"ŁÆØ =!%Ø#%&, 5.91.1. As
Moles (2007), 247 notes: ‘unappealing in its aim of subjugating Athens to Spartan rule,
this political analysis is, nevertheless, substantially the same as Herodotus’ own at 78,
almost as if the Spartans have “read the text”.’
50 Dan Hogg draws my attention to a pertinent parallel in Dionysius of Halicarnas-
sus. The decemvirs (under Appius Claudius) convene a debate in the Roman Senate in
such a way as to silence dissenting voices and reinforce their own authority; in the end,
though there is more than one vote, the decemvirs only consider the result of the first,
and so they declare their motion passed: Ant. Rom. 11.4–22. For the relationship of
speech and action in Dionysius, see Hogg (2008).
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all others are silent resonates with various moments in the Iliad, parti-
cularly when Diomedes—paradigmatically, we saw above—responds to
Agamemnon’s defeatism with a vigorous challenge to his authority.51
Soclees’ subsequent speech—the longest in the whole of the History—is
critical for thinking about the dilemma of freedom.52
Soclees begins with an initial adunaton, which emphasizes the topsy-
turvy state of affairs that will come about should the Spartans’ proposal
be adopted: ‘truly the sky will be below the earth and the earth above the
sky . . . now that you Lacedaemonians are destroying the rule of equals
and making ready to install tyrannies in cities.’53 This opening has an
epic tone to it, and even recalls Achilles’ precedent in standing up to a
wilful assertion of authority such as we saw in Iliad 1, which is here
reworked as an act of defiance against a similar attempt to assert illegi-
timate rule.54 Dwelling then on the evils of tyranny, first-hand experi-
ence of which the Corinthians have suffered, Soclees pointedly suggests
that the Spartans should try it themselves before seeking to impose it on
others (5.92.Æ.2).55 The very fact that he can speak in this assembly
illustrates the benefit of their newly won freedom that the overthrow
of tyrannical government has brought his city (5.92.:–Å).56 He ends
by invoking the ‘gods of Greece’ (‘K)ØŒÆº*,#*&%Ø (#E& Ł*%f. !%f.
51 See Hom. Il. 9.28–30; cf. 693–5: Pelling (2006c), 101. See also Ch. 1, sec. 2 above.
52 On the significance of the context of this speech, see Moles (2007), 246 and esp.
264: ‘Socles’ speech comes roughly halfway through the Histories, at the centre, or
“crossing”, of the narrative, when the Persians, tyrannical imperialists, are “crossing”
into Greece.’
53 ‘q 'c ‹ !* %PæÆ&e. 7&*æŁ* 7"!ÆØ !B. ªB. ŒÆd B ªB #*!1øæ%. ()bæ !%F %PæÆ&%F . . . ,
‹!* ª* (#*E. t ¸ÆŒ*'ÆØ#,&Ø%Ø N"%ŒæÆ!/Æ. ŒÆ!Æº2%&!*. !ıæÆ&&/'Æ. K. !a. ),ºØ.
ŒÆ!$ª*Ø& )ÆæÆ"Œ*ı$Ç*"Ł*’, 5.92.Æ.1.
54 Hom. Il. 1.231–42. See Wec¸owski (1996), 211–12. On q '+ as epic: Denniston
(1954), 285.
55 There is an immense bibliography on this important speech. See e.g. How and
Wells (1912), ii. 50–5; Immerwahr (1966), 194–5; Oost (1972); Hohti (1974);
M. Stahl (1983); Lang (1984), 104–6; Gould (1989), 55–7; McGlew (1993), 61–72;
Gray (1996; 1997); Wec¸owski (1996); Forsdyke (1999; 2002), 542–5; Johnson (2001);
Moles (2002), 38–40; Dewald (2003), 30–2, 35–7; R. Fowler (2003), 310–13; Pelling
(2006a), 106–8.
56 Pelling (2006a), 106 draws attention to a meta-literary aspect of this argument, ‘as
Herodotus’ text gives to others the experience of tyranny that—so Soclees claims—leaves
so indelible an impression and inescapable a conclusion’. Cf. Stadter (1992), 782; Moles
(2002), 40; Raaflaub (2002), 186. Moles (2007), 255–6 also explore the meta-quality of
Herodotus’ narrative and the correspondences between Herodotus and Soclees.
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@¯ººÅ&/%ı.’, 5.92.Å.5) and pleading with the Spartans ‘not to set up
tyrannies in our cities’ (‘#c ŒÆ!Ø"!$&ÆØ !ıæÆ&&/'Æ. K. !a. ),ºØ.’,
5.92.Å.5), such as restoring Hippias to power ‘contrary to right’ (‘)Ææa
!e '/ŒÆØ%&’, 5.92.Å.5). The response of the embedded audience over-
whelmingly shows dissent from the Spartan plan, as ‘when they heard
Soclees speaking freely, every one of them held his tongue no longer, but
expressed the Corinthian’s opinion, and urged the Spartans not to
meddle with the affairs of any city in Greece’.57 The episode ends with
freedom affirmed and attempts at suppressing it by means of despotic
government resisted by the very means by which the Spartans had hoped
to exercise control—through the assembly.58
Even here, however, Herodotus’ narrative resists a straightforwardly
encomiastic reading.59 Immediately after Soclees’ speech, and before de-
scribing the allies’ acclamation, Herodotus narrates Hippias’ warning that
‘surely the Corinthians would long for the Peisistratidae more than any-
thing else, when the appointed days would come for them to be plagued
by the Athenians’ (q #b& ˚%æØ&Ł/%ı. #$ºØ"!Æ )$&!ø& K)Ø)%Ł+"*Ø&
—*Ø"Ø"!æÆ!/'Æ., ‹!Æ& "çØ lŒø"Ø B#1æÆØ Æƒ Œ2æØÆØ I&ØA"ŁÆØ ()0
3ŁÅ&Æ/ø&, 5.93.1). Indeed, Soclees had quoted an oracle, prophesying
the birth of a lion, ‘mighty, savage, which will loose the knees of many’
(‘ŒÆæ!*æe& T#Å"!+&· )%ººH& '0 ()e ª%2&Æ!Æ º2"*Ø’, 5.92.:.3). In the
contextofhis tale, the lionclearly refers toCypselus theCorinthian tyrant as
part of Soclees’ attack on autocratic rule in his city. But, given the atempor-
ality and ambiguity of oracles, as well asHippias’ intervention at the end of
his speech, it is equally plausible to read this oracle differently, and regard
the lion as Athens, another tyrant ready to make the Corinthians suffer
more, andnurturedby this very speechbySoclees.60After all, asHerodotus’
57 K)*/!* 'b CøŒº1%. XŒ%ı"Æ& *Y)Æ&!%. Kº*ıŁ1æø., –)Æ. !Ø. ÆP!H& çø&c& Þ+5Æ.
Æƒæ1*!% !%F ˚%æØ&Ł/%ı !c& ª&-#Å&, ¸ÆŒ*'ÆØ#%&/%Ø"/ !* K)*#Ææ!2æ%&!% #c )%Ø1*Ø&
#Å'b& &*-!*æ%& )*æd ),ºØ& @¯ºº$'Æ, 5.93.2.
58 Lateiner (1989), 39 interprets this speech as explaining ‘something essential about
the Greeks’. Cf. Moles (2007), 255: ‘Book 5 is centrally concerned with the struggle
between freedom and despotism. Socles supports freedom and speaks “freely”.’ See also:
Hartog (1988), 322–39; McGlew (1993), 61–74; Gray (1996; 1997); Dewald (2003),
30–2.
59 Moles (2007), 257–63 discusses the negative aspects.
60 On Pericles as the lion-cub, see Hdt. 6.131.2; cf. Moles (2007), 262, n. 85. The
image of the lion-cub is a popular one in the Athenian imagination: Aesch. Ag. 717–36;
Ar. Eq. 1037–44 (Cleon), Ran. 1431–2 (Alcibiades).
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readership will be verymuch aware, the Corinthians will suffer most at the
handsofAthenian imperialism;Thucydides,of course, tells that story—but
even by the later stages of Herodotus’ History the two cities are at one
another’s throats.61The oracle’s injunction to theCorinthians to ‘consider
well’ (‘!ÆF!$ &ı& *s çæ$Ç*"Ł*’, S.92.:.3), then, seems pointedly aimed at
the difficulty of judgement on an issue so complex as freedom.
The fault-lines opening up here are going to be increasingly impor-
tant, and increasingly troubling, for Herodotus’ readership. Were So-
clees and the Corinthians wrong to uphold the values of freedom, when
Sparta and Hippias were trying to suppress Athens? Or if we think that
they were not wrong, since the Athenians helped win the war against the
Persians, would we feel the same way after conflict has broken out among
the Greeks? And yet, do we imagine that the situation would have been
any better had Athens been strangled at birth? Were the Corinthians
really wrong not to countenance the suppression of Athens, even given
everything that we now know? Would we have sided with a tyrant?
The Spartans try to characterize the Athenian democracy as mob
rule—well, they would say that, wouldn’t they? But, when Herodotus
returns to Athens, his assessment of the assembly’s decision appears to
bear out such a judgement, gnomically remarking that it was easier to
fool the many than the one. (Not that he had used Cleomenes’ rejection
of Aristagoras as an opportunity to praise Spartan decision-making
either.) While his readers may be supporters of freedom, perhaps even
of democracy, and hold dear the idea of a coalition of the willing
standing up to Persian despotism, and even as he himself comments
to that effect, our narrator insistently probes the problems of freedom
and the ideology of debate.62 At one level, Herodotus clearly shows the
61 Thuc. 1.67–87; Hdt. 8.59, 61, 94–5. On the relevance to future events and
Athenian imperialism, see Fornara (1971); Strasburger (1982), 589–90, 599–600;
Raaflaub (1987), 223–4; Wec¸owski (1996), 237–51; Moles (1996; 2002), 39–40;
(2007), 261–3; Munson (2001), 58; Dewald (2003), 31; R. Fowler (2003), 311–17.
Pelling (2006a), 108 concludes: ‘Even when a speaker talks straight, the relation to the
narrative, and the relation to extratextual events which the audience will know, must
complicate the reader’s critique of a speech.’ Cf. J. Henderson (2007), 306, n. 56. The
complication is especially acute when considering the multilayering of an ainos tale:
Gould (1989), 56–7; Johnson (2001); Pelling (2006a), 106–8; cf. Irwin (1998).
62 Moles (2007), 259 worries: ‘How can “equality of speech” be the wonderful thing
that Socles, the allies, the Athenians and, apparently, Herodotus himself think it is, when
the narrative attests its failures as well as its successes?’
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value of dissent, as the Corinthians stand up for the right of each Greek
city to rule itself and not to be suppressed by others, foreign or otherwise
(especially by those who claim to be supporters of freedom): the arena of
the assembly again acts as the conduit for dissident voices to be heard.
At another level, however, Herodotus offers no simple and glorious
message concerning freedom. The Athenians assembly—the most
evolved form of free expression—is the institution that a single indivi-
dual, himself a tyrant, can easily deceive. Herodotus’ digression, which
interprets the rise of Athenian democracy as a success story of freedom,
also gestures towards its potentially disastrous consequences. Freedom is
important and should be fought for; but it’s also messy and, paradoxi-
cally, can lead to slavery.
These issues—the importance of freedom, the growing sense of
conflict within the Greek coalition forces, the problematic representa-
tion of debate—come to a head in Herodotus’ narration of the Greek
assembly on the eve of the battle of Salamis.
At Salamis there was a great battle of words63 (8.40–82)
By book 8 of Herodotus’ History the situation in the Greek camp has
reached crisis proportions. In spite of a heroic to-a-man defence of
Thermopylae, the Persian juggernaut shows no signs of slowing: the
Athenians have been forced to abandon their city to the Persian invasion
force; the Greek coalition has retreated to Salamis before pondering its
next move. The debate that follows is the most complex in the whole of
the History. At stake is the future of Greece, no less.
Both the context—whether to sail away or not—and the chaotic form
of the pre-Salamis debate resemble the assembly scene of Iliad 2 which
was analysed above.64 In Homer, Agamemnon convenes the assembly to
63 On the debates before Salamis, see Munson (1988); Graham (1996); Pelling
(1997b); Blo¨sel (2001); Harrison (2002), 568–9; Bowie (2007), 130–71.
64 So now Bowie (2007), 144–5: ‘The scene is given a particular significance by its
intertextual relation with the assembly in Iliad 2. There, where Agamemnon falsely
recounts his dream (Il. 2.139–54), there is a noisy and unthinking flight of the Greeks to
their ships, as happens here when the message of the capture of Athens’ Acropolis is
brought. Then, as the Greeks flee, Odysseus is prompted by Athena and gives impas-
sioned and sententious advice to the individual commanders he stops (155–97), just as
Themistocles, encouraged by Mnesiphilus, will advise Eurybiades in private. Once the
assembly is reconvened, there is an acrimonious dispute between Odysseus and Thersites
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test the resolve of his troops, and finds that their desire for home almost
leads to a ‘nostos beyond what was fated’ (()1æ#%æÆ &,"!%., Il. 2.155). It
takes a combination of Odysseus’ wiles (and brute force) and Nestor’s
organizational capacities to wrest control back and prepare the troops for
battle. Something similar happens here, as Eurybiades plays the role of
the coalition leader not totally in control of his troops, and Themistocles is
given an Odysseus-like guise to prevent the flight to the ships, which
has already been prefigured by his introduction as ‘a man’ prominent
in Athens.65
Herodotus’ representation of debate, however, differs radically from the
assembly in Iliad 2, especially with respect to the degree and nature of the
narratorial framing of the debate. ‘When the commanders of the cities
that have been mentioned came together at Salamis,’ Herodotus relates,
‘they deliberated, and Eurybiades proposed that anyone who wanted to
should declare his opinion whether he deemed it best to make a sea battle
in the territory still under their control . . .Of the opinions that were
spoken most fell out in favour of sailing to the Isthmus and fighting at
sea in defence of the Peloponnese.’66HereHerodotus presents a picture of
Greeks debating openly;67 but the majority of arguments favour the
(211–77), which is here twice imitated in the exchange between Themistocles and
Adeimantus . . .Odysseus then addresses Agamemnon before the whole assembly, ar-
guing for the continuation of the siege (284–332); and Themistocles similarly makes a
speech in the assembly of generals, which is addressed specifically to Eurybiades.
Odysseus saves the Greek expedition, just as Themistocles is about to engineer the
Greek victory.’ Even from this summary account, however, the ‘just as’ in Bowie’s
conclusion may be contested: the strong resonances of Iliad 2 also serve to highlight
the differences, such as the lack of divine machinery. The present discussion focuses on
the difference in form of Herodotus’ account.
65 See n. 32 above. For Themistocles as a fifth-century Odysseus, see Fornara (1971),
72–3; Moles (2002), 48; Marincola (2007), 30–1.
66 ‰. 'b 9. !c& CÆºÆ#E&Æ "ı&BºŁ%& %ƒ "!æÆ!Åª%d I)e !H& *NæÅ#1&%& )%º/ø&,
K:%ıº*2%&!%, )æ%Ł1&!%. ¯Pæı:Ø$'*ø ª&-#Å& I)%çÆ/&*"ŁÆØ !e& :%ıº,#*&%&, ‹Œ%ı
'%Œ1%Ø K)Ø!Å'*,!Æ!%& *r&ÆØ &Æı#Æå/Å& )%Ø1*"ŁÆØ !H& ÆP!%d åøæ1ø& KªŒæÆ!1*. *N"/ . . .
Æƒ ª&H#ÆØ 'b !H& º*ª,&!ø& Æƒ )º*E"!ÆØ "ı&*51)Ø)!%& )æe. !e& 0I"Ł#e& )º-"Æ&!Æ.
&Æı#Æå1*Ø& )æe !B. —*º%)%&&+"%ı, 8.49.1–2.
67 Bowie (2007), 136 comments: ‘Eurybiades democratically throws the debate open
to all.’ That may be putting it a little strongly, given that Eurybiades, a Spartan
commander, is presiding over a debate of commanders from both democracies and
oligarchies. Nevertheless, Bowie is right to draw attention to the resonance of !e&
:%ıº,#*&%& with the formula that opens the Athenian assembly: ‘Who wishes to
speak?’ (!/. Iª%æ*2*Ø& :%2º*!ÆØ;). See Ch. 1, n. 4 above.
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option of retreating to the Isthmus, which not only reveals the self-interest
motivating the different coalition members, but also directly contradicts
the assertion that the narrator has already made, when he insisted that a
retreat to the Isthmus would have spelt disaster for the Greek effort.68
Worse is to follow. While the discussion was still going on, a messenger
arrives with the news that Athens had fallen to the Persians and that the
city is now on fire.69 The news of Athens’ sack puts the assembled
commanders into a panic, sending many of them rushing to their ships,
and prompting the rest to resolve to defend the Isthmus.70 It is at this
point, only ‘after they had broken up the conference’ (%Q 'ØÆºıŁ1&!*. KŒ
!%F "ı&*'æ/%ı, 8.56), that Herodotus moves into direct discourse for the
first time to relate the speech of Mnesiphilus, an Athenian man whom
Themistocles receives on his ship, and who tells the Athenian commander
in no uncertain terms that he must ‘go and try to upset what had been
decided’ (‘YŁØ ŒÆd )*ØæH 'ØÆå1ÆØ !a :*:%ıº*ı#1&Æ’, 8.57.2), to prevent
the coalition from disastrous fragmentation.
While interest has tended to focus on the nature of Herodotus’ source,
my concern here is with the narrator’s representation of debate.71
Herodotus in fact shows remarkably little interest in the workings of
the debate, in contrast to the assembly with which it so closely resonates
in the Iliad. Throughout this episode he draws attention to the external
factors which influence opinion, such as the Persian occupation of
68 7.139. OnHerodotus’ portrayal of Athens see Bowie (2007), 92 for a bibliography.
69 With the sack of Athens, the Persians actually meet one of their main objectives.
What with the death of one of the Spartan kings, from a Persian perspective their
expedition to Greece may not have been regarded as that much of a failure after all.
70 %ƒ 'b K& CÆºÆ#E&Ø @‚ººÅ&*. . . . K. !%"%F!%& Ł,æı:%& I)/Œ%&!% u"!* 7&Ø%Ø !H&
"!æÆ!ÅªH& %P'b ŒıæøŁB&ÆØ 7#*&%& !e )æ%Œ*/#*&%& )æBª#Æ, Iºº 0 7. !* !a. &1Æ.
K"1)Ø)!%& ŒÆd ƒ"!/Æ I*/æ%&!% ‰. I)%Ł*ı",#*&%Ø· !%E"/ !* ()%º*Ø)%#1&%Ø"Ø ÆP!H&
KŒıæ-ŁÅ )æe !%F 0I"Ł#%F &Æı#Æå1*Ø&, 8.56. As Bowie (2007), 145 comments: ‘Ł,æı:%&:
the panic is a little odd, since the Greeks cannot have expected a virtually undefended
Acropolis to survive long, and H[erodotus] does not say what happened to those who set
sail, but it is to be understood as part of the parallelism of this section with Iliad 2.’
Ł,æı:%. acts as a prelude to the so-called Constitutional Debate (3.80), on which see sec.
2 below. For the occurrence of Ł,æı:%. in scenes of debate in tragedy, see Ch. 6, n. 85
below.
71 On Themistocles and Mnesiphilus, see Burn (1962), 293; Frost (1971); Podlecki
(1975), 71, 230. Lateiner (1989), 254, n. 51 comments: ‘The erratically ungenerous
treatment in the Histories of a few persons such as Cleomenes and Themistocles was a
result of Herodotus’ failure to recognize hostile sources.’ That observation would now
more likely be read as part of the depth and nuance of Herodotus’ narrative.
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Attica. On the other hand, he reserves direct speech for the moment
when the assembly breaks up, as he relates the viewpoint of the otherwise
anonymous Mnesiphilus and his communication with Themistocles.72
Thus, the critical strategy of staying to fight at Salamis is attributed to a
meeting that takes place external to the assembly: this is where the fate of
the Greek coalition is decided: it is not decided—as so many issues had
been in the Iliad—in the institution of formal debate.73
A summary of the rest of the episode bears out this analysis. Themis-
tocles goes to Eurybiades’ ship, where, making Mnesiphilus’ ‘arguments
his own’ (8.58.2), he persuades the Spartan commander to reconvene
another assembly, at which Themistocles first of all silences the reluctant
Corinthian admiral Adeimantus (8.59.1), before making clear to Eur-
ybiades the strategic advantages and patriotic ideals of fighting at
Salamis.74 In place of learning what Eurybiades—or any of the other
commanders—thinks of this argument, however, the reader finds The-
mistocles once again embroiled in controversy with Adeimantus on his
right to speak in the assembly. Pricked, finally, to threaten withdrawing
the Athenian fleet from the alliance, Themistocles succeeds in persuad-
ing Eurybiades to change his mind and stay at Salamis. More news75
72 Bowie (2007), 145: ‘Here, for the first time since events after Thermopylae
(7.234–7), direct speech becomes prevalent.’ He observes that ‘it is much used from
here until 68 to mark the crucial moment when the decision on where to fight is taken by
both sides’, but does not comment on its striking occurrences outside the formal arena
for debate.
73 Pelling (2006c), 83 draws attention to another difference between Herodotus and
Homer. Whereas Athena intervenes in the Iliad, ‘in Herodotus the Athena-figure is
Mnesiphilus, who puts ideas into Themistocles’ mind: for the moment the divine role
has been taken over by human inspiration.’ As Pelling notes, however, while this
omission may say something about the Greek victory, the gods cannot be left out of
the picture long, which suggests that even as Herodotus plots ‘how traditional story-
patterns come to operate in a different world’, it is not possible to ‘limit those newer
explanatory strands to the human and secular’ (p. 84).
74 He omits mentioning the likelihood of the coalition fracturing, which had been
Mnesiphilus’ point, for, as Herodotus explains, it would have been unbecoming to
accuse any of the confederates to their faces (8.60.1). See Pelling (2006a), 120, n. 34.
75 We learn that in response to the defeat at Thermopylae the Peloponnesians have
been busy fortifying the Isthmus in panic (8.71–3). As Bowie (2007), 161 comments:
‘We now briefly see what is happening further south. 73 is a catalogue of shame to be set
against the more glorious list in 43–8, and H[erodotus] is forthright in his condemna-
tion, which picks up his earlier firmly expressed opinion that the wall was anyway quite
useless (7.139).’ In the Iliad, of course, the Achaean wall affords them little protection,
and won’t survive long after Troy’s fall: see esp. Il. 12.1–37.
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arrives, however, which first starts a campaign of whispers against
Eurybiades, then breaks out into open resentment,76 leading to yet
another assembly being convoked, where the same arguments are
made.77 ‘At this point,’ Herodotus relates, ‘Themistocles, seeing that
his judgement was going to be defended by the Peloponnesians, slipped
secretly away from the meeting and sent a man in a boat to the Persian
camp’, to deliver a message to Xerxes announcing his friendship and
warning him that the Greeks were about to flee.78 News of the blockade
fails to stop the Greeks from further argument,79 until a deserter from
Xerxes’ camp arrives: only then do the Greeks finally prepare for battle.
It is clear even from this summary that the representation of debate
before Salamis cannot easily be accommodated into a reading that
privileges institutional dissent. The abrupt changes of direction or the
influence of external factors demonstrate more than adequately the
precariousness of Greek institutions of debate.80 The assembly is clearly
seen as ineffectual: its first sitting is influenced by news of the capture of
Athens; Themistocles determines its second by threatening the com-
mander-in-chief with desertion; a third eventually sits, more-or-less
spontaneously as a response to further worrying news—and its outcome
is again pre-empted by Themistocles acting independently of it; lastly,
when Aristides arrives with his report, he finds the Greeks still quarrel-
ling.81 As Herodotus puts it: ‘There was a great pushing and shoving of
words among those at Salamis’ (!H& 'b K& CÆºÆ#E&Æ Kª/&*!% TŁØ"#e.
76 !1º%. 'b K5*ææ$ªÅ K. !e #1"%&, 8.74.2.
77 "2ºº%ª,. !* 'c Kª/&*!% ŒÆd )%ººa Kº1ª*!% )*æd !H& ÆP!H&, 8.74.2.
78 K&ŁÆF!Æ ¨*#Ø"!%Œº1Å. ‰. 9""%F!% !fi B ª&-#fi Å ()e !H& —*º%)%&&Å"/ø&, ºÆŁg&
K51æå*!ÆØ KŒ !%F "ı&*'æ/%ı, K5*ºŁg& 'b )1#)*Ø K. !e "!æÆ!,)*'%& !e F+'ø& ¼&'æÆ
)º%/øfi , 8.75.1.
79 !H& 'b Æs!Ø. Kª/&*!% º,ªø& I#çØ":Æ"/Å, 8.81.
80 Thompson (1996), 92 reads the chaos of the assembly more positively: ‘As opposed
to the Persian council, which follows a predictable procedure and has a clear beginning
and end, the gathering of the Greek council before Salamis is marked by its lack of
structure and its irresolution. . . .The Greek commander is so receptive to the opinions
of others that he cannot bring the debate to a proper close, for even when all seem
decided on a course of action, there turns out to be an opening for further debate. This
inability of the Greeks to agree on and stick to one decision results directly from their
perception of their leadership as both compliant and fallible.’
81 ‘[W]hat decides the issue is the threat that, unless the allies agree to fight, the
Athenians will sail away to Italy (62.2). That shows the truth in Themistocles’ original
fear that fragmentation would be the danger—but only because the Athenians them-
selves bring the fear so close to realisation. Thus the debate is short-circuited; then a
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º,ªø& )%ºº,., 8.78.1).82 This is a contest of words from which there is
no way out.
The institutional workings of the assembly remain something of a
mystery; at one time it seems that the coalition makes the decisions by
voting; at another that Eurybiades can make the call on his own. Instead,
Herodotus shows far greater interest in the actions of individuals, parti-
cularly when they are operating outside an institutional framework.83
So, Herodotus tells us, Aristides was the ‘best and most honourable man
there was in Athens’ (¼æØ"!%& ¼&'æÆ ª*&1"ŁÆØ K& 3Ł+&fi Å"Ø ŒÆd
'ØŒÆØ,!Æ!%&, 8.79.1), though he had been ostracized by his people.84
Similarly, Herodotus notes explicitly that Themistocles acts ‘outside the
assembly’, when he sends his tricky message to the Persian king—the
significance of which Herodotus again underlines by a shift into direct
speech.85
This picture of disruption in the assembly is all themore powerful given
the strong resonances of this account with the assembly of book 2 of the
Iliad. On the most basic level, in both cases the coalition forces are
further acrimonious debate (74, cf. 78) is again short-circuited, this time by Sicinnus’
message, a different type of speech, a piece of Themistoclean trickery’: Pelling (2006a),
112. Pelling, however, concentrates on the rhetoric of the speakers: ‘The Greek debate
was not merely a shambles in its conduct; it was also one where Themistocles did not
speak his mind . . .He has to resort to arguments which are second-best’ (ibid.).
82 For the use of TŁØ"#e. º,ªø& to mean ‘a battle of words’, see also Herodotus’
description of the debate between the Tegeans and Athenians before Plataea (9.26.1), a
‘metaphorical’ usage which ‘presages the actual combat, where the battle ends with just
such an action’: Flower and Marincola (2002), 147–8. See also Pelling (2006c), 97 with
n. 60 for the Iliadic resonances of the big ‘push’ (TŁØ"#,.). Herodotus offers important
testimony to the widespread association of debate with battle that we see in the fifth
century, though that association has already been anticipated in Homeric epic. See
Prologue, n. 25 above, on Athenian tragedy.
83 This point is implicit in Bowie’s commentary on this scene: ‘As often in
H[erodotus], direct speech is used for the crucial news, conveyed in the private discussion
between Themistocles and Aristeides (79–80), while Aristeides’ speech to the council is in
indirect speech; the focus remains on the main characters and their relationships’ (Bowie
(2007), 168, my italics) Herodotus’ focus is on the individuals, not on the institutional
framework in which they operate.
84 Bowie (2007), 169 observes that the just and aristocratic Aristides was often
contrasted to the scheming and democratic Themistocles. Here Herodotus brings the
rivals together, outside the political arena.
85 In a typically paradoxical manner, Themistocles hits upon the true situation in his
deceptive letter to Xerxes (8.75): the Greeks really are as fractious and on the point of
flight as he makes out. Cf. Pelling (2006a), 112.
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formally called to assembly ("ı&*º1åŁÅ"Æ&, 8.59) by their commander-in-
chief to discuss the prospect of flight. In both scenes too the assembled
Greeks eventually reaffirm their commitment to fighting, but only after a
protracted series of assemblies and much infighting. Indeed, their
commitment to staying depends largely on the action of an individual,
who prevents the flight to the ships and the fragmentation of the coalition,
acting on the instructions from a third party. Where Odysseus held back
the ships on the advice of Athena in the Iliad, Themistocles does the same
in Herodotus, this time following the advice of a mortal.
Significantly, however, the two episodes also differ in their treatment
of dissent. We saw in the chapter on the Iliad how book 2 continued the
exploration of dissent within the assembly by repeatedly calling into
question Agamemnon’s ability to manage debate: the crisis comes to a
head when a voice from below, Thersites, invades the epic stage, only for
Odysseus to take charge and reassert the control of the leaders. When
Eurybiades recalls the assembly for a second debate, these same issues
over who can speak resurface. First, Adeimantus chides Themistocles for
‘jumping the start’, which in turn prompts Themistocles to retort: ‘Yes,
but those who start too late don’t win’ (‘ˇƒ '1 ª* KªŒÆ!Æº*Ø),#*&%Ø %P
"!*çÆ&%F&!ÆØ’, 8.59.1).86 Whereas this initial banter had been ‘mild’
(!,!* #b& M)/ø., 8.60.1), Herodotus then reports Themistocles’ furious
response to further provocation (8.61.1–2):
!ÆF!Æ º1ª%&!%. ¨*#Ø"!%Œº1%. Æs!Ø. › ˚%æ/&ŁØ%. 3'*/#Æ&!%. K)*ç1æ*!%,
"ØªA& !* Œ*º*2ø& !fiH #+ K"!Ø )Æ!æd. ŒÆd ¯Pæı:Ø$'Å& %PŒ KH& K)ØłÅç/Ç*Ø&
I),ºØ I&'æ/· ),ºØ& ªaæ !e& ¨*#Ø"!%Œº1Æ )Ææ*å,#*&%& KŒ1º*ı* %o!ø ª&-#Æ.
"ı#:$ºº*"ŁÆØ. !ÆF!Æ '1 %ƒ )æ%1ç*æ*, ‹!Ø Bº-Œ*"Æ& !* ŒÆd ŒÆ!*/å%&!% Æƒ
3ŁB&ÆØ. !,!* 'c › ¨*#Ø"!%Œº1Å. Œ*E&,& !* ŒÆd !%f. ˚%æØ&ŁØ%f. )%ºº$ !* ŒÆd
ŒÆŒa 7º*ª*, 9øı!%E"Ø !* K'+º%ı º,ªøfi ‰. *YÅ ŒÆd ),ºØ. ŒÆd ªB #1Çø& X )*æ
KŒ*/&%Ø"Ø, 7"!0 i& 'ØÅŒ,"ØÆØ &1*. "çØ 7ø"Ø )*)ºÅæø#1&ÆØ.
While Themistocles was speaking, the Corinthian Adeimantus again attacked
him, ordering him to keep quiet since he was a man without a country, while
86 We can imagine that the punchy, epigrammatic quality of the exchange is one
reason which recommended itself for inclusion within Herodotus’ narrative: see e.g.
Plutarch’s Life of Themistocles 11. Nevertheless, it is significant that the first speech act,
which Herodotus chooses to quote from the assembly, is an example of witty banter
rather of sustained political argument. Shapiro (2000) discusses the use of competing
generalizations in Herodotus’ speeches, an aspect which is important too in Thucydides’
representation of political discourse: see Ch. 4, n. 144 below.
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also trying to prevent Eurybiades from putting any matter to the vote at the
behest of a man without a city. Rather, he ordered Themistocles to get himself a
city before he offered his advice. He said these things because the Athenians had
been driven back and were oppressed. On this occasion Themistocles heartily
abused both Adeimantus and the Corinthians, making it quite plain that they
[the Athenians] had a city and land much stronger than theirs, while they had a
full quota of two hundred warships.
Adeimantus adopts the position of a Homeric hero and tries to disallow
Themistocles from speaking on the basis that he was no longer a man
who had a city—a peculiarly elitist argument based on the importance
of a property qualification for determining citizen rights, particularly
the right to speak in the assembly. But Herodotus’ narrative resists that
assimilation: it has already represented Themistocles as an Odysseus-
like figure, a portrayal that is cashed in here as it is Themistocles—as
Odysseus—who prevents the Greeks from rushing to their ships. Adei-
mantus’ labelling of Themistocles as a Thersites nevertheless flags up the
difference between the two scenes of assembly: whereas the Homeric
Odysseus is the one who restores order to the assembly and reminds the
Achaeans of their duty and the benefit of fighting at Troy, this Odysseus
struggles to perform within the institution of assembly.87
Herodotus’ description of the end of the debate—‘These men skirm-
ished with words at Salamis’ (%o!ø #b& %ƒ )*æd CÆºÆ#E&Æ 7)*"Ø
IŒæ%:%ºØ"$#*&%Ø, 8.64.1)—reworks the Homeric narrator’s description
of the first Achaean assembly (S. !- ª 0 I&!Ø:/%Ø"Ø #Æå*""Æ#1&ø
K)1*""Ø& j I&"!+!Å&, Il. 1.304–5).88 But, as we have seen, any hopes
that the Greek assembly will prove an institution that can make use of
dissent—as it had in the Iliad—are soon dashed: ultimately Themistocles
87 Adeimantus tries to cast Themistocles as a Thersites figure, ineligible to address the
assembly on the basis of his lack of a city: but it is in fact Themistocles’ language that
resonates with Homer’s Odysseus in his upbraiding of Thersites. Cf. Bowie (2007), 181
(on 8.92.2) and 215 (on 8.125).
88 Pelling (2006a), 111 comments: ‘So this is “freedom” in action, in its most
unregulated and roistering form: and the language used to describe it—“skirmishing”
(64.1)—suggests that the bellicosity which should have been spent on the Persians is
being spent on one another.’ This description usefully draws attention to problems with
how freedom is practised as opposed to its rhetoric: but it is also important to note the
Homeric precedent for this kind of language. Pelling’s description actually recalls
Nestor’s intervention in that opening debate of the Iliad. What is entirely lacking in
Herodotus, however, is a sense that dissent becomes incorporated within the institutional
fabric of the community.
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succeeds in getting the Greeks to stay and fight only by operating on his
own initiative outside the assembly (KŒ !%F "ı&*'æ/%ı, 8.75.1). Whereas
the Iliad investigates debate and challenges authority in such a way that
makes dissent institutional in the Achaean assembly as part of its
foundational narrative, Herodotus investigates debate and challenges
his culture’s deliberative institutions, which are shown to be inadequate
to the task of managing dissent in the face of inter-poleis rivalry.
In this section, I have explored various examples of debate scenes
among the Greeks. Such episodes do not occur in the History until well
over halfway through the narrative, as if the text were mimetic of
historical progress: formal debate is not represented until the institution
of assembly has become part of the fabric of the Greek polis. When
assemblies do occur, they are found wanting at various levels: full-length
speeches representing political discourse are rare, as Herodotus more
frequently focuses on individuals performing within the institution;
unlike in the Iliad, where scenes of debate realize a sense of achievement,
Herodotus appears to show little interest in institutional progress. For
the narrative he is telling, the assembly is often the problem rather than
a means of finding a solution.
This shift in the representation of Greeks debating from the Iliad to
Herodotus derives from two interlocking factors. First, the circum-
stances of representing debate are different in Herodotus, not least
because of his role as an author of his text. The extent to which the
narrator is now involved in framing debate matches the extent of his
responsibility in writing down these other voices. Second, and following
on from this, the institution of the assembly that is founded in Homer
occupies a more hazardous position in Herodotus’ world. As the exam-
ple of the debate at Salamis shows, particularly by virtue of its resonance
with the Iliad, it fails adequately to accommodate dissent, principally
because citizens from different cities are trying to deliberate together.
The portrayal of Greeks debating in Herodotus is more nuanced and
problematic than it had been in Homer because the historian is con-
fronting the problem of inter-poleis debate: precisely what is lacking is
any kind of institution that can deal with dissent among the competing
communities.
This is where the role of the narrator comes in. In the way he
represents debate misfiring, Herodotus presents his own text as a way
of dealing with the issues concerning which the Greek assemblies are
Herodotus’ Odyssean enquiry 171
Barker 9780199542710_0029-0202_Barker_chap2-3 Final Proof page 171 29.4.2011 10:44am
instituted and yet are seen to fail the test. At Salamis we find that
Herodotus not only represents the confusion over debate among the
Greeks; he also narrates a comparison to decision-making in the Persian
camp:89 while the Greeks in their assembly behave wilfully and even
autocratically to suppress dissent, the Great King Xerxes acts democra-
tically by soliciting other people’s opinions about how to conduct the
forthcoming battle—though he remains sole arbiter and judge. The
paradox of Persians debating in defiance of and as a challenge to Greek
assumptions is the subject of the second section.
2. PERSIANS IN DEBATE (HERODOTUS 3, 7, 9)
In the previous section we have seen how scenes of formal debate among
the Greeks do not conform to any simple form or stereotypical notion
of utility. Indeed, in their varied representations we have seen the
Greeks struggle with concepts of freedom, autonomy and collective
action within one institution—the assembly—which is supposed to
guarantee such ideals. In the last example that we looked at, the debate
before Salamis, Herodotus not only emphasized Themistocles’ activities
outside the institutional arena of the assembly to hold the ships back; he
also presented the Persians conducting their own debate according to
the principles of collective participation.
This section tackles head-on the problematic issue of Persians debat-
ing. Working with the ‘self–other’ conceptual framework, scholars tend
to describe debate among the Persians as flagging up the problem of
speaking before the king, a feature that characterized the above study of
the Trojans in the Iliad.90 While that is certainly true for some of the
scenes, such as the debate on the eve of the battle of Plataea, it proves an
89 8.66–70. On the comparison of the two scenes of deliberation, see Pelling (2006a),
111; Bowie (2007), 153–61. On Artemia’s advice, see Munson (1988). Bowie (2007),
159 comments: ‘ [8.69.2] is a remarkable instance of how the opposition between Greeks
and barbarians can be deconstructed in H[erodotus]. In theory, the Greek camp operates
in a relatively democratic way, with decisions made by the assembled commanders,
whilst the Persians are ruled by a monarch. In practice, here at least, Themistocles acts in
an autocratic manner in defiance of the other commanders, whilst the King gives the
order to follow the majority verdict.’
90 See Ch. 1, sec. 3 above.
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insufficient explanation of the paradox that the most formal scenes of
debate take place in the king’s court rather than in a Greek assembly.
Two such debates are particularly interesting for thinking about the
issue of dissent: Xerxes’ council of war, and the debate on the constitu-
tions. Coming at critical moments of Persian history, both debates
challenge the (Greek) readers’ bias against the barbarian and their
preconceived notions of the nexus between freedom and debate.
No one spoke against (9.41–3)
Just as debates among the Greeks cluster around critical decisions, such
as whether to support the Ionian rebellion or fight at Salamis, so debates
among the Persians intersect with key stages of their conflict against
Greece. The last scene of debate on the eve of the decisive battle at
Plataea presents a good place to start, since it shows most starkly what is
at stake: it explicitly raises the problem of speaking truth to power.91
The debate takes place between two types familiar from other narra-
tives, the warrior figure who has power and the wise advisor.92 Here the
debate is between Mardonius, the man of action, and Artabazus: but, in
fact, the debate at Plataea represents the last of a series of confrontations
between Mardonius and a man of words,93 which recalls the series of
confrontations between Hector and Poulydamas that culminate in an
impromptu assembly on the eve of the equally decisive battle in the
Iliad.94 As in the Homeric scene, the framing of the debate is crucial,
and affirms the roles they are playing: Mardonius, the impatient
91 See Payen (1997); Greenwood and Cartledge (2002); and n. 18 above. Cf.
J. Henderson (2007), 292–5.
92 For wise advisors or ‘warner’ figures in Herodotus, see Bischoff (1932); Hellmann
(1934), 77; Lattimore (1939); Immerwahr (1966), 73–83; F. Solmsen (1982), 78–109;
cf. Flower and Marincola (2002), 7 with n. 48. On Herodotus’ Artabanus and Thucy-
dides’ Archidamus: Pelling (1991). On Poulydamas, see Ch. 1, n. 121 and accompany-
ing text.
93 For Artabazus’ alter ago Artabanus, see below.
94 Herodotus description even resonates with epic formulaic language: ‘During those
ten days nothing happened beyond what I have mentioned. But when the eleventh day
came about . . . ’ (#1åæØ #1& &ı& !H& '1ŒÆ B#*æ1ø& %P'b& K)d )º*F& Kª/&*!% !%2!ø&· ‰.
'b 9&'*Œ$!Å Kª*ª,&** B#1æÅ . . . , 9.41.1). Flower and Marincola (2002), 181 observe the
‘thematic resemblance’ of this episode to two scenes of deliberation involving Hector and
Poulydamas in the Iliad (Il. 12.200–50; 18.243–313). They comment: ‘Both Mardonius
and Hector are too headstrong and stubborn to listen to sound counsel and their
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warmonger, ‘entered into speeches’ (K&ŁÆF!Æ K. º,ª%ı. XºŁ%&, 9.41.1)
with Artabazus, whose credentials as ‘a Persian of repute with Xerxes
among the elite’ (n. K& Oº/ª%Ø"Ø —*æ"1ø& q& I&cæ ',ŒØ#%. )Ææa ˛1æ5fi Å,
9.41.1) are advertised in a similar manner to Poulydamas’. More strik-
ing still is his advice: given the advantage of the Persians’ present
position, we might have expected Artabazus to recommend staying
where they were; in fact he advises retreat to the safety of Thebes.95
Yet this proposal makes sense with Poulydamas’ advice in mind, which
had been to fall back behind Troy’s walls (Il. 18.254–82). In both
scenes the man of action counters by steeling his men for conflict, a
battle-cry which carries the day without opposition.96
Again, however, there is an important difference, and that again
points to Herodotus’ position as an author of his text. As we saw in
the section on the Iliad, the narrator—uniquely—enters into the debate
to cast his judgement on the Trojan ‘fools’ (&+)Ø%Ø, Il. 18.311).97
In contrast, Herodotus’ voice-print is all over this debate.98 Most
obviously, Herodotus narrates both sides in indirect discourse,
accompanied by a commentary designed to direct his readers’ judge-
ment: apparently the Thebans thought Artabazus especially gifted with
foresight (‰. )æ%*Ø',!%. )º*F& !Ø ŒÆd !%2!%ı, 9.41.4), while Mardo-
nius’ opinion is presented as reckless (Iª&ø#%&*"!1æÅ ŒÆd %P'Æ#H.
"ıªªØ&ø"Œ%#1&Å). Yet, ‘no one spoke against his judgement’ (!%2!%ı
'b %o!ø 'ØŒÆØ*F&!%. I&!1º*ª* %P'*/., 9.42.1): the reason—supplied by
Herodotus through word-play—is that Mardonius’ opinion ‘conquers’
(KŒæ$!**) because he has been assigned ‘command’ (Œæ$!%.) by the king
(9.42.1). This debate is controlled by the individual who possesses
power, a power moreover that is solely derived from an individual
who is not even present. Thus, when Mardonius asks whether anyone
eagerness for a pitched battle proves their undoing.’ Yet, the Persians, unlike their Trojan
counterparts, clearly hold the upper hand in terms of position: see the next note.
95 On the line N1&ÆØ K. !e !*Eå%. !e ¨Å:Æ/ø& (9.41.2), Flower and Marincola (2002),
182 comment: ‘this can only mean “to go inside the walls” and cannot be construed as
taking up a position near Thebes, which was less than 10 kilometres away (contra H[ow
and] W[ells (1912)] 306; Hignett [(1963)] 315). It is extraordinary if H[erodotus] really
thought that this was a viable plan’—which misses the force of the Iliadic resonance.
96 Just as Hector had urged his men to fight so Mardonius urges his to engage in
battle ‘in the Persian way’ (&,#øfi !fiH —*æ"1ø&, 9.41.4).
97 See Ch. 1, n. 123 with accompanying text.
98 On Herodotus’ ‘voice-print’, see R. Fowler (1996).
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has heard of any oracles, Herodotus remarks that ‘no one said a word’
("Øª-&!ø& 'b !H& K)ØŒº+!ø&, 9.42.2), adding, ‘while those who did
know them said nothing out of fear’ (!H& 'b *N',!ø& #1&, K& I'*/fi Å 'b %P
)%Ø*ı#1&ø& !e º1ª*Ø&, 9.42.2).99 Here, only the narrator’s dissenting
voice is heard, as the authority of the king’s representative silences any
possibility for dissent among the Persians.100
Even those men whose experience would be invaluable to the com-
munity have no power in the community to influence things. When
questioned by his (Greek) interlocutor on why he does nothing with the
premonition of disaster he possesses, a certain Persian replies: ‘This is
the most hateful thing for men: to understand many things and have
power over none’ (KåŁ/"!Å 'b O'2&Å [K"!d] !H& K& I&Łæ-)%Ø"Ø Æo!Å·
)%ººa çæ%&1%&!Æ #Å'*&e. ŒæÆ!1*Ø&, 9.16.5).101 Nowhere is Persian
institutional weakness more evident than here, with the fact that the
Persian, who predicts his side’s defeat and who offers this insight into
his culture, remains anonymous.
This example of debate demonstrates the lack of dissent among the
Persians, and serves as part of the explanation for their subsequent
defeat. While both of these points find a precedent in Homeric
narrative, the role of the narrator suggests a different relationship to
the representations of debate. What is a unique example of narratorial
intervention in the Iliad is commonplace in Herodotus. His frequent
and insistent intervention in the portrayal of debate reveals his position
as an author of his text and his role in generating dissent. That factor is
seen more clearly in the debate that presages the run-up to war.
If contrary opinions are not spoken . . . (7.8–19)
The discussion above has shown how the critical ‘coming together in
words’ on the eve of the battle of Plataea is determined by Mardonius’
99 ‘Noisy Greek debate about the meaning of an oracle (cf. the debate at Athens
about the wooden wall oracle: 7.141–143) is here replaced by the stony silence of the
Persians.’: Flower and Marincola (2002), 185 n. 42.2.
100 Herodotus rejects the applicability of the oracle that Mardonius cites, and instead
offers another, as proof citing its text that tells of the doom of the Medes (9.43.1–2).
101 Flower and Marincola (2002), 132 note the ‘harsh and lapidary quality of the
original [Greek] with it stark four-word formulation’. They also observe the Homeric
quality of O'2&Å (only here in Herodotus): cf. Il. 15.25; Od. 1.398.
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status as the king’s chosen representative, which seems to reflect a deeper
malaise in Persian culture pertaining to the lack of an institutional
apparatus for accommodating dissent. The assembly concerning the
crucial question whether or not to go to war against Greece exhibits
similar problems, but can be less easily explained by the lack of dissent
in the Persian assembly. In particular, it is necessary to examine the
curious, and complex, interaction between the scene of debate and the
framing of it, in relation to a series of dreams experienced by Xerxes.102
The manner in which Herodotus describes the setting up of this
assembly immediately distinguishes it from the scenes of debate among
the Greeks. In the manner of a Homeric king, Xerxes acts as an
instituting agent, establishing an assembly of Persian nobles ("2ºº%ª%&
K)/ŒºÅ!%& —*æ"1ø& !H& Iæ/"!ø& K)%Ø1*!%, 7.8.1) in order that he
might learn what everyone else thought (¥ &Æ ª&-#Æ. !* )2ŁÅ!Æ/
"ç1ø& ŒÆd ÆP!e. K& )A"Ø *Y)fi Å !a Ł1º*Ø, 7.8.1).103 The tension between
collective discussion and individual desire is brought out by the lan-
guage and style of Xerxes’ subsequent speech. He addresses the as-
sembled group as ‘Persian men’ (‘¼&'æ*. —1æ"ÆØ’, 7.8.Æ.1), as if this
were a citizen-body to whom he was speaking, and insists that he follows
Persian custom when advocating an aggressive foreign policy. Yet, from
the onset his discourse slips into a first-person mode that betrays his
personal concerns: he wants to take vengeance on the Athenians for
what they had done to Persia and his father.104 His concluding appeal
brings the problem of dissent to the fore: ‘These things must be done
now in this way; but so I don’t seem to you to be deliberating on my
own, I put the affair into the middle and order anyone who wishes to do
so to make known his opinion.’105 Xerxes’ language of openness—
102 See esp. Pelling (1999b). Cf. Harrison (2000a); Pelling (2006a), 108–10;
Scullion (2006), 194–7; Forsdyke (2006), 234–5.
103 The episode is introduced in the light of Xerxes’ desire to sack Athens (˛1æ5Å. 'b
#*!a `Nª2)!%ı –ºø"Ø& ‰. 7#*ºº* K. å*EæÆ. ¼5*"ŁÆØ !e "!æ$!*ı#Æ !e K)d !a. 3Ł+&Æ.,
7.8.1).
104 ‘#1ººø 5*25Æ. !e& @¯ºº+")%&!%& KºA& "!æÆ!e& 'Øa !B. ¯Pæ-)Å. K)d !c&
@¯ºº$'Æ, ¥ &Æ 3ŁÅ&Æ/%ı. !Ø#øæ+"ø#ÆØ ‹"Æ 'c )*)%Ø+ŒÆ"Ø —1æ"Æ. !* ŒÆd )Æ!1æÆ !e&
K#,&’, 7.8.:.1.
105 ‘)%ØÅ!1Æ #1& &ı& !ÆF!Æ K"!d %o!ø· ¥ &Æ 'b #c N'Ø%:%ıº1*Ø& (#E& '%Œ1ø, !/ŁÅ#Ø !e
)æBª#Æ K. #1"%&, ª&-#Å& Œ*º*2ø& (#1ø& !e& :%ıº,#*&%& I)%çÆ/&*"ŁÆØ’, 7.8.'.2. On
the phrases K. #1"%& and › :%ıº,#*&%. see above and Ch. 1, nn. 150, 159 with n. 139
below, and n. 4 above respectively.
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setting the affair ‘into the middle’ and inviting ‘whoever wishes’ to
speak—sits uneasily with the language of necessity and command.106
The mixed signals Xerxes’ speech invites—convoking an assembly to
help him reach a decision—elicits contrasting responses. First to speak is
his general Mardonius, whose speech, addressed to Xerxes alone as
‘master’ (‘ G H '1")%!Æ’, 7.9.1), merely bolsters the king’s call to arms:
it leaves no doubt as to the power of the throne. Silence greets his words:
Herodotus has delayed narrating internal audience reaction until after
Mardonius’ speech—we are not told what the ‘Persian men’ thought of
Xerxes’ speech: now Herodotus interprets the nobles’ silence as a lack of
courage to voice a contrary opinion.107 The problem of dissent before a
figure of authority again is made a pressing issue. This time, however, a
speech is heard in opposition, as Artabanus, the king’s uncle, speaks.
Addressing Xerxes as ‘king’ (‘G H :Æ"Øº*F’, 7.10.Æ.3, 10.Å.1), and thereby
reaffirming his nephew’s legitimate, constitutional status, Artabanus
provides a theoretical justification for hearing two sides to the question
in the most formal terms heard in the History (7.10Æ. 1–2):
‘#c º*åŁ*Ø"1ø& #b& ª&ø#1ø& I&!Ø1ø& Iºº+ºfi Å"Ø %PŒ 7"!Ø !c& I#*/&ø
Æƒæ*,#*&%& 9º1"ŁÆØ, Iººa '*E !fi B *NæÅ#1&fi Å åæA"ŁÆØ, º*åŁ*Ø"1ø& 'b 7"!Ø,
u")*æ !e& åæı"e& !e& IŒ+æÆ!%& ÆP!e& #b& K)0 9øı!%F %P 'ØÆªØ&-"Œ%#*&,
K)*a& 'b )ÆæÆ!æ/łø#*& ¼ººøfi åæı"fiH, 'ØÆªØ&-"Œ%#*& !e& I#*/&ø’.
‘If opinions that are contrary to each other are not spoken, then it is not possible
to choose which one is better; rather, one has to use the one that is spoken. But
if they are spoken, then we can discern the better, just as we don’t discern the
purity of gold by itself, but, whenever we rub it with other gold, we then discern
the better.’
106 ‘Several phrases in that sentence capture mantras of Greek, especially democratic,
debate: “to express his opinion”; “place the matter before you”, literally “into the
middle”, where all around may regard it as equally theirs; “anyone who wishes”, so
familiar from Attic decrees. But it is only “so that I may not seem to be self-willed”. This
is already a travesty of debate, at least as Greeks would understand debate’: Pelling
(2006a), 108–9 (his italics). Forsdyke (2006), 234 uses this debate to argue that
Herodotus’ narrative both ‘points to the lack of truly free and open debate in Persia’
and ‘suggests that democratic debate in such poleis as Athens may suffer from the same
dangerous tendencies as occur in the Persian debate’.
107 "Øø)-&!ø& 'b !H& ¼ººø& —*æ"1ø& ŒÆd %P !%º#-&!ø& ª&-#Å& I)%'*/Œ&ı"ŁÆØ
I&!/Å& !fi B )æ%Œ*Ø#1&fi Å, 7.10.1.
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Only after preparing his audience in this way does he present his advice
to the king,108 and then turn his attention to criticizing Mardonius for
speaking vain words and slandering the Greeks, which makes it im-
possible to come to a fair appraisal of the situation.109 Nowhere else in
Herodotus is there such a clear articulation and powerful justification of
the importance of dissent in the process of deliberation.110
The fact that the value of dissent is asserted so forcefully in a debate
among Persians is only one paradox of this scene. Xerxes’ initial angry
rebuke of Artabanus111 suggests the behaviour typical of a tyrant or, for
that matter, an Iliadic Agamemnon getting angry at his recalcitrant seer,
Calchas.112 Xerxes goes further, insisting that Artabanus would be in big
trouble were it not for the family connection that binds them:113 a
debate in which even the king’s uncle should not dissent from the will of
the king is no debate at all.114 But Herodotus then narrates that Xerxes
changes his mind as Artabanus’ argument eats away at him.115 This is not
the behaviour of the typical (eastern) despot who asserts his will over
everyone else, after all.
108 ‘"%d #b& 'c !ÆF!Æ, t :Æ"Øº*F, "ı#:%ıº*2ø’, 7.10.Å.1; cf. 7.10.Æ.3. Pelling
(2006a), 119, n. 26 notes that ‘gnomic generalisation tends to recur with Artabanus’.
‘At a court,’ he continues, ‘that is the register a wise advisor needs to make his own.’ See
the comments by G. E. R. Lloyd (1996) on the practice in ancient Chinese science of
presenting research to the throne: Prologue, nn. 33–7 and accompanying text above.
109 ‘)ÆF"ÆØ º1ªø& º,ª%ı. #Æ!Æ/%ı. )*æd @¯ºº+&ø& %PŒ K,&!ø& I5/ø& çºÆ2æø.
IŒ%2*Ø&’, 7.10.Å.1. Forsdyke (2006), 234 suggests that ‘Artabanus’ criticism evokes the
arguments made by elite critics of the Athenian democracy, who argued that clever
speakers in the assembly use flattery, falsehood and appeals to the selfish desires of the
Athenian masses to goad the Athenians into policy decisions which ultimately harm
them’. Not just elite critics: demagogues use exactly this kind of rhetoric too. See Ch. 4,
sec. 3 on Thucydides on the Mytilenean debate.
110 Thomas (2006), 68 speculates whether there may be an echo here ‘of Protagoras’
famous claim that he could make the weaker argument the stronger’. Cf. Thomas
(2000), esp. 266; cf. 228–35.
111 ˛1æ5Å. 'b Łı#øŁ*d. I#*/:*!ÆØ !%E"Ø'*, 7.11.1.
112 Hom. Il. 1.101–16. See Ch. 1, sec. 1 above.
113 ‘3æ!$:Æ&*, )Æ!æe. *r. !%F K#%F I'*ºç1%.’, 7.11.1.
114 The way in which Artabanus has had to speak is relevant too. See Pelling (1999b),
18, who comments: ‘Only Artabanus, Xerxes’ uncle (and it is the relationship which
made him so bold, 7.10.1) dares to put a different view, and even he has to speak
indirectly.’
115 #*!a 'b *Pçæ,&Å !* Kª/&*!% ŒÆd ˛1æ5Å& 7Œ&ØÇ* B 3æ!Æ:$&%ı ª&-#Å, 7.12.1.
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In fact, Herodotus’ representation of Xerxes’ responses to this
debate is multi-layered and defies any simple explanation.116 At night,
Herodotus continues, following the king’s change of mind, a dream-
vision comes to Xerxes, instructing him to change his mind back again
and resolve to invade Greece. Contrary to expectations, however, when
morning comes Xerxes simply ignores the dream-vision ‘and sum-
moned a meeting of the same people as before’,117 where he informs
them of his change of mind; ‘when the Persians heard him they were
delighted and bowed before him’.118 The tension between the power of
the king’s word and the arena of debate—expressed most visibly by the
sight of the Persians gladly receiving his speech and bowing—remains;
yet, even so, Xerxes’ public admission of his mistake, and his willingness
to accept what he now regards as the better advice, is noteworthy and
challenges notions of the lack of debate among the Persians. The Great
King shows himself to be not only tolerant of dissent—eventually—but
also unshakeable in resolve. Agamemnon had never behaved like this.
The dream-vision, however, is not so easily put off, and it now returns
to Xerxes in an even more belligerent mood (7.14). Terrified, Xerxes
persuades Artabanus to assume his garb, sit on the throne and pretend to
be him (7.15–16). Yet, neither deceived not deterred, the dream-vision
condemns Artabanus for being theman who had tried to dissuade Xerxes
from invasion, and issues an ultimatum that the king obey its instructions
or else (7.17). Equally terrified, Artabanus persuades Xerxes to change his
mind back again, and the two of them then ‘laid the whole matter before
the Persians’119—and, with that, the invasion of Greece is settled.
Thus the dream vision is absolutely critical to the Persians’ decision
to invade Greece: but what do we make of it?120 In his introduction to
116 F. Solmsen (1982), 89 notes the over-determination of the episode when combined
with the following dream narrative: ‘Xerxes’ behaviour in the stormy crown council session
would have sufficed to account for the fateful decision [to invade Greece].’
117 B#1æÅ. 'b K)ØºÆ#ł$"Å. O&*/æ%ı #b& !%2!%ı º,ª%& %P'1&Æ K)%Ø1*!%, › 'b
—*æ"1ø& "ı&Æº/"Æ. !%f. ŒÆd )æ,!*æ%& "ı&1º*5*, 7.13.1.
118 —1æ"ÆØ #b& ‰. XŒ%ı"Æ& !ÆF!Æ, Œ*åÆæÅŒ,!*. )æ%"*Œ2&*%&, 7.13.3.
119 ˛1æ5Å. !* ()*æ*!/Ł*!% !ÆF!Æ —1æ"fi Å"Ø ŒÆd 3æ!$:Æ&%., 7.18.4.
120 See e.g. Immerwahr (1954); Germain (1956); Del Corno (1982); S. West (1987).
F. Solmsen (1982), 82–99 comments on the difference ‘in outlook and conception’ of
the prior scene of council with this dream sequence, in which ‘responsibility is attributed
to a deity or other superhuman figure’ (p. 89). Pelling (1999b), 21 explores the ‘earthly
counterparts to much of the dream’s content’, in particular the imperialistic project ‘as
embedded in the way the court works’.
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its first appearance, Herodotus tells us that the story is what ‘the Persians
say’. Well, given the catastrophe that subsequently befalls them, perhaps
they would say that a god was involved, wouldn’t they? Yet, both Xerxes
and, in particular, Artabanus are highly sceptical of the dream-vision;
Xerxes initially tries to ignore it; Artabanus rationalizes away the like-
lihood of a divine source in the manner of the latest Ionian philoso-
phy.121 Furthermore, there are also striking echoes of a Greek tradition:
the narrative of a dream—apparently deceitful—appearing to a king to
urge him to war unmistakably recalls the beginning of the second book
of the Iliad, when Zeus sends the false dream to Agamemnon.122 Here
too a dream follows on from a debate in which the king gets angry, only
in this case Xerxes demonstrates a great deal more self-control and
reflection than Agamemnon. Lastly, the uncertainty of the dream-vision
is reproduced by Herodotus’ narrative, in which the language of ap-
pearances dominates.123
Herodotus’ ascription of the story to ‘what the Persians say’ could
lead his Greek readership to regard the story sceptically and put it down
to Persian guilt for starting the war. But that would mean not only
ignoring the strong resonances with the Iliad; it would also entail acting
out the role of single authority enforcing his judgement over all others.
That is to say, if we dismiss the divine narrative as ‘just Persian’, we put
ourselves in danger of closing down debate as Xerxes had initially done.
Similarly, while Herodotus’ (Greek) readers may take a sceptical stance
as a reasonable response to a Persian story about a ‘god’ telling them to
do it, that position has already been taken in the story by Artabanus and,
it appears, he is wrong. Readers overlook the ineffability of the dream
sequence at the risk of acting out the role of the despot in debate by
rejecting a perspective that fails to conform to their assumptions.
Artabanus himself acknowledges the doubtfulness of the vision, even
121 See e.g. On Regimen 4.88. Cf. Thomas (2006), 62.
122 Il. 2.5–36, esp. l. 20. See How and Wells (1912), ii. 131; Immerwahr (1954),
34–5; Fehling (1989), 204–5.
123 ‘It seemed to Xerxes that a tall man of noble appearance stood beside him and
spoke’ (K',Œ** › ˛1æ5Å. ¼&'æÆ %ƒ K)Ø"!$&!Æ #1ªÆ& !* ŒÆd *P*Ø'1Æ *N)*E&, 7.12.1); ‘it
seemed to Xerxes that it flew away after speaking’ (!e& #b& !ÆF!Æ *N),&!Æ K',Œ** ›
˛1æ5Å. I)%)!$"ŁÆØ, 7.13.1); ‘it seemed to Artabanus that the dream uttered these threats
and was then going to burn out his eyes with hot irons’ (!ÆF!$ !* '+ K',Œ** 3æ!$:Æ&%.
!e Z&*Øæ%& I)*Øº1*Ø& ŒÆd Ł*æ#%E"Ø "Ø'Åæ/%Ø"Ø KŒŒÆ/*Ø& ÆP!%F #1ºº*Ø& !%f. OçŁÆº#%2.,
7.18.1).
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as he concedes its point: ‘since some god is eager and, so it seems, some
heaven-sent destruction descends on the Greeks, I change my mind.’ If
we thought it was going to be easy to condemn the Persians for their
invasion of Greece, we had better think again.124
Herodotus chooses to mark one of the most critical moments in the
History—the decision to invade Greece—with a debate. In his institut-
ing of an assembly the Persian King explicitly demonstrates his author-
ity and will: this is an assembly lacking an institutional framework for
dissent and deficient of any purpose other than an opportunity for the
king to air his opinion; in spite of the language he uses, he doesn’t set
out to establish a Greek-style debate. As a result, what follows is not
really a debate at all: Mardonius panders to the king, Artabanus directs
his attack against Mardonius, Xerxes issues his judgement. Though
Artabanus establishes a theoretical basis for challenging the king’s
view, only his family connection presents him with an opportunity to
speak in the first place, and saves him once he has angered the king. On
this reading, the possibility of dissent in the Persian court is raised only
to be silenced. Yet, the debate does work: Artabanus’ carefully framed
dissent makes Xerxes think again and reach a judgement that is more
favourable to all. Contrary to expectations, then, it appears that it is
possible to dissent in the Persian court. (And it is striking that the most
formal articulation of the benefit of antilogy occurs here in the Persian
court before the king, not in any Greek assembly.) Moreover, it is a
decision by which Xerxes stands; it takes the intervention of the dream-
vision to get the move to war back on track. Greek assumptions about
debate are being severely tested.
124 K)*d 'b 'ÆØ#%&/Å !Ø. ª/&*!ÆØ ›æ#+, ŒÆd @‚ººÅ&Æ., ‰. %rŒ*, çŁ%æc !Ø.
ŒÆ!ÆºÆ#:$&*Ø Ł*+ºÆ!%., Kªg #b& ŒÆd ÆP!e. !æ$)%#ÆØ ŒÆd !c& ª&-#Å& #*!Æ!/Ł*#ÆØ,
7.18.3. Pelling (1999b), 21 comments: ‘We are still left with questions, but no answers,
about this “divine” element.’ Our worries may go deeper if we think that the dream was
intended to deceive, as it had been in the Iliad: so Harrison (2000a) 132–6; cf.
Immerwahr (1954), 33; Saı¨d (2002a), 144. As Scullion (2006), 197 puts it: ‘The
divinity’s motivation, conceived as that of an existent Persian god, is bafflingly opaque,
both on the view that he is simply ordering and on the view that he is deceiving both king
and “wise advisor” into undertaking a doomed invasion.’
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We are free because of one man (3.80–3)
While debate among the Persians is still figured as a problem, particu-
larly before the battle of Plataea where dissent from authority is supplied
only by the narrator himself, even so it does not lend itself easily to such
a one-dimensional and partisan model of interpretation as one might
have expected, given the importance of freedom to the narrative. In-
deed, in the critical debate on whether or not to go to war, readers may
find it difficult to condemn Xerxes without also implicating themselves:
if we interpret his dream as a (Persian) fabrication, we risk acting like an
autocrat in suppressing other voices; if, on the other hand, we accept the
validity of the dream-vision, then we have to accept the possibility that
the Persians do debate.
Nowhere is the paradoxical relationship to debate enjoyed by the
Persians better illustrated than in the first example of formal debate in
the History, the so-called Constitutional Debate, during which three
Persian nobles discuss the best form of constitution, isonomia, oligarchy
or monarchy.125 Not surprisingly, given the dramatic date of 522 for
this debate, scholarly reaction has been almost uniformly sceptical, each
pointing out that the whole scenario, and in particular Otanes’ speech
on isonomia, reads like a fifth-century sophistic exercise in assessing the
best constitutions.126 As Francois Hartog puts it, the Persians seem to be
‘speaking Greek’.127
The debate on the constitutions is embedded in two wider plot
movements, one that documents the Persian expansion that will even-
tually lead to conflict with Greece; the other that traces the transition of
125 The bibliography on this famous debate is extensive. See esp. Dihle (1962); Burn
(1972); Lasserre (1976); Hartog (1988), 325–7; Moles (1993), 118–20; Thompson
(1996), esp. 68–78; Pelling (2002); Dewald (2003), 28–30.
126 ‘The language and arguments of Otanes’ speech clearly derive from the language
of Athenian political debate in Herodotus’ own day and have numerous parallels in
contemporary Athenian literature’: Gould (1989), 15; cf. How and Wells (1912),
i. 277–8. Paul Cartledge puts it even more strongly. He writes: ‘in 522 there had been
no democracy anywhere in the world; it was one thing to set up or tolerate democracy at
the western extremity of the empire among Greeks and quite another to establish it as the
norm for the governance of the empire as a whole, beginning with the Persian court . . .
In fact, the “Debate” is a pioneering exercise in Greek political philosophy, originating
no earlier than 500’: Cartledge (2002), 109, 110.
127 Hartog (1988), 325.
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power from one Persian monarch to another. Herodotus’ starting-point
is Cambyses, who carries out the invasion of Egypt, the size, culture and
history of which—so carefully mapped out by Herodotus in the pre-
vious book—suggests that even to attempt such an undertaking is
mad—and Cambyses is.128 There is little doubt of the disastrous con-
sequences of autocracy when someone like this is in charge: prominent
figures are insulted, alienated or murdered; military forces are over-
stretched or soundly beaten; no one can act or speak freely without fear.
Before narrating Cambyses’ demise, however, Herodotus inserts two
stories about Polycrates of Samos and Periander of Corinth, which
afford the reader a comparison between a Persian single ruler and
Greek versions of the same kind of government.129 The stories of
the Greek tyrants not only show the corruptive influence of these
individuals over their cities; they also raise the problem of succession.130
When returning to Cambyses, then, the reader has in mind the question
whether Persian monarchy may be regarded in the same way, or whether
it is part of the institutional fabric of the culture.131
128 Whether his madness is the cause for or the result of his attack on the holy Apis
calf remains a matter of some doubt. When Herodotus recounts the story at 3.29, he
carefully documents that it was the Egyptian response that he went mad as a result of the
attack (3.30), whereas the narrator is non-committal, especially in his identification that
Cambyses had been inflicted from birth by the ‘disease which some call sacred’ (!c& ƒæc&
O&%#$Ç%ı"Ø !Ø&1., 3.33)—as if the narrator were drawing on the latest Ionian science to
cast doubt on the divine causation of Cambyses’ madness. Yet, at the moment when
Cambyses gives himself the fatal wound, Herodotus notes that it was the same place
where the Apis bull had been struck (3.65). One cannot help feeling the presence of the
ineffable, even as Herodotus constructs a scientific enquiry of sorts.
129 On Herodotus on tyrants, see Waters (1971); Dewald (1985); McGlew (1993);
Christ (1994); Gray (1996). For the question whether all tyrants are represented in the
same way, see Dewald (2003).
130 Herodotus’ accounts of the Greek tyrants emphasize that beyond the usurper
himself, the individual finds it difficult to retain power. One reason for that seems to be
that this kind of autocratic power is not embedded in the institutional framework of the
culture. Dewald (2003) comes close to identifying the problem of succession among
Greek despots when she mentions in passing that ‘tyrants’ sons have problems’ (45): see
the comparison by G. E. R. Lloyd between the institutional contexts for Greek and
Chinese scientific practice discussed in the Prologue above, especially his conclusion that,
while competition exists in China, there is never any questioning of the institution of
emperor itself. As we shall see, that description fits rather well with the situation of the
Persians.
131 ‘This interlacing raises an expectation that the constitutions episode will have
suggestions, not merely for the Persian court where it takes place, but for the Greek world
as well’: Pelling (2002), 131. Herodotus himself seems alert to the potential difference in
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That question becomes all the more urgent after Cambyses’ death,
when the Magi take advantage of a power vacuum to install their own
puppet dictator, the false Smerdis. (The ease with which this transition
is achieved already suggests that Persian culture all too easily assimilates
itself to one-man rule.) A group of seven not-so-easily-duped Persian
nobles gather to discuss the situation in an assembly that anticipates the
debate on the constitutions (3.71–3) by introducing the lead players
(Otanes, Darius), their arguments and the outcome. Otanes is the prime
instigator of the conference, desperate to avoid the risk of another tyrant
like Cambyses; but it is Darius who carries the day, by reducing Otanes
to silence and winning unanimous support from everyone else. Yet, it is
only because the conspirators debate that Darius is able to propose his
(successful) plan and have it adopted.132 Moreover, Darius succeeds
because he uses lies to close down dissent: not only is lying often
celebrated in Greek narratives; it is expressly not what Persians usually
do.133 The Persians, especially Darius, already sound Greek.
the way kingship is thought about. In his explanation of how it was that the territories in
the east came to have individual rulers again, after having won their freedom against the
Assyrians, Herodotus takes the example of Deioces (1.96–101), which has been inter-
preted as paradigmatic by both Steiner (1994), 130–2 and Dewald (2003), 27–8. Steiner
argues that Deioces’ city, with its concentric walls and his palace occupying the centre, is
expressive of his power, in contrast to the Greek polis where (ideologically at least) the
centre is taken by the public space of the agora. Dewald suggests that ‘the various aspects
of the Deioces story are articulated as a series of causally connected steps in a historical
process, indeed almost as a recipe for how to found an autocratic government’ (p. 27).
But while she notes that Herodotus frames this episode with the word ‘tyrannis’—the
free peoples ‘came into tyranny’ (z'* Æs!Ø. K. !ıæÆ&&/'Æ., 1.96.1) because Deioces
‘desired tyranny’ (KæÆ"Ł*d. !ıæÆ&&/'%., 96.2); and Deioces ‘strongly armed himself with
tyranny’ (KŒæ$!ı&* 9øı!e& !fi B !ıæÆ&&/'Ø, 100.1)—she overlooks the point that the
people themselves use different terminology: they see their chosen leader in terms of
monarchy (:Æ"Øº*2. and its derivatives at 1.97 twice, 98 four times, 99 twice). That is to
say, whereas the embedded audience see Deioces as a legitimate king, the (Greek)
narrator interprets the rule of one man as a tyranny. Herodotus’ awareness of the
problem of one-man rule has implications for the way he constructs his narrative and,
in particular, represents debate.
132 The paradox is brought out by Gobyras, who, by addressing the assembled group
not only as ‘friends’ but also as ‘men’ (‘¼&'æ*. ç/º%Ø’, 3.73.1), echoes the language used
by citizens when addressing one another. See Ch. 5, n. 114 below on occurrences of this
phrase in Athenian tragedy. There is a further irony too, however, since Otanes is no less
self-interested than Darius: the imposter is sleeping with his daughter (3.68–9).
133 Hdt. 1.136.2. For drawbacks of Persian truth-telling, see Thompson (1996),
79–111.
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Having overthrown the false Smerdis, the seven meet again to discuss
no less important a subject than the future of Persia. Otanes’ opening
words gesture towards regime-change, as he ‘called upon them to put
the affairs for the Persians into the middle’ (0O!$&Å. #b& KŒ1º*ı* K.
#1"%& —1æ"fi Å"Ø ŒÆ!ÆŁ*E&ÆØ !a )æ+ª#Æ!Æ, 3.80.1). As we saw above,
the phrase ‘putting x into the middle’ denotes a transformative act,
making an object of private ownership into public property, which
Detienne illustrates with the ago¯n in Iliad 23, when Achilles puts prizes
‘into the middle’ to be competed over. Here, Herodotus extends that
application to debate: Otanes proposes that the seven debate openly the
future of Persian affairs, thereby signalling a contest of words, in which
arguments are put forth ‘into the middle’ of the group, to be contested,
evaluated and judged.134 Again, the narrative’s most formal articulation
of the ideology of debate occurs in the context of a Persian assembly.
The language of openness enshrined within this phrase has obvious
relevance for Otanes’ speech, which proposes the most radical form of
open constitution, rule of the majority. Yet, in spite of his commitment
to ‘equality before the law’ (N"%&%#/Å), Otanes ends up devoting most of
his speech to articulating the ills of tyranny. While this is not so very
unexpected in itself, given the Persians’ recent miserable experience of
kingship, he has little to say of substance other than a cliche´ about the
idea of freedom and equality, the basis of his radical proposal that they
should hand power over to the people.135 Similarly, Megabazus, the
134 By stretching its semantic range to incorporate debate scenes, Herodotus himself
plays a key role in formulating the ideological charge of this phrase, which becomes one
customary way of marking debate in Athenian tragedy. For this expression as denoting
discussions on stage: Athena invites Poseidon to parley with the words: ç1æø 'b "%d j
Œ%Ø&%f. K#Æı!fi B !0 K. #1"%& º,ª%ı. (Eur. Tro. 54; cf. 61); cf. Hel. 1033. For the
communal import of this expression in Herodotus see: 1.68.1, 141.21, 166.5;
2.30.16; 3.80.29, 82. 11, 84.9, 119.3; 4.173.4; 5.91.23, 109.12; 6.14.10, 39.12;
7.144.3, 229.2; 9.87.8, 117.6. A similar point may be made about Herodotus’ use of
the term Iª-&. From books 1 to 6 Iª-& is taken to mean simply ‘games’—its Homeric
meaning. Once the war narrative has begun, however, its meaning encompasses a more
abstract notion of ‘contest’, thence the idea of ‘battle’ itself. The extension of this term’s
semantic range is played out in an oracle scene (a byword for polysemic discourse): the
Spartans, finding the traditional notion of Iª-& as an ‘athletic contest’ insufficient to
answer the oracle, hit upon its alternative meaning to denote ‘battle’ (9.33.2–4).
135 Indeed, he does not once mention the Persians as a group. This will be important:
see n. 141 below.
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advocate for oligarchy, criticizes the idea of popular power by discussing
it in relation to monarchy; his own preferred constitution is relegated to
little more than a footnote, and hardly presents an attractive, well-
thought-out alternative. In contrast, Darius’ entire speech is geared
towards telling the story of how all constitutions—no matter what
their initial orientation—gravitate towards monarchy. Here Darius
appropriates the language of freedom—characteristic, at least notion-
ally, of Greek constitutions such as democracy and oligarchy—and
recasts it with a Persian slant, as national liberty rather than individual
freedom: ‘Where did we get freedom from, and who gave it to us?’
(‘Œ,Ł*& B#E& B Kº*ıŁ*æ/Å Kª1&*!% ŒÆd !*F ',&!%.’; 3.82.5). This is what
debate looks like from a Persian perspective: even when the Persians
don’t have a king, they speak as if they were before one. Darius is the
one speaker who knows the language his countrymen speak and under-
stands their fear of dissent. The way the Persians speak, even about
concepts of freedom and dissent, is deeply embedded within a mon-
archical institutional framework.136 It comes as no surprise that Darius
wins the vote hands down.
Even so, for Herodotus’ Greek readership the scene’s manifold para-
doxes will be apparent. The Persians set up an assembly to debate what
constitution they ought to have; various proposals are set forth into the
middle; and . . . they vote for a king!137 Furthermore, once the resolu-
tion for a king has been passed, the seven set the rules of competition:
‘that any one of the seven who wished could enter the king’s presence
without an announcement, unless the king happened to be sleeping
with a woman, and that the king should not marry outside the family of
the seven revolutionaries.’138 Yet, even though Herodotus’ narration of
their discussions again suggests a correspondence between debate and
136 This point came up in discussion of the ‘Constitutional Debate’ in the professorial
seminar on ‘Speeches in Herodotus’, Hilary term, Oxford 2005, for which I thank in
particular Chris Pelling and Dan Hogg. For the embedded nature of monarchical rule in
Persia, as confirmed by this debate, see Thompson (1996), esp. 76–8.
137 By conducting a debate among themselves, the conspirators are actually practising
the oligarchic form of government that Megabyzus proposes, and which receives the least
attention from both conspirators and scholars.
138 )ÆæØ1&ÆØ K. !a :Æ"Øº+ØÆ )$&!Æ !e& :%ıº,#*&%& !H& 9)!a ¼&*ı K"Æªª*º1%., j& #c
!ıªå$&fi Å *o'ø& #*!a ªı&ÆØŒe. :Æ"Øº*2., ªÆ#1*Ø& 'b #c K5*E&ÆØ ¼ºº%Ł*& !fiH :Æ"Øº1œ j KŒ
!H& "ı&*)Æ&Æ"!$&!ø&, 3.84.2.
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freedom—they set about planning ‘for the common interest’ (!$'* 'b K.
!e Œ%Ø&e& K:%2º*ı"Æ&, 3.84.2)139—their vote for monarchy sits uneasily
with the rhetoric of freedom. The only man to remain free in the newly
established monarchy is Otanes: the exponent of ‘equality before the
law’ has ruled himself out of the running to be king.140 Indeed, the
narrator guarantees the nature of this freedom by noting that Otanes’
family alone remains free ‘up to this day’ (ŒÆd &F&, 3.83.3).141 On the
other hand, his fellow conspirators are soon to discover that freedom has
important, and fatal, limitations in a monarchy.142
Herodotus’ narrative on Persian internal affairs, which has documen-
ted the madness of the king and exposed his successor as a fraud, puts
the Persian institutional framework on the agenda: look what happens
in a culture where one-man rule is the norm: even a madman or slave
can be king!143 Regime-change is just the thing that could put Persia’s
house in order; yet the Persians vote for monarchy. So, even when they
do debate, the Persians don’t get it right.144
139 ‘The expressions K. #1"%& and K& #1"øfi are exactly synonymous with K. Œ%Ø&,&, K&
Œ%/&øfi . Thus the meson or middle defines the common or public domain (the 5ı&,&), as
opposed to what is private, individual’: Vernant (1983), 190. Vernant contrasts this
notion of public space to the pyramid structures of political space in Eastern Kingdoms.
See Prologue above, esp. n. 62. If these are the normative expectations of a fifth-century
Greek, Herodotus’ application of the phrase ‘into the middle’ to describe political
activity in Persia is particularly challenging.
140 Herodotus’ narration of Otanes’ decision not to compete resonates with his earlier
description of Otanes’ arguments: ‘he put these arguments into the middle’ (7º*5* K.
#1"%& ÆP!%E"Ø !$'*, 3.83.1); Otanes ‘was not going to compete with them but instead
stood aside from the middle’ (%y!%. #b& '+ "çØ %PŒ K&Åªø&/Ç*!% Iºº 0 KŒ #1"%ı ŒÆ!B"!%,
3.83.3). In contrast, from this point on the remaining six are labelled ‘rivals’ (¼&'æ*.
"!Æ"ØH!ÆØ, 3.83.2).
141 We might well ask, however, where Otanes’ concern for the well-being of his
people is now. It is interesting that the only time he mentions the Persians en masse (!e
—*æ"1ø& )º+Ł%., 3.83.2) is when he absents himself from them.
142 Intaphernes comes to sticky end when he is denied entry to see the king
(3.118–19).
143 Cf. Otanes (3.80.2). Dewald (2003), 29 notes: ‘It is not surprising, given the
immediate narrative context, that Otanes makes the judgement he does, since Cambyses’
reign, just ended, has exemplified most of these traits.’
144 Thus the debate on the constitutions acts to undermine fatally Persian capacity to
dissent and represents, in the words of Norma Thompson, ‘a debate to inhibit all future
debates’ in Persia: Thompson (1996), 77. She continues: ‘The defining moment for the
Persians was the debate in which the Persians failed to transcend their challenge and were
induced into a state of resignation by Darius. The Greeks, too, are shown at an early stage
debating the future course of their rule’ (p. 88).
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But not only has Herodotus invited his readers to imagine what
freedom looks like from the other side, that a people are free because
of the rule of one man;145 he also lays down a challenge. For, he tells us,
the Persians really did debate these issues. His entry in the debate at the
point of representing it makes it difficult not to think of the ideological
import of holding a debate.
3. THE NARRATOR ENTERS THE DEBATE
(HERODOTUS 1, 3, 9)
Over the previous two sections we have seen how the ideals of debate
that had been so carefully explored and worked out in the Iliad become
subject to the most intense scrutiny in Herodotus’ narrative: the assem-
bly is not the reason why the Greeks stay and fight at Salamis; the most
formal debates occur among the Persians. While it is far from the case
that dissent is institutional within the king’s court, Herodotus does
subvert expectations that debate is not possible under a monarchy: his
readers, no less than the Persians themselves, are challenged to think
about debate, its utility, shortcomings and consequences.
This last section brings to the fore a feature of debate that, while having
remained in the background for the most part during this investigation,
sets Herodotus apart fromHomeric epic: that is, the role of the narrator in
representing debate. Arguably, the most complex framing of debate in the
History occurs when Alexander of Macedon delivers an appeal from
Mardonius which, in turn, quotes Xerxes: the self-conscious constructed-
ness of the speech is matched by the Athenians’ staging of a debate before
145 Darius concludes, ‘I hold, therefore, that we are free because of one man’ (‘7åø
!%/&ı& ª&-#Å& B#1Æ. Kº*ıŁ*æøŁ1&!Æ. 'Øa =&Æ ¼&'æÆ’, 3.82.5). All through his speech,
he insists on calling the rule of one man ‘monarchy’ (#%ı&Ææå/Å, 3. 82.1, 4 (twice), 5),
whereas Otanes slides between monarchy (3.80.3, 6) and tyranny (3.80.4), and Mega-
byzus dismisses tyranny in one line (3.81.1). See n. 131 above on Deioces. One reason
for the ‘failure’ of the Constitutional Debate perhaps then results from the incapacity of
Otanes and Megabyzus to translate the ‘Greekness’ of their ideas into Persian; Darius
wins because he tailors his proposal to the Persian mind-set, which betrays an acceptance
of inevitability, commitment to the system, and a partiality for eminently rational,
unambiguous arguments. Hartog (1988), 326 comments: ‘Whereas, for Otanes, mon-
archy is something opposed to the ancestral customs, for Darius it is in conformity with
them.’ See also Thompson (1996), 72–6.
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their Spartan allies. This debate serves as an appropriate conclusion to our
enquiry by focusing on the role of the narrator; indeed, to a certain extent
the interest in rhetoric anticipates Thucydides’ close examination of
debate. But we start this last section with the most notorious example of
narratorial framing in theHistory: whenHerodotus enters his text to assert
that the Constitutional Debate did actually take place.
Unbelievable to the Greeks (3.80.1)
Before narrating the debate on constitutions in Persia, Herodotus makes
the following statement (3.80.1):
K)*/!* 'b ŒÆ!1"!fi Å › Ł,æı:%. ŒÆd KŒ!e. )1&!* B#*æ1ø& Kª1&*!%, K:%ıº*2%&!% %ƒ
K)Æ&Æ"!$&!*. !%E"Ø #$ª%Ø"Ø )*æd !H& )$&!ø& )æÅª#$!ø&, ŒÆd Kº1åŁÅ"Æ&
º,ª%Ø ¼)Ø"!%Ø #b& K&/%Ø"Ø @¯ºº+&ø&, Kº1åŁÅ"Æ& '0 t&.
When the commotion had calmed five days later, those who revolted against the
Magi deliberated on the whole affair, and words were spoken that to some of
the Greeks are unbelievable, but nevertheless they were spoken.
Herodotus goes out of his way to stress that this debate really happened.
It is possible, as I have suggested above, that the Persians speak in a
Persian manner when they discuss those issues: nevertheless, those issues
(the three forms of constitution) and the manner of their articulation (a
formal debate) still seem so very Greek. As a result, most scholars either
assert that Herodotus has a good source for his account146 (though he
neither names any source nor assigns responsibility to another), or else
they condemn him outright for lying.147 The vast majority of critics
remain utterly unconvinced by the narrator’s protestations of veracity.
146 How and Wells (1912), i. 277: ‘Probably H[erodotus] is following the account of
a Hellenized Persian.’ According to Immerwahr (1966), 101, n. 71, ‘disbelievers no
doubt based their opinion on the unlikelihood of democratic political currents in Persia;
the existence of such was proved to Herodotus by Mardonius’ actions in Ionia in 492
B.C. (6.63). ‘ Herodotus’ comment certainly lays down a challenge, particularly if we
posit an Athenian audience. So Irwin and Greenwood (2007), 26, n. 64, who suggest
that ‘Herodotus once again anticipates Athenian isonomie¯ by another group, generating
comparisons and inferences which some in his audience would no doubt hardly find
flattering’.
147 Fehling (1989), 122. See Pritchett (1993) and Moles (1993), 119 with additional
bibliography.
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The problem facing the reader lies not only in the impression that the
subsequent debate does not bear out Herodotus’ narratorial statement;
it is the fact that Herodotus’ narratorial statement is so strong in its
affirmation. As Christopher Pelling argues, Herodotus seems to go out
of his way to point out its incongruity: ‘The “Greekness” of the debate is
not something which somehow crept in under Herodotus’ guard . . . ; it
is something to which he himself draws attention.’148 It seems that
‘Herodotus has issued a broad interpretive challenge’.149 That is to say,
far from exercising a definitive authoritative judgement, the authorial
irruption into debate casts the debate and the reading of it as a moment
of a crisis. Indeed, Herodotus explicitly refrains from casting judgement
on whether the Persians could or could not debate these issues; instead,
his statement that the debate really happened pushes the question of its
status and worth onto the reader.150 In addition, it is not only a debate
that poses some serious questions about the nature of freedom, the role
of debate in achieving that, the best kind of polity one could have—
though these are all important; by virtue of his provocative frame,
Herodotus writes his reader into the debate.
This is a key point: the writing of the reader into the debate has the
effect of transforming Herodotus’ narrative from an individual enquiry
into a text with which and through which one can think politically. Its
re-creation of debate to some degree mimics that most characteristic of
Greek institutions, which lies at the heart of all discussions on freedom,
provides the context for those discussions, and serves as the means of
achieving freedom: the assembly. This public arena, where issues are
taken up, debated and resolved by the citizen group at large, Herodotus
appropriates for his narrative. But, by appropriating it, Herodotus
transforms that institution and replaces it with his textual enquiry: by
remaining disbelieving, his readers play out the role already assigned to
them by the text. The frame thrusts each and every reader into an
148 Pelling (2002), 125. Moles (1993), 120–1, however, argues that ‘it was rhetori-
cally necessary, even at risk of attack, to maintain the illusion of strict historicity’.
149 Thompson (1996), 68. She adds that the reader must have ‘the intellectual
courage to answer it in kind’.
150 As Pelling (2002), 154–5 puts it: ‘Greeks may find this Persian toying with free
speech and democracy incredible, but they should not. As they, and we, look at different
peoples and cultures, they may turn out as not so Other after all, or Other in very
unpredictable ways.’
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ongoing debate about Greekness. Thus, in his representation of debate,
Herodotus not only resists the position of tyrant; his call to debate
works to authorize his project in the wider community’s ‘contest of
voices’.151 This Constitutional Debate is not just, or rather, not even an
example of tub-thumping Greek pride in their institutions; it is a
challenge to the reader to renew them in the form of reading about
them.152
Solon left town (1.29–33)
Herodotus’ direct address of his readers as a prelude to the first formal
debate of theHistory demonstrates his involvement in the representation
of debate even as he reproduces the debate in his narrative. More
generally, by writing, Herodotus operates on the margins of his com-
munity, outside sanctioned institutional contexts. Significantly, a num-
ber of historical agents reprise this role over the course of the
narrative.153
The first, and most revealing, figure is Solon. For many authors,
Solon was good to think with, especially regarding Athenian democ-
racy.154 Herodotus’ interest in Solon, however, lies not so much in his
151 On the community’s ‘contest of voices’, see Greenwood and Cartledge (2002),
352; cf. Goldhill (1991), 167–76. On Herodotus’ agonistic milieu more generally:
Thomas (2000), 249–69; Flower and Marincola (2002), 4.
152 Dewald (2003), 28 makes the point that both the Deioces episode and the
Constitutional Debate contain ‘as an implicit premise the notion that at base, people
(at least, the important people) choose their form of government’. Identifying the role of
the group at large is important for thinking about the performativity of Herodotus’
narrative and its ambiguous relationship to the idea of freedom. See also the Epilogue
below, for a discussion of the (premature) democratization of Samos (3.142–3).
153 Demaratus e.g. the exiled Spartan king who accompanies Xerxes on his invasion
of Greece, or Croesus himself, the ex-Lydian confidante of Cyrus the Great. On the
former, see most recently Holland (2005); Forsdyke (2006), 233; Stadter (2006), 244.
On Croesus, see Pelling (2006b). Redfield (1985), 117 makes the point that both
Lycurgus and Solon—traditional lawgivers in other accounts—are both represented in
Herodotus as operating on the margins of their cultures: Lycurgus ‘made his people
capable of mixing with strangers by himself mixing with strangers’, while Solon ‘bor-
rowed a nomos from Amasis of Egypt and enacted it in Athens’ (1.177.2).
154 Plutarch explains e.g. that the Athenians, frustrated from being able to question
and harangue Solon, or to compel him to change or even explain the laws, were obliged
to work the laws out for themselves (Plut. Sol. 14.4. Cf. Mor. 152c). On Solon and
Croesus as illustrating a principle of democracy, see Kurke (1999), 148–50; Wohl
(2002), 232–3. On Solon and Athenian democracy, see Loraux (1984; 2002).
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relation to Athens’ institutional framework as his departure from it.
According to Herodotus, Solon ‘made the laws for the Athenians and
then left town for ten years’ (n. 3ŁÅ&Æ/%Ø"Ø &,#%ı. Œ*º*2"Æ"Ø )%Ø+"Æ.
I)*'+#Å"* 7!*Æ '1ŒÆ, 1.29.1–2). Apparently, he went on a sightseeing
tour around the ancient world, but this was just an ‘excuse’ (ŒÆ!a
Ł*øæ/Å. )æ,çÆ"Ø& KŒ)º-"Æ.); in actual fact his departure meant that
the Athenians ‘were unable to dissolve any of the laws he had estab-
lished, since they were bound by great oaths to use the laws for ten years’
(ÆP!%d ªaæ %PŒ %x%/ !* q"Æ& ÆP!e )%ØB"ÆØ 3ŁÅ&ÆE%Ø· ›æŒ/%Ø"Ø ªaæ
#*ª$º%Ø"Ø ŒÆ!*/å%&!% '1ŒÆ 7!*Æ åæ+"*"ŁÆØ &,#%Ø"Ø !%f. ¼& "çØ
C-º%& ŁB!ÆØ, 1.29.2). Solon’s first port-of-call is Croesus—a chrono-
logical impossibility that has exercised many critics.155 But such anxi-
eties pass over Herodotus’ vital observation that Solon leaves Athens so
that the laws he instituted can be given a chance to work: in his absence
the Athenians are not able to ‘undo’ the laws he had set down, but
instead must ‘use’ them. Herodotus’ Solon, then, enjoys a peculiarly
marginal relationship with his polis : while he establishes its laws, he
himself operates entirely independent of its institutional framework in
Herodotus’ narrative.156
In this way, Solon may act as a suitable precedent for Herodotus, who
similarly establishes a framework which the community at large can use
in his absence.157 Herodotus’ Solon demonstrates how an individual
operating on the margins of his community can still talk like a Greek of
the polis. Indeed, more than that: this individual author can stimulate
his community to act like Greek citizens of a polis precisely by pursuing
freedom and engaging in debate—in its textual form. His journey
through debate ultimately replicates Odysseus’ position within debate
155 On Solon as ‘something of a calque for Herodotus himself’ (Pelling (2007), 196),
see: Bischoff (1932), 39; Hellmann (1934), 39, 43–5; Moles (1996), 263–5; Pelling
(2006b). Redfield (1985), 102 calls Herodotus’ Solon ‘a kind of alter ego of the narrator
himself ’.
156 Herodotus’ use of Solon seems to reflect an astute reading of Solon’s poetry. The
emphasis by Herodotus’ ‘Solon’ on life’s uncertainty picks up on Solon, fr. 13.63–70W;
the uselessness of wealth in the face of death (fr. 24.1–10W); and the dangers of excess
(fr. 6.3–4W). See also n. 18 above.
157 Similarly, Solon’s ‘happy men’ are seen as happy in respect of their association
with the polis, whereas Croeus looks only to his personal wealth: Kurke (1999), 147. On
the proverbial nature of Solon’s remarks, see Gould (1989), 81–2.
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as he composes an enquiry for his readers to adopt and pursue.158 That
nexus of freedom, reading and debate structures our final scene of
debate, which confronts the spectre of Athenian medizing before the
battle’s lost and won.
Alexander said Mardonius said Xerxes said . . . (8.140–4)
After the resounding Greek victory at Salamis, one could be forgiven
for thinking that the Persians’ defeat was inevitable: with their supply
route under threat and their ability to gain a stranglehold in Greece
severely hampered, Xerxes returns home. Yet not all is lost: they send
Alexander of Macedon to Athens as their kingmaker in one final
attempt to break up the Greek coalition. This critical debate is the
most elaborately staged of all debates in the History.159 Alexander
speaks on behalf of and as both Mardonius and Xerxes; the Athenians
do not respond immediately, but wait for the Spartans to turn up.
More than in any other debate in the History, the reader is aware of the
written medium through which debate is being represented.160 And all
this, it should not be forgotten, takes place in the home of debate itself,
Athens.
The cast-list for this debate to end debates is impressive. The Persian
commander in Xerxes’ absence, Mardonius, has good reasons for soli-
citing an Athenian alliance: with them on board, he could expect to gain
mastery over the seas, an expectation, Herodotus is quick to point out,
which was perfectly reasonable (8.136). Speaking for him at Athens is
Alexander of Macedon, who is chosen for two reasons: he was connected
to the Persians by marriage, and he enjoyed a special relationship with
158 On Herodotus as an ‘alter ego of the great Odysseus’ (Moles (1993), 96), see n. 4
above. This current study puts the onus on the complex dynamic between the narrative
voice and the narration of debate, which had been a feature of the study of the Odyssey
in Ch. 2 above. The most striking example of Herodotus’ presence in debate is his
representation of the debate over the Athenian decision to fight or to medize.
159 See Bowie (2007), 229–38. Lang (1984), 106–13 discusses tetrads, and this scene
on p. 111.
160 Crane (1998), 242 describes how the Athenians’ delay ‘brings out the self-
consciously theatrical nature of this episode’.
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the Athenians.161 On the other side, the Spartans, though late as usual,
are also eager to send envoys, since they remembered an oracle which
predicted that the Medes and Athenians would drive them out from the
Peloponnese (8.141). In the middle are the Athenians, courted and
shunned in equal measure by these warring parties, as much responsible
for the debate as they are the judges of it. It is they, for example, who, by
dragging out their business with Alexander, ensure that all parties are in
Athens at the same time (8.141).
The themes of the speeches are relatively straightforward. Alexander
proposes that, given the current situation, it would be in the Athenians’
self-interest to medize. The Spartans don’t even address Alexander’s
arguments or the threat of the Persian army. Instead they stress the
negative consequences for the Athenians were they to opt out of the
Greek coalition: it would be dishonourable (especially given the fact
that the Athenians had precipitated the crisis), and inappropriate (given
the Athenians’ traditional role as liberators, 8.142.2).162 Conclusively,
they describe Alexander as ‘smoothing over’ Mardonius’ arguments:
foreigners are not to be trusted (8.142.4).
It is Herodotus’ structuring of the debate, however, that catches the eye.
The reader does not hear Xerxes’ arguments from the horse’s mouth, but
through an ever-receding ring of voices (8.140.Æ.1–2, 2–3, :.1):163
‰. 'b I)/Œ*!% K. !a. 3Ł+&Æ. I)%)*#çŁ*d. ()e FÆæ'%&/%ı, 7º*ª* !$'*·
‘@&'æ*. 3ŁÅ&ÆE%Ø,FÆæ',&Ø%. !$'* º1ª*Ø· “ 0¯#%d Iªª*º/Å lŒ*Ø )Ææa :Æ"Øº1%.
º1ª%ı"Æ %o!ø.· ‘3ŁÅ&Æ/%Ø"Ø !a. ±#Ææ!$'Æ. !a. K. K#b K5 KŒ*/&ø& ª*&%#1&Æ.
)$"Æ. #*!/Å#Ø . . . ’ !%2!ø& 'b I)Øª#1&ø& I&ÆªŒÆ/ø. 7å*Ø #%Ø )%Ø1*Ø& !ÆF!Æ,
j& #c !e (#1!*æ%& ÆY!Ø%& ª1&Å!ÆØ. º1ªø 'b (#E& !$'*. &F& !/ #Æ/&*"Ł* ),º*#%&
:Æ"Øº1œ I&!Æ*Øæ,#*&%Ø; . . . ”FÆæ',&Ø%. #b& !ÆF!Æ, t3ŁÅ&ÆE%Ø, K&*!*/ºÆ!, #%Ø
*N)*E& )æe. (#1Æ.. Kªg 'b )*æd #b& *P&%/Å. !B. )æe. (#1Æ. K%2"Å. K5 K#*F
%P'b& º15ø . . . ’
161 In fact, Alexander’s career shows him to be the perfect go-between: he had sent
envoys to persuade the Greek army to abandon Thessaly (7.173); yet he will also warn
the Greeks of an attack by Mardonius at Plataea (9.44–6). On his skilful diplomacy,
which lays the foundations of Macedonian power, see Hammond (1989), 43–8; Scaife
(1989); Badian (1994).
162 See Bowie (2007), 233.
163 Bowie (ibid. 229) calls this narrative technique ‘nesting’. F. Solmsen (1982), 103
suggests that ‘to have Alexander speak first in the name of the king, then in that of
Mardonius, finally in his own was Herodotus’ brilliant device of rendering the offer
increasingly attractive’.
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When [Alexander] arrived in Athens, having been sent by Mardonius, he said
these things: ‘Athenian citizens, Mardonius says these things: “A message comes
to me from the king with these words: ‘I put aside all the wrongs against me . . . ’
These are the instructions which I have been compelled to carry out, unless
there should be any blame on your part. But I say this to you: Why now are you
so mad as to take up arms against the king? . . . ” Mardonius, O Athenians,
ordered me to say these things to you. And I won’t mention anything about my
goodwill towards you . . . ’
This speech remarkably displays three levels of direct speech and a
threefold appeal to Athens, each revealing distinctive stylistic traits:
Xerxes magnanimously offers an amnesty; Mardonius threatens the
imminent deployment of superior forces; Alexander plays upon his
special relationship with the Athenians and the daunting prospect
of their unique position in-between two armies (#*!Æ/å#Ø%&,
8.140.:.3).164 At one level, then, this gives an apt demonstration, if
one were needed, of where the power lies: the pyramid structure stresses
the authority of the most remote figure, Xerxes, whose ‘long arm’ (å*dæ
()*æ#+ŒÅ., 8.140.:.2) tangibly extends to this debate in Athens,
though by now he is far away in Persia. As a result, promises of freedom
and assurances of autonomy ring hollow, as even the mode by which
they are communicated depend on the king’s word.
At another level the complex arrangement of a speech within a speech
within a speech draws attention to the artificiality of Herodotus’ repre-
sentation of debate. Unlike an epic poet, who may adopt the voice of
any of his characters, or a tragic poet, who stages a debate with actors
taking the role of different characters, the prose-writing historian can
never fully assimilate his voice to those of his historical agents. His
debates are scripted performances within a wider world written from a
first-person vantage-point. This debate rips away the veil from the
representation to serve as a reminder of the extent to which the text is
transmitted and of the author’s role in its construction.
The constructedness of the episode is raised again when Herodotus
comes to relate the Athenians’ response (8.141.2). The Athenians
drag out their business with Alexander until the Spartans are present,
before whom they advertise their commitment to the Greek cause and
164 See Bowie (2007), 229–30.
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‘Greekness’ (!e @¯ººÅ&ØŒ,&, 8.144.2).165 This term is highly charged.
With the exception of the accounts of Persian wise men that opens
Herodotus’ enquiry, this term is absent from Herodotus’ text until the
Persians invade.166 Then, in a rare, and provocative, statement, the
narrator asserts that Greece would have been doomed had it not been
for the Athenians, and their commitment to ‘Greekness’: ‘by choosing
that Greece should remain free, they alone roused all the rest of the
Greek world.’167 Now, the Athenians articulate ‘Greekness’ at greater
length, and the elements they raise are their common blood, language,
religious ritual and customs.168 There is no clearer statement of what it
means to be Greek in Herodotus’ narrative and, intersecting as it does
165 Crane (1998), 241 comments: ‘The Athenian response (8.144) is remarkable not
only for its high-minded disdain for danger and material advantage but also for its
formulation of “Hellenism” as a positive value worthy of defence.’ According to Price
(2001), 372 !e @¯ººÅ&ØŒ,& represents ‘an overarching notion, “the Hellenic entity” or
“the whole Hellenic world” as opposed to just “Hellas” in a geographical sense’. He goes
on to make the claim that most fifth-century expressions of Hellenic identity ‘never had
an ultimately political purpose’ (p. 374). Part of what both Herodotus and Thucydides
are doing, this section argues, is recasting Hellenism as something political as well as
cultural. Only their narratives, however, are able to transcend the inward-looking
political institutions of each individual polis.
166 Hdt. 1.4 (twice). The Persian wise men use the accounts of the mythological rape
of women to account for the emnity between the two peoples. As they put it, they claim
the ‘barbarian nations’ (7Ł&*Æ :$æ:ÆæÆ) as their own, while Europe and ‘the Greek area’
are separate. That is to say, the notion of ‘Greekness’ is introduced by the Persians, as an
external group looking in, rather like Herodotus’ own activity as a tourist on his travels,
on which see Redfield (1985); on Hellenicity, see esp. J. Hall (2002), 172–205. In this
sense a strong claim may be made that Herodotus, from his perspective on the margins of
the Greek world, constructs a sense of Greekness in his enquiry. In one other example of
!e @¯ººÅ&ØŒ,& before the later books, Herodotus claims that the ‘Greek stock’ have used
the same language from its beginning (1.58).
167 9º,#*&%Ø 'b !c& @¯ºº$'Æ )*æØ*E&ÆØ Kº*ıŁ1æÅ&, [!%F!%] !e @¯ººÅ&ØŒe& )A& !e
º%Ø),& . . . ÆP!%d %y!%Ø q"Æ& %ƒ K)*ª*/æÆ&!*., 7.139.5. This ideal is immediately put to
the test when the Greeks send a delegation to Gelon in Syracuse to make common cause
(7.145). It fails.
168 ‘And again [we have done this because of] Greekness in common blood and
common language and common shrines of and sacrifices to the gods, and common
customs, all of which the Athenians could not betray’ (‘Æs!Ø. 'b !e @¯ººÅ&ØŒe& Ke&
‹#ÆØ#,& !* ŒÆd ›#,ªºø""%& ŒÆd Ł*H& ƒ'æ2#Æ!$ !* Œ%Ø&a ŒÆd Łı"/ÆØ XŁ*$ !* ›#,!æ%)Æ,
!H& )æ%',!Æ. ª*&1"ŁÆØ 3ŁÅ&Æ/%ı. %PŒ i& *s 7å%Ø’, 8.144.2). The rhetoric of a common
Greece does not get much more tub-thumping than this. Price (2001), 71 makes the
point that ‘Hellenic loyalty and unity, and more importantly the strengthening of
Hellenic institutions, . . . is one of Herodotus’ great themes’. This study goes further: it
suggests that Herodotus’ enquiry not only represents that ‘Greekness’, but also repro-
duces it—by virtue of which it goes some way to replacing Hellenic institutions, such as
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with Herodotus’ prior assertion, this makes for a particularly striking
rhetorical tour-de-force. And it occurs at the climax of a critical debate
that ultimately determines the fate of Greece and the ‘Greek thing’, the
importance of which Herodotus has made clear by his careful writing of
this debate. The ideals of freedom and Greekness win out in the arena
which both guarantees and reproduces those values, the arena of
debate.169
And yet . . .There is something already manufactured about this
debate, and not only with respect to Herodotus’ representation of it.
The Athenians have deliberately dallied in their response to Alexander
in order that they could give this speech before their comrades-at-arms,
and rivals, the Spartans: this is, in many ways, a show of loyalty and
commitment to the common cause. Moreover, within the space of seven
chapters the Athenians will be making another speech to the Spartans,
only then it will be the Athenians who appeal to the Spartans to honour
their alliance (9.7; cf. 9.6, 11.1–2).170 Indeed, there the Spartans show
such a demonstrable lack of interest in the Athenians’ fate that their
behaviour provokes a frustrated response from the narrator as he tries to
account for their change in attitude (9.8).171 It is the precarious nature
of freedom and Greekness that invests Herodotus’ overtly stylized
debate in Athens with so much charge.172 Unlike the Persian king,
whose presence lurks in the background oppressing free speech, or
the assembly, which after all tend to be limited to each individual polis and cannot
support interpolitical action.
169 Pelling (2006a), 113 comments: ‘Such rhetorical power captures the emotive
force of freedom, and the Athenians are given the best freedom tunes—better even than
the harsher, more Spartan version which we saw with Demaratus, talking of the Greek
‘fear’ of law and custom (7.104.4–5).’
170 Athenian confidence appears severely shaken by the Spartans’ own delay of
coming to their aid, with the result that they threaten to medize after all (9.11.1–2).
The Spartans are, of course, on the way, so the rupture does not occur at this point. But
scholars have been alert to the contemporary resonances such near-misses have: Fornara
(1971), 86; Raaflaub (1987), 239–40; cf. Crane (1998), 241–6.
171 Pelling (2006a), 113–14 wonders whether the Athenian speech of 9.7 is the
disingenuous part, rather than the behaviour of the Spartans: ‘Something is being
unmasked here, but what? Perhaps it is the fine rhetoric itself of 8.143–4; perhaps the
Athenians would indeed have come to terms with Persia. But more probably it is the
threat itself that is being exposed as simply a negotiating trick, a way of applying pressure
to the Greek allies.’
172 Cf. Bowie (2007), 235–6.
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indeed unlike the Athenians, who set up a debate in order to show off
their resolve to the Spartans, Herodotus’ representation of debate
challenges authoritative dictates and explores the fault-lines opening
up in the coalition’s commitment to freedom. In particular, with its
abrupt juxtaposition to the scenes of in-fighting that follow, Herodotus
invites his reader to scrutinize just what holds the fragile coalition
together and question what it means to be Greek and what exactly
‘Greekness’ consists of. Exposing the discourse of freedom to scrutiny,
Herodotus anticipates Thucydides’ analysis of and challenge to political
rhetoric.173
In Herodotus debate is not an opportunity to feel smugly complacent
about one’s place in the Greek world, though that is the position
adopted here both by the Athenians within the assembly and by the
Spartans afterwards; rather, it is an invitation to reflect on the apparent
failure of debate and the instability within the concept of freedom and
Greek identity. In other words, debate is an invitation to perform one’s
role as a citizen, scrutinizing argument and making one’s own judge-
ment. Only, in this case, one does not have to do this within the
institution of the assembly in the centre of one’s own city; one can do
it by reading and taking on Herodotus’ enquiry. Reading debate can be
a political act of defiance to rank alongside the defence of Greece.
At the beginning of this chapter I emphasized Herodotus’ debt to
Homeric epic in his representation of debate. That he should even
include formal scenes of debate in his history of the Persian War recalls
the narrative strategy of the Iliad; yet the influence goes deeper than
that, since it provides one means for his investigation into why Greeks
and barbarians came together. To put it simply, scenes of Greeks
173 One element of this is Thucydides’ deconstruction of !e @¯ººÅ&ØŒ,& from the very
beginning of his history (1.1.1). See Price (2001), 375, who argues that ‘every single
element of Herodotus’ definition is corrupted or destroyed in Thucydides’ account of the
Peloponnesian War’; and J. Henderson (2007), 300–1, who observes that, while Her-
odotus headlines the ‘beginning of evils for Greeks and barbarians’ ( @‚ººÅ"/ !* ŒÆd
:Ææ:$æ%Ø"Ø, 5.97.3), Thucydides reduces the evils to ‘strictly “for Hellenes” [!%E.
@‚ººÅ"Ø #*ª$ºø& ŒÆŒH& ¼æ5*Ø, 2.12–3]’ (p. 300 with n. 42). He also talks of ‘the
psychosis of Thucydides’ narrative drive—toward Spartan admirals, Persian money,
Athens thrust back into Asia, history re-wound’ (p. 294). Xenophon takes Thucydides’
deconstructive strategy one stage further, by writing about ‘Greek things’ (plural)—in the
Hellenica.
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debating illustrate their commitment to freedom, while Persians failing
to debate shows the institutional failings of a system that seeks to
exclude possibilities of dissent from the king.
Debate is not, however, simple in Herodotus. As section 1 showed,
Greeks debating fails to suggest that sense of achievement founded in
the Iliad, even though Herodotus’ text maps out a similar diachronic
progression of debate over the course of the narrative: the Athenians are
held responsible by Herodotus for beginning all the evils after being
collectively deceived in the assembly; at Salamis the coalition of the
willing barely holds together, and only does so because of the actions of
individuals operating outside the institutional framework. On the other
hand, section 2 highlighted the paradox that the most formal debate
scenes in Herodotus take place in the Persian court. Readers may be
rightly sceptical of the possibilities of dissent before the king, but
Herodotus’ representations of debate challenge them to review their
expectations and renew their own practice of dissent. Section 3 explored
this last point further by drawing attention to the performance of
notable Greek individuals external to their community’s institutional
framework. A parallel was suggested to the status of the narrator, who as
a writer of prose occupies the margins of his society. In the end,
Herodotus lacks the very institutional structure that poetry enjoys, he
lacks the communal sanction that epic receives; his authority becomes
the issue. One way in which he attempts to construct a communal voice
is by taking over the public scene of debate; he writes into his text this
institutional framework. But it does not remain the same in his hands.
The dissenting strategies his debates reproduce invite the reader to
adopt Herodotus’ enquiry as his own.
The assembly is by no means as fundamental to the narrative of
Herodotus as it had been to the Iliad. In this way, as in many others,
Herodotus’ enquiry reflects more the Odyssey and its uncomfortable
relationship to scenes of debate. Yet, the assembly remains a key
ideological marker. As book 1 draws to a close, Herodotus narrates
the Greeks’ first close encounter with the growing power of Persia. The
Spartans send heralds to warn Cyrus not to harm any Greek city in
Ionia. Cyrus’ response is telling (1.153.1):
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‘%PŒ 7'*Ø"$ Œø ¼&'æÆ. !%Ø%2!%ı., !%E"/ K"!Ø åHæ%. K& #1"fi Å !fi B ),ºØ
I)%'*'*ª#1&%. K. !e& "ıºº*ª,#*&%Ø Iºº+º%ı. O#&2&!*. K5Æ)Æ!H"Ø. !%E"Ø, j&
Kªg (ªØÆ/&ø, %P !a 0I-&ø& )$Ł*Æ 7"!ÆØ 7ºº*"åÆ Iººa !a %NŒ+ØÆ’.
‘I’ve never yet feared men, for whom there’s a place set aside in the middle of
the city where they gather together to swear oaths and deceive each other. Such
men, if I am of sound mind, will not only have the sufferings of Ionia to chatter
about but also their own.’
Cyrus explicitly confronts and challenges the Greek ideal of the agora,
reconfiguring the arena of institutional dissent as the market-place where
people swear and cheat on each other and idly chatter. The assembly
undergoes a similar revolution inHerodotus. From the centre of theGreek
city, as it had been the centre of the Iliad ’s narrative about the TrojanWar,
the assembly occupies a rathermarginal position inHerodotus, in terms of
both its narrative frequency but also its value, even when it is represented:
assemblies are shown to come to nought; critical decisions are taken and
enacted outside the institutional structure. Instead, it seems, the onus is
placed on the individual. For sure, the individual performs as part of a
community on behalf of a community; but his (or even her) actions are
often undertaken in opposition to the community’s institutional frame-
work. Thus we see Greek figures who think and act in a way that under-
lines their cultural heritage of debate, but external to institutional arenas:
Demaratus accompanies the Persian king, informing him of the Spartan
(institutional) difference; Themistocles succeeds in dissent, only after he
continues it outside the assembly. This seems to prefigure howHerodotus
imagines his own role—or perhaps better, the role of his reader—as being
a product of a particular kind of institutional thought (debate), but as
being independent of its institutional manifestation (the assembly). The
interest in the individual operating outside institutional arenas takes us
back to the Odyssey, suggesting a Herodotus who plays an ‘Odysseus’-like
figure constructing his own narrative.
The problem Herodotus’ enquiry seems to expose is the inability to
establish, or the plain lack of, institutions that extend beyond any one
Greek city-state. His narrative sets about investigating the problem of
debate on a Panhellenic level where institutions are notably lacking,
exploring the institutional differences between different Greek poleis
even as the rhetoric the Greeks utter reflects a common identity. We see
the problem as Themistocles has to operate outside the assembly after
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having just given a moving speech about Panhellenism; or when the
Athenians have to go to Sparta to appeal for the aid that had been
promised, having just previously been so sure of their value and the
cohesiveness of the coalition.
Herodotus’ text itself offers one way of overcoming the lack of inter-
poleis institutions, constructing a sense of Greekness, and achieving the
common aim. His constant invitation to dissent is a lure for gaining
authority for his account readers debate themselves into non-dissent.174
Herodotus’ text can work to reproduce a ‘Greek’ way of doing things,
but it does so in a way that encourages doing that by reading—thereby
setting up his narrative in competition with the institutions that struc-
ture debate and politics in the community. In this way we see how
debate in Herodotus differs from that in Homer, since he uses it to
authorize what he is doing.
This approach reflects a shift from dissent as being represented in the
Iliad, to dissent being part of what the historian is doing when author-
ing and writing a prose narrative. Thus we have moved from examining
the contrast between differing groups deliberating, through to consider-
ing the role of the individual in endorsing dissent. I believe that this
observation is important for two reasons. In the first place it suggests
that the common perception of Herodotus’ dialogism is in need of
revision. This is normally understood with respect to the narrator’s
setting up of rival accounts between which the reader can judge.175
But we have seen how a Greek–barbarian polarity structures speech,
even when the Persians are seen to be debating; clear authorial backing
of one speaker over another is marked; a Hellocentricism underpins
heteroglossia. That is not to say that dialogism does not exist; only that
we ought to recognize that its basis is in Greek political thought. It is the
inherent Greek bias in debate that Herodotus’ authorial statement
draws attention to prior to the constitutional debate, where we witness
174 As J. Henderson (2007), 289 puts it: ‘We have it coming to us. Read Herodotus.
We must read Herodotus. What this prose epic wants and demands.’
175 ‘Herodotus goes to considerable pains to show that he has a vested interest
in nothing but telling what has been told before him’: Dewald (1987), 168. ‘[The]
superposition of layers of narrative and the interplay of utterances from different sources
are fundamental to the narrative’s ability to persuade the addressee to believe it’: Hartog
(1988), 294.
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the historian taking a controversial stand in a tactic that Thucydides
frequently employs in his own narrative.
This brings me to my second point. Herodotus does not simply
reflect Greek ideals or represent scenes of dissent: by virtue of writing,
he also takes part in dissent, using the idea of contest to make a space for
his voice to be heard in the community. Furthermore, he makes reading
his enquiry reflect the normative behaviour of a Greek citizen involved
in the affairs, not only of his own polis, but also of the wider Greek
world. Lastly, he introduces the notion that reading could be part of the
construction of such a citizen.
It is a precarious achievement, however. Even as Herodotus’ narrative
draws to a close, more and more infighting between vying Greek cities
takes place as dissent threatens to break out beyond any institutional
confines. Herodotus’ response has been to use his written enquiry into
human relations to condition his reader into dissenting more respon-
sibly. It is testimony to his success that his successor, Thucydides, who
writes up how that factitious coalition finally breaks down, takes this as
the premise for his narrative.
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4
Thucydides writes debate
Whereas the majority of modern critics emphasize the distinction
between Herodotus and Thucydides, ancient readers conceived of that
relationship rather differently.1 The story goes that at one of Herodotus’
public performances of his enquiry, a young Thucydides listened and
wept.2 Regardless of its authenticity, this anecdote is revealing of the
ancient reception of the two authors: Herodotus’ work was indebted to
and in some degree reproduced an oral tradition; Thucydides, while
influenced by Herodotus, went on to write an account of a war with a
more starkly sombre mood.3
Chapter 4 also posits a closer relationship between the two writers
than that usually allowed by modern criticism, based on this book’s
unique focus on debate. The conclusions from the last chapter drew
attention to Herodotus’ involvement in representing debate: the mar-
ginality of his written word and his personal stake in constructing
1 On Thucydides’ powerful influence on the way history was done (at least in modern
times), see Hornblower (1987), 13–33; cf. Lateiner (1989), 220–4.
2 According to Marcellinus: !"#b #"F $˙æ"%&#"ı #a' N%(Æ' ƒ)#"æ(Æ' K!Ø%*ØŒ+ı,-+"ı
!Ææg+ #fi B IŒæ".)*Ø ¨"ıŒı%(%Å' ŒÆd IŒ"/)Æ' K%.Œæı)*+, Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 54–5, on
which see Canfora (1971), 658–60; Nagy (1990), 28, n. 23; Thompson (1996), 65;
Allison (1997a), esp. 239–50. The same author also labels Thucydides’ style and language
Homeric: Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 35, 37: Woodman (1988), 29; Allison (1997b), 499.
3 See Crane (1998), 1–19 for a discussion of ‘Thucydides’ generally pessimistic view
of human nature and his disdain for pious illusions’ (p. 2). See esp. Parry (1989);
Macleod (1983), 52–139. On the influence of tragedy on Thucydides: Cornford
(1907), 129–52, 221–43; J. Finley (1967); Macleod (1983), 140–58. Rood (1998),
205–48 interprets Thucydides’ explanation for Athens’ defeat in terms of a ‘tragic
pattern’ (p. 201). Thucydides’ narrow focus in terms of time—he ‘starts’, in the words
of R. Fowler (1996), 84, ‘as it were the day before yesterday’—and space reflects an
Iliadic narrative strategy, in contrast to Herodotus’ more expansive, and Odyssean,
journey. On the difference temporally and spatially between the two Homeric epics,
see Lowe (2000).
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authority go some way towards explaining the paradoxical picture of
Persians debating and Greeks operating outside civic institutional struc-
tures. Where Thucydides departs from Herodotus is in the extent and
nature of his representation: unlike Herodotus, who shows little interest
in the processes of debate, Thucydides makes its accurate representation
his aim. He investigates decision-making processes within the polis’
institutional framework.4
But before investigating Thucydides’ representation of debate, it is
first necessary to gauge and assess the nature of his narrative voice, which
appears so very different from Herodotus’. According to most scholars
of the past generation, Thucydides constructs his narrative in such a way
that the voices of others are suppressed.5 It is certainly true that, unlike
Herodotus, he does not display the sources on the basis of which he has
constructed his narrative, which prevents the reader from asking about
its composition.6 It is also true that the effect of this omission is to
create a narrative that directly equates to its subject-matter without, it
appears, the mediation or intervention of the narrator in the seeming
4 In her analysis of Lucian’s How To Write History (specifically on para. 42), Green-
wood (2006), 114 suggestively comments that ‘according to Lucian, Thucydides con-
ceived of the impartial, critical, stateless model of history-writing in response to the
reception of Herodotus’ work’. Important here is the description of a ‘stateless model of
history-writing’: this chapter will argue that, while Thucydides’ reporting is not restricted
to any one state (such as Athens), its target—political deliberation—represents an
appropriation of the political field by a written text. This may help to explain Thucy-
dides’ almost exclusive narrative focus on men (i.e. citizens): Crane (1996). On the
importance of political judgement (ª+0,Å): Edmunds (1975); Crane (1998), 42–4.
Huart (1973) discusses the range of meanings of this word. For the radical import of
Thucydides’ writing more generally, see Greenwood (2006), 1–18; cf. Crane (1998).
5 See the seminal work of Loraux (1986b), responding—in the wake of poststructur-
alist criticism—to the emphasis on Thucydides’ objectivity in such authors as Cochrane
(1927), de Romilly (1963) and Adcock (1963). Challenges to that model of Thucydides,
however, had been made before: Cornford (1907) on traditional thought patterns in
Thucydides; V. Hunter (1973) on Thucydides’ artfulness. There is still much potential
in this approach, which explores Thucydides’ objectivity through rhetoric: see Woodman
(1988); Crane (1998) esp. 8–10, 261–2; Kurke (2000); Greenwood (2006). See esp.
Dewald (2005), whose recent ‘stylometric’ study on Thucydides demonstrates rather
well how individual units piece together the events and influence greatly their reception.
These studies generally put more emphasis on the emotional connection to events: so
Connor (1977; 1984); Orwin (1994).
6 ‘Thucydides the historical investigator presents himself as having conducted his
investigations in so rigorous a way as to render his account of them magisterial and
definitive: this is the end of investigation’: Gould (1989), 111.
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achievement of objectivity.7 As Leslie Kurke has argued, however,
scholars ‘have been too quick to construct Thoukydides in the pattern
of a modern scientific historian’, when ancient readers had a very
different answer: they recognized Thucydides as a ‘master of enargeia
(“vividness”), who used that technique (and others) to engage readers’
emotions at a visceral level’.8 Furthermore, the latest work on Thucy-
dides’ authorial statements has suggested a more provocative voice, that
prompts critical engagement rather than encourages unmediated access
to the author’s thoughts.9 Indeed, this voice, which represents the
historian making a judgement in his narrative as an interpreter of the
events, itself seems to derive from Herodotus, such as when he claims
that the Athenians were ‘the saviours of Greece’.10 In addition, building
on her work on narrative composition in Herodotus, Carolyn Dewald
has recently undertaken a stylometric analysis of Thucydides which
provides a useful framework for analysing the ways in which narrative
units relate to each other.11 This study continues the recent trend by
7 Building on Loraux, Edmunds (1993) claims that, ‘the establishment of the
historian-subject’s authority can succeed only to the extent that he disappears, only to
the extent that the reader will consent to take the writing as the equivalent of the war’
(p. 841). If we concede to Thucydides’ text the possibility of ‘absolute mimesis’, we must
also concede to him ‘absolute authority’.
8 Kurke (2000), 132, commenting on Plutarch’s analysis of Thucydides’ account of
the great harbour battle at Syracuse (Plut.Mor. 347a). She continues: ‘Part of [the] effect
of immediate emotional engagement is achieved by the absence of explicit authorial
intervention and commentary, so that events seem to be conjured up directly before the
reader without any mediation.’ Cf. Hornblower (1987), 35; Debnar (2001), 21. Con-
temporary scholarship’s preference for Herodotus’ compositional style derives at least in
part to our own cultural context, in which the historian’s tactic of allowing the events to
‘speak for themselves’ has been deconstructed in recent criticism: see e.g. White (1978),
51–80; Barthes (1986), 131–9.
9 According to Gribble (1998), 56, narratorial interventions do not provide a
solution: they are really no more than pointers towards answers that can be found in
the narrative. Rood (1998), 134 similarly contends that it is ‘dangerous to read Thucy-
dides’ analysis at ii.65 as his final thoughts on Athens’ defeat, without respect for its
context’. See also Marincola (1997), 6.
10 +F+ %b 1ŁÅ+Æ("ı' ¼+ #Ø' º-ªø+ )ø#BæÆ' ª*+-)ŁÆØ #B' $¯ºº.%"' "PŒ i+ ±,Ææ#.+"Ø
#IºÅŁ-"', Hdt. 7.139.5. Herodotus gives the Athenians praise in spite of their objec-
tionable status during the period of his writing, which had seen the Athenians enslave
much of the Greek world.
11 Dewald (2005). See Barker (2007) for a review of Dewald (2005) and Greenwood
(2006).
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arguing that Thucydides’ representation of debate not only introduces
other voices onto his stage, but also puts interpretation under the
spotlight in a way that, potentially at least, even destabilizes the narra-
tor’s own voice.
Influenced by the previous scholarly consensus regarding Thucy-
dides’ authority, Josh Ober has read the historian’s narrative in opposi-
tion to the methods and values of Athenian democracy.12 Whereas
‘democratic knowledge’ was investigated, worked out and put into
effect in the assembly on the basis of opinion—as in ‘it seemed best to
the de¯mos’13—Thucydides asserts his account’s difference and super-
iority on the criteria of accuracy and objectivity.14 According to Ober,
then, Thucydides’ representation of debate in the form of the ago¯n
demonstrates the inefficacy of public debate by exposing the faulty,
partial arguments and perspectives of the historical agents.15 In contrast
stands the historian’s narrative, by means of which he establishes himself
as the sole arbiter of truth about the war.16
This chapter sets out to challenge Ober’s interpretation of political
dissent in Thucydides by re-evaluating the use of debate. Basing his
approach on a model of dissidence in the United States during the Cold
War,17 Ober posits an opposition between debate and narrative. The
argument developed here, based on the narratological and cross-generic
study that this book offers, will explore how debate works as part
of Thucydides’ narrative.18 On the one hand, Thucydides structures
debate as an ago¯n in such a way as to empower the reader to look into
12 Thucydides’ logos represents a counter-knowledge to the formulation of demo-
cratic knowledge: Ober (1998), 58–9, with n. 15.
13 See also Ober (1989).
14 On IŒæ(4*ØÆ, see Crane (1996), 34–5, 50–74.
15 The ago¯n ‘obscures the dialectical tendency of Athenian public debate’ and ‘pre-
sents Assembly debate as precisely the sort of contest for audience applause that
Thucydides himself has explicitly renounced as a basis for his own text’: Ober (1998),
103.
16 ‘[I]t is through being confronted with Thucydides’ text itself—which presents itself
as a disinterested narrative and analysis of great political events . . .—that they will come
to an understanding of [human nature and the nature of power’: Ober (1998), 61.
17 Ober (ibid. 46, n. 63) explains that he has taken his idea of dissent from the title of
an American journal, which had offered a new US brand of left-wing political criticism
in the wake of Stalinism: see Prologue, n. 43 above, with accompanying text.
18 Debnar (2001) similarly seeks to refocus attention away from Thucydides’ author-
ial voice towards analysing the effect of his speeches on embedded audiences.
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arguments of the kind that dominated the political decision-making
arena and that compelled its listeners to adopt certain courses of
action.19 From this perspective, ‘the speeches are so constructed that a
careful reader can see into—or see through—the speaker’s reasoning’.20
On the other hand, because of Thucydides’ strategy of direct imitation,
as articulated by Kurke above, his representations of debate also have the
effect of propelling readers into the hurly-burly of warring words,
which, to a certain extent at any rate, puts them at risk of being seduced
by the arguments reproduced.21Crucially, for the most part Thucydides
avoids directing his readers’ judgement onto the circumstances for, and
outcomes of, the debates. When he does intervene, as in the fallout from
the decision to launch an expedition against Sicily, that too is signifi-
cant, for it demonstrates the ultimate failure of deliberation within his
polis’ institutional framework during times of conflict and, as such,
represents a reworking of the Iliad ’s foundational narrative of dissent.22
This chapter is structured according to three propositions: that
Thucydides introduces his narratorial voice as a challenge to rival
interpretations in a way that emphasizes its argumentativeness; that he
represents debate in such a way as to recoup it for his written project;
and that the historian’s voice becomes implicated in the ago¯n by virtue
of the way it embeds debate in the narrative. Section 1 reconsiders the
19 ‘The diction and style of [Thucydides’] speakers, often so dense as to border on the
incomprehensible if delivered in the hubbub of an actual assembly, were designed to
provoke careful reading and reflection’: Yunis (1998), 239. See, however, Debnar
(2001), n. 21 below.
20 Macleod (1983), 69.
21 Debnar (2001), esp. 20–3, makes precisely this point. According to her interpreta-
tion, ‘the difficult, condensed, and abstract style Thucydides created for political oratory
offers readers an experience comparable to that of an audience listening to actual speech’
(p. 20)—by which she means that Thucydides aims to reproduce not the transcripts of
the speeches delivered but the experience of them. She later concludes: ‘If verbatim
reports of speeches had been included in the History, our task would most likely be
easier. As it is, the language of the speeches complicates their logic and disguises their
rhetorical ploys even for an audience who can study, contemplate, and reread the work
over time.’ (p. 233) This chapter will argue that an essential part of that agonizing
process is Thucydides’ representation of debate as ago¯n.
22 According to Edmunds (1993), 831: Thucydides ‘made the fact of writing, the
mode itself of communication, part of his historiographical strategy’. Debnar (2001), 20
agrees: ‘Thucydides transformed an essentially oral genre—deliberative oratory—into a
literary one.’
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narrator’s authority in the light of his inclusion of speeches. While
conventional views of Thucydides suggest that he demands absolute
authority from his reader, a closer inspection of his methodological
claims will show that his statements of authority are overtly contentious
and seek to provoke a considered response. Section 2 analyses the place
in Thucydides’ narrative when alternative voices do come to the fore, in
scenes of debate. Unlike Herodotus, who had shown little interest in the
institutional workings of the assembly, Thucydides investigates the
failure of, and fault-lines in, debate in relation to their institutional
contexts, and not just in Athens but across the Greek world. By
reproducing assembly debate, he exposes his readers to the kind of
political discourse they would be subject to in their own polis, but also
equips them with the tools for analysing that discourse. One effect of
taking a stand, however, is to get involved in the ago¯n: section 3
examines how that manifests itself in the role the narrator himself
plays in framing debate. It will be argued that Thucydides’ representa-
tion of debate as ago¯n cannot be so easily hacked off from the body of
the narrative that surrounds it. Yet, nor is it the case that readers can so
easily disengage themselves from the ago¯n when battling through the
narrative, but must also take responsibility for making judgement.
Thucydides’ strategy of writing up debate as ago¯n implicates both
author and reader in fighting over—and fighting for—Greece.
1. THE NARRATOR’S AUTHORITY AND THE
ROLE OF THE READER (THUCYDIDES 1, 5)
Throughout the course of his narrative Herodotus appears at his read-
ers’ side, offering suggestions about how to interpret a particular event,
cajoling them into assessing different accounts, displaying whence he
got his information. Yet, he avoids making a general methodological
statement. On one rare occasion Herodotus claims that he is obliged to
say the things that are said (but not necessarily to believe them), and that
this approach should stand for his whole account (Hdt. 7.152.2). But
this statement of principle emerges in the context of a story about the
Argives’ medization: in this highly charged context, his insistence on
relating every account that comes his way stresses the difficulty of
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treating all stories in the same impartial manner and challenges the very
principle he enunciates.23
Thucydides is quite different. He does not appear at his readers’ side
with remarks, speculations or criticisms. On the contrary, he remains
generally absent from his text, thereby giving the impression that the
events speak for themselves without his mediation. As noted above,
while this has led some scholars to suggest that Thucydides aims at
investing his narrative with total authority, ancient readers observed that
the directness of his representation increases his narrative’s vividness and
power. In line with the properties of immediacy, Thucydides explicitly
enunciates his methodological approach before he begins his narrative.
This example is important for what Thucydides has to say about his
record of both events and speeches, but it also presents an opportunity
to examine his claims to authority and the role of the reader. A similar
moment of anxiety surfaces at the point where his narrative begins, as
the narrator lays out the causes of the war. On both occasions, the
narrator’s statements of authority are to be seen as contentious and a
stimulus to exercising judgement.
It seems best to me
Following his opening statement of subject, the war between the Athe-
nians and Peloponnesians, Thucydides conducts a brief foray into the
history of the Greek world. Having worked his way up to the present
circumstances, he then breaks off to describe how he has constructed his
narrative (1.20.1):
#a ,b+ "s+ !ÆºÆØa #"ØÆF#Æ Åyæ"+, åÆº*!a Z+#Æ !Æ+#d 56B' #*Œ,Åæ(øfi
!Ø)#*F)ÆØ. "ƒ ªaæ ¼+Łæø!"Ø #a' IŒ"a' #H+ !æ"ª*ª*+Å,-+ø+, ŒÆd j+ K!Øå0æØÆ
)ç()Ø+ fi q, ›,"(ø' I4Æ)Æ+()#ø' !Ææ 7 Iºº8ºø+ %-å"+#ÆØ.
I found out about these ancient events, though it is difficult to trust in every
piece of evidence in succession. For people accept hearsay about prior times
from others uncritically, even if it concerns their own land.
23 ‘The moment at which he declares that his principle is to repeat what has been
said . . . is one where one of the most controversial subjects of all is at stake, the terrible
question of who medized in the period of the Persian wars—hence the importance of his
claim not to believe everything either’: Thomas (2000), 214.
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With these lines Thucydides sets his account apart from others like it
on the basis of his greater effort, painstaking research and more vigorous
standards, and clearly invites his readers’ concurrence. Nevertheless, this
section also reveals a marked distribution of tenses that sheds light on
Thucydides’ self-fashioning as an author of his composition. On the
one hand, he refers to his act of research as an act undertaken in the past,
using either the aorist or imperfect depending on aspect.24 On the other
hand, he uses the present tense to refer to other readers of the past.25 In
turn, these distinctions suggest a significant difference in the conception
of the task at hand.26 Thus Thucydides refers to his own research in
secondary sequence, indicating that the act of research itself belongs to
the writer’s past and cannot be accessed by the reader. When he relates
the opinions of his contemporaries, however, he slips into primary
sequence in recognition that these accounts represent interpretations
subject to the judgement of the reader. In this view, when Thucydides
uses the present tense he does so in the context of relating competing
opinions, among which his voice (albeit the best) is just one.
That is not to say that all these opinions ought to be considered
deserving of equal merit. Unlike other writers who receive hearsay
without examination (1.20.1) and turn towards easier things (K!d #a
5#"E,Æ ,Aºº"+ #æ-!"+#ÆØ, 1.20.3), Thucydides contends that his ac-
count derives from hard work and a concern to test the evidence. For
proof he cites three examples of mistaken belief: two relate directly to
Herodotus’ enquiry and are usually understood as straightforward cor-
rections;27 the third contests his contemporaries’ understanding of the
24 Thus he assigns one-time actions the aorist (Åyæ"+, 1.20.1; åÆº*!e+ #c+ IŒæ(4*ØÆ+
ÆP#c+ #H+ º*åŁ-+#ø+ %ØÆ,+Å,"+*F)ÆØ q+ K,"(, 1.22.1; "PŒ M6(ø)Æ ªæ.ç*Ø+, 1.22.2),
and those that indicate a continuous process of investigation the imperfect (K!Ø!&+ø' %b
Å9æ()Œ*#", 1.22.3; ‰' %7 i+ K%&Œ"ı+, 1.22.1; ‰' K,"d K%&Œ*Ø, 1.22.2).
25 "ƒ ¼+Łæø!"Ø . . . %-å"+#ÆØ (1.20.1); #e !ºBŁ"' "Y"+#ÆØ (1.20.2); "ƒ ¼ºº"Ø $‚ººÅ+*'
"PŒ OæŁH' "Y"+#ÆØ (1.20.3).
26 Edmunds (1993) distinguishes between Thucydides’ use of the aorist to denote the
historian’s labours, his act of research, which coincides with the effacement of his
personality in the creation of third-person objectivity, with his use of primary tenses to
refer to the act of writing. He sums up: ‘Thucydides is a third person who wrote a
)ıªªæÆç8 in the past; Thucydides is a first person present to the reader at any given time’
(p. 838).
27 See Gould (1989), 111; Dewald (1998); Ober (1998), 54. Gomme (1945), 136–7
thinks Thucydides has other writers and common opinion in mind as well as Herodotus.
As both Thomas (1989), 238–82 and Hornblower (1991), 57 point out, Herodotus and
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tyrannicide story, a challenge which, given the myth’s associations with
the founding of democracy, strikes at the heart of Athenian civic
ideology.28 In contrast to these rival claims, Thucydides’ account ‘will
present facts that have been “tested” and so are more reliable than the
hodgepodge of often erroneous beliefs held by the Athenian masses’.29
It is a short step from this description to the conclusion that Thucydides
provides his readers with the text from which they may derive the
correct interpretations of what happened in the war.
But is it the right step? Thucydides’ methodological claim to have
written a more accurate account than his contemporaries is usually
taken to refer to his narrative of the war, as if he has just been
demonstrating his own historiographic method.30 Yet, a close inspec-
tion of the grammatical construction of this section reveals a somewhat
different picture. The narrator’s comment that no one would err think-
ing such things as he himself has come to from the evidence gathered (KŒ
%b #H+ *NæÅ,-+ø+ #*Œ,Åæ(ø+ ‹,ø' #"ØÆF#Æ ¼+ #Ø' +",(Çø+ ,.ºØ)#Æ L
%ØBºŁ"+ "På ±,Ææ#.+"Ø, 1.21.1) forms a ring circling back to his version
of the distant past and strikes a concluding note: the next sentence,
starting with ‘and this war’ (ŒÆd › !&º*,"' "y#"'), marks a new begin-
ning.31 On this reading the present war, Thucydides’ narrative, operates
according to a different set of principles: the methodological claims
regarding accurate and painstaking reconstruction relate only to Thu-
cydides’ competitive reading of the past, not to his project of writing up
Thucydides seem to be in agreement over the fall of the Peisistratid tyranny. Arguably it
may be truer to say that Thucydides is correcting the way Herodotus has been read rather
than Herodotus himself. Indeed, the structural similarity of Thucydides’ ‘Archaeology’
to Herodotus’ ‘false preface’, in that both sections represent the historians’ foray into past
times before beginning their own accounts, already suggests a more nuanced reading of
the relationship between the two writers. So R. Fowler (1996), 76: ‘His language and
technique in [the archaiologiai of Books 1 and 6] are thoroughly Herodotean, suggesting
that [Herodotus’] methods were acknowledged as the appropriate way to determine the
truth about the remoter past’; cf. 80. See also Allison (1997a), 239–41.
28 Wohl (1999).
29 Ober (1998), 54.
30 See e.g. Connor (1984); Loraux (1986b), 159; Edmunds (1993); Ober (1998).
31 Woodman (1988), 8–9. See also Hornblower (1991), 56–66, whose commentary
distinguishes between ‘20–1. Digression on method: sloppiness of earlier inquirers’
(p. 56) and ‘22. Th[ucydides] on his own method’ (p. 59).
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the war which he followed from its inception (1.1.1). If the reader is to
draw any conclusions from these claims for thinking about the narrative
before him, it ought to be that interpretation is an active process
requiring a great deal of hard work. Far from gaining any insight into
the composition of his text, however, the reader gets instead a brief
glimpse of Thucydides as a reader of history.
This explanation leaves open the question of the relevance of Thucy-
dides’ methodological claim to his narrative. The transition from Thucy-
dides’ reading of the past to his writing of the present is made in one
sentence, containing the remarkable conceit that his war will be judged
greater than all others on the basis of the facts themselves (ŒÆd › !&º*,"'
"y#"' . . . I!7 ÆP#H+ #H+ :æªø+ )Œ"!"F)Ø %Åº0)*Ø ‹,ø' ,*(Çø+
ª*ª*+Å,-+"' ÆP#H+, 1.21.2). But the rhetorical force of this description
rather tells against the conclusion of Josh Ober, that ‘the truth about the
war is no longer a matter of verbal persuasion or interpretation’.32 Indeed,
as Ober himself acknowledges, ‘immediately following this remarkable
and momentary disappearing act comes an explicit reminder of the pre-
sence of the author, the constructed nature of his verbal record, and its
problematic relationship to historical words and deeds.’33
This is Thucydides’ infamous statement of methodology. (1.22.1):
ŒÆd ‹)Æ ,b+ º&ªøfi *r!"+ ;ŒÆ)#"Ø j ,-ºº"+#*' !"º*,8)*Ø+ j K+ ÆP#fiH X%Å Z+#*',
åÆº*!e+ #c+ IŒæ(4*ØÆ+ ÆP#c+ #H+ º*åŁ-+#ø+ %ØÆ,+Å,"+*F)ÆØ q+ K,"( #* z+
ÆP#e' XŒ"ı)Æ ŒÆd #"E' ¼ºº"Ł-+ !"Ł*+ K,"d I!Æªª-ºº"ı)Ø+! ‰' %7 i+ K%&Œ"ı+
K,"d ;ŒÆ)#"Ø !*æd #H+ ÆN*d !Ææ&+#ø+ #a %-"+#Æ ,.ºØ)#7 *N!*E+, Kå",-+øfi ‹#Ø
Kªª/#Æ#Æ #B' 6ı,!.)Å' ª+0,Å' #H+ IºÅŁH' º*åŁ-+#ø+, "o#ø' *YæÅ#ÆØ.
And all the things that they said in word either while preparing to go to war or
when they were already involved in it, it has been difficult to remember with
accuracy what was said both for me, what I myself heard, and for those who
informed me. Therefore, as it has seemed best to me that each say what was
necessary about the present circumstances, while keeping as close as possible to
the general purport of what was really said, so it has been said.
32 Ober (1998), 56. According to Ober: ‘It [the truth about the war] has become a
self-evident matter of visual perception.’ Cf. Loraux (1986b). Kurke (2000), 133 notes
Thucydides’ authorial effacement, but puts this down to his concern to represent the
war’s suffering (1.23.1): ‘This is Thoukydides’ real theme, and his seeming authorial
objectivity is not the goal, but the means by which he conveys to the reader as
immediately and vividly as possible the experience of the war.’
33 Ober (1998), 56.
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The awkwardness of the translation represents an attempt to render
the difficulty of the ideas being expressed here, which have been the
source of much contention.34 The first point to notice is Thucydides’
subdivision of the ‘facts’ (:æªÆ) of the war into two further categories,
events (:æªÆ) and speeches (º&ª"Ø), which already reveals a degree of
self-consciousness about narrative composition and particularly the
representation of speech that had not been the concern of Herodotus.35
The narrator’s anxiety about following correct procedure for citing
other people demonstrates, if nothing else, the importance with which
speeches are held in this narrative.
What Thucydides has to say about his recording of speech is also
significant, however. He wrote down ‘what was necessary, keeping as
close as possible to the general thought of what was said’,36 which raises
several fundamental, perhaps even contradictory, ideas. First, Thucy-
dides says that he wrote down what he thought they should say on any
given occasion. On the one hand, it is difficult to judge what Thucy-
dides means by this, other than relating a speech that fits the circum-
stances and the character of the speaker.37 On the other hand, the label
34 In general, see Gomme (1945), 139–48; Cogan (1981), p. xii; J. Wilson (1982b);
Macleod (1983), 52; Connor (1984), 27; Hornblower (1987), 45–55; Canfora (1992);
Badian (1992); Hedrick (1993); Swain (1993); Orwin (1994), 207–12; Garrity (1998);
Rood (1998), 47; Crane (1998), 39–40; Winton (1999); Pelling (2000), 114–22. For
further bibliography, see Moles (1993), 104, n. 18; Debnar (2001), 14–18. Comment-
ing on the order of speeches first, then deeds, Woodman (1988), 54, n. 68 notes the
connection to the Homeric Phoenix, who pronounces on the heroic ideal to be ‘speaker
of words and a doer of deeds’ (,/Łø+ #* ÞÅ#Bæ 7 :,*+ÆØ !æÅŒ#Bæ. #* :æªø+, Il. 9.443)—
in that order.
35 Hornblower (1991), 59 comments: ‘There is nothing like it in [Herodotus]. More
remarkably, it is hard to parallel in any writer later than Th[ucydides]. In particular, most
historians went on making up speeches without showing any kind of bad conscience
about doing so’ (italics in the original). So too Pelling (2000), 118: ‘the original
audience, accustomed as they were to epic, Herodotus, and logographers, might rather
be struck by any concern for accuracy’ (his italics). Cf. M. Finley (1985), 12–15; Yunis
(2003), 201.
36 #a %*&+#Æ ,.ºØ)#7 *N!*E+, Kå",-+øfi ‹#Ø Kªª/#Æ#Æ #B' 6ı,!.)Å' ª+0,Å' #H+
IºÅŁH' º*åŁ-+#ø+, 1.22.1.
37 Pelling (2000), 115 notes two aspects which Thucydides cannot presumably be
saying: that he gave his speakers the right policies to urge (‘otherwise we could not
explain the existence of head-to-head debates, with both speakers urging diametrically
opposite policies’); or that he gave them the best arguments (if he had, he did a bad job of
it, since ‘recent scholars, especially Macleod, have ruthlessly exposed the frequency with
which the arguments are contradictory or self-unmasking’).
Thucydides writes debate 213
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 213 29.4.2011 11:30am
‘what was necessary’ (#a %*&+#Æ) comes directly from the rhetorical
schools:38 that is to say, though the narrator is talking about the voices
of other people, he makes it clear that he is inextricably involved in their
representation, thereby priming the reader against taking the speeches as
the very words spoken. Second, Thucydides juxtaposes the contentious
idea of authorial interference, expressed provocatively as a rhetorical
exercise, by a less controversial idea expressed in appropriately milder
terms: he wrote the speeches according to what was necessary, ‘keeping
as close as possible to the general thought (ª+0,Å) of what had actually
been said’. In other words, while admitting that he has had to compose
the speeches themselves, Thucydides shows an acute concern that those
speeches derive from their particular circumstances and in some way
reflect the actual speeches that were delivered. On this reading, the
general perspectives, if not the precise phrasing or argument, may
legitimately be regarded as those of the historical agents, not those of
the author.39
However these difficult ideas should be understood, one thing is
clear: the two parts of this sentence, the ambiguous claims of #a %*&+#Æ
and ª+0,Å, have to be worked through by each and every reader.40
For some critics it represents an unresolved contradiction, for others
the problem may be resolved with careful deliberation;41 for some it
38 So Macleod (1983), 52, who cites Gorg. Hel. 2; Isoc. 13.8; Pl. Phdr. 234e6. Cf.
Zadorojnyi (1998), 298–9.
39 Tompkins (1972; 1993) has demonstrated that discernible stylistic differences may
be identified that are characteristic of particular speakers; cf. Debnar (2001). The issue is
more than whether the speeches should be seen as Thucydidean reconstructions or a
genuine attempt to capture what was said. Even if the speeches are entirely Thucydidean,
‘dialogism’ is still possible on the basis that the speeches characterize particular speakers.
On the possibilities of dialogism in the similar context of Plato, see Nightingale
(1995), 7. On ‘heteroglossia’, see Prologue, n. 68 above, and on its frequency in
Herodotean, not Thucydidean, studies, see Act II, intor., n. 4 above.
40 Pelling, (2000), 116–17 observes that the positions of both the ‘extreme “historical
accuracy” interpreter’ (p. 116) and the ‘extreme “free composition” interpreter’ are ‘as
right as one another’ (p. 117)—the Greek allows for both. Indeed, Pelling suggests that
Thucydides ‘is providing an umbrella description which could cover a range of different
procedures . . .Whatever the speech, we can infer that he expected to be blending his own
reconstructions with what he knew had been said; but the blend itself can be very
variable, and it will be impossible to work out what that blend is in any particular
case’ (p. 117).
41 An unresolved contradiction: Hornblower (1991), 45. Resolvable: Rood (1998),
46–8.
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provides a general map for thinking about Thucydides’ speeches, for
others each speech requires individual consideration without the
application of any general procedure.42 The way Thucydides has for-
mulated his methodological concerns obliges each reader to confront
both the meaning of this methodological claim and the relationship of
the speeches to the narrator’s voice. In fact, by taking up a position vis-
a`-vis this claim, readers may find themselves part of the debate: it will
make a difference to interpreting the speeches just what position each
reader chooses to adopt.43
Turning to the facts themselves, the :æªÆ, at first sight we seem to be on
surer ground.44 Thucydides stresses that the :æªÆ have been recorded ‘not
according toas it seemedbest tome’ ("P%7 ‰' K,"d K%&Œ*Ø, 1.22.2),bywhich
he seems to signal a qualitative difference in the veracity of the events in
comparison to the difficulty of recording speeches.45 Yet, Thucydides im-
mediately complicates the notion that his :æªÆ could even be regarded as
objective entities by conceding that the events too are inevitably dependent
on perspective, whether that point of view belongs to him or to any of his
sources (1.22.3). In addition, in the next clause Thucydides writes that he
42 In her examination of 1.22.1, Debnar (2001), 18 suggests ‘that we cannot extract
from it a neat recipe measuring out the objective and subjective ingredients of Thucy-
dides’ speeches.’ Her assertion, however, that there is no proof that any of Thucydides’
speeches could not have been delivered (Debnar (2001), 19–20; cf. Kagan (1975), 77)
seems rather to contradict her emphasis on the literariness of their rhetoric (Debnar
(2001), 22–3, 233). The difficulty of Thucydides’ speeches was notorious even in
antiquity: Dion. Hal. Thuc. 49.
43 There is a further point to be made here about Thucydides’ interest in speech.
According to Price (2001), 82, ‘each speech illustrates the first two principles of stasis
rhetoric, revealing an instability (and eventual disintegration) in the vocabulary of the
basic standards and values of Hellas’. The narrator’s later analysis of the transvaluation of
words in the Corcyraean stasis illustrates this well (3.82.4): but Thucydides’ representa-
tion of debate also shows that no context exists in which speech can extend beyond purely
parochial concerns. Like Herodotus, Thucydides offers his prose narrative as a means of
negotiating a way out of political crisis that engulfed the Greek world. His debate scenes
provide a context in which a reader may form political judgement more soundly: see secs.
2 and 3 below.
44 Rood (1998), 47–8. Parry (1989) is generally more pessimistic about the stability
of :æªÆ in Thucydides’ narrative.
45 Furthermore, his use of the verb %"Œ-ø in the third person matches the formula
used by the demos when it makes its resolutions. According to Ober, this shows that ‘the
facts themselves have been removed to a realm beyond interpretation,—and certainly
beyond the interpretive capacity of ordinary citizens sitting in public Assembly.’: Ober
(1998), 59.
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‘goes after’ the :æªÆ:46 even as he stresses his impartiality, then,Thucydides
makes it clear that he is actively engaged in the construction of his narra-
tive.47Whilehemightnot appear insistently like aHerodotus athis reader’s
side to worry about the composition of his narrative at any one particular
point, his general comments concerning his narrative composition show
that he is acutely aware of its limitations and pitfalls.48
The cause least apparent in speech
After his methodological statement, Thucydides rarely enters his text
again: his narrative is presented before his reader as the finished article,
with few doubts, speculations or alternative scenarios offered. Yet, an
indication of its potential for provocation comes to the fore at the very
beginning of the formal narrative of war. The question posed of the
reader relates to the issue, not of composition, but of interpretation:
what was the cause of the war (1.23.5–6)?49
%Ø&#Ø %7 :ºı)Æ+, #a' ÆN#(Æ' !æ"/ªæÆłÆ !æH#"+ ŒÆd #a' %ØÆç"æ.', #"F ,8 #Ø+Æ
ÇÅ#B)ÆØ !"#* K6 ‹#"ı #")"F#"' !&º*,"' #"E' $‚ººÅ)Ø ŒÆ#-)#Å. #c+ ,b+ ªaæ
IºÅŁ*)#.#Å+ !æ&çÆ)Ø+, IçÆ+*)#.#Å+ %b º&ªøfi , #"f' 1ŁÅ+Æ("ı' >ª"F,ÆØ
,*ª.º"ı' ªØª+",-+"ı' ŒÆd ç&4"+ !Ææ-å"+#Æ' #"E' ¸ÆŒ*%ÆØ,"+("Ø' I+ÆªŒ.)ÆØ
K' #e !"º*,*E+.
46 He uses the term K!*6*ºŁ0+ (1.22.2), which he employs elsewhere to describe the
motion of attacking the enemy: Connor (1984), 27; Crane (1996), 36. See Crane
(1996), 70 and Moles (1999) for the tension between writing and memorializing. The
same verb is used by Herodotus in a similar context: see Ch. 3, n. 4 above.
47 ‘Exiled from his city and separated from the practices of empire, Thucydides
ultimately turned his full energies to the pursuit and analysis of evidence’: Crane
(1996), 37.
48 In fact, Thucydides brings his methodological section to an end by explicitly
inviting reflection on the task of reading. As a result, expectations of how to decode
the text are infinitely deferred, as Thucydides instead promises some future benefit for
those who look at his monument closely without clear indication what those benefits
may be perceived to be, for whom, in what way. For the relation of #e )Æç-' to the future
see: Woodman (1988), 24; Moles (1993), 107–9. Nicolai (1995) discusses modern
(pp. 13–16) and ancient (pp. 17–25) responses to these fateful words.
49 Thucydides’ statement has prompted much comment. See e.g. Gomme (1945),
153; Sealey (1957); Andrewes (1959); von Fritz (1967), 623–4; Heubeck (1980); Heath
(1986); J. Richardson (1990); Hornblower (1991), 64–6; Moles (1993); Swain (1993),
(1994), 318–19; Sertcan (1997); Rood (1998), 208–10; Crane (1998), 36–71. On
the specific question of the origins of the war, see: Kagan (1969); de Ste Croix (1972),
51–63.
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On account of which they dissolved the peace treaties, I wrote up first the causes
and differences, so that no one need enquire further on account of which this
war between the Greeks broke out. For the truest cause, and the one least
apparent in speech, I consider that the Athenians becoming great and putting
fear on the Lacedaemonians compelled them to war.
Thucydides’ reassurance to his reader that the work has been done and
that no further research (#"F ,8 #Ø+Æ ÇÅ#B)ÆØ !"#*) need be done has
prompted some critics to claim that this marks the end of investigation:
the reader has only to read the text to find out the causes of the war.50
But the sequence of tenses identified earlier marks an important dis-
tinction here between the act of writing—the aorist ‘I wrote’
(!æ"/ªæÆłÆ)—and an act of judgement—the present ‘I consider’
(>ª"F,ÆØ). The construction of the text belongs necessarily to the past
and, as a result, cannot be accessed by the reader: the reader must simply
accept Thucydides’ narrative as the basis for any account on the war.
The narrator’s judgement, however, belongs to the present: the cause of
the war is a matter of opinion.
At one level this might not materially appear to make much differ-
ence: Thucydides’ interpretation determines the point from which he
begins his narrative. Nevertheless, he makes the beginning difficult to
read as anything other than a personal judgement: ‘I wrote down the
causes (ÆN#(ÆØ),’ Thucydides explains, ‘but the truest cause (!æ&çÆ)Ø')
was this.’51 On the face of it, Thucydides subordinates the first c(l)ause
to the second, since otherwise it would make no sense for him to claim
the second cause as the ‘truest’ one. But that interpretation immediately
presents a problem, since the usual word for ‘cause’ or ‘beginning’ is
ÆN#(Æ; yet, that is exactly the term which Thucydides passes over here.
Instead, Thucydides uses the word !æ&çÆ)Ø' to denote the ‘truest
cause’, when it usually means ‘excuse’, as it does everywhere else in his
narrative.52 Normally, then, !æ&çÆ)Ø' would be contrasted with ÆN#(Æ,
50 ‘He invites his reader to agree to his judgment on the basis of the facts he presents
(1.21.2, cf. 5.26.2) and not to continue inquiry on the origins of the war, for which he
provides the truest explanation (1.23.5–6)’: Edmunds (1993), 842.
51 In addition to n. 49 above, see Pearson (1952; 1972); Rawlings (1975) on
prophasis. Cf. Allison (1997a), 115–19.
52 Gomme (1945), 153 notes that both words have a wide range of meanings, and
appear to shift in sense over the course of the narrative: ‘In i.118.1 what are here the
ÆN#(Æ are called the !æ&çÆ)Ø'; and in i.146, where he sums up the previous narrative
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but in a negative way: normally it means precisely the opposite to the
‘true cause’; but, here, Thucydides uses !æ&çÆ)Ø' to designate the ‘truest
cause’. In expressing his opinion, therefore, Thucydides draws upon
deliberately provocative—even paradoxical—language.53 The narrator
passes judgement; but readers cannot avoid exercising their own judge-
ment either, and moreover, in such a way that brings their expectations
into conflict with the narrator’s opinion.
At another level, identifying the cause of conflict and demonstrating the
difficulty of defining the origins goes back to the Iliad (Il. 1.6–10).
Similarly, Herodotus states as his opening aim the discovery of the
‘cause’ (ÆN#(Æ) of the war between Greeks and barbarians (Hdt. 1.1.1),
only to proceed with a playful reworking of prior competing claims before
asserting the validity of his own enquiry.54 Here Thucydides invites spec-
ulation into the very nature of causality and what constitutes a ‘cause’ by
prompting an investigation into the relationship between ÆN#(Æ and
!æ&çÆ)Ø'. That picture becomes all themore complicated when the ‘truest
!æ&çÆ)Ø'’, ‘the one least apparent in speech (IçÆ+*)#.#Å+ %b º&ªøfi )’, is
very noticeably raised in the very first speech of the narrative.55
Far from being represented as unproblematic assertions of authority,
Thucydides’ narratorial incursions into his text pose a series of questions
that involve the reader in pondering the issues raised by the narrative.
One effect is to set into relief Thucydides’ interpretative claims: while
the composition of the text is irrevocably and inevitably in the past (for
how could a reader gain access to the information available to the
(24–88, 119–45), he uses first the same words as here, ÆN#(ÆØ ŒÆd %ØÆç"æÆ(, then
)!"+%H+ ªaæ 6/ªåı)Ø' #a ªØª+&,*+Æ q+ ŒÆd !æ&çÆ)Ø' #"F !"º*,*E+, the external
occasion of the war, referring to the same events as ÆN#(ÆØ ŒÆd %ØÆç"æÆ( .’ He concludes:
‘there is thus no linguistic reason, and no reason of style, against taking ÆN#(Æ and
!æ&çÆ)Ø' as of equivalent meaning in this passage.’ Cf. Cornford (1907), 57–68. See
most recently Moles (2011).
53 The ÆN#(ÆØ have true explanatory force: Heath (1986); !æ&çÆ)Ø', a human construct,
can be distinguished from ÆN#(Æ, something ‘natural’: Allison (1997a), 115–19, 192.
54 On various ways of defining ÆN#(Æ, see Darbo–Peschanski (1997), esp. 1076, n. 62
on Thucydides; cf. Goldhill (2002), 13–15. Herodotus has the same collocation of
ananke¯ and the ‘truest logos’ at 7.233. Cf. Crane (1998), 37, n. 6.
55 The Corcyraeans make it the linchpin of their appeal to the Athenians: ç&4øfi #fiH
9,*#-æøfi , 1.33.3. Gomme (1945), 168 notes in passing that ‘this was Thucydides’ view of
the true cause of the war’. Cf. Hornblower (1991), 78. Neither commentator makes
anything of the tension between Thucydides’ description of the cause as the ‘one least
apparent in speech’ and its presence in the first speech of the narrative. But seeMoles (2011).
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author?), what one does with that material, and the conclusions one
reaches, is not dictated. In fact, the narrator appears to express his
opinions in a deliberately provocative and contentious manner in
order to prompt debate.
By way of comparison to the openness of the ago¯n that will be argued
in section 2, it might first be instructive to consider the other formal
device that Thucydides draws upon to represent speech: the dialogue.
Take up anything untoward that we say,
and judge (5.85–113)
Dialogue enjoys a similarly long narrative history as debate, but it is
associated with a rather different context: not the public arena of the
assembly, but the elite, private space of the symposium.56 Featuring
prominently at the beginning of Herodotus in his depiction of Croesus’
meeting with Solon, it occurs liberally throughout the rest of the
History. The picture is very different in Thucydides, who represents
only two dialogues in the whole of his narrative.57 The first, a drawn-
out, triangulated exchange between the Plataeans, Spartans and Athe-
nians, demonstrates the overweening influence of the two major powers
and the difficulty of maintaining neutrality once conflict has begun: the
Plataeans are obliged to remain in the war by their Athenian allies, who
are not even present during the formal negotiations.58
The infamous example of the Melian dialogue illustrates a similar
point, as the Athenians first send an expedition to Melos on the basis
that the island’s continued neutrality constitutes a threat to their
empire, and then enter into discussion with the leading oligarchs:
56 Loraux (1998).
57 Gomme (1945), 144 notes the difference from Herodotus. For a helpful table of
speeches, with a bibliography, see W. West (1973a and b); cf. Debnar (2001) 221, n. 1.
See also H.-P. Stahl (1966; 1973); Immerwahr (1973); Raubitschek (1973); Hammond
(1973); Macleod (1983), 52–122; Hornblower (1987); Debnar (2001).
58 Thuc. 2.71–4. The drawn-out episode serves to emphasize the absent presence of
the Athenians without overtly condemning either side. Indeed, scholars have been
generally approving of Archidamus’ behaviour: Debnar (2001), 96–101; cf. Orwin
(1994), 58. This low-key beginning, during which responsibility for the breakdown of
negotiations is not dwelled upon, will, of course, lead to the ultimate destruction of
Plataea: see sec. 3 below. In this light, the judgement that this exchange has a ‘disap-
pointing outcome’ (Debnar (2001), 101) may seem rather inadequate.
Thucydides writes debate 219
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 219 29.4.2011 11:30am
from its low-key beginnings Thucydides sets the stage for the extra-
ordinary scene of dialogue that follows.59 The fact that the Athenians
invite the Melians to parley ‘before doing wrong to the land’ (!æd+
I%ØŒ*E+ #Ø #B' ªB', 5.84.3) may suggest, as it has to one scholar at least,
a humanitarian aspect to the episode: the Melians are at least given the
opportunity to surrender.60 In addition, the dialogue form could in-
dicate an exchange of ideas not determined by authorial dictate, parti-
cularly given the striking absence of narratorial commentary throughout
the whole episode.61 Significantly, however, the dialogue does not
represent a negotiation or lead to compromise: each new path sought
out by the Melians is ring-fenced and closed off by the Athenians, in
much the same way as the Athenian forces blockade the island. This
dialogue at any rate does not seem so much a means of exchange to open
up new ways of thinking as a manifestation of power.62
In this light, the opening frame takes on additional import. Here
Thucydides draws explicit attention to the way the dialogue is set up.
59 See e.g. Treu (1954); Andrewes (1960); H.-P. Stahl (1966), 158–71; Macleod
(1983), 52–67; Deininger (1987); Morrison (2000); Kallet (2001), 9–20.
60 Bosworth (1993). It is perhaps truer to say that Thucydides avoids representing a
scenario from which easy lessons can be drawn: the Melians are also culpable in their
susceptibility to fine-sounding rhetoric; cf. Connor (1984), 153. On the other hand, the
justification that ‘we all know’ that the strong rule over the weak (cf. Andrewes (1960), 6)
earns a fierce rejoinder from Crane (1998), 238–46, who compares the Athenians’
rejection of pity to their previous representation in Herodotus.
61 Andrade (1993–4) interprets the absence of evaluative comment as a sign of poly-
phony: ‘La “objetividad” de Tucı´dides se funda en e´ste su frecuente enmascararse detra´s de
los personajes, en dejar oir sus voces sin emitir, en muchos casos, sen˜ales claras de un juicio
de valor ni determinar sus palabras inserta´ndolas en un discurso monolo´gico autoral’ (‘The
“objectivity” of Thucydides is based on his frequently hiding behind the mask of his
character, on letting their voices be heard without expressing, in most cases, clear signals
of value-judgement, and without determining their words by inserting them into a mono-
logic authorial discourse’: p. 21). Cagnetta (1990) comments that the problem with the
dialogue is that there is no judge. Recent scholarship on Plato has emphasized the possibility
of ‘dialogism’: Griswold, ed. (1988), esp. the contributions by Desjardins, Griswold, and
Mittelstrass; and Euben (1994; 1996). But see Barber (1996) for a strong rebuttal. The ways
in which Plato frames his dialogues is crucial: Goldhill (1993); J. Henderson (2000); cf.
Prologue, n. 67 above.
62 Price (2001), 200–1 suggests that the Athenians articulate their position as if they
were relaying an extended speech, which is barely disguised by the dialogue form. The
overtly blunt language of Thucydides’ Athenians has attracted critical attention: Crane
(1998), 242, 246–7 notes that the first occasion the Athenians speak, they already refer to
arguments based on their Persian War service as cliche´ 1.73.2). Deininger (1987), 123–
30 discusses the sophistic background to the ‘might is right’ claim.
220 Act II: Historiography
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 220 29.4.2011 11:30am
The Melian representatives, members of the ruling oligarchy, prevent
the Athenians from speaking before the people ("R' "ƒ ?8ºØ"Ø !æe' ,b+
#e !ºBŁ"' "PŒ XªÆª"+, 5.84.3)—presumably because they fear lest the
Athenians, given their experience in democratic rhetoric, persuade the
de¯mos.63 Instead, at the suggestion of the Athenians, the two sides enter
into dialogue. The Athenian proposal suggests a concern to meet the
Melians on their own turf: indeed, their intention to ‘instruct’ their
interlocutors recalls the elitist tradition of wisdom dialogue.64 There is
more, then, to these initial skirmishes than a choice over the form which
the discussion will take: the difference in form reflects an ideological
divide between democratic debate on the one hand, and aristocratic
dialogue on the other,65 between the form Thucydides adopts else-
where, and this unique example from which he absents himself.
Yet, in spite of the overt absence of the narrator, the Melian dialogue
occupies a clear place in the narrative. As many scholars have noted,
Melos signals a prelude to the attack against Sicily,66 which the narrator
has already identified as the cause of Athens’ eventual defeat in the
war.67 Paradoxically, then, at the point when author appears to absent
himself, the more likely the reader is to endorse Thucydides’ narrative of
Athenian defeat, particularly if this episode is reread after the Sicilian
episode. As, indeed, the Athenians so clearly demonstrate, the dialogue
form restricts the discussion and closes off dissent. The next section will
argue that the ago¯n, as a means of representation, is much less focused
and not so easily controlled.
63 This is what the Athenians suspect at least: ‘K!*Ø%c "P !æe' #e !ºBŁ"' "ƒ º&ª"Ø
ª(ª+"+#ÆØ, ‹!ø' %c ,c 6ı+*å*E Þ8)*Ø "ƒ !"ºº"d K!Æªøªa ŒÆd I+-º*ªŒ#Æ K).!Æ6
IŒ"/)Æ+#*' >,H+ I!Æ#ÅŁH)Ø+ (ªØª+0)Œ",*+ ªaæ ‹#Ø #"F#" çæ"+*E >,H+ > K' #"f'
Oº(ª"ı' Iªøª8)’, 5.85.
64 ŒÆŁ7 ;ŒÆ)#"+ ªaæ ŒÆd ,Å%7 9,*E' 5+d º&ªøfi , Iººa !æe' #e ,c %"Œ"F+ K!Ø#Å%*(ø'
º-ª*)ŁÆØ *PŁf' f!"ºÆ,4.+"+#*' Œæ(+*#*. ŒÆd !æH#"+ *N Iæ-)Œ*Ø ‰' º-ª",*+ *Y!Æ#*,
5.85.
65 Loraux (1998), 267 describes this dialogue as: ‘Choix politique aristocratique—ou,
du moins, anti-democratique.’
66 See esp. Macleod (1983), 52–67; Connor (1984), 147–57, 158, with n. 1. Ques-
tions of Melos’ strategic importance are explicitly passed over in the dialogue. Instead the
Athenians are made to espouse a logic of empire: see de Romilly (1963), 273–310. Crane
(1998), 246–57 sees the Athenians as acting like Persians.
67 Thuc. 2.65.10.
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2. THE DIALOGIC AGO¯N (THUCYDIDES 1, 3, 8)
The previous section analysed Thucydides’ statements on his methodol-
ogy for constructing his narrative and found that, contrary to the
assumptions of most critics, the narrator’s utterances are not simply to
be seen as assertions of authority, but as thought-provoking proposi-
tions. Thucydides is well aware of his responsibility for constructing the
narrative, and does not attempt to disguise his hand in its composition;
yet, at the same time, his reader cannot fail to recognize the narrator’s
point of view, which seems to be expressed in such a way as to provoke an
inquisitive response. Thus Thucydides appears to stake his authority on
adopting a position of dissent—and challenges the reader to do the same.
This section considers Thucydides’ representation of debate. It is
generally accepted that Thucydides shows strong disapproval of debate
and, in particular, of those conducted within Athens. Yet this view
overlooks two crucial features that set Thucydides in relation to
Herodotus: like Herodotus, Thucydides shows a keen awareness of
the problem of the lack of debate; unlike Herodotus, however, he
represents debate in a formal manner, in terms of both examining its
institutional context and representing it within the narrative. By repre-
senting debate as an ago¯n Thucydides both demonstrates its limitations
in the context of the public assembly, and opens up possibilities of its
utility for a reader. In this way, Thucydides is not only critical of debate,
as it is practised in the assemblies around Greece; he also utilizes it for
reproducing a political culture within his text.
No one still spoke in opposition
In line with the dominant view of Thucydides’ authorial persona, the
scholarly consensus holds that Thucydides shows strong disapproval of
debate, particularly of those debates conducted in the democratic frame-
work of his city, Athens.68 It is certainly true that the narrator exposes a
succession of speakers deceiving the de¯mos in the assembly, a picture
68 See esp. Ober (1998), 52–121. The best criticism of Thucydides’ speeches—in
terms of unmasking the speakers’ rhetoric—remains Macleod (1983), 52–122. But see
also Hesk (2000), 248–58.
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which has much in common with Aristophanes’ comedies and even
recalls Herodotus’ judgement that it was easier to deceive a mass of
people than a single individual.69 Yet, the narrator demonstrates an
equally sceptical view of the lack of debate in the political communities
in and around Greece.
The awareness of the problem of the lack of debate comes to the fore in
Thucydides’ description of two scenes of civil strife, as if the absence of a
forum for public debate were the symptom of, and even a contributory
factor to, a deeper malaise. The first, and paradigmatic, example of civil
strife is Corcyra, which is shot through with language of competition.70
People ‘competed in every way’ (!Æ+#d %b #æ&!øfi Iªø+ØÇ&,*+"Ø, 3.82.8)
to carry out themost terrible acts; a culture of ‘competition in being clever’
(6ı+-)*ø' Iªø+(),Æ, 3.82.7) prevailed; those citizens who tried to take
the ‘middle way’ (#a %b ,-)Æ #H+ !"ºØ#H+, 3.82.8) were killed, either
because of envy or else because of ‘their failure to join in the ago¯n’ ("P
6ı+Åªø+(Ç"+#", 3.82.8). Instead of opening up a middle ground, in times
of war and, in particular, of civil strife competition between citizens leads
to the dissolution of the civic body; the ago¯n here is both symptom and
cause of the worsening situation, and debate suffers. As a result, the
community’s valorization of dissent, which in the Iliad had been founded
as a response to civil strife, here breaks down in its midst: ‘He who was
violent was always trustworthy, he who disagreed (› %7 I+#Øº-ªø+) was
held in suspicion’ (3.82.3). Thucydides’ narrative not only confronts the
way politics is being done in the community; it also challenges the
achievement of the Iliad. If you want to debate properly, don’t look to
the conventional political institutions, which are so easily corruptible in
difficult times, or to traditional epic narratives, which give a fancifully
idealistic portrait of debate. Thucydides’ narrative tells it how it is.71
69 See Ch. 3, sec. 1 above. Cleon (4.17) and Alcibiades (5.45) respectively pull the
wool over the de¯mos’ eyes by manipulating assembly procedure and style. For Thucy-
dides’ (possibly misleading) representation of Cleon’s prominence in the Pylos debate,
see H. Flower (1992).
70 On the corruption of language: J. Wilson (1982a); Allison (1997a) 163–71. On
this scene in general: Macleod (1983), 123–39; Orwin (1994), 175. On stasis in
Thucydides’ narrative and beyond, see the two recent works: Price (2001); Loraux
(2002).
71 Hence his emphasis on ‘keeping as close as possible to the general thought (>
6ı,!.)Å ª+0,Å) of what was actually said’, 1.22.1: see sec. 1 above, and esp. n. 4 on
ª+0,Å.
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By book 8, the last extant book of Thucydides’ work, the civil strife
which had so afflicted Corcyra now infects Athens.72 Interestingly, the
site in and over which Thucydides denotes the shift in power from the
democracy to the plotting oligarchs is the assembly. Though debate
continues under the tutelage of the four hundred, Thucydides wryly
observes that ‘no one still spoke in opposition’ (I+#-º*ª- #* "P%*d' :#Ø
#H+ ¼ººø+); anyone who did immediately died ‘in some convenient
way’ (KŒ #æ&!"ı #Ø+e' K!Ø#Å%*("ı, 8.66.1–2).73 Presently the city’s
affairs are presided over by behind-the-scene shadow-puppeteers, aris-
tocrats like Antiphon, ‘a man who never came before the de¯mos nor
before any other ago¯n if he could help it’ (K' ,b+ %B,"+ "P !ÆæØg+ "P%7 K'
¼ºº"+ IªH+Æ 5Œ"/)Ø"' "P%-+Æ, 8.68.1). While Thucydides’ attitude
towards debate is normally taken as uniformly critical, here he identifies
the suppression of debate as the problem: the oligarchs do away with all
who try to speak against them, and use the assembly as little more than a
rubber-stamping chamber.74 Moreover, the suppression of alternative
perspectives is commonly held to be the position of Thucydides.75 But
72 Until recently book 8 was condemned as either unfinished or simply dull: Corn-
ford (1907), 244. Building on more stylistically sensitive criticism by Macleod (1983),
141 and Connor (1984), 210–30, recent critics have drawn attention to the different
effects Thucydides’ shift in narrative technique produce. According to Rood (1998),
251–84, ‘Thucydides suggests through echoes of his earlier narrative that the war is
entering a new, complex phase, and that this phase will be unexpectedly long’ (p. 253).
Dewald (2005), ch. 6 shows how closely the Aegean narrative of book 8 corresponds
stylistically to the Sicilian expedition by presenting a single, continuous story.
73 On the bitter irony of Thucydides’ description, see Connor (1984), 223 n. 25: ‘An
epite¯deios, “a suitable one, ” was someone you could rely upon, a good friend. The word
becomes a feature of oligarchic language, meaning someone who was suited to the
oligarchy, that is who could be relied upon to support it, 8.48.2; 54.3; 63.4; 64.4; cf.
5.76.2 . . .To say that someone died “from some suitable means” catches the tone of
oligarchic speech while showing how widely it can be extended to mask the violence of
the conspirators.’
74 Greenwood (2006), 95 comments: ‘In Book 8 the oligarchic revolution marks the
breakdown of democratic politics, which derived its stability precisely from its engage-
ment in institutionalized conflict.’ She, however, stresses the unflattering picture of the
de¯mos in the oligarchic revolution (pp. 89–97). Elsewhere she connects the de¯mos’ silence
here (8.66) to a series of critical sketches of the Assembly, notably the silence of those
who disagreed with the decision to sail to Sicily (6.24.4): Greenwood (2004), 185–9. As
the stasis in Corcyra shows, however, the problem of the lack of dissent (especially during
times of war) extends beyond Athens.
75 But see Farrar (1988), 131: ‘Thucydides’ History is an argument: it both justifies
itself (that is, shows that history is the proper way to think about—and in—politics, and
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his commentary here—all the more effective for its terseness—shows
the clear undesirability of debate in which only one voice is heard.76
In fact, it may be significant that one of the ways in which
Thucydides succeeds in portraying the chaos inflicting the Greek
world in book 8 is precisely by not representing any debates at all. In
this world, which shows the ever-increasing disintegration of the in-
stitutional fabric of Greek culture, there is no place for conventional
politics, only for the Odyssean adventures of individuals such as
Alcibiades.77
Thucydides’ answer to the limitations to and corruption of conven-
tional politics is the narrative he constructs, but not in the sense that it
provides the solution; on the contrary, his narrative offers a response by
means of its capacity to put its readership through the process of
doing politics. Rather than retreating into the murky and terrifying
world of an Antiphon who never entered the ago¯n, Thucydides
writes back by representing debate in the form of ago¯n. Institutional
debate is not possible in that world of shadowy politics, which has
already seen Corcyra tear itself apart, with Athens sooner or later to
follow; it is not only possible, but necessary, in its recuperation by
Thucydides.
that it makes historical judgement possible) and justifies also a particular set of actions in
a particular context . . .Thucydides did not seek to close off reflectiveness or the collective
exercise of judgement, but to shape it.’ Ober, however, reads Farrar’s ‘shaping of
judgement’ as ‘control of interpretation’, which, he claims, ‘would be regarded as
antidemocratic by fifth-century Athenians’: Ober (1996) 123.
76 Price (2001), 326 compares Thucydides’ account of the establishment of the four
hundred to Aristotle ([Ath. Pol.] 8.69–70), in which the ‘matter-of-fact statement that
the Athenians had no choice (M+ÆªŒ.)ŁÅ)Æ+) but to convert their democracy into an
oligarchy of four hundred, without a hint of the violence employed or of dissent in
Athens, as well as his account of procedure in the Assembly dissolving the democracy
. . . lend an air of inevitability and orderliness’. Thucydides, on the other hand, ‘will not
abet the propaganda and legal/constitutional tricks of the Four Hundred. Rather his
purpose is to expose them.’ (p. 325)
77 Gribble (1999), 202 comments: ‘In the episodes of Alcibiades’ deception of the
Spartan ambassadors in 5.43–6, for example, or of the Athenian delegation to Tissa-
phernes in 8.56, Alcibiades takes on the role of the Odyssean or Themistoclean trickster,
equipped with cunning intelligence.’ On the later tradition of Alcibiades as polytropos:
Detienne and Vernant (1991), 269–70. On the resonances of Thucydides book 8 with
tragedy, see Greenwood (2006), 98–107, who draws out parallel themes in Sophocles’
Philoctetes, a play in which Odysseus plays a prominent role.
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They say that . . . (1.32–43)
Speech in Herodotus takes many different forms, with liberal scatter-
ings of conversation, dialogue and single speeches in the manner of epic
narrative; assembly talk is just one form among many. Moreover,
Herodotus demonstrates a capacity to represent debate more formally,
especially as his narrative approaches the recent past and enters a period
when Greek cities would have enjoyed a developed institutional frame-
work.78 Yet, the fact that debate remains less prominent in form and
role is significant: Herodotus sets his enquiry in competition with the
public institution of assembly, where politics—including deliberation,
exercising historical judgement, and interpreting oracles and so on,—is
usually done. The way debate is represented in Herodotus—frequently
outside an institutional framework—reflects his own ambiguous parti-
cipation in civic affairs, as a prose-writer crossing over and straddling
more than one particular polis.
Thucydides represents debate in a radically different manner. Gone is
the sheer variety of different forms: Thucydides reduces heterogeneous
opinions to a model of speech and counter-speech, where, within care-
fully bounded parameters, opposing speakers compete with each other
to try to persuade a judging audience.79 Even those speeches that are not
formally set in paired opposition form some kind of agonistic relation-
ship with other speeches or events.80 On occasion Thucydides appears
78 It is striking that Herodotus, when recording the more familiar, recent past of
Greece, represents speech in a more formal, argumentative style as, for example, with the
ago¯n between the Athenians and Tegeans (9.26–8), on which see Flower and Marincola
(2002), 147–58.
79 Cogan (1981), 1 notes eight debates out of twenty-seven speeches. For Yunis
(2003), Thucydides’ antilogizing of speech has the result of putting ‘opposing views
into sharpest possible antithesis with no accommodation for synthesis’ (p. 204). On
Thucydides’ debt to Protagoras, see Yunis (1998), 234–9; (2003), 204; cf. Farrar (1988);
Allison (1997a), 248.
80 So e.g. Pericles’ first speech before the Athenians answers the Corinthian ultima-
tum at the Spartan congress; his second speech answers the reported speech of Archida-
mus (on which see Connor (1984), 49–51 with n. 58); the funeral oration is answered by
the plague: Parry (1989). Yunis (2003), 204 comments: ‘Taken as a group, all the
Thucydidean speeches function in a similar manner to a single antilogy, except with a
broader, more complex ranger of perspectives. As a fixed written text, each speech
crystallizes a political insight conditioned by one set of circumstances and one speaker’s
agenda. No single speech, not even any of those of Pericles, has ultimate authority; all
compete in the reader’s mind for interpretative potential.’
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even to stress the artificiality of his presentation.81 Thus, even when
other voices make it onto Thucydides’ stage, they are strictly policed,
which again suggests the narrator’s dominant role in presenting the
material. Nevertheless, how one should approach Thucydides’ debates
remains an important question.82
While dialogue appears in various informal manifestations in pre-
vious narrative works, including Herodotus’ History, in characteristic
fashion Thucydides formalizes its structure and manufactures a scene
akin to a dramatic performance without the mediation of the narrator.
But, as we have seen far from lacking authorial guidance, the dialogue
form exerts strict control over the material it presents: whether it is the
Athenians blocking the Melians’ every attempt to escape the hard-
headed logic of their situation, or Thucydides’ reader applying that
same logic of imperialism to assessing the Sicilian expedition, little
opportunity to dissent presents itself.
But the Melian dialogue stands unique in Thucydides narrative; by
far the most common form of quotation is public speech in the
assembly. Left at that, this would demonstrate Thucydides’ interest in
investigating deliberation within the community’s broader institutional
framework, in a significant departure from Herodotus; it is also im-
portant to note that Thucydides’ enquiry is not aimed solely at his city’s
democratic processes, but also at the decision-making capacities of all
the Greek city-states, including Sparta and Sicily.83 But Thucydides’
81 So e.g. he balances the Corinthians’ condemnation of perceived Athenian aggres-
sion by providing a detailed point-by-point Athenian rejoinder, introduced by the casual
remark that ‘there happened to be some Athenians present’ (1.72.1). For a discussion of
the Athenians at Sparta, see Gomme (1945), 252–6. The fact that the Athenians are
talking to Spartans might account for their bluntness: Pelling (2000), 122.
82 How are the debates paradigmatic? According to Cogan (1981), the speeches
represent a change of policy, one standing for the status quo, the other for change. As
the war proceeds, these changes are made for the worse. It is questionable, however,
whether the debates do mark a change in policy. Following the Mytilenaean debate, the
next revolting ally of whom we hear, Scione, receives the punishment that Cleon had
earlier recommended. Furthermore, it seems somewhat problematic to conclude that
Cleon, in that debate, represents the status quo. His adherence to tradition is a rhetorical
ploy and ought to be regarded as such: Macleod (1983), 94.
83 Ober’s selection of what debates to analyse—those concerning Corcyra, Mytilene
and Sicily—reflect his own preconceptions, which are to explore the assembly in Athens.
It is important to note, however, that since Thucydides does not restrict his use of the
ago¯n to Athens, he cannot be exposing debate only there. For the debates at Sparta, see
Debnar (2001).
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reworking of debate as ago¯n also reproduces the tension between assem-
bly deliberation and its textual representation. To test the thesis that
Thucydides employs the ago¯n as a reading strategy for prompting
informed dissent, the rest of this section focuses on the first scene of
formal debate as a case study: that is, the debate between the Corcyr-
aeans and the Corinthians delivered in Athens prior to the war.84
While Thucydides’ narrative of the war begins simply enough, with
the laconic ‘Epidamnus was a city’ (¯!(%Æ,+&' K)#Ø !&ºØ', 1.24.1), a
series of events rapidly unfold which paradigmatically exemplify the
upheaval this war causes.85 The Corinthians and Corcyraeans are drawn
into the internal conflict in Epidamnus in support of parties that
paradoxically represent their ideological opponents: the oligarchic
Corinthians come to the aid of the Epidamnian democrats; the demo-
cratic Corcyraeans, the oligarchs.86 Fearing defeat at the hands of
superior forces, the Corcyraeans send a delegation to Athens to ask for
an alliance; hard on their heels are the Corinthians, who fear lest these
two powerful navies should form a coalition against them. Thucydides
then records the speeches that were made on either side in the Athenian
assembly.
The Corcyraeans employ a number of strategies by means of which
they hope to gain the Athenians’ favour. According to the later rheto-
rical treatises, it was standard to appeal to justice when soliciting an
alliance: the first word of the Corcyraeans’ speech is %(ŒÆØ"+, ‘it is right’
(1.32.1).87 As the sentence continues, however, %(ŒÆØ"+ serves not so
much to represent a claim to justice as to introduce a key theme of the
speech: ‘it is just,’ the Corcyraeans, propose, ‘to teach you how it will be
expedient.’ In this way the idea of justice slides into its conceptual
84 See Debnar (2001) for a similar analysis of Thucydides’ speeches in relation to
their embedded audience.
85 See Hornblower (1987), 116 for the Homeric-style low-key introduction (cf. Il.
6.152); cf. Dion. Comp. 4. See also Gomme (1945), 158 for the connection to
Herodotus’ beginning (˚æ"E)"' q+ ¸ı%e' ,b+ ª-+"', 1.6).
86 Crane (1998), 97–105 discusses the puzzling nature of this introductory narrative
from an alternative perspective: that is, its intensely emotional aspect, when Thucydides’
usual ruthless exposure of sentimentality might have been expected. He notes that the
Corcyraeans were ‘puffed up’ (K!ÆØæ&,*+"Ø, 1.25.4) because of the occupation of their
island by Phaeacians, whose glory (Œº-"') was their ships. We see here the potent force of
myth on contemporary politics.
87 See e.g. Rhet. ad. Alex. 1424b28. See Hornblower (1987), 47; (1991), 75–6.
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opposite of expediency.88 On the one hand, this could suggest a sleight
of hand on the part of the Corcyraeans, as they introduce the notion of
expediency through the language of justice. Alternatively, it could be
Thucydides’ reconstruction of their speech that draws attention to the
dissonance between their expression of conventional values and the self-
serving tenor of their argument.89
The tension between these two elements—imitation of the speakers’
persuasive strategy and its exposure—becomes more apparent from the
next line. Referring to themselves as objects of a third-person directive,
‘the Corcyraeans ordered us’ (‘˚*æŒıæÆE"Ø %b . . . I!-)#*ØºÆ+ >,A'’,
1.32.2), the speakers configure themselves as impartial representatives
without a personal stake in what they have to say. It is only after they
have introduced their usefulness to the Athenians (1.33.1) that they
become bolder in their modes of address. Using a series of prefixes and
personal pronouns, they align their fate with the Athenians’ in common
cause against the Corinthian threat: the Corinthians have attacked them
first (‘!æ"ŒÆ#ÆºÆ,4.+"+#Æ'’, 1.33.3) as a pre-emptive strike against
Athenian power (‘K' #c+ 9,*#-æÆ+ K!Øå*(æÅ)Ø+’, 1.33.3): this should
bring them together ‘in common hatred’ (‘#fiH Œ"Ø+fiH :åŁ*Ø’, 1.33.3).
Having established a special relationship with their audience, the speak-
ers next use language that recalls their opening third-person address: ‘if
they should say that it is not just that you receive their colonists’ (‘j+ %b
º-ªø)Ø+ ‰' "P %(ŒÆØ"+ #"f' )ç*#-æ"ı' I!"(Œ"ı' 9,A' %-å*)ŁÆØ’,
1.34.1)—only now, however, the Corinthians are relegated to the
position of outsiders, left trying to claim what is just or not.90 Similarly,
it is no longer the Athenians who need instructing, but the Corinthians:
‘Let them learn’ (‘,ÆŁ&+#ø+’, 1.34.1). The reader thus gains an insight
into how language performs as the Corcyraeans move closer to the
Athenians in terms of address and drive a wedge between them and
the Corinthians.
88 The scholiast on 1.32 reads: ‘The speech of the Corcyraeans places greater em-
phasis upon expediency than on what is just, that of the Corinthians justice more than
expediency.’ Cf. Macleod (1983), 55; Crane (1998), 105–8. See also Heath (1990).
89 Connor (1984), 34, n. 33 notes the weakness of the Corcyraean position from the
perspective of traditional values: ‘They had no claim on Athenians either by kinship of by
past services.’ Cf. Cogan (1981), 10–13.
90 The Corinthians are now relegated to the third person, whereas before the speakers
referred to themselves in such a way.
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Of interest too is the means by which the Corcyraeans make the case
for their usefulness, having initially acknowledged their position of
weakness in having to solicit the Athenians for an alliance (1.32.4–5):
‘ŒÆd !*æØ-)#ÅŒ*+ > %"Œ"F)Æ >,H+ !æ&#*æ"+ )øçæ")/+Å, #e ,c K+ Iºº"#æ(fi Æ
6ı,,Æå(fi Æ #fi B #"F !-ºÆ' ª+0,fi Å 6ıªŒØ+%ı+*/*Ø+, +F+ I4"ıº(Æ ŒÆd I)Ł-+*ØÆ
çÆØ+",-+Å . . . K!*Ø%c %b . . . >,*E' I%/+Æ#"Ø ›æH,*+ ‹+#*' #fi B "NŒ*(fi Æ ,&+"+
%ı+.,*Ø !*æØª*+-)ŁÆØ, ŒÆd –,Æ ,-ªÆ' › Œ(+%ı+"' *N K)&,*ŁÆ 9!7 ÆP#"E',
I+.ªŒÅ ŒÆd 9,H+ ŒÆd ¼ºº"ı !Æ+#e' K!ØŒ"ıæ(Æ' %*E)ŁÆØ, ŒÆd 6ıªª+0,Å *N ,c
,*#a ŒÆŒ(Æ', %&6Å' %b ,Aºº"+ ±,Ææ#(fi Æ #fi B !æ&#*æ"+ I!æÆª,")/+fi Å K+Æ+#(Æ
#"º,H,*+’.
‘Our previous thinking, which we considered wise since we didn’t risk being
dragged into someone else’s war by someone else’s policy, has turned out to be
not good planning and lacking strength. Since we see that we’ll be unable to
survive with only our own resources, and the danger is great if we are over-
powered by them, it is necessary for us to get help from you or from any other,
and we ought to get sympathy now that we venture on an opposing course of
action having kept ourselves to ourselves, not for any sinister reason, but rather
in an error of judgement.’
Prior to the present crisis their thinking (> %"Œ"F)Æ >,H+) had been that
being in an alliance (6ı,,Æå(Æ) meant having to share in the dangers
(6ıªŒØ+%ı+*/*Ø+). It has turned out (#*#/åŒ*), however, that they now
face a truly great danger (,-ªÆ' › Œ(+%ı+"'), since they have been left
alone, bereft (KæB,"Ø, 1.32.4) of allies. Therefore, they must (I+.ªŒÅ)
reverse their previous policy, which they now recognize as having been
made in error (±,Ææ#(Æ), and seek an alliance—a change of mind that
ought to elicit sympathy (6ıªª+0,Å). To seasoned spectators of the
theatre, this appeal has a suggestive ring about it: it strikingly recalls the
language of tragedy and the image of the isolated hero.91 Indeed, some
of the terminology reappears to anticipate Aristotle’s reflections on the
kind of ‘error’ a character should make if he is to be considered truly
tragic, particularly the distinction that their error is of an intellectual
kind (I4"ıº(Æ), not a moral error.92
The resonance with the tragic stage—if that is what is going on
here—has two practical benefits. First, the Corcyraeans are able to
91 See e.g. the description of the typical Sophoclean hero: Knox (1983).
92 Arist. Poet. 1453a.
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avoid begging for pity explicitly,93 which would ultimately undermine
their claim to usefulness. Second, they can manipulate the Athenians’
self-image both as the defenders of the weak and as having the intelli-
gence to see their mistakes.94 Thucydides’ record of the Corcyraeans’
speech, whether or not, or to what extent, it represents the words
actually spoken, is important both for imitating the persuasive force
of the arguments used, on the one hand, and for giving the reader the
means by which to analyse those arguments on the other. The oppor-
tunities for analysis are further greatly enhanced by Thucydides’ juxta-
position of this speech with the Corinthian response.
After the end of the Corcyraeans’ speech, Thucydides immediately
relates what the Corinthians said. Thus, at this point between the
speeches at any rate the narrator avoids giving any indication of audi-
ence response. This juxtaposition of speeches without mediation by
narratorial commentary continues with very few exceptions throughout
the narrative, so that the observations made here may be regarded as
applicable for thinking about the ago¯n more generally in Thucydides.
The absence of narratorial commentary between the speeches already
suggests that interpretation is going to be a complicated business, which
continues the trend of representing assembly scenes witnessed in the
Iliad.
The formality of the ago¯n, however, is markedly different from any-
thing we have seen in other kinds of narrative, including Homeric epic.
The status of the Corinthians’ speech as a reply is brought out in a
number of ways. The Corinthians offer another ‘account’ (º&ª"',
1.37.1), explicitly tag their opponents’ arguments with ‘they say’
(çÆ)(, 1.37.2, 37.5; 39.1),95 and even counter the Corcyraeans’ open-
ing gambit on justice (%(ŒÆØ"+) with their own on necessity (I+ÆªŒÆE"+,
‘it is necessary’, 1.37.1). The formal opposition, exemplified by this
paradigmatic ago¯n, invites comparison of the rival strategies used by the
two groups.96
93 The standard defensive ploy of the defendant according to Socrates: Plato, Ap.
34b–35d.
94 Thus, while their policy for them has proven against their own interests
(I6/,ç*æ"+, 1.32.3), for the Athenians it must seem only illogical (Iº&ª"+, 1.32.3).
95 Hornblower (1991), 75.
96 For a theoretical justification of antilogy, see Artabanus, Ch. 3, sec. 2 above. The
formal opposition of speeches receives much attention during this period as, for example,
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The Corcyraeans had shown the utmost care to present themselves in
the best light to the Athenians, first as impartial commentators on their
own predicament, then as potential comrades-in-arms against a com-
mon enemy. The Corinthians address the Athenians in quite a different
way: a demand for equality runs through their speech;97 indeed, they
speak as if their relationship to Corcyra were equivalent to Athenian rule
over their subjects.98 Having identified a difference in the style of
address, the reader is left to ponder the significance of the change, for
which various possibilities may apply. The Corinthians’ concern for
equality suggests a more traditional view of inter-poleis relationships
based on the long-standing idea of reciprocity, as befitting a city that
Thucydides has already identified in his ‘Archaeology’ as being largely
conservative.99 Then again the emphasis on equality could point to their
conception of relations with the Athenians as being one of equals, which
would indicate an underlying friction already present between the two
powers.100 It is important to note that Thucydides does not provide the
answer to these or any other speculations: once equipped with the
knowledge that this speech fails (if this was indeed news), the reader
may suspect that the Corinthians failed to show sufficient flattery or, at
least, the care to appeal to Athenian self-image; but whether or not a
lack of respect was the reason for their failure, or even if there were a lack
of respect, is not made explicit.
in the Tetralogies of Antiphon or the Dissoi Logoi (DK 90): Kerferd (1981), 30–1, 84–5.
Cf. Guthrie (1971), 316–19. See Prologue, n. 14 above.
97 ‘We consider it worthy to get the same from you’ (‘+F+ !Ææ 7 9,H+ #e ÆP#e I6Ø"F,*+
Œ",(Ç*)ŁÆØ’, 1.43.1); ‘give back exactly the same’ (‘#e %b Y)"+ I+#Æ!&%"#*’, 1.43.2).
98 ‘Each should discipline his own allies’ (‘#"f' )ç*#-æ"ı' 6ı,,.å"ı' ÆP#&+ #Ø+Æ
Œ"º.Ç*Ø+’, 1.43.1).
99 1.13.2–5. Corinth is said to have been the first to adopt the state-of-the-art
triremes, and fought in the first sea-battle (ironically with the Corcyraeans), but there
is a sense that their great power lies in the past: Thucydides notes that the ‘ancient poets’
(!ÆºÆØ"E !"ØÅ#ÆE) called the place wealthy (1.13.5). Crane (1998), 122 suggests that
‘when the Corinthians state their case at Athens, they frame their position in the
traditional language of bilateral relationships’. This could explain why scholars have
found their arguments unconvincing: Kagan (1969), 231–6; de Ste Croix (1972), 70–1;
Salmon (1984), 285–8.
100 Indeed, their very language of equality could suggest an aggressive act of appro-
priation of a key Athenian ideal: here the argument would be that their city too is based
on a sense of equality, though one that looks very different from the Athenian version,
democracy. For a suggestive parallel, see Darius’ version of Persian freedom, Ch. 3, sec. 2
above.
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Of particular interest for thinking about the process of judgement is the
response of the Corinthians to their opponents’ reconfiguration of a
previous policy as an intellectual error.101 The Corinthians contest their
opponents’ pitiable colouring of ‘error’ (±,Ææ#(Æ) with their insistence
that they ‘have erred’ (‘¼ººÆ #* >,Ææ#8ŒÆ)Ø’, 1.38.5) and that they are
deserving of punishment. Where the Corcyraeans had sought to empty
their ±,Ææ#(Æ of moral baggage by putting it down to an intellectual
mistake, the Corinthians reinvest it with moral culpability and responsi-
bility.102This has implications for the judges too, who are warned that the
proposed alliance (the 6ı,,Æå(Æ) will in effect be a ‘6ı+-Æ%ØŒ*Ø+’: that is to
say, the alliance won’t lead to a share of the ‘profit’ (as the Corcyraeans
claim103), but rather to share of the wrong-doing. Decision-making in this
context can never be purely intellectual, without moral responsibility, free
from risk. The judges may well find themselves being judged too.
And they had in mind too Italy and Sicily (1.44)
This first ago¯n has exposed the reader to the persuasive strategies used by
both groups and, in part due to the juxtaposition of competing voices and
in part due also to Thucydides’ writing up of the speeches, also equips the
reader with the tools to unlock those strategies.What Thucydides does not
do, however, is to provide the reader with a particular interpretation of the
speeches that could be considered authoritative. In fact, in the scene of
embedded audience reactions that follows, the narrator complicates any
notion of a simple, discrete judgement.
In contrast to all other scenes of debate examined in this book in epic,
Herodotus and tragedy, Thucydides also narrates the audience’s re-
sponse in some detail. This point already suggests that Thucydides is
as much interested in the decision-making process itself as in the
delivery of speeches. His commentary raises other important concerns
too (1.44.1–3):
101 See nn. 91–2 above, with accompanying text.
102 They are guilty of o4æØ', K6"ı)(Æ and 4(Æ (1.38.5). Hubris in particular is heavily
loaded in traditional Greek thought, and is a favourite topic for elegists such as Solon and
Theognis. See Fisher (1992); D. Cairns (1996). The Corinthians’ emphasis on excess
also resonates with the dialogue between Croesus and Solon which begins Herodotus’
narrative.
103 See sec. 1 above.
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1ŁÅ+ÆE"Ø %b IŒ"/)Æ+#*' I,ç"#-æø+, ª*+",-+Å' ŒÆd %d' KŒŒºÅ)(Æ', #fi B ,b+
!æ"#-æfi Æ "På q))"+ #H+˚"æØ+Ł(ø+ I!*%-6Æ+#" #"f' º&ª"ı', K+ %b #fi B 9)#*æÆ(fi Æ
,*#-ª+ø)Æ+ ˚*æŒıæÆ("Ø' 6ı,,Æå(Æ+ ,b+ ,c !"Ø8)Æ)ŁÆØ . . . K!Ø,Æå(Æ+ %7
K!"Ø8)Æ+#" #fi B Iºº8ºø+ 4"ÅŁ*E+ . . . K%&Œ*Ø ªaæ › !æe' —*º"!"++Å)("ı'
!&º*,"' ŒÆd S' :)*)ŁÆØ ÆP#"E', ŒÆd #c+ ˚-æŒıæÆ+ K4"/º"+#" ,c !æ&*)ŁÆØ
#"E' ˚"æØ+Ł("Ø' +Æı#ØŒe+ :å"ı)Æ+ #")"F#"+, 6ıªŒæ"/*Ø+ %b ‹#Ø ,.ºØ)#Æ
ÆP#"f' Iºº8º"Ø' . . . –,Æ %b #B' #* 7I#Æº(Æ' ŒÆd @ØŒ*º(Æ' ŒÆºH' KçÆ(+*#"
ÆP#"E' > +B)"' K+ !Ææ.!ºøfi Œ*E)ŁÆØ.
And the Athenians, after listening to both sides, and with there being two
assemblies, in the first they accepted the arguments of the Corinthians no less,
and in the second they changed their mind and made an alliance with the
Corcyraeans, but not a full alliance, rather a defensive one in which to help each
other . . . For they considered that they too would be war with the Peloponne-
sians, and they had no wish for Corcyra, with such a navy, to fall into the hands
of the Corinthians, but for these two powers to wear each other out . . .And at
the same time it was well apparent that the island [of Corcyra] lay on the voyage
to Italy and Sicily.
The extended description of the scene of judgement is interesting for
several reasons. First, and foremost, the narrator describes the difficulty
of coming to a decision, as the Athenians first vote one way and then
another: if anything is clear it is that there is no easy resolution to the crisis
of judgement facing the Athenians. Indeed, their final decision can be said
to represent something of a compromise: they offer the Corcyraeans an
alliance, but not the full alliance (6ı,,Æå(Æ) that was proposed, rather a
defensive alliance (K!Ø,Æå(Æ). Their decision marks a ‘third way’ between
losing Corcya to a dangerous enemy, and provoking that enemy into
war.104 Thus the judges enter the ago¯n by a performance of mediation,
which might be thought of as paradigmatic for making judgement.
Yet, the profound repercussions of assuming the middle ground are
explored in some detail over course of the narrative that follows. As the
Corcyraeans and Corinthians come to blows at sea, the Athenians initially
remain on the sidelines as spectators, with explicit instructions not to
engage the enemy unless Corcyraean land was threatened (1.45.3). Even-
tually, however, a point is reached (K' #"F#" I+.ªŒÅ', 1.49.7) when,
104 Crane (1998), 122–3: ‘The Athenians accept neither argument, and their final
decision, though it rescues Corcyra, is not intended to favour either side.’ For a
discussion of the Athenian decision, see Stadter (1983).
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seeing the Corcyraeans in difficulties, the Athenians can no longer ‘still
make the separation’ (%Ø*Œ-ŒæØ#" "P%b+ :#Ø, 1.49.7),105 and enter the
battle to assist them ‘without evasion’ (I!æ"çÆ)()#ø', 1.49.7). Another
critical moment has been reached; another act of judgement must be
made. And another scene of direct speech between the two opposing
forces marks the significance of the moment: the Corinthians bluntly
accuse the Athenians of having done wrong (‘I%ØŒ*E#*, t ¼+%æ*'
1ŁÅ+ÆE"Ø’, 1.53.2); in response, the Corcyraeans clamour for the heralds
to be executed (I+*4&Å)*+ *PŁf' ºÆ4*E+ #* ÆP#"f' ŒÆd I!"Œ#*E+ÆØ,
1.53.3). For both of these embedded audiences, then, there has been no
ambiguity in reading the original Athenian decision and subsequent
intervention as anything else than full support for the Corcyraeans, even
as the Athenians themselves deny it.106 Nevertheless, an important shift
has taken place: whereas their previous decision had been to offer a
defensive alliance (K!Ø,Æå(Æ, 1.44.1), now, in the midst of conflict, they
refer to their relationship to the Corcyraeans simply as an alliance
(6ı,,Æå(Æ, 1.53.4).107 The fallout from the ago¯n shows how the judges’
compromise becomes compromised in itself. As a paradigm, it shows what
is at stake in making a judgement.
A second feature of note emerges from a close inspection of
Thucydides’ insight into the Athenians’ reasoning underpinning their
decision. According to the narrator, ‘it seemed to them that there would
be war with the Peloponnesians, and they did not want to lose Corcyra,
which had such a large navy, to the Corinthians’.108 On the face of it,
the Athenians would appear to have accepted the Corcyraean argument
that war was inevitable (1.33.3). Furthermore, that assessment relates
directly to the ‘truest cause (!æ"ç.)Ø')’, which the narrator had earlier
105 The verb is associated with making judgement: LSJ III, 399.
106 In doing so the Athenians try to maintain their role of mediators: they proclaim
that they are not looking to start a war, in line with their instructions (1.53.4; cf. 45.3).
But as Hornblower (1991), 96 notes: ‘the alliance stipulated that Athens should help if
[and only if] Corcyra territory was attacked . . . In fact, the Athenian commanders,
whatever they now say, have gone beyond their instructions and the terms of the alliance’
(italics in the original).
107 Gomme (1945), 176 considers 6ı,,Æå(Æ to be of wider import, so that it includes
K!Ø,Æå(Æ within its scope: but his claim is based on this passage. See de Ste Croix (1972),
p.xiii for a definition and discussion of these terms.
108 K%&Œ*Ø ªaæ › !æe' —*º"!"++Å)("ı' !&º*,"' ŒÆd S' :)*)ŁÆØ ÆP#"E', ŒÆd #c+
˚-ŒæıæÆ+ K4"/º"+#" ,c !æ"-)ŁÆØ #"E' ˚"æØ+Ł("Ø' +Æı#ØŒe+ :å"ı)Æ+ #")"F#"+, 1.44.1.
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flagged. Yet there is a striking difference between these two judgements.
At the beginning of his account Thucydides had claimed ‘that the
Athenians, by becoming great and making the Lacedaemonians fearful,
compelled them to war’.109 The narrator’s special insight identifies the
Spartans as the object of necessity and the cause of the war.110 In the
judgement of the ago¯n, however, Thucydides indicates that the Athe-
nians considered themselves to be under compulsion when they made
their decision to accept the Corcyraean alliance. On that basis it is the
Athenians who were under compulsion to go to war.111 The shift is
significant for various reasons. It not only suggests that Thucydides does
not provide one single way of reading the ago¯n; it also shows how
previous judgements, including those by the narrator himself, get
drawn into the contest. In spite of the emphasis on necessity, therefore,
human decision-making remains important.112 Moreover, reading is
configured as a continuous process of re-examining the text, reassess-
ing one’s assumptions, reflecting on one’s previous interpretations.
109 #"f' 1ŁÅ+Æ("ı' >ª"F,ÆØ ,*ª.º"ı' ªØª+",-+"ı' ŒÆd ç&4"+ !Ææ-å"+#Æ' #"E'
¸ÆŒ*%ÆØ,"+("Ø' I+ÆªŒ.)ÆØ K' #e !"º*,*E+, 1.23.6. See sec. 1 of this chapter above.
Scholars are divided as to whether the Corinthians themselves accept the premise of the
Corcyraean argument that war is inevitable: de Romilly (1963), 21; Cogan (1981), 14.
Whereas Cartledge (1979), 225 suggests that Thucydides’ ‘permanency of value’ belongs
to ‘his unswerving insistence, for purposes of historical interpretation, on the amorality
of interstate relations’, Crane (1998), 108 argues that ‘the amoral events in the History
often provide the dark background against which Thucydides’ emotional and principled
attitudes stand out’.
110 Though the infinitive ‘to compel’ lacks an object, Rood (1998), 222, n. 67 rules
out the possibility that it is the Athenians who are the group being compelled. Yet, the
fact that he has to argue this point suggests a certain ambiguity in the syntax, which has
prompted different scholarly reactions: see the bibliography cited there. On Thucydides
as putting the blame on the Spartans, see Badian (1993).
111 We might also recall that the moment of Athenian intervention in the sea-battle,
which brings them into conflict with the Corinthians, is marked by the expression K'
#"F#" I+.ªŒÅ', 1.49.7.
112 The combination of necessity and human decision-making resonates with the
dual determinism so prevalent in Greek thought, particularly in tragedy. Indeed, a
striking parallel presents itself. In the famous parodos of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, the
chorus describe how Agamemnon ‘put on the yoke of necessity’ (K!*d %7 I+.ªŒÆ' :%ı
º-!Æ%+"+, Aesch. Ag. 217) when he decided to sacrifice his daughter. We might note not
only that the same symbiosis of necessity and judgement prevails, but the context is
similar too: Agamemnon’s act also begins a war. Fraenkel (1950), 127 notes related
metaphors in Herodotus. See also Dover (1973).
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In Thucydides’ reworking of a publicly performed judgement, the
performance of the reader as a judge comes under scrutiny.
The analysis of the ago¯n thus far has shown the complexity of
judgement experienced by both the embedded audience and reader.
A third and related feature derives from the fact that the Athenians
debate the resolution twice. According to Ober, the ambiguity of the
Athenian decision—the double debate—demonstrates the weakness of
the democratic system: they cannot make up their minds which decision
they should make.113 Yet, it is important to note again that Thucydides’
narrative in no way reveals the answer that the Athenians should have
made. Besides, the passing comment has a rather different effect: it
points to the narrator’s hand in the construction of this ago¯n. That is to
say, Thucydides does not represent the Athenian debate over the even-
tual decision to accept (conditionally) the Corcyraean alliance: rather,
he reproduces for his reader the arguments with which the Athenian
de¯mos had to grapple.114 His readers, no less than the Athenian de¯mos,
find themselves in a position of having to make a judgement.
In fact, the paradigmatic quality of this ago¯n comes to the fore in the
explanation of judgement. In tracing the Athenian thought-process for
eventually accepting a defensive alliance, Thucydides notes that the
Athenians were also (–,Æ %-, 1.44.3) influenced by Corcyra’s proximity
to Italy and Sicily. The mention of Sicily is striking, and yet has aroused
little comment from critics.115 But Sicily will become the turning-point
of the war, according to Thucydides’ representation of events and his
own narratorial judgement in the wake of Pericles’ death, and as a result
of the Athenians’ departure from their great leader’s strategy (2.65.10).
And yet, here the narrator reveals that Sicily was already on the
agenda—this even before the beginning of the war, and well before
Pericles’ sudden disappearance from the scene. This passing note has the
113 Ober (1998), 103.
114 Though the Spartans and Athenians were grimly aware that war was likely, ‘no
speaker gives the impression that their choice is inevitable’ and ‘the two-day agonising
over the decision (1.44) suggests that the assembly could genuinely have gone either
way’: Pelling (2000), 113.
115 Gomme (1945), 177 notes the importance of the West for trade, but he does not
consider the implied contrast with the narrator’s judgement on Athenian conduct of the
war at 2.65.10. Nor does Hornblower (1991), 88, who notes that the Athenians have
accepted the Corcyaean arguments (36.2).
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potential not only to destabilize a reading of this ago¯n and the Athenian
attempt at negotiating a compromise, but even to call into question
Athenian foreign policy under the stewardship of Pericles.
Ober takes the ambivalent judgement by the Athenian audience as a
sign of the limitations of debate; but Thucydides’ presentation is hardly
any clearer and, indeed, prompts a whole series of questions. It appears to
be no coincidence that Thucydides locates his first ago¯n in Athens: it is
not so much the beginning of the war that is made the object of the
readers’ judgement, as their judgement being made the beginning of the
war;116 and even as each reader scrutinizes the Athenian judgement, all
are made to reflect upon the formation of their own judgement.117 The
fact that Thucydides locates a debate at the start of his narrative also
evokes the beginning of the Iliad, which began with a debate. And, just as
the Iliad establishes the assembly as an institution that can accommodate
dissent from its opening scene, so Thucydides’ narrative demonstrates
how reading the written agon can inform political judgement.
This section has analysed Thucydides’ representation of debate. Unlike
Herodotus, whose speeches differ enormously in form and location as he
conducts an enquiry outside any civic institutional framework, Thucy-
dides investigates how individuals relate to their poleis and their institu-
tions. His debates do not simply constitute an examination of speech
acts—the relationship ofwords to action; his deliberate and stylized setting
of speech against speech marks an appropriation of the ago¯n, the public
form for judging and evaluating argument. At one level, it is a means of
deconstructing political rhetoric: the reader gets to see different and
competing strategies employed, and their success or failure to persuade.
But it is also a way of positioning the reader: in experiencing debate every
reader must find their place in between the positions mapped out.118
116 An ultimatum: Cogan (1981). It does not catapult the Athenians into war, but it is
the critical moment: Ober (1998).
117 Ober (1998), mindful of the tension with the ‘truest cause’ statement, comments
on the ago¯n : ‘Without entering into the debate, it seems fair to say that Thucydides’ text
as a whole encourages the reader to feel that the Corcyraeans have seriously overstated the
war’s proximity’ (p. 75). But Ober does enter the agon, as his language implies:
‘Answering the question of whether the Assembly made the right decision in this case
depends on how one interprets Thucydides’ discussion of the causes of the war’ (p. 79).
118 Debnar (2001), 233 concludes: ‘This may be Thucydides’ greatest accomplish-
ment: to allow his readers to become both participants and analysts of the war between
Athens and Sparta.’
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The proposal that the debate between the Corcyraeans and Cor-
inthians acts as a paradigmatic ago¯n for Thucydides’ narrative also
recalls the Iliad ’s opening assembly. Whereas in Homer dissent is
made institutional in the form of the Achaean assembly, in Thucydides
the reader gets a clear insight into the failure of the Athenian assembly as
an institution of adequate deliberation. But its reverberations are felt far
beyond Athens: all forms of public speaking, acting and thinking are
brought into question by the narrative. As the last section will show,
Thucydides’ narrative challenges the way politics is done.
3. FORMING A POLITICAL READER
(THUCYDIDES 3, 6)
The previous section explored Thucydides’ representation of debate as
ago¯n in terms of both challenging its primacy as the place of deliberation
within the community and recouping it for reading his narrative. It
showed that, unlike Herodotus, Thucydides investigates debate
throughout the whole Greek world in its institutional manifestations.
But it is not simply the case of showing debate going wrong; for
example, there is little suggestion that the first debate between the
Corcyraeans and Corinthians was mishandled or adjudicated badly by
the Athenians. Rather, Thucydides’ imitation of the political cut and
thrust of debate fashions a monument which, while free from the actual
limitations of a real-life assembly—the chaotic atmosphere, the lack of
preparatory thought, the fatal repercussions, and so on—is accurate
enough to put his reader through the critical process of decision-
making.
Since many studies have shown the utility of Thucydides’ representa-
tion of debates for assessing the speakers’ arguments in line with the
results of the enquiry in section 2 above,119 the rest of this chapter
considers a feature that has attracted far less interest: the ways in which
Thucydides sets up debate and embeds it within his narrative. Thucy-
dides’ frames of debate have been described as ‘normally brief, straight-
forward, and factual’, with the purpose of keeping the readers focused
119 See esp. Macleod (1983); Debnar (2001).
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on the speeches ‘from which they are expected to derive almost all the
instruction that these reports are designed to convey’.120 Yet, the textual
frames around debate mark key points of tension in the narrative when
Thucydides concedes his stage to voices other than his own.121 From
that point of view alone they would be worth studying; but Thucydides’
narratorial voice also increasingly becomes important for assessing the
speeches. This section will tackle three key ago¯n scenes which, for
various reasons, have been condemned for showing debate going
wrong: the debates that discuss the fates of Mytilene and Plataea, and
the assembly that leads to the launching of the expedition against Sicily.
It will show the ways in which Thucydides frames the ago¯n to inform
political judgement to the extent that, in the final assembly scene, the
narrator himself enters the debate as the Athenians rush to the ships. In
Iliadic terms, Thucydides takes an Achilles-like stance in dissent from
the way debate is being conducted in his community, and issues a
challenge to his reader to do the same.122
There was an agon nevertheless
The first clear-cut instance of overt narratorial framing of debate occurs
in Athens after Pericles has died.123 At the climax of the debate over
120 Westlake (1973), 90–108 (quotations are from pp. 91 and 95). For the impor-
tance of narrative framing, see n. 61 above.
121 Pelling (2000), 121 observes that ‘scholars are often puzzled when a preamble
seems at odds with the speech which follows’, and goes on to suggest that ‘it is better to
take the preamble and speech as complementing one another, with the speech picking up
selected highlights of the argument for dissection, but not necessarily keeping anything
like the balance of the original’. This section will extend that line of analysis to suggest
that the frame is often in tension with the speeches which it embraces, thus providing
potential for dialogue between the two.
122 ‘Thucydides designed his history as a political argument, a justification of a certain
kind of politics and political analysis’: Farrar (1988), 126. Whether we want to go as far
as Farrar and claim that Thucydides’ response to concerns about democracy was demo-
cratic is questionable—and Ober (1996), 126–32 in his review certainly questions the
claim; but it is important to note that Thucydides investigates deliberation within the
institutional framework of his community and reproduces those debates in his narrative.
123 The debate at Sparta on the eve of the war is complex, but narratorial mediation is
kept at a minimum (the decision itself receives no comment from Thucydides, 1.87.3–
5)—though the introduction to the Athenian speech is dissonant with the speech that
follows, as has already been noted. With respect to the speeches of Pericles, as has been
mentioned above, all are set in some form of opposition in the narrative, but receive little
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whether to kill or not to kill the entire male population of the revolting
city Mytilene, Thucydides writes (3.49.1):
ÞÅŁ*Ø)H+ %b #H+ ª+ø,H+ #"/#ø+ ,.ºØ)#Æ I+#Ø!.ºø+ !æe' Iºº8ºÆ' "ƒ
1ŁÅ+ÆE"Ø qºŁ"+ ,b+ K' IªH+Æ ‹,ø' #B' %&6Å' ŒÆd Kª-+"+#" K+ #fi B å*Øæ"#"+(fi Æ
Iªå0,Æº"Ø, KŒæ.#Å)* %b > #"F ˜Ø"%&#"ı.
After these opinions had been spoken with almost equal force against each
other, the Athenians came into a conflict nevertheless of opinion, and the show
of hands was very near; the view of Diodotus won out.
‘Not an easy sentence’, writes Simon Hornblower laconically.124 Pro-
blems of interpretation centre especially on two issues. First, the position
of ‘nevertheless’ (‹,ø'), after IªH+Æ and halfway through the sentence,
is odd, and has prompted fierce debate among Thucydides’ commenta-
tors along with attempts at emendation. Gomme, for example, transfers
‹,ø' to after the %-- clause, which clarifies the syntax (after %b) and
meaning—‘and, nevertheless, Diodotus’ opinion won the day’—but fails
to explain why it is where it is.125 For Hornblower, its positioning
suggests a decision made ‘irrespective of the reasoning which had been
advanced’;126 that is, the Athenians came into an ago¯n in spite of [the
arguments made]. The point is—and this is the second problem—that
back in chapter 36 Thucydides had introduced the debate by describing
how the Mytilenean ambassadors had ‘easily persuaded’ (:!*Ø)Æ+ Þfi A"+,
narrative comment. The one exception is Thucydides’ obituary after Pericles’ death,
which encompasses the whole scope of the war, on which see Gribble (1998).
124 Hornblower (1991), 438.
125 ‘[V]arious unlikely explanations of ‹,ø' have been attempted (“referring back” as
far as 36.4, “in spite of the revulsion of feeling”; or, “in spite of the full discussion”) and
equally unlikely emendations, such as Bredow’s ›,"(ø' (adopted by Hude). Of course
an IªH+Æ #B' %&6Å' is a probable, not an improbable result of near-equality of the
arguments on both sides. I do not doubt that Heilmann’s forgotten suggestion to transfer
‹,ø' after KŒæ.#Å)* %b is correct’: Gomme (1956), 324. This is the text printed by
Rhodes (1994), who comments: ‘The manuscripts place [“nevertheless”] with “engaged
in a struggle”, where it reads paradoxically after “fairly evenly matched”’ (p. 213).
126 Hornblower (1991), 438. While agreeing with Hornblower that Thucydides
emphasizes the ‘emotional struggle of the voters’ (p. 439), this section argues that the
reader falls under that description too, who, equally, can hardly fail to be affected by the
experience of the ago¯n. Consequently, Hornblower’s further claim that the debate shows
‘the irrelevance of eloquent speeches’ (p. 439) rather misses the point: we see just how
relevant (Cleon’s) eloquence is.
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3.36.5) the Athenians to reconvene the debate and not kill them all.127
The reader is led to expect a decisive decision in favour of some more
lenient resolution—only for a struggle over whether to exact the death
penalty to occur nevertheless.128 Apparently, then, the debate almost
doesn’t do the right thing. It is in part for this reason that Ober regards
Thucydides as condemning the ago¯n per se.129
Closer attention, however, needs to be paid to Thucydides’ opening
frame (3.36.4–6):
ŒÆd #fi B 9)#*æÆ(fi Æ ,*#.+"Ø. #Ø' *PŁf' q+ ÆP#"E' ŒÆd I+Æº"ªØ),e' T,e+ #e
4"/º*ı,Æ ŒÆd ,-ªÆ Kª+H)ŁÆØ, !&ºØ+ ‹ºÅ+ %ØÆçŁ*EæÆØ ,Aºº"+ j "P #"P' ÆN#("ı'.
‰' %7 fi X)Ł"+#" #"F#" #H+ ?ı#ØºÅ+Æ(ø+ "ƒ !Ææ&+#*' !æ-)4*Ø' ŒÆd "ƒ ÆP#"E' #H+
1ŁÅ+Æ(ø+ 6ı,!æ.))"+#*', !Ææ*)Œ*/Æ)Æ+ #"f' K+ #-º*Ø130 u)#* ÆsŁØ' ª+0,Æ'
!æ"Ł*E+ÆØ! ŒÆd :!*Ø)Æ+ Þfi A"+, %Ø&#Ø ŒÆd KŒ*(+"Ø' :+%Åº"+ q+ 4"ıº&,*+"+ #e
!º-"+ #H+ !"ºØ#H+ ÆsŁØ' #Ø+Æ' )ç()Ø+ I!"%"F+ÆØ 4"ıº*/)Æ)ŁÆØ. ŒÆ#Æ)#.)Å'
%7 *PŁf' KŒŒºÅ)(Æ' ¼ººÆØ #* ª+H,ÆØ Iç 7 5Œ.)#ø+ Kº-ª"+#". ŒÆd ˚º-ø+ ›
˚º*ÆØ+-#"ı, ‹)!*æ ŒÆd #c+ !æ"#-æÆ+ K+*+ØŒcŒ*Ø u)#* I!"Œ#*E+ÆØ, J+ ŒÆd K'
#a ¼ººÆ 4ØÆØ&#Æ#"' #H+ !"ºØ#H+ #fiH #* %B,øfi !Ææa !"ºf K+ #fiH #&#*
!ØŁÆ+0#Æ#"', !Ææ*ºŁg+ ÆsŁØ' :º*ª* . . . .
And on the following day straightaway they had a change of mind, and reflected
that a decree which condemned the whole city not only the guilty was savage
and excessive. And the Mytilenean ambassadors who were present and their
Athenian supporters perceived this, and they urged those in authority to put the
judgement again; and they persuaded them easily, because it was clear also to
those men that the majority of citizens wanted to have the opportunity to
127 On the ‘rawness’ of the decision (T,e+ #e 4"/º*ı,Æ, 3.36.4): Connor (1984), 82,
n. 6; Rhodes (1994), 203.
128 ‘The Athenians, notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a vote
in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the motion of Diodotus carried
the day’: Crawley, in Strassler (1996), 183. Cf. Arnold (1839), 410; Classen and Steup
(1892), 99.
129 ‘The Mytilenean debate is clearly a contest (ago¯n) of words; this is implied by
Thucydides’ introductory and concluding comments . . . and is underlined by Cleon’s
terminology . . . .The nature of the debate as a contest is emphasized by Thucydides’
selection for presentation of the two most-opposed arguments delivered that day, a
narrative strategy that obscures the dialectical tendency of Athenian public debate . . . [I]t
presents Assembly debate as precisely the sort of contest for audience applause that
Thucydides himself has explicitly renounced as a basis for his own text’: Ober (1998), 103.
130 Simply, ‘those in authority’. Rhodes (1994), 203 notes: ‘Thucydides often avoids
using technical language in constitutional matters.’ This is an important aspect of
Thucydides’ appeal to an audience that may extend far beyond Athens alone. Like
Herodotus, in other words, Thucydides’ narrative aims at a Panhellenic audience in
the manner of epic poetry. Cf. Ridley (1981), 26.
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consider the judgement again. And straightaway they established an assembly,
and many opinions were spoken on both sides. And Cleon, son of Cleaenetus,
he who prevailed in the previous assembly with the decision to kill them all, and
who was the most violent of all the citizens and by far the most persuasive to the
de¯mos at that time, he came forward and spoke again . . . .
There are several points worthy of note. First, a string of conjunctions
links the surrender to the decision about it; but, with the exception of a
solitary ª.æ, all are neutral indicators—ŒÆ(, %- and #*—which puts the
onus on the reader to work out the process that first leads to condemna-
tion, and thence to a change of heart.131 Second, that change of mind
prompts a reopening of the debate. In the Corcyraean ago¯n analysed
above, the narrator also drew attention to a change of mind and a
subsequent assembly; but there Thucydides had represented the initial
debate when the petitions had been presented, not the debate among the
Athenians about what to do, nor indeed their subsequent change of
mind. Here, however, it is the reconvened assembly that Thucydides
represents, which in effect puts the efficacy of decision-making on the
agenda. This will be a debate on debate, ‘as much about how to conduct
debate in the ekklesia as about the fate of Mytilene’.132
Third, certain words in Thucydides’ framing here indicate the duality
of the ago¯n discussed in section 2 above. As events move towards
reconvening the assembly, Thucydides plays upon the meaning and
sound of two adverbs to hint at the tension between imitating debate
and writing it down, the dynamic between the actual moment of debate
(‘straightaway’, *PŁ/') and its timeless represented form (‘again’, ÆsŁØ').
The slippage between the two adverbs gestures towards the reading
process on the basis that Thucydides’ addressee is both subject to the
immediacy of debate but free to read the debate again at leisure. As
discussed above, the effect of the ago¯n both propels readers into the
hurly-burly of warring words, and empowers them to look into argu-
ments of the kind which dominated the political decision-making arena
and compelled its listeners to adopt certain courses of action.133
131 From 3.36.1–6 there are no fewer than six (clause-connecting) ŒÆ(’s and six %-’s.
The solitary ª.æ is at 3.36.2.
132 Gomme (1956), 315. See also Connor (1984), 82, who writes: ‘A surprising
amount of this debate is devoted to argument not about the punishment of the islanders
but about the role of discussion in Athenian decision making.’ For extensive bibliogra-
phy on this problematic ago¯n: Hornblower (1991), 422–3, 462.
133 See nn.18–22 above, with accompanying text.
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Lastly, Thucydides labels the first speaker in the Mytilenean debate as
the ‘most violent of the citizens and by far the most persuasive to the
de¯mos’, in the first instance of explicit narratorial guidance of a speech
seen so far in the narrative. The first occasion this happened in the Iliad
was when the narrator disqualified Thersites as a non-hero from speak-
ing in the epic assembly.134 It is interesting, then, that Cleon has been
compared to Thersites for the regurgitation of arguments first articu-
lated by the Achillean Pericles;135 and there does seem to be a distant
echo of the narrator’s evaluation of Thersites that he would say whatever
would please the Achaeans in Thucydides’ description of Cleon as the
most persuasive speaker to the de¯mos. Yet there is also a critical differ-
ence. When Thucydides labels Cleon in Thersites-like terms, he does so
from the perspective of someone who knew him and, having been exiled
from his city, presumably as someone who had suffered at his hands.136
The narrator’s assessment of Cleon, furthermore, is fundamental for
approaching the subsequent ago¯n. For, far from giving his enemy a poor
speech, Thucydides exposes his reader to the full force of Cleon’s
rhetorical pyrotechnics. One particular strategy which Cleon employs
is especially telling: Cleon makes the fact that they are even having a
debate the bone of contention (3.38.4):
‘ÆY#Ø"Ø %7 9,*E' ŒÆŒH+ Iªø+"Ł*#"F+#*', "¥#Ø+*' *N0ŁÆ#* Ł*Æ#Æd ,b+ #H+ º&ªø+
ª(ª+*)ŁÆØ, IŒæ"Æ#Æd %b #H+ :æªø+.’
‘You are to blame, you’ve set up contests just for the spectacle, you lot who are
accustomed to be spectators of words and listeners of deeds.’
Here the speaker berates the assembly for treating deliberation about
political affairs as just a game. In fact, throughout his speech Cleon
draws on the language of the ago¯n to play on any anxieties the audience
might have had about their capacity to decide policy.137 Representing
his audience as taking delight in the spectacle rather than making,
and sticking by, decisions, Cleon thus presents a damning critique of
134 See Act I, ch. 1, sec. 2 above.
135 F. Cairns (1982), 203–4.
136 ‘For all its famed appeals to objectivity, (writes Goldhill (2002), 32) ‘a sense of
loss veins this history.’ In fact, as the citizen who has been exiled from his city’s
institutional arenas, Thucydides runs the risk of appearing like Thersites.
137 Cf. 3.37.4; 37.5; 38.3; 38.4; 38.6.
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democratic decision-making. Critics of democracy and of democratic
deliberation need point no further than this speech. But this speech
represents the world according to Cleon:138 it was his proposal that had
been carried the previous day; he wants his audience to stand by their
initial ‘savage decision’; he doesn’t want them debating this issue again.
To achieve this end he deploys all the tools of his trade to attack
rhetoric: the king of spin makes a show of renouncing spin.139 Cleon
pulls out all the stops to shock and awe his audience into submission
and show just why they aren’t qualified to make a judgement140—even
as he demands that they do, and swiftly. Cleon’s authority depends on
suppressing dissent.
Three points are worth highlighting from the fallout of this ago¯n.
First, the role of the reader is again stressed at the moment of the
narrator’s entry into the narrative. Thucydides warns us explicitly that
Cleon, this most violent of citizens, is the most persuasive. By parading
these superlatives Thucydides not only takes a stand, he is seen to take a
stand, with the result that his reader must enter the debate and take a
position, whether that is in agreement or not with this judgement.141
138 ‘This is a highly sophisticated and cynical representation. Thucydides has the
demagogue talk about the dangers of demagoguery. Rather than political debate—says
the politician debating the point—there is here just a display of competitive speech-
making. Listening with passive pleasure means a failure of the ideals of active participa-
tion in government. The brilliantly sophistic rhetorician, Cleon, thus dismissively scorns
the tools of rhetoric—as the ideals of democracy become a twisted token in his violently
persuasive argument’: Goldhill (2002), 40.
139 Hesk (2000), 253–4 discusses how Thucydides’ design emphasizes the strategic
nature of the speakers’ rhetoric and anti-rhetoric, leaving the reader to decide the
difficulty of deciding which of these speakers recommend the best policy. See also
Macleod (1983), 93–5.
140 ‘It would be more natural to hear speeches and watch actions, but the reversal
emphasises the remoteness of the audience from the real world of real action’: Rhodes
(1994), 207–8. ‘The rhetoric is effective; but the distinction is, of course, false (for in the
theatre there is no difference between Ł*Æ#Æ( and IŒæ"Æ#Æ(), and disappears in the next
clause, when they listen to words’: Gomme (1956), 304. Cf. Allison (1997a), 198–205.
Greenwood (2004), 178–81 suggests that Cleon’s criticism comes close to Thucydides’
own attitude: ‘In fact, the scenario that Cleon describes and descries could apply to
Thucydides’ History, where the audience really are spectators and listeners of speeches
and deeds’, (p. 180).
141 Gomme (1956), 298 comments on how this is Cleon’s first appearance ‘and he is
at once judged’. Connor (1984), 85, n. 15 warns against thinking ‘that “introductions”
of this sort are intended as a comprehensive judgement of the character or that they are
intended to substitute the historian’s evaluation for the reader’s’.
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Second, Thucydides’ representation of Cleon’s attack on assembly
debate is persuasive. On the face of it, the Mytilenean debate works,
since the ‘savage decision’ (3.36.5) to kill every male is reversed; yet the
response of scholars has been almost universally critical of it.142 Indeed,
seduced by Cleon’s representation of debate as ago¯n, scholars readily
reproduce his criticism of the assembly as the place where spectators vie
with each other in their enjoyment of sophisticated word-games. The
narrator asks his reader not to be taken in by Cleon, even as Cleon
repeatedly warns his audience not to be taken in—as indeed they are. In
this way the narrator issues his judgement; but he does not make it any
easier for his readers to judge.143 Rather, by putting the criticisms of the
assembly into the mouth of the arch-demagogue, Thucydides does more
than demonstrate the danger of political rhetoric; his text performs the
danger of that rhetoric—and the danger too of succumbing to it.144 As
Cleon’s speech demonstrates all too well, the speaker’s rhetoric is not so
easy to see through and analyse. (No one said it was going to be easy.145)
142 This is implicit in the translations that read the ‘coming into an ago¯n nevertheless’
against the ease with which the Athenians were persuaded from carrying out Cleon’s
proposal. Macleod (1983), 119 grimly remarks: ‘the Mytilenean debate, partly through
both speakers’ refusal of pity, partly through their criticisms of the Athenian assembly
and democracy, shows how tenuous [the qualities of free speech and reasoned argument]
are.’ See, however, Wolin (1996), 69, who argues that the Mytilenean debate actually
‘best reveals the demos learning how to be an actor’.
143 Hornblower (1987), 166, n. 51 observes that Thucydides’ attitude towards Cleon
is more complex than we might have expected given this introduction. Cf. Hornblower
(1991), 423: ‘It is a curious but undeniable feature of Kleon’s speech that it contains
much that Th[ucydides] himself, who disliked the man, seems to have agreed with’ (my
italics). Cf. Rhodes (1994), 204–5. Greenwood (2004), 178–81 also draws attention to
the correspondences between Cleon’s criticism and Thucydides’ methodology.
144 Both speakers draw heavily on gnomic expressions, which represent a readily
useable, and thereby compelling, form of knowledge: Cleon (3.37.2, 39.2, 39.5, 40.1),
Diodotus (3.45.3–6). The strategy suggests a conscious aim to present their resolutions
(ª+0,ÆØ) in terms of the timelessness of a maxim (ª+0,ÆØ): for example, Macleod
(1983), 93 notes how Cleon passes off his decree (ł8çØ),Æ) as the law (+&,"').
Diodotus’ series of gnomic statements attempt to bring the Mytilenean predicament
home to the Athenians, a point made by Daniel Tompkins in his unpublished paper
‘Thucydides Constructs His Speakers: Pericles and Diodotus’, delivered at Ohio State
University (Spring Term, 1998). See also ch.3, n. 86 above on gnomic expressions in
Herodotus. In both cases, the use of these ‘sound-bytes’ of community wisdom are being
held up for scrutiny by the writer.
145 ‘And for listening to, [my account] perhaps will appear not so enjoyable given the
absence of storytelling’ (ŒÆd K' ,b+ IŒæ&Æ)Ø+ Y)ø' #e ,c ,ıŁH%*' ÆP#H+ I#*æ!-)#*æ"+
çÆ+*E#ÆØ, 1.22.4).
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The reader too is put in danger of falling foul of the rhetorical tricks of
the most persuasive speaker as if present in the assembly;146 but each
reader is also able—quite unlike the historical agents who were there the
first (and only) time—to enter the debate again, and again . . . 147
Third, Thucydides’ closing frame writes his reader into the ago¯n by
posing the question of the misplaced ‹,ø'. Is the %-- clause to be taken
as a supplement (‘and Diodotus’ opinion won out’), or else as strongly
oppositional (thus: ‘There was a contest in coming to a decision, but
Diodotus’ opinion won out’)?148 Is the audience coming into an ago¯n in
spite of Cleon and his attempt to stop them from dissenting, or as a
result of it? And what difference would either interpretation make to a
conception of democratic debate, or of politics more generally, or even
of the reading process? Public oratory, such as that exemplified by
Cleon, deploys a coercive kind of rhetoric that gives the people what
they want to hear in order to gain power over them. By contrast,
Thucydides’ reader is challenged to go beyond the temporary attractions
of the representation to attain to a more reasoned awareness of the
dangers inherent in it.149 Locating the problem with the ago¯n depends
on a kind of reading that this ago¯n warns against: if readers accept that
146 ‘Thucydides’ skill in accommodating rhetorical speech to his contemplative work
has ensured that even readers are in danger of falling prey to the rhetorical guile of his
speakers’: Debnar (2001), 22.
147 This is particularly true given the speech with which Thucydides balances Creon’s
excesses: ‘in the last analysis Diodotus no more than Cleon offers any protection to
Athens’—so Macleod (1983), 100. In other words, Thucydides does not give his reader
an easy way of negotiating the challenge Cleon’s rhetoric poses. Ober (1998), 94–104
passes judgement on the Athenian assembly as a result of both speakers’ rhetoric. Yunis
(1996), 99–101 and Saxonhouse (1996), 72–86 are more positive in their assessment of
Diodotus.
148 A selection of translations demonstrates the different ways these issues have been
understood: ‘The Athenians, in spite of the recent change of feeling, still held conflicting
opinions, and at the show of hands the votes were nearly equal. However, the motion of
Diodotus was passed’: Warner (1954); ‘The Athenians were at contention which they
should decree; and at the holding up of hands, they were both sides almost equal, but yet
the sentence of Diodotus prevailed’: Hobbes, in Grene (1989); ‘[The arguments] were
almost equally strong, but there was nevertheless a struggle between the two opinions; the
show of hands was very near, but the motion of Diodotus prevailed’: Hornblower
(1991), 438.
149 Hesk (2000), 258, argues that Thucydides’ negative image of the decision-making
process inculcates a ‘sense of irony and insecurity in the reader’: Thucydides refuses ‘to
provide any clear approval or endorsement for either speaker’ (p. 258). Similarly,
Connor (1984), 91 concludes: ‘We are left then with unresolved and complex reactions.
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the ago¯n is corrosive of deliberation, then are they being seduced by the
arch-seducer Cleon?150 Even as Thucydides delivers his judgement on
Cleon—even when we might think that it is imperative that he does so
given that at stake are people’s lives,151 the future of his political
community, and the authority of his text—he makes persuasion a
question.
What (good) have the Plataeans ever done for us?
At the same point in the summer when the Athenians were putting
down the rebellion in Mytilene and were debating over what punish-
ment to exact, the Spartan siege of Plataea was drawing to a successful—
even peaceful?—close as they successfully persuade the besieged Pla-
taeans to surrender and submit to arbitration.152 Two speeches then
follow, one by the Plataeans, one by the Thebans, in which both parties
appeal to their Spartan adjudicators. This next section explores Thucy-
dides’ framing of that debate, which also attracts criticism from scholars
for its inconclusiveness. Indeed, many critics have drawn parallels to the
deliberations over the fate of the Mytilenaeans.153 Thucydides’ repre-
sentation of debate goes far beyond a narrow critique of Athenian
assembly practice to encompass—and challenge—political decision-
making more generally. But more particularly, having set up a law-
court context for deciding the fate of the Plataeans, Thucydides puts his
reader into the position of an adjudicator, not only of the relative merits
of either party, but also of those doing the judging.
We have wanted Diodotus to win and acclaimed him. Yet his victory, not only at the
practical level but also at the theoretical level, is unsatisfactory.’
150 Being persuaded by the (most persuasive) speaker who warns us against being
persuaded—who is persuading whom here? Euben (1996), 336 makes a similar case for
the complexity of reading Plato.
151 Thucydides structures his narrative to emphasize the drama, as the second trireme
arrives in the nick of time to prevent the first ship carrying out its ‘monstrous action’
(!æAª,Æ Iºº&Œ"#"+, 3.49.4). Is this Thucydides’ judgement (Gomme (1956), 325) or
‘more likely’ the view of the sailors (Hornblower (1991), 440)? Cf. Pelling (2000), 276,
n. 31.
152 This episode brings to an end a narrative arc that includes the failed negotiations
between the Plataeans, Spartans and Athenians that Thucydides had represented in a
triangulated dialogue: see Thuc. 2.71–8. See Cagnetta (1984).
153 Hornblower (1991), 462–3. The classic comparison remains Macleod (1983),
118–22. See also Debnar (2001), 125–46.
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The setting up of debate is the most elaborate yet (3.52.2–5). With
the besieged Plataeans at the end of their tether, the Spartan commander
offers them an escape-rope: the promise of a fair trial. Assured that only
the guilty would be punished ‘and none contrary to justice’ (!Ææa %(ŒÅ+
%b "P%-+Æ, 3.52.2), the Plataeans accept the terms and surrender. So far,
so good: expectations are raised of the intercession of the due process of
law in the conduct of the war. Even as this very proposal is being made,
however, the narrator removes the mask of impartial legitimacy worn by
the occupying power: the Spartans made this offer—the narrator reveals
with a delectable instance of mind-reading—so that they would not
have to return the city once any future peace-deal was made.154 The
rope being offered the Plataeans is one with which they may hang
themselves. But the narrator’s observation not only offers the promise
of a special insight;155 his cutting remark undercuts the very ground on
which judgement is (to be) made. It demands that the reader delve more
deeply into what lies beneath the surface meaning of words and resist
rushing to judgement.
The scene of judgement next comes under scrutiny as five judges from
Sparta arrive ("ƒ KŒ #B'¸ÆŒ*%Æ(,"+"' %ØŒÆ)#Æd !-+#* ¼+%æ*' Iç(Œ"+#")
and lay down the law: ‘no accusation was brought against the Plataeans,
but they were summoned by the judges and asked just this: “Have you
done any good to the Spartans and their allies in the present war?”’156
The Spartan judges reduce considerations of justice to a single question
of present self-interest dressed up in an adherence to traditional ethics:
whether or not the Plataeans had done them ‘some good’ (IªÆŁ&+ #Ø).157
The Spartans rule by trying to rule out all concerns other than the
154 The Lacedaemonian commander didn’t want to take Plataea by force, ‘(since he
had received orders from Lacedaemon to this effect, that, if one day a peace treaty was
made with the Athenians, and both parties agreed to give up all the places which they had
taken by war, they wouldn’t have to give back Plataea since the inhabitants had
surrendered willingly)’ (‘*NæÅ,-+"+ ªaæ q+ ÆP#fiH KŒ ¸ÆŒ*%Æ(,"+"', ‹!ø', *N )!"+%Æd
ª(ª+"Ø#& !"#* !æe' 1ŁÅ+Æ("ı' ŒÆd 6ıªåøæ"E*+ ‹)Æ !"º-,øfi åøæ(Æ :å"ı)Ø+ 5Œ.#*æ"Ø
I!"%(%")ŁÆØ, ,c I+.%"#"' *YÅ > —º.#ÆØÆ ‰' ÆP#H+ 5Œ&+#ø+ !æ")åøæÅ).+#ø+’,
3.52.2).
155 Goldhill (2002), 36.
156 KºŁ&+#ø+ %b ÆP#H+ ŒÆ#Åª"æ(Æ ,b+ "P%*,(Æ !æ"ı#-ŁÅ, Mæ0#ø+ %b ÆP#"f'
K!ØŒÆº*).,*+"Ø #")"F#"+ ,&+"+, *Y #Ø ¸ÆŒ*%ÆØ,"+("ı' ŒÆd #"f' 6ı,,.å"ı' K+ #fiH
!"º-,øfi #fiH ŒÆŁ*)#H#Ø IªÆŁ&+ [#Ø] *NæªÆ),-+"Ø *N)(+, 3.52.4.
157 The brevity of the question, even the focus on ‘something good’, is typically
Spartan! Cf. Debnar (2001), 126.
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immediate circumstance; the interpretative framework they establish is
vigorously anti-historical. The issue at stake, then, is greater than about
the Plataeans’ war ‘guilt’ or even about the Spartans’ capacity to judge
that. It is about the relevance of taking a historical perspective for making
(proper) political judgement.158
As it is, Thucydides’ narrative exposes how the Spartans spectacularly
fail to keep the question to a simple one-word answer: two contrary
responses have the effect of bringing the whole process of judgement
under scrutiny. The Plataeans, realizing the question was an effective
noose around their necks, ‘begged to speak at greater length’ ("ƒ %7
:º*ª"+ ÆN#Å).,*+"Ø ,ÆŒæ&#*æÆ *N!*E+, 3.52.5), in effect opening up
the question to different possibilities and, in particular, expanding its
frame of reference beyond the present circumstances.159We are not told
what the Spartans thought about this; instead, Thucydides propels his
reader headlong into the Plataeans’ desperate appeal. Immediately after-
wards the Thebans, ‘fearing lest because of this speech the Lacedaemo-
nians might yield in some way’ (%*()Æ+#*' !æe' #e+ º&ª"+ ÆP#H+ ,c "ƒ
¸ÆŒ*%ÆØ,&+Ø"( #Ø K+%H)Ø, 3.60), also ask to speak; their wish—this time
we are told—is granted. (The Spartans—wanting to hear both sides—
are impartial, after all, aren’t they?) By structuring his account in this
way, in the form of a set-piece ago¯n, Thucydides installs a law court in
the text, which is highly apposite given the legal resonances of the frame
when judges from Sparta seek a verdict on the Plataeans’ guilt. It serves
to place readers not only on par with the Spartan dikasts as assessors of
the Plataeans’ fate, but also as judges of the judges themselves.
Turning now to the scene of judgement, the Spartan response comes
as something of a surprise, and duly shocks (3.68.1):
"ƒ %b ¸ÆŒ*%ÆØ,&+Ø"Ø %ØŒÆ)#Æd +",(Ç"+#*' #e K!*æ0#Å,Æ )ç()Ø+ OæŁH' ;6*Ø+, *Y
#Ø K+ #fiH !"º-,øfi 9!7 ÆP#H+ IªÆŁe+ !*!&+ŁÆ)Ø . . . ÆsŁØ' #e ÆP#e ;+ ;ŒÆ)#"+
158 The most striking example of the need to know your history for making political
judgement is Thucydides’ account of the mutilation of the Herms (6.53–60; cf. 1.20.2).
Because the Athenians hold mistaken beliefs about the tyrannicide, they readily give in to
their fears about Alcibiades, which leads precisely to what they fear: he goes over to the
Spartans. See Wohl (1999).
159 Debnar (2001), 126–30 discusses how the Plataeans effectively try to make room
for a response ‘by claiming to perceive a lack of clarity in their question’ (p. 127). This
makes, as she notes, a pointed inversion of Sthenelaides’ earlier claim not to be able to
understand the Athenians’ lengthy speech (1.86.1).
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!ÆæÆªÆª&+#*' ŒÆd Kæø#H+#*', *Y #Ø ¸ÆŒ*%ÆØ,"+("ı' ŒÆd #"f' 6ı,,.å"ı'
IªÆŁe+ K+ #fiH !"º-,øfi %*%æÆŒ&#*' *N)(+, ›!&#* ,c çÆE*+, I!.ª"+#*'
I!-Œ#*Ø+"+ ŒÆd K6Æ(æ*#"+ K!"Ø8)Æ+#" "P%-+Æ.
The Lacadaemonian judges decided that their question, whether they had received
any benefit from the Plataeans in the war, was right . . . So they made them come
forward again, one at a time, and put the same question, whether they had done
any good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the war, and when they said no
they led them off and killed them, and made none an exception.
After Thucydides’ representation of two extended set-piece speeches,
the Spartans simply restate their question: ‘What (good) have the
Plataeans ever done for us? ’ This classic instance of repetition, which
recalls the use of epic formulae, frustrates many scholars, including
Simon Hornblower, who bemoans that ‘the Spartans simply repeat
their original question as if the speeches had never been delivered at
all . . .The message of the Plataian Debate is that it would have made
no difference if there had been no debate at all.’160 After the elaborate
setting up of a law-court ago¯n, the self-appointed judges judge on the
basis of their original question.161
The reader waits in vain, however, if expecting explicit condemnation
by the narrator: the narrative relates the pitiful fate of the Plataeans without
comment.162 The narrator’s subdued rhetoric is much more in keeping
with the Spartans’ refusal to be swayed from their original question or,
for that matter, the Thebans’ appeal to present self-advantage. Yet, that is
not to say that the speeches make little or no difference to the reader. It
may well be the case that the Thebans’ speech appears the more
convincing because of its focus on the present situation, whereas the
Plataeans come across as wistful and desperate.163 But the Thebans’
160 Hornblower (1991), 446, 462 (his italics).
161 The Spartans, it should not be forgotten, are no lovers of long speeches. Her-
odotus tells the story about how the Samians’ lengthy petitions for assistance are
punctured by typical Spartan laconic wit: ‘The Spartans at this first sitting answered
that they had forgotten what had been said at the beginning and could not understand
what came after. After this, the Samians made a second sitting and didn’t say anything;
instead they brought in a bag and merely remarked ‘the bag needs flour’—to which the
Spartans replied that the word ‘bag’ was superfluous’ (Hdt. 3.46.1–2).
162 Thucydides’ underwhelming rhetoric has given rise to the belief that his narrative
represents a kind of ‘Realpolitik’: see the discussion of Crane (1998), 21–35.
163 Debnar (2001), 133 observes that ‘as the Plataeans approach the end of their
speech, their argument becomes increasingly emotional’.
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notable neglect of the past also has the effect of rendering their speech
hollow and overtly expedient,164 particularly after the Plataeans’ own
focus on their glorious past record fighting for Greece against Persia,
and particularly when so much of the Plataeans’ speech shows
familiarity with Herodotus’ narrative of that war.165 Indeed, a familiarity
with Herodotus’ narrative is revealing in two additional ways. First,
Thucydides’ representation of the trial of the Plataeans resonates power-
fully with a similar scenario in Herodotus near the end of the battle of
Plataea when the Spartans besiege the city of . . .Thebes! Negotiations
there lead to the besieged surrendering those who had fought for the
enemy, under the expectation that these men would have the opportunity
to defend themselves (Hdt. 9.87); instead, the Spartans summarily execute
them (9.88). The parallel is striking: the Spartans (again) act with ruthless
disregard for speech. But then, at least, they seem to have acted with regard
to justice.166 In the present case, however, Thucydides describes how the
Spartans ‘thought they were no longer under obligation to the treaty’
(3.68.2), since they had urged the Plataeans to maintain their neutrality
(3.68.1): the narrator’s disclaimer, ‘so they claimed’ (M6("ı+), could have
164 For the lack of persuasiveness of the Thebans, see ibid. 136–45. Hornblower
(1991), 456–7 notes that the Thebans’ claim that their government at the time of the
Persian Wars was a family clique (3.62.3) ‘is one of the few passages in a Thucydidean
speech which is evidence for a fact about earlier Greek history not otherwise known from
Herodotus or from Th[ucydides’] own narrative (p. 457)’. This point too would seem to
detract from the force of their speech. Cf. Hornblower (1992).
165 Hornblower (1992), 148–9. The Plataeans’ description that they are surrounded
‘on all sides’ (!Æ+#Æå&Ł*+, 3.53.3) chimes with one of the moments of the Persian War,
when the Greek fleet found itself trapped at Salamis (Hdt. 8.80.2; cf. 7.25.2), only
now the Plataeans are surrounded not by the enemy’s physical presence but by their
own mental desperation. On this word suggesting the ‘claustrophobic ineluctability’ of
the Pylos and Sicily episodes, see Rood (1998), 199, n. 74. Their glowing war re-
cord (3.54.4) includes their participation in the sea-battle at Artemisium, for which
Herodotus had singled them for praise (Hdt. 8.1.1), and the final victory at, of course,
Plataea (Hdt. 9.25–88). Their reminder to the Spartans of their former plea for an
alliance (3.55.1) draws on Herodotus’ fuller account (Hdt. 6.108), in which the Spartans
themselves advise the Plataeans to seek an alliance with the Athenians, advice which,
Herodotus coolly observes, ‘did not come from any goodwill’ (Hdt. 6.108.3)—a
narratorial judgement that rings ominously in Thucydides’ ago¯n.
166 Herodotus notes that Pausanias let Attaginus’ sons go, judging them free of guilt:
but the rest supposed that they would be put on trial and could get off by bribery (9.88).
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been lifted straight fromHerodotus.With it, withHerodotus, Thucydides
devastatingly calls into question the Spartan judgement.
Second, defining features of Hellenism that had interwoven Hero-
dotus’ text—glory, freedom, a sense of Greekness itself167—are un-
wound systematically and with crushing effect: the rotten Thebans
condemn their rivals in a grim stalemate of words; the land in which
the Greeks won freedom is enslaved under the Spartan slogan of libera-
tion.168 The narrator’s commentary is short on emotion and pathos, but
is all the more effective as a result.169 In fact, the subtle resonances with
Herodotus’ Persian War account, put in the mouths of the unsuccessful
defendants, demonstrates more powerfully than the narrator himself
could have expressed the fall from the ideals of Greekness represented in
Herodotus.170 Moreover, the underlying Herodotean resonances ob-
struct the dismissive reading such as that which the judges themselves
had performed: the ago¯nmakes its reader acutely aware of what is lost in
the Spartans’ reductive line of enquiry. While the Spartans make a
pretence of legal niceties, it is Thucydides’ narrative that institutes a
trial and helps obstruct complacent reading.171
What Thucydides’ text does is to use the ago¯n to open up contest far
beyond the boundaries of this single scene to take in the events of and
narrative about the past.172 To make better judgement, the reader needs
167 For the importance of the Persian Wars for Hellenic self-definition, see esp. E.
Hall (1989). Price (2001), 110 draws an explicit connection between the Plataeans’
speech and the Athenians’ definition of ‘Hellenic identity and duty in terms of gods and
shrines, common practices and sacrifices, honor (#Ø,8) and justice, heroism and reputa-
tion (%&6Å)’, etc., at Hdt. 8.144.2—see ch.3, sec. 3 above. According to Price, ‘the
anachronism has a point. The Plataeans’ language and themes recalled a bygone age
which contrasted dramatically with Hellas at war with itself. The battleground for
Hellenic freedom had become an Hellenic butchering ground.’
168 Debnar (2001), 146.
169 As Hornblower (1991), 446 recognizes.
170 However fragile and inconsistent they may be in Herodotus, as we have seen. On
the power of the Plataean appeal to their past glory, see Gomme (1956), 346; Debnar
(2001), 136.
171 ‘So [the Plataeans’] exordium, rhetorically hopeless, is rich in history. The
Spartans, concerned only with their immediate interests (68.4), still make a show of
their reputed virtue by allowing a kind of trial, whose apparent purpose is to establish
guilt or innocence, merit or demerit (52.2, 53.4). But this trial is a travesty of legal
forms’: Macleod (1983), 105.
172 Even the named Plataeans chosen to speak are significant in this context, the sons of
‘Mr River-boundary-between-Plataea-and-Thebes’ and ‘Mr Always-to-be-remembered’.
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to take account of, and adopt, a historical perspective. Thus, when
the Spartans repeat their question, it is not simply repetition, as
Hornblower complains: in Thucydides’ hands the ago¯n allows the
reader to resist attempts by the more powerful to marginalize opposition
and silence the weak. More particularly, this ago¯n empowers the reader
to dissent from the tyranny of the present. Through these implicit
means, prompting but not controlling interpretation, Thucydides as-
signs political value to the reading of history.173
Desire fell upon all alike to sail
This section has so far examined the frames of two crucial debate scenes
which are usually interpreted as showing debate going wrong. In both,
the historical agents are seen to manipulate the deliberative process to
elicit assent from their audience. In both, the narrator invites dissent
from those manouevres in the way he sets up an ago¯n. By these means,
Thucydides recoups the ago¯n as a way of coming to an informed judge-
ment. It is important to note again that Thucydides does not provide any
clear-cut solution to the debates, even as he enters the text to direct his
reader’s interpretation: though he explicitly condemns the demagogue,
Thucydides still leaves his readers exposed to the full force of Cleon’s
powerful rhetoric; the Spartans’ judgement passes without comment. To
close this chapter, I will consider one last example of a failed debate. In
the assembly that represents the launching of the catastrophic expedition
to Sicily only the narrator dissents properly.
The Sicilian debate is the most elaborately framed of all assembly
scenes in Thucydides. From the beginning of book 6, the narrator
marks out the danger of the expedition in ways that reveal his personal
investment in the narrative and recall the start of his war narrative. Since
the Athenians are ignorant of Sicily, its geography and history, he
As Debnar (2001), 126, observes, the one name ‘marks the boundary between Plataean
and Theban territory, a boundary that the speakers are trying to preserve’, while the other
‘is a fitting choice to remind the Spartans of the debt they owe the Plataeans’. Cf. Connor
(1984), 97, n. 42. Gomme (1956), 337, however, is more sceptical: ‘Nothing, as far as we
can see, is added to the narrative by the mention of the names of the speakers’ (his italics).
173 Cf. Yunis (2003).
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supplies a second ‘Archaeology’;174 when ambassadors come from
Egesta, he states bluntly that they said many things that were not true
("PŒ IºÅŁB, 6.6); Thucydides even uses the word with which he had
denoted ‘the truest cause’ (!æ"ç.)Ø', 6.8.4), only now it is used with its
customary meaning of ‘an excuse’. All these reminders of the beginning
of his account and the first debate over Corcyra serve to accentuate the
difference between the two episodes: this ago¯n is not about the ambi-
guity of the claim or the difficulty of coming to a judgement. Instead,
Thucydides establishes the ago¯n when the assembly reconvenes to dis-
cuss the practicalities. The decision has already been made.
Though the issue is no longer under discussion, Nicias nevertheless
raises his voice in dissent. Previous speech introductions have been
important for gauging the words that are spoken, but this is the most
revealing yet, since the narrator expressly reads the speaker’s mind.
According to Thucydides, Nicias was ‘unwilling’ (IŒ"/)Ø"') to com-
mand and speaks up, ‘thinking that the city had not deliberated rightly’
(+",(Çø+ %b #c+ !&ºØ+ "PŒ OæŁH' 4*4"ıº*F)ŁÆØ, 6.8.4). Gone is the
gesture of the author absenting himself from the framing of debate,
which had given the Corcyraean ago¯n its sense of impartiality. Whereas
the majority of critics point to debate degenerating at Athens, we might
be struck instead by the increasing conspicuousness of the narrator’s
involvement in its representation.
That point comes across even more forcefully in the introduction to
Nicias’ second speech (6.19.2):
ŒÆd › ˝ØŒ(Æ' ª+"f' ‹#Ø I!e ,b+ #H+ ÆP#H+ º&ªø+ "PŒ i+ :#Ø I!"#æ-ł*Ø*,
!ÆæÆ)Œ*ıB' %b !º8Ł*Ø, *N !"ººc+ K!Ø#.6*Ø*, #.å7 i+ ,*#Æ)#8)*Ø*+ ÆP#"/',
!Ææ*ºŁg+ ÆP#"E' ÆsŁØ' :º*ª* #"Ø.%*.
And Nicias knew that he could not turn them from their plan with the same
arguments, but with the magnitude of the preparation, if he should order a
huge undertaking, he could perhaps change their minds. So he came forward
and spoke again to them with such words.
174 6.1–6. Whether or not the Athenians were so ignorant of Sicily is debatable:
Plutarch records the animated discussions of Sicilian topography that took place all over
Athens (Plut. Vit. Nic. 12.1). Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1970), 197 consider this
account as not incompatible with Thucydides’ picture, on the basis that the picture
veterans painted ‘was not necessarily more accurate, or more conducive to cool thinking,
than the reminiscences of uneducated observers usually are’.
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This is the only time in the narrative that one speaker speaks twice in the
same debate. Already somewhat out of place, Thucydides exaggerates
the effect by reading Nicias’ thoughts for a second time, yet with a
crucial difference. While the narrator had conveyed an important in-
sight into the speaker’s thinking on the previous occasion, that speech
had been clearly directed towards tempering his audience’s enthusiasm
for the armada. In this second case, however, the narrator’s introduction
is absolutely fundamental to a reading of the speech. For without it,
Nicias’ second speech could be read as useful advice to the Athenians to
take the expedition seriously enough. Instead, the reader is informed not
to take Nicias’ words at face value, but to interpret them as part of a
complex, and somewhat paradoxical, plan that exaggerates the difficul-
ties and resources in order to dissuade his audience from attacking
Sicily.175
The result is catastrophic, as the Athenians, as it were, ‘rush to the
ships’ (6.24.2). Nicias, Agamemnon-like in formulating a plan to say
one thing when he means another, becomes Agamemnon-like in his
misreading of the mood of the audience: his distinction between young
and old dissolves as ‘ero¯s’ for the expedition fell on all alike (6.24.3), and
a terrifying consensus silences all those who wished to dissent: even
those who disagreed with the decision kept silent.176 Here Thucydides
not only again enters the text to inform his reader that the opposite
(#"P+Æ+#("+, 6.24.2) happened to what Nicias had hoped; his is also the
only dissenting voice to be heard: Thucydides points out that the
Athenians were ‘too much’ in love with the expedition.177 Here the
175 It is ironic, given that Nicias thinks that he is exaggerating the difficulties and the
Athenians accept his dire predictions at face value, that his fears come true nevertheless.
176 *Y #fiH ¼æÆ ŒÆd ,c Xæ*)Œ*, %*%Øg' ,c I+#Øå*Øæ"#"+H+ ŒÆŒ&+"ı' %&6*Ø*+ *r+ÆØ #fi B
!&º*Ø >)ıå(Æ+ qª*+, 6.24.4.
177 u)#* %Øa #c+ ¼ªÆ+ #H+ !º*&+ø+ K!ØŁı,(Æ+, 6.24.4. One of the problems, at least
among the youth, is the ‘desire for sights and sightseeing’ (!&Ł"' Zł*ø' ŒÆd Ł*øæ(Æ',
6.24.3). The importance of ‘sightseeing’ (Ł*øæ(Æ) to Herodotus’ narrative is well
documented (Munson 2001), and its prominence here does not seem accidental: Red-
field (1985), 98. Indeed, Redfield’s analysis of the ‘link between philosophy and theoria’
(p. 102) in Herodotus offers a way of thinking about Thucydides’ perjorative insinuation
against sightseeing here. As Redfield shows, Herodotus’ strategy of connecting wander-
ing and wisdom owes much to an Odyssean tradition (see also nowMarincola (2007), 3–
20). In Thucydides’ Athens it is as if Herodotus’ enquiry has stimulated a spirit for
Odyssean adventure among the youth—a taste for philosophical investigation under-
taken by each individual. Thucydides subtly corrects this attitude by writing up the
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narrator is the hero trying to hold the troops back from rushing to the
ships.178
As we saw in Chapter 1 above, Agamemnon’s miscalculated attempt
to provoke his men to dissent from his testing speech belongs to a
vigorous examination of the assembly as a place of institutional dissent.
Here Nicias’ failure to provoke his audience to dissent exposes the
failure of the civic institutional framework at Athens to accommodate
dissent. In the hubbub of the assembly, political decision-making is
subject to irrational forces and group pressure. In its place, then,
Thucydides authorizes his own dissenting voice as the only voice cap-
able of resisting the pull towards uncritical consensus. Yet, even as he
writes Athens’ tragic downfall, he demonstrates his commitment to the
polis; even as he reveals the failings of the assembly, Thucydides enters
the ago¯n and exposes his own position to risk to an extent that Her-
odotus as a narrator rarely does. The reading position with which we are
left is highly unstable179 and challenging.180
Sicilian Expedition not as an Odyssey but as an Iliad, with a political emphasis on
collective suffering. See following notes.
178 For Homeric allusions in the Sicilian narrative: C. Mackie (1996); Allison
(1997b); via Herodotus: Allison (1997a), 88–91; Rood (1999). On Nicias as an
Agamemnon-like figure, see Allison (1997b), 510; Zadorojnyi (1998). The Homeric
correspondences that Allison (1997b) draws to the Athenians’ actions are significant for
revealing the complexity of Thucydides’ account, since at times they recall the Iliadic
Achaeans, at others the Odyssean suitors (pp. 503–5): who are the Athenians more like?
For Thucydides, emphasis on suffering as en epic feature, see Woodman (1988), 29. On
the importance of the issues behind the phrase ‘many pains’ in epic poetry, see Barker
and Christensen (2008).
179 Thucydides represents a seductive image of the Sicilian debate; but, significantly, the
Sicilian Expedition is not the end. With the words: ‘Few out of the many returned’ (Oº(ª"Ø
I!e !"ººH+ K!7 "YŒ"ı I!*+&)#Å)Æ+, 7.87.6), Thucydides gestures towards an Odyssey to
come: see Allison (1997b), 514. While Ober (1998), 121 sees the Sicilian debate as
concluding Thucydides’ critique of democratic deliberation, he is forced to concede that
this view does not square with the actual events (which Thucydides would have witnessed):
‘If, having completed her study of the history, Thucydides’ fourth-century reader now
believes that she understands the processes by which Athens shook itself apart, she remains
at a loss to explain how the shattered fragments of a poliswere so quickly reassembled under
the apparently discredited aegis of de¯mokratia, and in the absence of a leader in the Periclean
mold. In sum, the historical facts of democratic Athenian resilience after the crises of 411
and 404 cannot easily be accommodated within the critical/theoretical framework that the
author introduced at the beginning of the text and developed in his presentation and
analysis of Athenian assembly speeches.’ Thucydides is well aware of this, as he embarks on
the Odysseus-like adventures of Alcibiades in book 8.
180 ‘Thucydide n’est pas un colleague’: Loraux (1980).
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This last section has shown the importance of the frame that sur-
rounds the scenes of debate in Thucydides’ narrative. The dynamic
between the frame and the representation of debate draws attempts at
judgement into an ago¯n, to the extent that the narrator himself makes a
stand. Thucydides begins his narrative, seeing (›æH+) that, as he puts it,
‘all the Greek world takes a stand against each other, some immediately,
others after thinking about it’ (ŒÆd #e ¼ºº" $¯ººÅ+ØŒe+ ›æH+
6ı+Ø)#.,*+"+ !æe' 5ŒÆ#-æ"ı', #e ,b+ *PŁ/', #e %b ŒÆd %ØÆ+""/,*+"+,
1.1.1). The prominence of #e $¯ººÅ+ØŒ&+—a term Herodotus seems to
have coined—right at the beginning of his narrative suggests Thucy-
dides’ close engagement with this concept, which turns out to be its
decontruction. Having established the veracity of the idea of the ‘Greek
thing’ in the Archaeology,181 Thucydides shows how it comes under
increasing strain as the events of the war unfold, particularly when stasis
takes hold of Corcyra;182 it returns finally to give the catastrophe of the
Sicilian expedition a suitably comprehensive climax.183 Significant too
are the appeals made to this idea in speeches, which explicitly evoke
Herodotus’ narrative: the Plataeans pin their hope of survival on the
possibility that ‘the Greek thing’ still means something—and fail;184
while the Spartans themselves later appeal to the ideal in their peace
proposal, even as they offer the Athenians joint hegemony over the rest
of Greece.185 By its representation of debate as ago¯n, his narrative
181 1.6.6, 15.3. Price (2001), 333 comments: ‘It may be said that the reader enters
into the narrative of the war proper instructed in the idea of Hellas as a unified entity.’
182 o)#*æ&+ ª* ŒÆd !A+ ‰' *N!*E+ #e $¯ººÅ+ØŒe+ KŒØ+8ŁÅ, 3.82.1; cf. 83.1. Price
(2001), 273, n. 139 notes the connection between Thucydides’ opening line and his
comment in the stasis section: ‘These are statements so striking, and singled out as
unusual by Thucydides himself (‰' *N!*E+), that an ancient reader of theHistory in scrolls
was likely to remember them, if he remembered any particular phrase from one scroll to
the next.’
183 7.87.5. The only other use in the narratorial voice is Thucydides’ description of
the battle of Mantinea, where the ‘greatest Hellenic army’ assembled (5.60.3).
184 3.57.3. See esp. ‘what good have the Plataeaus done for us?’, above.
185 This example is particularly interesting: if they—the Athenians and Spartans—
make peace, the rest of the Greek world would honour them, because it would be weaker
(>,H+ ªaæ ŒÆd 9,H+ #ÆP#a º*ª&+#ø+ #& ª* ¼ºº" $¯ººÅ+ØŒe+ Y)#* ‹#Ø 9!"%*-)#*æ"+ Z+ #a
,-ªØ)#Æ #Ø,8)*Ø, 4.20.4)—which represents a striking reworking, and inversion, of the
Athenians’ appeal to ‘Greekness’ made before the Spartans in Herodotus: see Ch. 3, sec.
3 above. The Spartan speech itself is later echoed by Alcibiades (6.90.4). Its only other
occurrence describes Themistocles’ machinations with the Persian king (1.138.2)—again
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performs that difficulty of remaining neutral and impartial.186 In this
ever-divisive world, even those who seek neutrality and impartiality
cannot afford to be simply ‘spectators of a debate’. Thucydides’ writing
in the ago¯n politicizes reading.
This chapter has explored representations of debate in Thucydides’ narra-
tive of the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. It started by
meeting the objection that Thucydides’ construction of his narratorial
voice rules out possibilities of debate in his narrative. It was found that, on
the contrary, Thucydides’ narratorial voice is distinct from his narrative by
being opinionated and provocative. In the light of the narrator’s com-
ments on the problems caused by a lack of debate in the Greek commu-
nities during the war, section 2 analysed Thucydides’ representation of
debate as ago¯n from the perspective of its utility for reading. Thucydides
does much more than show debate going wrong—it is not even clear that
the Athenians come to the wrong decision about Corcyra, though it leads
to war; by aiming for an accurate representation of speech, Thucydides
exposes the reader to the full force of a speaker’s rhetoric, but also equips
the reader with the tools, particularly by the process of comparison, to
analyse and gain greater awareness of the strategies of persuasion. In the
last section attention was turned to Thucydides’ framing of the assembly
scenes in order to bring to the fore his management of debate. It was
shown not only that he represents debate to educate his reader in political
judgement by not providing an authoritative way of interpreting the
debates; his voice also enters the debate in dissent.
As the tragic climax of the Sicilian expedition approaches, Nicias is
still to be found trying to dissent from the decisions that have beenmade.
On this fateful last occasion, he uses a letter to express his discontent with
the expedition (7. 8.2).187 The reasoning given (by the narrator) closely
in the context of selling ‘Greece’ out. On Thucydides’ structuring of the Peloponnesian
War as an internal struggle between Greek cities, see Price (2001).
186 Can one—or should one—remain neutral in stasis? A much-disputed law of
Solon (Ath. Pol. 8.5) apparently legislated for people to take sides in stasis and not
remain neutral: see Osborne (1990), 100–2; Loraux (2002), 102–3.
187 As Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1970), 386 observe: ‘Not even Gylippos’
victory and the decisive progress of the counter-wall (6.3f.), the sufferings of the crews
based on Plemmyrion (4.6), or the description (8.1) of Nikias’ apprehensions prepare the
reader fully for the tone of hopelessness which pervades this letter.’ Cf. Zadorojnyi
(1998), 300 puts the ‘puzzling pessimism pervading the letter’ down to ‘Nicias’ assim-
ilation to Agamemnon’.
Thucydides writes debate 259
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 259 29.4.2011 11:30am
intersects with Thucydides’ own methodological concerns discussed in
1.22.1–4: since Nicias ‘feared lest the messengers would not report
things as they were, either through an incapacity to speak or having left
behind the memory of it or because they spoke to curry favour with the
mob in some way, he wrote a letter’,188 as a result of which ‘the Athenians
could counsel on the truth’.189 Moreover, at the conclusion of his letter
(7.14.4), Nicias declares that he will speak the truth (‘I)çÆº-)#*æ"+
>ªÅ).,Å+ #e IºÅŁb' %ÅºH)ÆØ’), notwhat is pleasant, though that is what
the de¯mos likes to hear (‘#a l%Ø)#Æ IŒ"/*Ø+’).190
With this Nicias expresses anxieties similar to those articulated by
Thucydides himself.191 Given such a clear coincidence of language and
ideas, it is not surprising that critics have identified Nicias’ attitude with
the author’s own understanding of his written account, particularly in
terms of its opposition to assembly debate in privileging truth over
pleasure.192 Some chapters later, however, Thucydides returns to nar-
rate the letter’s reception in Athens, during which the secretary
(ªæÆ,,Æ#*f') reads out the letter only after the messengers have already
188 ç"4"/,*+"' %b ,c "ƒ !*,!&,*+"Ø j ŒÆ#a #c+ #"F º-ª*Ø+ I%ı+Æ)(Æ+ j ŒÆd ,+8,Å'
KººØ!*E' ªØª+&,*+"Ø j #fiH Zåºøfi !æe' å.æØ+ #Ø º-ª"+#*' "P #a Z+#Æ I!Æªª-ººø)Ø+,
:ªæÆł*+ K!Ø)#"º8+, 7.8.2.
189 1ŁÅ+Æ("ı' 4"ıº*/)Æ)ŁÆØ !*æd #B' IºÅŁ*(Æ', 7.8.2.
190 See Thucydides’ methodological statement, 1.22.1–4. The relationship of Nicias’
letter to Thucydides’ enterprise is discussed by Edmunds (1993), 838–44; Allison
(1997a), 225–30; Greenwood (2004), 181–5; (2006), 76–81. As Greenwood (2006),
80–1 puts it: ‘Nicias attempts to transcend the problems of oral communication, the
shortcomings of human memory and the pressures that Athenian mass audiences could
bring to bear on speakers. This attempt is framed in terms that remind the reader of
Thucydides’ historiographical project and his discussion of the difficulties involved in
conveying a clear account of speeches and events at 1.22.1–4.’ None of these critics,
however, focuses on the significance of what subsequently happens to the letter for
thinking about Thucydides’ own writing—though Greenwood (2006), 81 notes in
passing that ‘Nicias’ letter is only partially successful’.
191 It is particularly striking that Nicias applies the word ‘accuracy’ (IŒæØ4*(Æ, 7.13.2)
to describe the state of the fleet.
192 Edmunds (1993), 842 interprets the letter as demonstrating Thucydides’ belief
that writing can achieve an ‘absolute mimesis’. Allison (1997a), 226 regards the written
word as containing the truth and able to duplicate itself: several scholars, however, have
explored the problematic authority of the written logos in Plato’s Phaedrus. According to
Nightingale (1995), 168, Plato shows how the written word is no more secure than the
spoken word on the basis that it cannot respond to questioning. Ferrari (1987), 205
agrees, pointing to Socrates’ observation that it cannot choose its audience (274b6).
Mittlestrass (1988) suggests how Plato may have found an answer in his dialogue form:
by being somehow incomplete, it can partially suspend its textual character.
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spoken about the situation, and only after they have answered any
queries.193 That is to say, once in the hands of the messengers, the letter
becomes a mere tool: subject to the action of its carriers, it is open to
manipulation, misinterpretation or even misrepresentation. Moreover,
the letter itself becomes a problem. In contrast to the prior, verbal
process of investigation, in which the assembly is engaged (according
to Thucydides’ narrative), the authority of the letter is immediately
conceded by the Athenians—though they then rush to the opposite
conclusions.194 The very absence of narratorial commentary at this
point conversely makes the reader aware that the letter ought to have
been discussed. By focusing on the performance of the letter in the
assembly, Thucydides suggests the possible reception of his own written
account within an Athenian institutional context, and dramatizes its
failure.195 The written word is allocated an authority which it cannot
sustain, and ultimately fails because it does not allow for dissent.
193 ‘They spoke to them, and if anyone had a question they answered, and they gave
them the letter; and the secretary of the city came forward and read it out to the
Athenians’ (ÆP#"E' *r!"+, ŒÆd *Y #(' #Ø K!Åæ0#Æ I!*Œæ(+"+#", ŒÆd #c+ K!Ø)#"ºc+
I!-%")Æ+. › %b ªæÆ,,Æ#*f' › #B' !&º*ø' !Ææ*ºŁg+ I+-ª+ø #"E' 1ŁÅ+Æ("Ø' %Åº"F)Æ+
#"(Æ%*, 7.10).
194 They elect a new general, and send even more troops to Sicily—which not only
misunderstands Nicias’ intention but also adds significantly to the impending cata-
strophe. Zadorojnyi (1998) suggestively compares Nicias’ letter to Agamemnon’s test
of his troops in Iliad 2. He argues that Nicias is using the same strategy, namely to play
up the hardships in order to effect a change for the better: ‘That is what Nicias really
wants, not permission to withdraw from Sicily’ (p. 301). While largely in agreement with
Zadorojnyi on the correspondences between Nicias and the Iliad ’s Agamemnon, this
study sees that as part of Thucydides general Iliadic colouring of his portrait of the
Sicilian Expedition and the Peloponnesian War in general. In particular, this letter seems
to rework Nicias’ earlier speech, in which—according to Thucydides—he had tried to
trick his audience (6.19.2): from this perspective, therefore, Nicias’ letter seems rather to
replay Agamemnon’s speech of despair to the Achaeans in Iliad 9, when the commander
has given up on Troy in all seriousness. Like Agamemnon, Nicias is rebutted: but the
commitment to stay will condemn even more Athenians to their deaths. Unlike in the
Iliad, these Greeks aren’t going to sack Troy (Syracuse), nor are they going to make it
home (7.87.6): see n. 179 above.
195 The similarity of this episode with Herodotus’ own account of a climactic sea-
battle is highly suggestive. In the midst of the failed debates at Salamis, Themistocles
writes a letter, whose authority is immediately accepted by its recipient. There, however,
Themistocles acted explicitly outside his community’s institutional framework, and the
recipient of the intentionally deceptive letter was the Persian king: Thucydides, on the
other hand, internalizes the problem of the written text by having the letter misinter-
preted in the assembly.
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Where debate was failing in the city’s institutions, in Thucydides’
text the ago¯n is transformed into something useful (Tç-ºØ,Æ,
1.22.4).196 By being part of something that can be possessed (Œ#B,Æ),
the ago¯n is not limited by its extra-textual manifestation where, as a
contest piece (Iªø+(),Æ), it is subject to the instant moment of hear-
ing.197 By being part of something that can be read, reread, put down,
picked up again, Thucydides’ representation of the ago¯n empowers the
reader to look into ()Œ"!*E+)198 clearly (#e )Æç-') language in perfor-
mance.199 As Thucydides writes in the ago¯n, so he stimulates controlled
dissent. This marks a significant step towards the formalizing of speech
and its study under the rubric of rhetoric.200 At the same time, however,
the ago¯n is not a purely intellectualized experience and emptied of
passion; Thucydides’ text is not a rhetorical treatise. On the contrary,
his narrative also captures the cut and thrust of argument and counter-
argument. It makes the reader aware of what is at stake, often when the
narrator’s own language is studiously sober.
196 A catchword in political debate: Nightingale (1995). To claim utility for one’s
own account would be essential for anyone entering the contest of voices, but is especially
urgent for a writer, as someone who has chosen not to participate in the customary
political life of the citizen.
197 Greenwood (2004), 189–95 draws attention to the importance Thucydides puts
on his exile, which allowed him, because of the leisure (ŒÆŁ7 >)ıå(Æ+), to reflect on
matters more (5.26.5). As Greenwood points out, >)ıå(Æ is usually associated with
political inactivity, and she cites Thucydides’ ancient evidence that he composed not for
‘men of the agora’ (Iª"æÆ("Ø' I+Łæ0!"Ø') but those of a ‘free education’ (IªøªB'
Kº*ıŁ*æ("ı, Dion. Hal. Thuc. 50). This chapter alternatively has argued that Thucydides
uses his leisure to transform the way politics was thought about and done, by projecting
his text as the locus for discussion instead of the public assembly, democratic or
otherwise.
198 The term )Œ"!*E+ is never used ‘neutrally’ in the narrative in a description of a
character’s action. When not used by the narrator qua author, it occurs only in direct
speech or focalization. It is used, then, only prescriptively for the reader. It is a key term
in debate, occurring some 225 times in the Demosthenes corpus.
199 For #e )Æç-' see Woodman (1988), 23–8, who connects it to the feature of
vividness (K+.æª*ØÆ), which Plutarch sees as characteristic of Thucydides’ narrative: Plut.
Mor. 246f–7c. See n. 8 above. See also Edmunds (1975), 155–63; Greenwood (2006),
26–33.
200 Yunis (1998), 237. For ‘the human thing’ (#e I+Łæ0!Ø+"+, 1.22.4) as revealing a
continuous process of interpretation, not isolated decisions: Cogan (1981), 233–54.
Examples of the relationship between Thucydides’ speeches and rhetorical treatises:
Hornblower (1987), 47. The Sicilian orators: T. Cole (1995).
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Writing in the ago¯n, then, Thucydides explores the constant, ongoing
contest over the representation of contest. He not only investigates the
assembly as an institution and criticizes public debate for making wrong
decisions; he also brings that public form to bear on reading his text
and, in doing so, recoups debate as a means toward forming responsible
political judgement.201 His use of the ago¯n does not demonstrate the
superiority of his written text; his narrative performs that superiority by
opening readers up to a process of monitoring and self-criticism each
time they enter the ago¯n. Far from providing the reader with the
solution to the crisis of debate, the ways in which Thucydides frames
debate reproduce the crisis of interpretation and implicate the reader
into doing politics this way. His narrative does not appeal to a ‘ready-
made’ group of critics;202 it constructs a political community—a differ-
ent kind of political community, for sure: one with a text in front of
them, but political nevertheless—forged in the agony of reading all
about it.203 By this means Thucydides provides some kind of potential
for getting beyond the purely parochial concerns and debates of his
speakers.204 This is writing for thinking politically.
201 ‘It is not by chance that the invention of historical prose (with its special critical
contract between author and reader) takes place as democracy (with its culture of
public judgement and personal responsibility) comes into being’: Goldhill (2002), 43–4.
Farrar (1988) also regards Thucydides as embedded in a particular kind of political society
(p. 12), and suggests that ‘his response to concerns about democracy was democratic’
(p. 126) without fully articulating what that might look like or what it might mean.
202 One of the criticisms levelled at Ober (1998) is his conception of elite writers as a
‘“virtual community” of critics’, like contributors to a journal: J. Roberts (2000), 482;
Harris (2000); Rhodes (2000). For a more nuanced attempt at contextualizing Thucy-
dides: Kurke (2000).
203 Hornblower (1991), 439 suggestively glosses ago¯n at 3.49.1 as stressing ‘not so
much the competitive aspect of the oratorical display . . . but the emotional struggle of
the voters, almost an “agony” (a word derived from Iª0+) of decision-making’. That
struggle is also the readers’. The language of competition pervades the climactic battle of
Syracuse harbour (cf. 7.61.1, 64.2, 70.3). Not only does Thucydides challenge his
(Athenian) readers’ expectations by presenting this catastrophe from the perspective of
the Syracusans and their Spartan allies as a ‘beautiful contest’ (ŒÆºe' Iª0+, 7.68.3; cf.
ŒÆºe+ Iª0+Ø),Æ, 7.56.2, 59.2; 86.2; ¼6Ø"' Iª0+, 7.56.3; cf. 7.66.1); in the scene that
won Plutarch’s admiration for vividness, Thucydides also describes the spectators as
enduring ‘a mighty conflict and tension of mind’ (!"ºf+ #e+ IªH+Æ ŒÆd 6/)#Æ)Ø+ #B'
ª+0,Å' *rå*, 7.71.1). Thus he extends the notion of the ago¯n to anxiety or, as one might
say, agony: see Be´tant (1961), under ‘anxietas’; sec. III. 6 of LSJ 19.
204 Price (2001), 376 notes that ‘in light of the main themes of the Archaeology and the
main focus of the war narrative, Thucydides’ Hellas had a fundamental political potential ’
(emphasis in original): but he does not place an emphasis on Thucydides’ construction of a
new way of doing politics, as this study does. Readers of the (Greek) world unite.
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Introduction: institutional dissent
Achilles’ dissent from Agamemnon at the beginning of the Iliad has
generated a variety of responses. The Homeric epics—the founda-
tional poems of Greek literature and culture—establish competing
narrative strategies for thinking about the contest of words. In the
Iliad dissent is valorized in the Achaean community to the extent
that challenging the king is affirmed as an important, if not defining,
feature of the assembly. The Odyssey, on the other hand, relentlessly
marginalizes political dissent in its privileging of Odysseus’ home-
coming and tale of endurance. Similarly, Herodotus’ cross-cultural
odyssey around the Mediterranean, in which debates are represented
as taking place outside a polis environment or else in the Persian
court, promotes his own written enquiry as an alternative means of
engaging in political activity. In turn, Thucydides takes an Achilles-
like stance in his representation of the assembly as ago¯n in a more
direct challenge to the way deliberation is carried out in the various
political decision-making bodies of his time, as he recoups assembly
speech by writing it up in such a way that puts the reader through
the process of exercising proper political judgement.
This journey has taken us to Athens: where Homer was performed
at the Panathenaia;1 where Herodotus was said to have recited
sections of his ‘historia’; where Thucydides fought as a general. It
is the place where dissent becomes fully institutionalized in the
1 On Homer performed at the Panathenaia, see Parke (1977), 34; Goldhill (1991),
167–73; Nagy (1999); Haubold (2000), 145–90.
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politeia, democracy.2 It is here that tragedy, Athens’ response to
Homer,3 is performed.
Act III investigates representations of debate on the tragic stage. Since
tragedy in and of itself may be regarded as staging a contest of voices
between the protagonists before an embedded audience (the Chorus), it
will be important to consider more broadly the question of the thematiza-
tion of dissent. It will be shown that tragedy inherits many of the features
from epic, including many of the same story patterns and characters, but
explores the issue of dissent from the perspective of those looking on.
The politics of Athenian tragedy has reached something of an ortho-
doxy over the past decade,4 with the cultural context of performance at
the city Dionysia coming under particular scrutiny.5 As a festival which
all the citizens could be expected to attend, it was an event where the
polis put itself on display.6 Certain features reinforced the interconnect-
edness between the institution of tragedy and its broader political
framework,7 such as the procedure for selecting the judges.8 Before
the festival, each of the ten Attic tribes provided a list of fifty of their
2 G. E. R. Lloyd (1979) locates contest at the origins of democracy, while Wolin
(1994) stresses the importance of renewal and revolution to democracy. As we saw above,
Ober (1998) explores political dissent in Athens, but from the perspective of those
marginal to the dominant political hegemony, the ‘elite’. Such an approach has been
criticized by Euben (1997), 91–108 precisely on the basis of its premise that dissent is
something external to democracy. Hesk (1999; 2000) has shown one way in which
Athenian drama may contribute to the debate, through the strategy of ‘anti-rhetoric’. Cf.
Halliwell (1997).
3 On the influence of epic: Arist. Poet. 1448a1–30, 1448b28–1449a2, 1449b9–20 and
1460a5–26; cf. 1451a16–29, 1459a17–b32, 1461b26–end.
4 Tragedy is now used in discussions on the theory of democracy. See esp. Euben
(1990; 1997), and the edited volumes by Euben (1986) and Goff (1995).
5 See esp. the series of essays in Winkler and Zeitlin, eds. (1990) and in Easterling, ed.
(1997). On the interrelationship between the theatre and Athenian life, see most recently
Debnar (2005); E. Hall (2006). On using tragedy as evidence for historical analysis, see
Pelling, ed. (1997).
6 As Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 58 puts it, it was an ‘effective advertisement of the
wealth and power and public spirit of Athens’. For the ‘theoric fund’, see Csapo and
Slater (1995), 287–8, 420–1. For participation in democracy in general, see Sinclair
(1988); Ober (1989; 1998). For the difficulties of non-participation, L. Carter (1986).
7 The theatre and theatrical space: Scodel, ed. (1993); Green (1994); Wiles (1997;
2000); Rehm (2002). The dramatic productions: Sommerstein et al. (1993); Silk (1996).
Gellrich (1995) has a good discussion about the problems of this approach, with the
warning that the posited context is also a text that requires interpretation (p. 40).
8 See Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 95–9.
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members. From this list, the chief archon selected one name at random
from each of the tribes, leaving ten citizens to judge the contest. When it
came to compiling the scores, the archon counted, at random, just five
of the ten votes cast. This elaborate procedure does not simply reflect a
concern to avoid corruption; it also substantiates the principle that each
individual has a role in the collective. Now, no man of the de¯mos, no
Iliadic Thersites, need be excluded on the basis of status alone.9
Recently, however, opposition to reading tragedy so politically has
been growing increasingly vocal, for a number of reasons.10 First, it is
not clear how or to what extent the extra-dramatic material is relevant to
an analysis of the plays themselves.11 Second, and related to this point,
the understanding of the politics of tragedy has tended to be limited to
the actions and words of the characters, and to identifying references to
contemporary figures and ideas—that is to say, on what is political.12
While taking a broader definition of politics, as for instance ‘things to
9 It is on the basis of his demagogy, and not his class, that Thersites is attacked by
Neoptolemos and Philoctetes in Sophocles’ Philoctetes (438–42). In fact, his identity
merges with Odysseus’—the king who beat him (and others) up to enforce class
distinctions in the Iliad (Il. 2.265–8; cf. 2.199).
10 See esp. Griffin (1998; 1999), prompting a defence of reading tragedy and politics
by Goldhill (2000). See also Seaford (2000) and Heath (2006) for alternative views on
the social function of tragedy. In September 2007 the University of Reading held a
conference to address the central question ‘Why Athens?’, that explored the extent to
which tragedy was distinctively Athenian, Pan-Hellenic and/or political. See D. Carter
(2011) for the edited volume of these proceedings.
11 One of the problems is that tragedy, in the end, is performance not theory: Winton
and Garnsey (1981), 38.
12 Such a reductive approach has prompted at least one scholar to ask: ‘Were the
spectators really looking through the surface meaning and content of the action for subtle
hidden political messages?’: Griffin (1999), 91. He has in mind such critics as Goldhill
(1987) and Rose (1995), but his criticisms are far-reaching. See e.g. Podlecki (1966),
who marks an early attempt at looking for politics based on direct allusion; or Meier
(1990; 1993), who, while more subtle in showing how tragedy educates the citizen into
citizenship, also remains focused on uncovering ‘messages’ in themes. For a survey of the
various positions: S. Saı¨d (1998). The fact that tragic action occupies a place somewhere
else in time and space—cf. Zeitlin (1990)—would seem to militate against this kind of
direct one-to-one mapping. Cf. Pelling (2000), esp. 1–17. Sommerstein (1997) talks
about how ‘aspects of the action [of Aeschylus’ Suppliants] were designed to recall recent
events’. When confronted too directly with their (self-induced) troubles, the Athenians
react badly, as with their response to Phrynichus’ Sack of Miletus recorded by Herodotus
(Hdt. 6.21), a story which may have come into being precisely because it explains
tragedy’s avoidance of the here and now.
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do with the polis’,13 can help meet some of these anxieties (such as
allowing the fruitful discussion of concepts such as gender and family),
this also raises a third concern: to what extent should tragedy even be
regarded as a specifically Athenian or democratic art form?14 After all,
tragedy came to be disseminated throughout the Greek and Roman
worlds and recognized as a genre in its own right, one not specifically
associated with Athens.15
In trying to account for its successful transition from its Athenian-led
production to Hellenic-wide consumption, Pat Easterling has talked
about tragedy’s double vision—its interplay between the heroic and
the contemporary.16 Again, the broad compass of this book has the
13 D. Carter (2007), 67 provides the following definition of ‘political’: ‘a concern
with human beings as part of the community of the polis’, a definition that owes much to
Macleod (1983), 28: ‘a concern with human beings as part of a community.’ Rhodes
(2003) questions the assumptions underlying the view that tragedy can (or should) be
seen as democratic. See also Finglass (2005), who argues for more precise terminology to
be used in talking about a play’s politics.
14 D. Carter (2007), 35–43 critiques what he calls the ‘democratic assumption (p. 35)’.
Tellingly, he concentrates his attack on the paucity of references to Athens or her institu-
tions. In contrast, this book focuses on the agonistic form of the drama and the process the
audience undergoes in their experience of the contest of words: along with the prominence
of such issues as frank speaking or speaking back, the agonistic form suggests a democratic
tonality to tragedy, while not disallowing its relevance to enfranchised citizens ofGreek city-
states elsewhere. On the political rhetoric of tragedy, see Ober and Strauss (1990). See also
Halliwell (1997), who discusses how tragedy reveals ‘the latent patterns, and the lurking
anxieties, of a cultural mentality which sustained and mistrusted rhetoric in equal measure’
(p. 141); and Hesk (2000), who shows how Attic drama in general exposes the rhetorical
strategies common to Athenian political discourse.
15 On the exportability of tragedy see Easterling (1997b); Taplin (1997). Aristotle
provides arguably the important evidence for the reception of tragedy—and he leaves out
the Athenian polis from his analysis: E. Hall (1996). Aristotle may also be criticized for an
overly literary (and philosophical) approach to tragedy: Ford (1995), 127; Wiles (2000),
168–70; cf. Gellrich (1988), 5.
16 Easterling (1997c), 25: ‘The plays they watched were distinctively Attic in dialect
and style, close enough to contemporary speech to be easily accessible to them, but also
identifiable, through their manifold links with epic and lyric poetry, as part of a large,
rich and extremely self-conscious tradition with a strong Panhellenic pedigree.’ She calls
this ‘heroic vagueness’ (ibid.). See also: Easterling (1985; 2005); Pelling (2000), 163–7;
Rehm (2003), 21–39, esp. 34. Hesk (2007), 79 makes the point that ‘many Greek poleis
had assemblies and judicial bodies even though they were not democratic (or not as
democratic as Athens) and thus their explorations of, and allusions to, notions of “the
civic” in relation to heroic myth would still be pertinent’; cf. 84–5. For the concept of
‘zooming’ in (and out) of particular fields of reference, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1989),
166.
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advantage of exploring debate’s various manifestations diachronically,
which should help bring into focus the ways in which tragic double
vision may work. The first aspect to consider is who debates on the tragic
stage—which immediately brings to light tragedy’s difference from epic:
speech is no longer the preserve of the male hero. Instead, different kinds
of figures, namely women, slaves and barbarians, all now have a voice,17
and that freedom of speech is even extended to the group at large, since
the Chorus have an important mediating role no matter what their
precise relationship may be to the audience.18 In this way tragedy’s
difference from epic may be configured in terms of focalization:19 in
17 For women in tragedy, see esp. H. Foley (1981), 127–68; (2001); Zeitlin (1996),
341–74. For a recent survey of tragedy’s marginal voices see the chapters of Mossman
and Ebbott in Gregory, ed. (2005). H. Roisman (2004) discusses women’s free speech,
drawing a distinction between its public good and its subversiveness when used for
personal expression alone. While recognizing that ‘tragedy legitimises the value-system
necessary to the glorification of Athens’, E. Hall (1997), 118 argues that ‘the polyphonic
tragic form, which gives voice to characters from all such groups, challenges the very
notions which it simultaneously legitimises’. In her view, ‘Athenian tragedy is thus a
supreme instantiation of what Marxists call art’s “utopian tendency” . . . ; in tragedy the
Athenians created a public dialogue marked by an egalitarian form beyond their imagi-
nation in actuality’ (p. 125, her italics).
18 In the recent cultural analysis of tragedy, some scholars have come to regard the
Chorus as representing in some shape or form the citizen-body: see e.g. Vernant and
Vidal-Naquet (1988), 24; Longo (1990); Calame (1999). For a critique of this position,
see Griffin (1999). While it is important to observe the individuality of each Chorus,
some general remarks may be made, including the basic point that the identity of a
Chorus changes the way the events are seen. On this aspect of focalization, see Gould
(1996) and Goldhill (1996), 254, whose response to Gould stresses the possibility of
shifting registers. Cf. Easterling (1997a), 163–5. Rehm (2003), 113 draws attention
to the ‘inclusive sweep of choral lyric’ which, he argues, ‘opens the world of tragedy
to realms beyond ideological time-serving’. Wilson (2011) draws attention to the
high frequency of citizen involvement in choruses in Attica, particularly in the re-
performance of drama in the demes, which provides an alternative means of thinking
about the democratic/Athenian aspect of tragedy from the one offered in this book.
On the choregia as an Athenian institution, see P. Wilson (2000). On demes as the
building-blocks of Athenian democracy (‘deme-ocracy’), see Osborne (1990; 1996),
294–9; cf. (1985a).
19 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988), 25 argue that the ‘democratic moment’ of
tragedy relates to the way the hero ‘has ceased to be a model [and] has become, both for
himself and for others, a problem’. See also Lada-Richards (1997), 91; cf. Knox (1983).
Yet, as we have seen, both Homeric epics already configure the hero as a problem for his
group. See Haubold (2000), esp. 28–35, where he points out that the leader’s loss of his
people is embedded in the very formulae of Homeric verse.
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contrast to the exclusive focus on the individual’s concerns in epic,
tragedy puts a great deal more stress on responses to the hero.20
Moreover, in the light of our central focus on debate, another
important feature of tragedy comes to the fore. Not only is tragedy, as
a dramatic art form, freed ‘from the dominance of authorial stance as
represented by a privileged narrator’;21 more destabilizing still, tragedy
also represents debate in its most extreme form, as characters do battle in
and over words.22 Indeed, in tragedy debate is not restricted to a
particular discrete context; it is part of the very fabric of the form itself.
Thus my analysis of tragedy’s representation of debate will explore the
staging of dissent more generally—who speaks, when, with what con-
sequences?—beyond the scene of formal debate itself.
Nevertheless, the formal debate scene—or ago¯n—will constitute an
important part of the next two chapters, particularly since problems of
interpretation have dominated scholarship on the tragic ago¯n. This study
has so far proposed that debate is best understood in relation to the
institutional context of the assembly: the ago¯n itself has had only passing
reference—limited primarily to the isolated examples of Patroclus’ funeral
games in the Iliad and Thucydides’ chosen form to represent debate.23 As
I have just mentioned, however, tragedy is dominated by debate, the most
formal aspect of which is the ago¯n: the scene that sets paired speeches in
opposition to each other—though articulating a precise definition of the
ago¯n has been one of the problems that scholars have faced.24 The
20 Wiles (1997), 177 suggests a democratic aspect to staging in Athens, in the way
that it empowers the audience over the actors in contrast to, say, staging of drama in
Elizabethan England. See also Wiles (2000), 89–127.
21 Rehm (2002), 244.
22 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988), 43 bring out tragedy’s struggle of and over
words, but limit it to the actors on stage: for the audience, ‘the language of the text can be
transparent at every level’. See, however, Mossman (1995), 204, who comments: ‘The
physical fact of having two people conversing with each other, rather than a single author
relating a story, means that a dramatist can use each character to enunciate a different
view. It also means that the impression left by a scene on stage to which two or more
people have contributed will be a complex one, progressively redefined by each and every
speech.’ For similar expressions, see E. Hall (1997), 118–24; Allan (2000), 118–48.
23 See esp. pp. 86–8 above.
24 M. Lloyd (1992), 1 bases his study of the agon in Euripides on the simple-enough
formulation: ‘a pair of opposing set speeches of substantial, and about equal, length.’ But
even this innocent-looking definition proves to be difficult to sustain and has been
criticized by his reviewers: Dunn (1992), 121 comments that in spite of ‘the regularity of
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artificiality of the ago¯n form is another, a criticism which has been levelled
with some frequency at Euripides’ plays.25 This has prompted some
scholars to explain its currency according to Athenian cultural life, in
particular the audience’s fondness for rhetoric and legislative practice.26
Yet, as we shall see, the law-court model of finding in favour conclusively
of one side or the other is insufficient to account for the tragic ago¯nes,
which frequently appear not to achieve anything, least of all a resolution to
the crisis.27 For this reason alone, it is necessary to take account of the play
as a whole when analysing the ago¯n, in order to explore how it works in
context and draws the rest of the play into its field of contest. It will be
argued, moreover, that a better way of approaching the ago¯n, particularly
in its problematic cases, is through this book’s central claim, that repre-
sentations of debate explore issues of dissent and authority.
The subject of dissent is an important one in contemporary democ-
racy; but it has relevance for our study of tragedy too. A recent study of
ancient notions of freedom of speech by Arlene Saxonhouse has drawn
attention to its importance to Athenian democracy.28 Using the exam-
ple of the Chorus in Aeschylus’ Persians, who sing of the consequences
of Xerxes’ defeat at the hands of the Athenians as meaning that ‘no
formal features such as the ago¯n, they ‘can be extremely slippery to define’; Mossman
(1994), 261 complains that Lloyd’s ‘arbitrary definition’ means that one risks not seeing
how Euripides manipulates the agonistic form, such as with the ‘near-agon’, on which see
Ch. 6, sec. 1 below. Duchemin (1968), 39 writes: ‘On ne peut le´gitimement employer le
mot Iª0+ que s’il y a un de´bat re´gulier.’ See also Strohm (1957), 3–49.
25 According to M. Lloyd (1992), 2: Sophocles ‘avoids formality and incorporates
ago¯nes into his plays in a more naturalistic way.’ Collard (2003), 66 makes a similar
point: ‘Euripides’ formal debates tend to compare badly with those of Sophocles. In this
poet the debates are less rigid in structure; they are more naturally accommodated to
episodic development; they are always more circumstantial in their argument: there is a
sense of firm dramatic control as well as harmony of style.’
26 As far back as the late nineteenth century, Jebb (1896), p. xliv, in the context of
explaining the unpopularity of the ago¯n among critics, observed that ‘prolonged rheto-
rical debate has not the same attraction for modern readers which an ancient Athenian
audience found in it’. See also Porter (1990), 99–172; Picco (1999); Scodel (2000). For
the interplay between the law court and the stage, see Bers (1994); E. Hall (1995);
Scafuro (1997). For ancient evidence of the Athenian love for theatrical word-contests,
see Herodotus (Hdt. 1.60.3) and Thucydides’ Cleon (Ch. 4, sec. 3 above).
27 Again, Euripides’ agones bear the brunt of criticism. According to M. Lloyd
(1992): ‘The agon in Euripides rarely achieves anything’ (p. 15), and ‘Euripides often
seems to go to great lengths to detach it [the agon] from its immediate context’ (p. 18).
28 Saxonhouse (2006). She prefers the translation of !ÆææÅ)(Æ as ‘frankness of
speech’ rather than ‘freedom of speech’. See Prologue, n. 47 above.
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longer will men keep a curb upon their tongues’,29 Saxonhouse com-
ments: ‘The Athenian practice of free speech—parrhe¯sia, the saying of
all by the unbridled tongue—becomes a hallmark of the democratic
regime.’30 While her study is important for thinking about the general
cultural context of frank speech, Saxonhouse does not relate tragedy’s
representations of these issues to the broader institutional framework.31
Neither does Nick Croally who argues that: ‘we cannot help but be
struck by the quirky nature of Athenian ideology when, at the potent
central event of civic discourse called the Great Dionysia, at the very
moment when Athens’ power is most celebrated, it seeks to affirm itself by
putting itself at risk.’32
In line with the discussion above, Act III of this book explores tragic
debates, and in particular the ago¯n, in terms of dissent. This argument
extends beyond identifying the ago¯n as putting responsibility on the
29 The Chorus continue, ‘for the people are free to speak freely, now that the yoke of
power has been broken’ ("P%7 :#Ø ªºH))Æ 4æ"#"E)Ø+ j K+ çıºÆŒÆE'! º-ºı#ÆØ ªaæ j ºÆe'
Kº*/Ł*æÆ 4.Ç*Ø+, j ‰' Kº/ŁÅ Çıªe+ IºŒA', Aesch. Pers. 591–4).
30 Saxonhouse (2006), 8.
31 Indeed, she analyses Thucydides and Plato for their anxiety concerning the ‘poten-
tially tragic and destructive consequences of this practice when it was taken out of the
context of the Assembly’: see ibid. 30. Dunn (1996), 162–3 regards !ÆææÅ)(Æ as both ‘a
prerogative of the democratic assembly’ (p. 162) and a source of ‘the violent upheaval of
this period (p. 163)’. He considers Orestes as ‘the first work to portray this freedom of
speech as a negative and dangerous license’ (p. 163). As we shall see, both tragedies under
investigation here already show anxiety about frankness of speech, even as an onus is
placed on characters to speak back. With the exception of one fragment of Aeschylus,
!ÆææÅ)(Æ only occurs in Euripides: what it means to be Athenian (Hipp. 422; Ion 672,
675); a general condition of belonging to a city (Phoen. 391); the tragic agon (Elec. 1056;
cf. 1049); the trait of a demagogue (Or. 905). Cf. Bacch. 668. On the basis of this
evidence (collected under Ch. 3, n. 94), Raaflaub (2004a) suggests that parrhe¯sia
becomes the watchword for democracy in opposition to ise¯goria, which had prior
aristocratic connotations. As he puts it: ‘it was crucial to maintain in political life not
only the principle that all citizens were allowed to speak but the farther-reaching
principle that they could say whatever they wanted’ (p. 225).
32 Croally (1994), 162 (my italics). Pelling (2000), 179 interprets tragedy’s question-
ing differently and more in line with this book’s emphasis on institutions: ‘We can see
this questioning as itself ideologically authorised: one of the marks of the good citizen
is to feel the problems which the polis raised, or at least to feel them in the right setting;
and the tragic theatre was the right setting.’ Segal (1981), 47–51; Cf. Pelling (1997a).
Chapter 6, however, will argue that one of the aspects that is most disturbing about
Euripidean tragedy is how neither the agon, nor the play itself, contains or makes sense of
dissent.
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audience to judge, although that is important;33 rather, the entire tragic
performance represents an investigation into dissent that reproduces
multiple viewpoints and transfers the responsibility to manage them
onto the audience.34 From this perspective, this study may meet the
objections raised above against the politics of Athenian tragedy, since
the question becomes not so much what is political about tragedy, as
how it is political.35 Investigating the staging of dissent helps bring to
light the point that politics takes place in the act of interpretation.36
As a brief illustration of the benefit of approaching tragedy’s contest
of voices and the ago¯n in terms of dissent rather than through a law-
court model, it may be fruitful to consider the paradigmatic example of
a law-court representation on stage in Aeschylus’ Eumenides. The Or-
esteia more generally has generated much debate regarding its political
orientation.37 From the beginning of the trilogy the conditions for and
nature of power have been under examination;38 but political demands
come to a head in the Eumenides, as Aeschylus sets the play in
Athens and the conflict within the confines of a law court—specifically
33 Croally (1994), 160 argues that the central contest of words between Hecuba and
Helen in Euripides’ Trojan Women undermines secure definitions and ‘throws the
responsibility for deciding who won the war and who won the debate onto the audience’.
34 We are no longer restricted to one particular place (the assembly) or form (the
ago¯n): tragedy itself—its very structure—is agonistic and institutional.
35 Pelling (2000), 17: ‘there is . . . a sense in which a text illuminates the dynamics of
its own occasion, “how” rather than “what” the audience would think in a particular
context.’
36 It is interesting to note that Demosthenes privileges spectating over acting: ‘You
taught, I studied; you initiated, I was initiated; you were the public secretary, I addressed
the assembly; you were third actor, I spectated; you were cat-called, I hissed’ (K%(%Æ)Œ*'
ªæ.,,Æ#Æ, Kªg %7 Kç"(#ø+. K#-º*Ø', Kªg %7 K#*º"/,Å+. KªæÆ,,.#*ı*', Kªg %7
MŒŒºÅ)(ÆÇ"+. K#æØ#Æªø+()#*Ø', Kªg %7 KŁ*0æ"ı+, K6-!Ø!#*', Kªg %7 K)/æØ##"+, Dem.
de Cor. 285). Glossing this quotation, Goldhill (1999a), 5, comments: ‘To sit as an
evaluating, judging spectator was to participate as a political subject.’ For the etymolo-
gical (and conceptual) connection between ‘theory’ and ‘theatre’, see Euben (1990), 4–5,
232–3, and Rehm (2002), 3–6.
37 See e.g. Thomson (1941); Dover (1957); Dodds (1960); Podlecki (1966), 63–100;
(1986); Macleod (1983), 20–40; Jones (1987); Euben (1990); Sommerstein (1989), 25–
32; (1992); Bowie (1993); Saı¨d (1993); Rosenbloom (1995); Griffith (1995; 1998);
Goldhill (2000).
38 Clytemnestra’s vengeance upon her husband, for example, which the Odyssey had
portrayed as a straightforward act of adultery, in Aeschylus takes the form of a coup d’e´tat.
Macleod (1983), 20–40 emphasizes the close integration of the trilogy’s political themes.
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identified as the Areopagus—established by Athena.39 The politics of
that gesture appear all the more pointed given the contemporary frac-
tious history surrounding the Areopagus’ curtailment of powers,40 but
the unresolved debate over whether or not Aeschylus supported those
changes illustrates most clearly the limitations of such direct political
referencing as this.41
Instead, Aeschylus’ representation of the law court displays some-
thing of the double vision raised above, in that it exhibits a certain
vagueness in form and procedure and singularly fails to replicate legis-
lative practice.42 Specifically, the ago¯n-scene between the Furies on the
one hand, and Orestes and Apollo on the other, with Athena and
Athenian citizens as judges, diverges from the law-court model in two
important ways. First, the judgement is crucially decided by Athena’s
casting vote (736–43), after the human jurors reach some kind of split
39 Remarkably for a tragedy, the scene changes, as we are invited to reflect on a move
from Delphi, where Orestes could not ultimately gain freedom from pollution, to
Athena’s polis, the ‘city of words’ (cf. Goldhill (1986), 57–78). Rehm (2002), 88–91
interprets the beginning of the Eumenides in a way that maximizes the trilogy’s gradual
movement towards greater openness, ‘beyond what lies hidden behind the ske¯ne¯’ to ‘the
plein-air court on the Areopagus’ (p. 91). Similarly, Wiles (1997) argues that the drama
undergoes an increasing democratization in terms of its action, shifting ‘away from the
private towards the public, away from a society based on the oikos towards a society
which put civic identity first, away from the enclosed acropolis towards the open agora’
(p. 84). Cf. Cartledge (1997), 15. The harmonious picture of the trilogy’s transition to
social justice (see e.g. Kitto (1956), 78–86), however, has been criticized by Goldhill
(1986), 33–56, who argues that the language of dike¯ is appropriated by characters and
critics alike.
40 For the reforms of Ephialtes in the Areopagus’ council: Sealey (1964); Wallace
(1989); Bearzot (1992); Marr (1993); Saı¨d (1993); Braun (1998).
41 See e.g. Podlecki (1966), 63–100; J. Cole (1977); Calder (1981); Meier (1990),
82–9, 106–8. As Pelling (2000), 172 notes, while one may infer Aeschylus’ enthusiasm
for an Argive alliance, ‘it is harder to be sure of his position on the 462/1 Areopagus
reforms’. Cf. Sommerstein (1989), 32; Bowie (1993), 11.
42 On the extent to which the law court in Euripides’ Orestes departs from its real-life
counterpart, see Sommerstein (1989), 16–17; Easterling (2005); and esp. Pelling (2000),
165: ‘Eumenides provides the charter-myth for the Areopagus, but the trial procedures do
not seem very specific to that court: they provide a prototype for any (at least, any
Athenian or democratic) court to follow’ (his italics). Sommerstein (2010), however,
argues that ‘the trial of Orestes bears a much closer resemblance to an ordinary Athenian
trial before a heliastic jury than to a homicide trial on the Areopagos.’ If this is the case,
then it is possible to regard Aeschylus as ‘simultaneously encouraging his audience to see
the members of this “council of dikastai” as performing the same function which they
themselves had performed or (if not yet thirty years old) would one day be performing, as
dikastai in the regular Athenian courts’.
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decision. This is particularly interesting since Athena’s vote establishes
the precedent for acquittal on the basis of an equally divided vote: but
the reason for doing so—her very personal and rather odd patriarchal
prerogative—and the means by which she achieves it—casting a ballot
to make the vote equal, or else casting the deciding ballot once the votes
are equal43—underlines the ambiguity of the scene of judgement, which
a law-court model cannot fully explain.44
Second, the law court that Athena establishes not only does not secure
a consensual judgement over the evils of the house of Atreus—the split
decision shows that the human jurors recognize faults on both sides; it
also fails to bring the conflict to an end. On the contrary, the Furies
challenge Athena’s judgement and threaten Athens with a kind of
superhuman dissent.45 Their violent insurrection is only quelled after
prolonged negotiation with Athena, who in the end offers them a place
within the Athenian civic framework.46
Athena’s critical role recalls her intervention in the conflict between
Agamemnon and Achilles, which had helped generate a series of re-
sponses that led ultimately to the Iliad ’s instituting of dissent within the
Achaean community. Something similar happens in the Oresteia, which
further draws out the significance of the double vision of heroic and
contemporary. In the first play Agamemnon’s death leaves the Chorus,
his people, without a leader and struggling for survival in the face of
tyrannical suppression.47 In this last play Athena significantly addresses
43 On the number of jurors and Athena’s vote, see Hester (1981), who argues for
twelve plus Athena; Gagarin (1975), who includes Athena in the twelve; cf. Kitto (1956),
65–6. See also Conacher (1987), 164–6; Sommerstein (1989), 221–6; Seaford (1995).
44 It may that our understanding of the law court, however, is in need of revision. Cohen
(1995), 20 argues that lawsuits ‘should not be conceptualized as a disease-like entity which
interrupts the “ordinary” life of a society’, but rather as an integral part of it. Indeed, he
suggestively describes the law court as an ago¯n (pp. 66–7, 112). Similarly, Johnstone (1999)
stresses the process of negotiation and the performance of citizenship.Osborne (1985b) 44 uses
the term ‘open-texture’ to describe the accessibility of law to every citizen, which emphasizes
participation in making it work. This image of the people as the ultimate authority over the
laws accords much better with the version of the tragic ago¯n that is discussed below.
45 See Goldhill (1986), 29–32.
46 AsTaplin (1977), 407 suggests, itmay have beenmore sensible for Athena to expel the
Erinyes: but they are here to stay, and Athena exploits their power for the benefit of the city.
On the complications Athena’s intervention brings to the drama, see Winnington-Ingram
(1949).
47 At the moment of his death, the Chorus splinter and speak separately, symbolizing
their loss of identity as a people, now that the king is dead. On the remarkable splintering of
the choral voice here, see Taplin (1977), 393. On the comparable challenge to choral
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the Athenian audience as an epic group—the ‘Attic people’ (1##ØŒe'
º*0', 681)—as she herself acts as the institutionalizing individual in an
aetiology for the Areopagus’ role within the Athenian community.48
Yet this tragic law court, as we have seen, does not impose a definitive
solution on tragic conflict; rather, it is left to Athena and not the law
court to manage dissent for the benefit of the community.49 Thus the
tragic ago¯n offers something different from the law-court model,50 by
not so much solving as providing an opportunity to explore the problem
of conflict: it makes the audience responsible for legitimizing and mana-
ging disagreement and dissent.
Following the approach that this book has adopted thus far, Chapters
5 and 6 will each take one case study respectively to suggest how the ago¯n
and the theme of dissent more broadly work in the genre of tragedy.51
The two case studies in question, Sophocles’ Ajax and Euripides’ He-
cuba, have been chosen primarily because they have been considered
problem plays, especially with regard to the role of the ago¯n: they
present, then, a good opportunity to test whether the hypothesis pre-
sented in this book can satisfactorily account for these problems. In brief,
both plays suffer from sharp breaks in their dramatic action which
have been thought to detract seriously from their artistic worth. That
identity in Sophocles’Ajax, see Ch. 5, sec. 3 below. It does not appear to be coincidental that
the institutionalization of dissent in a tragic ago¯n grows out of Agamemnon’s tragedy, the
king whose problematic authority in epic makes dissent necessary and desirable.
48 For the role of the Athenians in the Eumenides, see Chiasson (1999–2000).
49 Goldhill (1984), 262–83 is particularly emphatic regarding the lack of conflict
resolution, though see Seaford (1995). Wilson and Taplin (1993) suggest that Aeschylus’
representation of the Furies evokes the idea of tragedy itself; certainly, their insistence on
dissent does seem to be a typical feature of tragedy.
50 As Euben (1990), 56 argues: ‘tragedy’s distance from the urgency of daily deci-
sions—which drove the council, assembly and juries—allowed it to develop a uniquely
theoretical perspective.’ Simultaneously, however, as part of a drama, it also provoked its
audience ‘into participating in the task of deconstructing and reconstructing a world that
was both familiar and other’ (p. 58).
51 The ago¯n, in the form of the contest of words, is such a common feature in tragedy
that it has simply not been possible to extend this scope further, not, at any rate, if one
wants to contextualize fully the ago¯n-scenes and analyse the theme of dissent as it
functions within each play. It is hoped, nevertheless, that by undertaking a detailed
analysis of a sample pair of tragedies a more general application may emerge and help to
shed new light on some major problems customarily associated with the study of
Athenian tragedy.
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break is most obvious in the Ajax, given the fact that the protagonist
commits suicide with a little under half of the play remaining; but a
similar criticism has been levelled also at the Hecuba, whose protagonist
undergoes a radical shift from sufferer to doer, promptingmany critics to
attribute to her a decline in moral standards. In addition, the ago¯n in
both plays is identified as either a major cause or alternatively a mani-
festation of the problem. The second half of Sophocles’ play leaves the
stage open to petty figures to wrangle over the fate of the hero’s body in a
double ago¯n ; the final ago¯n-scene in Euripides’Hecuba attracts the usual
criticisms of Euripides’ ago¯n as artificial and lacking resolution.
A related point of interest is the relationship of both plays to Homeric
epic. Both plays are located by some means or other in the ‘fallout’ from
dissent dramatized at the beginning of the Iliad:52 Sophocles’ play
derives from Ajax’s refusal to accept the judgement on awarding the
arms of Achilles; in Euripides, the authority given to the brooding shade
of Achilles casts a shadow over the events of the play. At another level,
the thematization of dissent is explored through the actions and words
of their protagonists in ways that rework the rival epic strategies. Thus,
while Ajax’s Achilles-like persona has been well documented, this study
analyses Ajax’s armed insurrection as an extreme replaying of Achilles’
dissent from Agamemnon. On the other hand, Hecuba’s transforma-
tion from victim to avenger mirrors Odysseus’ narrative of vengeance,
only for the violent consequences of her actions and words to come
under investigation.
It will be argued that this pairing represents two paradigmatic tragic
responses to the dynamic between dissent and authority that has been
traced through representations of debate from Homeric epic through
historiography to the Athenian dramatic stage. Chapter 5 will show that
Sophocles exploits an Iliadic strategy that explores and valorizes dissent
from the authority of the king, Agamemnon. This tragedy, however,
differs radically from the Iliad since it explores Ajax’s dissent from the
perspective of those looking on, Ajax’s concubine-wife, his half-brother
and the Chorus. Such an approach makes sense of the much-maligned
52 Michelakis (2002) includes these two plays in his study of Achilles in tragedy,
though his analysis of the repercussions on the social environment is undertaken from the
perspective of the hero’s death.
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second half of the play by showing how Ajax’s dissent is managed and
set within an institutional frame: first, by means of Teucer’s defence in
the ago¯n ; second, through Odysseus’ intervention, which allows burial
to take place. It will be argued that Ajax’s dissent is not only made
institutional in Athens; it makes up part of the process the audience
themselves engage in while active in spectating. The fact that dissent,
even given the negative example of Ajax’s violent action, can be assimi-
lated to, and by, the process of democratic debate marks the extraor-
dinary recuperative powers of tragedy.
Chapter 6, on the other hand, will show that Euripides exploits the
alternative Odyssean narrative strategy to devastating tragic effect. It
will be argued that this play privileges the justice of Hecuba’s revenge, as
though this female, foreign, ex-royal slave were an Odysseus returning
home to avenge himself on the suitors. The play’s Odyssean-like in-
sistence on the authority of her suffering culminates when an on-stage
judge sets up an ago¯n in order expressly to deal with the fallout from her
revenge. In this way, Euripides establishes the most extreme test-case of
the capacity to control and make use of dissent within the institutional
framework of the ago¯n. Yet, as the play ends with Polymestor’s unrest-
rained dissenting voice ringing out, the audience is left alone to deal
with dissent and face the consequences of their own judgement outside
the security of any institutional framework, even that of the play itself.
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5
Speaking back in Sophocles’ Ajax
We first hear of Ajax’s tragedy in the Odyssey when Odysseus reports
that he sees Ajax standing apart from all the other spirits.1 When
Odysseus tries to address him, Ajax ‘answered not a word’.2 His silence
marks a continuing challenge to the victory won by his rival, taking his
dissent to the grave—and beyond. Elsewhere too in narrative traditions
Ajax is a ‘doer of deeds’ rather than a ‘speaker of words’,3 seemingly
having little in common with the democracy’s constitution of words.4
Yet the Athenians also knew Ajax as one of the eponymous heroes of the
ten Attic tribes honoured in cult.5
1 Hom. Od. 11.541–7. The literary evidence for versions of the myth prior to
Sophocles’ play are discussed by Bowra (1944), 16–18; Stanford (1981), pp. xii–xxiv;
Garvie (1998), 1–5; Hesk (2003), 17–39. Hesk (2003), 27 comments: ‘In places,
Sophocles’ Ajax seems to be so imbued with Homer’s underworld scene in Odyssey 11
that it reads like a probing and explanatory “prequel” to it.’
2 ‘S' Kç.,Å+, › %- ,7 "P%b+ I,*(4*#"’, Od. 11.563.
3 Such as is witnessed by the brusqueness of his speech in the Embassy to Achilles:
Hom. Il. 9.624–42. Pindar exploits the difference between Ajax and Odysseus on this
basis: Pind. Nem. 7.20–30, 8.21–25; Isth. 4.35–9.
4 On democracy as a constitution of words, see Dem. 19.184. While it would be
incorrect to suggest that tragic characters were tailored to democratic models, Aristo-
phanes’ ‘Euripides’ criticizes his rival on the basis that he depicts silent figures. It is
significant that doing the opposite—giving a voice to all—he regards as democratic: ‘[in
my plays] I made the wife speak, the slave no less, and the master, the maiden and old
crone . . . For what I did was democratic’ (Iºº 7 :º*ª*+ > ªı+8 #- ,"Ø åT %"Fº"' "P%b+
w##"+ åT %*)!&#Å' åM !ÆæŁ-+"' åM ªæÆF' ¼+ . . . %Å,"ŒæÆ#ØŒe+ ªaæ Æh#7 :%æø+, Ar. Ran.
948–52).
5 For details: Kearns (1989), 46, 80–91, 141–2; Shapiro (1989), 154–7; Bradshaw
(1991), 99–125, esp. 113–15. See also: Jebb (1896), pp. xxx–xxxii; Garvie (1998), 5–6.
In his great tour of Greece Pausanias recounts that there was a statue of Ajax in Athens, as
well as an altar to his son, Eurysaces: Paus. 1.5.1; cf. 1.35.3. Herodotus relates that before
Salamis the Athenians prayed to Ajax, and afterwards dedicated a trireme to him (Hdt.
8.64, 121).
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Sophocles’ play captures something of this duality. The first scene
after the parodos stages a tableau of a despairing Ajax, surrounded by
butchered animals, trying desperately to maintain his dignity in silent
resolve; by the end, Ajax’s body is carried off for burial in an aetiology
for, though not a performance of, his ritual.6 The disjunction between
the two visions of Ajax is reproduced by the structure of the play, in
which Ajax’s monologues that lead to his death give way to debates over
his dead body.7 That abrupt transition tends to be interpreted ideolo-
gically, as the suicide of the last, great Homeric-style hero, who cannot,
and will not, change his ways to fit in with the new environment,
thereby leaving the stage to the bickering of lesser men who appear to
embody the pettiness of contemporary demagogues.8 In this interpreta-
tion the second half of the play comes in for particular criticism, which
crystallizes around the ago¯n over Ajax’s body, for being an unwarranted
incursion of the Athenian love for debate into the hero’s tragedy, with a
consequent loss of dramatic effect.9 Even those critics who emphasize
the importance of burial fail to explain adequately Ajax’s radical shift
from outcast to cult-like figure and the significance of the ago¯n in
relation to the earlier events.10
6 As usual, Jebb is alive to the tension. ‘Ajax, at the beginning of the play, has been
shown in the deepest humiliation . . .Yet this Ajax is the same to whom the Athenian
spectators . . . had been taught to pay divine honours’: Jebb (1896), p. xxx.
7 For the ‘diptych’ or divided play, see Waldock (1951), 49–79; Webster (1969),
102–3; cf. Kitto (1961), 118–23. For scholars defending the play’s unity, see: Jebb
(1896), pp. xxviii–xxxii; Stanford (1981), pp. lxi–lxiv; Heath (1987a), 195–7, 204–8.
Taplin (2003), 148 comments that Sophocles has constructed ‘this division so carefully
and deliberately’. J. Davidson (1985) summarizes critical opinion on the diptych, as well
as on the two debates.
8 ‘Contrast this petty-mindedness with the final greatness of Ajax! Contrast his
“righteousness” with the “wrong-doing” of the great hero’: Reinhardt (1979), 32. See
also Kitto (1956), 183–98; Knox (1961), esp. 20–4; (1983), 17–24. Recent critics have
offered more nuanced positions on this theme: Winnington-Ingram (1980), 57–72; Segal
(1981), 109–51, esp. 142–6; Michelakis (2002), 144–50. Cf. Hesk (2003), 124–48,
though his reading of the quarrel scene marks a radical break from the usual criticism.
9 The scholiast on line 1123 condemns the exchanges in the agon, saying that ‘such
clever things do not belong to tragedy’: #a #"ØÆF#Æ )"ç(),Æ#Æ "PŒ "NŒ*EÆ #æÆªøfi %(Æ'.
Reinhardt (1979), 32 comments: ‘as a method of representing the opponents, the agon
appears to our minds to be unduly restricted by the formal nature of its construction.
Instead of situations which develop from the nature of the pervading hostility, there is a
ready-made schema, a mere substitute for it’ (his italics). See also Holt (1981), 281–2.
10 This approach was first proposed by Jebb (1896) and has been taken up by more
recent critics: Burian (1972); Easterling (1988); Henrichs (1993); Seaford (1994),
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This chapter will explain the role of the ago¯n according to Sophocles’
thematization of dissent more broadly. In a remarkable move, Sophocles
does not represent the judgement of arms itself.11 Instead, he dramatizes its
aftermath—the consequences of Ajax’s dissent from that decision.
Clearly this displaces an authoritative view of that judgement, leaving
the audience to piece together the events from the competing perspec-
tives of the characters;12 but it also places the experience of being a
spectator under the spotlight, since Sophocles explores the fallout from
the hero’s dissent through those figures most affected by his refusal to
accept the judgement of arms—hismen, his concubine-wife, his brother.
The study of the play takes place in three stages. The first section
establishes Ajax as a figure from a bygone era, in the mould of an Iliadic
‘shepherd of the people’, on whom both his men and family depend.
More particularly, Ajax’s representation both follows his Iliadic persona
as the second-best of the Achaeans, but also shows a debt to the Iliad ’s
portrait of Achilles. The play’s opening scene, which stages a dialogue
between the hero and Athena, recalls the beginning of the Iliad, where
Athena came down from Olympus in order to prevent Achilles from
butchering Agamemnon. In Sophocles’ play, however, the hero’s dissent
is not so much checked as redirected, as Athena deflects Ajax’s murder-
ous intent onto the cattle. Crucially, too, we see things from the
perspective not of the agent (Ajax) but of an audience (Odysseus).
The rest of the section assesses responses to Ajax’s frank speaking
articulated by his men and his concubine-wife, Tecmessa.
In the light of the play’s emphasis on dissent, the problematic ago¯n
between Teucer and the Atreidae accrues additional significance. Section
2 argues that the agon, though ostensibly about burial, explores the issue
392–405; Rehm (2002), 137–8. Miralles (1997), 40 wonders: ‘E la morte di Aiace non
istituisce, chiaramente, per gli Ateniesi un culto eroico che protegga la citta`?’ (‘For the
Athenians, does Ajax’s death not clearly establish a heroic cult that protects the city?’).
11 As, it seems, Aeschylus had done in the $…!ºø+ Œæ()Ø'. According to March
(1991–3), 4–6, Aeschylus also innovated by making the judges of the contest not the
Trojans (as at Od. 11.47) but the Greeks themselves. Whether or not the source for
Sophocles is Aeschylus or Pindar, the idea that the Greeks as a collective have made
judgement (Soph. Aj. 441–9, 1135–6, 1239–49) is already suggestive of the increased
importance of the role of spectator that is set out here, especially because we do not witness
that vote. Murnaghan (1986b), esp. 177, sees the play as a whole as re-enacting Ajax’s
trial, this time for the attempted murder of the Atreidae.
12 Rose (1995), 63.
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of authority more generally. At one level Teucer’s defence of Ajax is seen
as legitimate resistance to the Atreidae’s denial of burial; at another, the
very means by which he achieves this—by drawing on anti-Spartan
prejudice and by echoing the Iliad—invites a re-evaluation of the prin-
ciple of dissent. The ago¯n spills over its dramatic frame and implicates the
audience in re-viewing and re-evaluating Ajax’s initial defiance.
There remains the problem of Odysseus’ intercession in the crisis, who,
though Ajax’s avowed enemy, paves the way for burial to take place. The
last section investigates the problem through the Chorus’ role in the
drama. It will show that, from the parodos, the Chorus are seen as Ajax’s
‘people’ (laos), which not only evokes an Iliadic world but, more perti-
nently, establishes their relationship to Ajax as one of dependence. Con-
fronted by their leader’s suicide, the Chorus are threatened with a loss of
their identity; but, as they experience the debates of the ago¯n, they take on a
new role, with the result that in the impasse at the climax of the ago¯n the
Chorus take the lead by inviting Odysseus to mediate. The Chorus’
transformation from an epic people to a quasi-political group culminates
in the performance of the audience, who must also make a judgement if a
way is to be found out of the agon other than continued violence.
1. THE FALLOUT FROM DISSENT
I stayed his hand
The play begins in typical Sophoclean fashion with a dialogue between
two characters who introduce the plot of the play.13Odysseus, searching
for information about what had happened during the night which has
seen cattle—and the odd herdsmen—slaughtered, has come to Ajax’s
tent, where the goddess Athena awaits him, ready to act as his guide.
With a deity giving instructions, and with her mortal interlocutor
clearly seeing himself in a position of ignorance (15, 33, 35), a model
of learning is quickly established.
13 Hesk (2003), 40–1 discusses the ‘implied’ stage directions that result from this
dialogue. Heath (1987a), 166–7 notes Sophocles’ departure from usual practice by
presenting an immortal interlocutor. Dobrov (2001), 61–2 interprets Odysseus’ refer-
ence to Ajax’s tent (ske¯ne¯, 3) as a metatheatrical reference to the actual stage building. The
suggestion of a play within a play will be important.
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There is more to it than the founding of a simple pedagogic model,
however. The god exhibits a striking air of familiarity with her mortal
counterpart. Her first words—the first words of the play—establish a sense
of camaraderie between the pair: ‘Always, son of Laertes, I watch you, as you
hunt to try to seize something fromyour enemies’ (I*d,-+,t!ÆE ¸Ææ#("ı,
%-%"æŒ. )*, ||!*EæÆ+ #Ø+7 KåŁæH+ ±æ!.)ÆØ ŁÅæ0,*+"+, 1–2).WithAthena
playfully toying with her favourite, Odysseus, we could almost have landed
on anOdyssean Ithaca,14were it not for a striking difference:Odysseus does
not seeAthena;hehears onlyher voice (tçŁ-ª,7 1Ł.+Æ', 14).This, after all,
is not an Odyssean world where the hero enjoys unrestricted, and unme-
diated, access to the goddess, but an Iliadic state of affairs which introduces
Odysseus’mortal perspective.15 Indeed, it is likely that Athena appears high
up on the ske¯ne¯ building, physically separated from the human actors.16
Once she has filled in the details of the night’s shocking events,
Athena proceeds to call Ajax on-stage, much to Odysseus’ distinct
unease. Yet, Athena has so maddened Ajax that he neither sees Odysseus
nor the state he is in. Thus deluded, Ajax boasts that he has stained his
hands with the blood of the Achaean leaders, ‘so that never again shall
they refuse honour to Ajax’ (u)#7 "h!"#7 `YÆ+Ł7 "¥%7 I#Ø,.)"ı)7 :#Ø,
98).17 While his sentiment shocks, it is by no means unprecedented:
having had his honour slighted (by being passed over for the arms of
Achilles) Ajax acts according to customary moral standards.18 On the
14 See e.g. Od. 13.221–440, with Clay (1983), 186–212. Cf. Stanford (1981), 52.
15 The Iliadic Odysseus only hears Athena as well: › %b 6ı+-ÅŒ* Ł*A' Z!Æ çø+Å).)Å',
Il. 2.182; cf. Il. 10.512. Achilles does enjoy a full epiphany with Athena (Il. 1.194–222),
but that is due to the presentation of his special relationship with the divine and even
then fails to gain his immunity from mortal suffering.
16 For questions of staging, see: Seale (1982), 176, n. 3; Heath (1987a), 165–7;
Mastronarde (1990), 278; Rehm (2002), 125–6; Hesk (2003), 43–4. Pucci (1994), 27
argues that Athena’s invisibility is made visible to the audience in order to stress the tragic
vision of man.
17 When we see Ajax again, he will, in fact, be surrounded by the beasts he has
slaughtered in mistake. It is his realization that he has erred so wide of the mark that
plunges him into a despair from which he will never recover.
18 Heath (1987a), 173 suggests that we—the modern audience—should not be put
off by the violence of Ajax’s dissent: though from our perspective it might seem morally
reprehensible for an individual to act in this way, from an ancient Greek viewpoint Ajax
has his honour to defend, and desperate times call for desperate measures. For proof of
his argument that Ajax is not being condemned for thus defending his honour, Heath
cites the Homeric precedent of Achilles’ impulse to kill Agamemnon. See also Garvie
(1998), 11–12.
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other hand, it can hardly be the case that this kind of dissent is to be
approved: by turning on his comrades, Ajax has broken the bonds of
philia. Indeed, both Tecmessa and the Chorus are truly shocked by what
Ajax has done and foresee disastrous consequences for themselves.19
Nevertheless, Ajax’s actions resonate strongly with a scene explored
earlier in this book: when dissent in the Achaean assembly gets so out of
hand that Achilles deliberates whether to strike down Agamemnon or
check his wrath.20 There we observed that Achilles actually goes for his
sword, before being physically restrained and then persuaded to keep his
weapon sheathed.21 This memorable scene in the Iliad gets reworked in
Sophocles’ play with three important differences.22 First, there is the
action itself. Frustrated by his perceived injustice at the hands of the
Greek leaders, Ajax takes the matter into his own hands and reaches for
his sword. Unlike the epic precedent, however, Athena intervenes not to
stay his hand, but to deflect his blow. It is almost as if the scene offers a
window onto the beginning of the Iliad, where Achilles does draw his
sword, where dissent does stray into violence. Second, there is the out-
come. In the Iliad Athena offers Achilles recompense for not striking
down Agamemnon: he will gain honour threefold for obeying her. In
Sophocles’ play the result of Athena’s intervention is hardly auspicious
19 See e.g. the Chorus at Aj. 141–7, 196–200; Tecmessa at Aj. 214–20, 271–7. Many
scholars have regarded Ajax’s tragedy as punishment by Athena for his pride: Bowra
(1944), 32–3; Kitto (1961), 122; Winnington-Ingram (1980), 13; Stanford (1981),
p. xxvi. See, however, Garvie (1998), 243–53, who points out that the language of hubris
is most often applied to Ajax’s enemies. In his discussion of Ajax’s hubris (pp. 141–8),
Hesk (2003), 148 concludes that Ajax may ‘embody the kind of hubristic behaviour
which, while transgressive in societal or legal terms, is sometimes necessary in the face of
tyranny and injustice’. Important here is the issue of ‘big talking’, which manifests itself
differently over the course of the play: see esp. sec. 2 below. For the influence of the
‘traditional’ ancient Greek ethical code on Ajax’s behaviour: Blundell (1991).
20 Hom. Il. 1.193–4.
21 Athena may not say that Achilles is wrong to stand up to Agamemnon, but her
intervention serves to prevent his dissent from Agamemnon from transgressing into
violence, which would prove catastrophic for the Achaeans. See Ch. 1, n. 31, with
accompanying text.
22 Ajax as an Achilles: Knox (1961); Goldhill (1986), 154–61; Murnaghan (1987b),
174–5. For the influence of the Iliad more generally, see Kirkwood (1965), 53–70;
Zanker (1992), 20–5; Hesk (2003), 27–34. O’Higgins (1989), 43–56 argues that it is
not so much the case of Ajax being slotted back into the Iliad as the Iliad being adapted
to the circumstances of the play. Michelakis (2002), 18–19, 144–54, analyses Ajax as an
Achilles, but looks beyond Homer to the fragmentary evidence of tragedies expressly
about Achilles.
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for the agent: Ajax’s armed defiance misses its target and he strikes down
sheep instead, because of which he will suffer crippling humiliation.
The comparison to the Iliad, therefore, is instructive for underlining the
point that taking individual action outside institutional means of re-
dress—such as killing your leaders when you disagree with them—
cannot, and does not, gain sanction.23
On the face of it, Athena’s mediation in the Iliad serves to add to
Achilles’ glory: any of its negative consequences—such as the fact that it
sets in motion a train of events which will culminate in the death of his
friend, Patroclus—are left unexpressed at the time. It is hard to see
Athena’s role in Sophocles’ play, however, as anything other than
damaging for the hero, given the manner in which Athena has staged
the action24—which introduces the third, and most important, differ-
ence between the two scenes. The Iliad explores dissent from the agent’s
perspective, from Achilles’ initial withdrawal to his rejection of the
embassy: we learn only in piecemeal fashion what other Achaeans
thought about his action; the important thing is what Achilles says,
thinks and does.25 Sophocles, on the other hand, puts the response of
others intensely and immediately under the spotlight.
It is worth taking a look at the way each episode is represented to
highlight the difference in emphasis and the consequences that follow.
In the Iliad, after Athena explains her intervention, Achilles makes the
following remark (Il. 1.218): ‘‹' Œ* Ł*"E' K!Ø!*(ŁÅ#ÆØ, ,.ºÆ #7 :Œºı"+
ÆP#"F’ (‘Whoever obeys the gods, they listen to him especially’).
Throughout the exchange, Achilles’ views and actions are under scru-
tiny. The hero himself draws the moral from his dialogue with the
goddess: being allowed the final say confirms the epic’s interest in his
response. Immediately afterwards, he criticizes the rest of the Achaeans
for not standing up to Agamemnon in the way he deems appropriate or
23 ‘The Achaeans could not but see a traitor in Ajax on account of his onslaught’:
Kamerbeek (1963), 14. See also Jebb (1896), p. xxix. For an analysis of the Iliad along
these lines, see Ch. 1, sec. 1, above. In his subsequent exchange with Agamemnon,
Achilles foreshadows Achaean deaths at Hector’s hand (Hom. Il. 1.240–4), a point that
is reinforced in the following scene with Thetis (1.408–12).
24 At least, at this point in the play: see, however, sec. 3 below.
25 Nestor attempts to mediate the conflict; the heralds go to take Achilles’ prize
‘unwillingly’ (Il. 1.327); Thersites sees the quarrel as adding grist to his mill against
Agamemnon (Il. 2.239–42); Nestor persuades Agamemnon to make recompense
(Il. 9.104–11).
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adequate (Il. 1.231). Sophocles crucially alters the dynamic. On the one
hand, now it is Athena herself who draws the episode to a close. Her
conclusion—that ‘the gods love those who are moderate’ (#"f' %b
)0çæ"+Æ' j Ł*"d çØº"F)Ø ŒÆd )#ıª"F)Ø #"f' ŒÆŒ"/', 132–3)—offers a
sentiment akin to Achilles’ expression, but strikes a quite different note.
Achilles’ words were a sign that he accepted Athena’s intervention; when
Athena herself with similar language caps the episode, the stress on
the god’s power is uppermost, the understanding of the human agent
less so.
On the other hand, the human in dialogue with the god is no longer
the central agent, who is looking to dissent from the Achaean comman-
der(s); now he is a bystander, the onlooking Odysseus, for whose
benefit, it seems, Athena has staged this scene.26 It is his response to
Ajax, and not Ajax’s action itself, that is at issue here: the scene puts
Odysseus’ judgement under scrutiny. When Athena invites Ajax on-
stage, she expressly invites Odysseus to gloat at his enemy’s fall from
grace: ‘Is not laughing at one’s enemies the most delightful kind of
laughter?’ ("hŒ"ı+ ª-ºø' l%Ø)#"' *N' KåŁæ"f' ª*ºA+; 79). Her conclu-
sion accords with the perceived wisdom of harming one’s enemies;27
yet, Odysseus’ response to the spectacle is quite different (121–4):
. . . K!"ØŒ#(æø %- +Ø+
%/)#Å+"+ :,!Æ', ŒÆ(!*æ Z+#Æ %ı),*+B,
›Ł"/+*Œ7 ¼#fi Å )ıªŒÆ#-Ç*ıŒ#ÆØ ŒÆŒfi B,
"P%b+ #e #"/#"ı ,Aºº"+ j #"P,e+ )Œ"!H+.
I pity him in his misery, though he is my enemy, since he has been yoked to evil
delusion, not looking out so much for his fate as for my own.
26 Athena as didaskalos: Easterling (1993), 77–86. Odysseus as a spectator: Murna-
ghan (1987b), 177–80; Segal (1995), 16–25; Dobrov (2001), 57–69. On the metathea-
tricality of the opening scene, see further Seale (1982), 144–76; Davis (1986); Pucci
(1994); Hesk (2003), 43–7.
27 The scholiast on line 79 describes Athena’s speech as ‘harsh’ ()ŒºÅæ&+). Similarly,
de Romilly (1976), 22 condemns the Athena of the prologue as ‘une de´esse cruelle’. A
note on line 82, however, offers an alternative view. The scholiast here (different from
the one previous?) observes a distinction between the god—who can speak freely (,*#a
!ÆææÅ)(Æ')—and Odysseus, who as a mortal ‘sees only the moment’ (#e+ ŒÆØæe+ ›æfi A).
Mortals have to gauge what is appropriate to say at any one moment, whereas deities do
not need to worry about that: cf. Cairns (1996) on hubris. Stanford (1981), 67 observes
that ‘Athena here expresses . . . the normal heroic attitude, that nothing is more pleasant
than to be able to exult and gloat over the misfortunes of one’s enemies’.
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Odysseus rejects Athena’s invitation to gloat, even as he acknowledges
Ajax as an enemy. As Pat Easterling has pointed out, Athena’s advice
would seem to suggest that we should take Ajax ‘as a cautionary example
and avoid any kind of arrogance towards the gods. But these are not the
terms in which Odysseus himself “reads” the scene that he and we have
witnessed.’28 In fact, Odysseus pities Ajax precisely because he sees a
relevance to his own mortal predicament ("P%b+ #e #"/#"ı ,Aºº"+ j
#"P,e+ )Œ"!H+, 124).29 Faced by the gruesome spectacle offered by the
goddess, Odysseus’ thoughts turn away from the maddened Ajax, and
turn inwards in contemplation of a common humanity. He pities him.30
In this way, Sophocles invites his audience to regard Odysseus in a way
far removed from his usual tragic guise of a glib orator.31
This opening section has shown that the scene between Athena,
Odysseus and Ajax resonates with the beginning of the Iliad, when
Athena intervened in Achilles’ quarrel with Agamemnon; but, far from
restraining Ajax, she allows his dissent to transgress into violence, which
not only maximizes his shame but also exposes him to legitimate
reprisal. In addition, through the figure of Athena, Sophocles changes
the focus of the scene: whereas in the Iliad Athena enjoys an individual
audience with the dissenting heroic agent that excludes everyone else
from their dialogue, in Sophocles’ tragedy Athena stages a play through
28 Easterling (1993), 82.
29 ‘The effect reminds [the audience], paradoxically, not of their security as distant,
quasi-divine onlookers but of their involvement as mortal participants, capable of human
pity which they, like Odysseus and in contrast to Athena, can still feel’: Segal (1995), 6.
For the extent to which Odysseus’ sentiment may be seen as radically challenging
traditional Greek ethical behaviour—or not—see Vlastos (1991), 192–4.
30 Just as Odysseus had earlier shown fear of being in Ajax’s presence (l. 82), now he
feels pity for him—these are, of course, the two emotions that, according to Aristotle,
represent the function of tragedy: Arist. Poet. 1450a30–1, 1452b29–30, 62b12–13. See
Heath (1987a), 5–17 for a discussion of these ‘first principles’ and pp. 168–9 for their
application to Ajax. Cf. Hesk (2003), 46.
31 See e.g. the portrait of the devious orator that the Chorus paint when they enter
(ll. 148–58). Dobrov (2001), 64–5 suggests that Odysseus gains an ethical awareness
from Athena’s staging of Ajax’s tragedy that he will later bring to bear on resolving the
crisis of burial. Whether or not he is right to see Odysseus as acquiring that attitude here,
this initial depiction of Odysseus will be critical to the final scenes and is suggestive of the
emphasis on spectating that is the focus of this chapter. Garvie (1998), 124 similarly
comments that Odysseus’ ‘remarkable attitude, which is more attractive than that of the
goddess and evidently beyond her understanding, foreshadows the final scene of the play’
(my italics). Cf. Taplin (2003), 41; Hesk (2003), 45–6.
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which she invites the spectating Odysseus to draw the lesson from her
deception of the protagonist. This shift in focalization anticipates the
play’s movement from presenting Ajax’s dissent to exploring its con-
sequences when he is dead.32 Yet, the different responses of Athena and
Odysseus already suggest different ways of responding to Ajax. That
process continues in the scenes that follow, when first the Chorus of
Ajax’s men and then Tecmessa enter to articulate the impact of Ajax’s
predicament on them all.
I suffer anguish
The Chorus’ entry continues the orientation of the opening scene, with
an extension of the interest in audience response to a group of onloo-
kers, except that these spectators associate themselves with Ajax.33 Their
entrance song has the primary function, then, of establishing their
identity as Ajax’s men and setting out their concerns given the present
circumstances. Immediately aligning their fate with Ajax, they describe
how they shrink in fear whenever a ‘slanderous word from the Danaans’
(º&ª"' KŒ ˜Æ+ÆH+ ŒÆŒ&Łæ"ı' K!Ø4fi B, 138) strikes their lord. According to
the Chorus, this is the case now (‰' ŒÆd +F+, 141), as ‘a great com-
motion holds them in infamy’ (,*ª.º"Ø Ł&æı4"Ø ŒÆ#-å"ı)7 >,A' j K!d
%ı)Œº*(fi Æ, 142–3).
The Chorus’ song raises two important considerations. First, it
locates the source of its woes as ‘evil rumour’ (ŒÆŒ. ç.#Ø', 186, 191),
a ‘slanderous word’ (º&ª"' ŒÆŒ&Łæ"ı', 138). Thus one speech act is
replaced by another: in place of Ajax’s verbal—and physical—assault on
the Achaean leaders is the report of it. In the opinion of the Chorus,
moreover, the blame for the transmission of such an evil report lies with
Odysseus, whose glib oratory has convinced the army that Ajax is
32 That is not to say that Ajax is not given the opportunity either to defend himself
(see esp. ll. 430–80) or express his anguish (ll. 646–92); rather, it is to stress that the play
expressly explores the reactions of those affected. Interestingly, when Ajax does have
his say, he does so particularly in the guise of a ‘Hector’: the hero whose personal
relations are under focus in the Iliad. See n. 43 below with accompanying text.
33 As a group they are discontinuous (at least to begin with) from the rest of the army:
Soph. Aj. 138, 151, 162, 164, 186, 196; Ajax is in no position to help them. See
Budelmann (2000), 195–272. See also Winnington-Ingram (1980), 24; Segal (1995),
21; Michelakis (2002), 148–50.
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guilty.34 This is the Odysseus familiar to the tragic stage, as the dema-
gogic orator. Second, ‘infamy’ (%ı)Œº*(Æ) is something that greatly
preoccupies Agamemnon in the Iliad.35 Similarly, the last words of
the parodos, in which the Chorus announce that they are ‘fixed in
anguish’ (K,"d %7 ¼å"' ;)#ÆŒ*+, 200), recalls the anguish articulated
by Homeric heroes, paradigmatically Achilles himself.36 In this play,
however, it is the Chorus who voice the fear of infamy, the feeling of
pain.37 On the one hand, this demonstrates the Chorus’ dependency on
their leader along the lines of the discussion above on Homer’s people.38
On the other hand, the focus has changed in tragedy: now that once
silent (though important) group in epic gets the opportunity to articu-
late their response to the events which affect both themselves and their
leader. It is as if Sophocles has put on stage Achilles’ Myrmidons to air
their grievances.39 In the fallout from Ajax’s Achillean dissent, the
security of the group, once again, is threatened.
And not only the group: Ajax’s woman, Tecmessa, also faces the
disastrous consequences of her man’s dissent. Her eyewitness report of
the previous night’s misadventures brings clarity to the wild rumours
that have been circulating, and starkly expresses the predicament that
they all face now that Ajax has overstepped the mark.
34 Significant here is the description of Odysseus as the spawn of Sisyphus (åT #A'
I)0#"ı @Ø)ıçØ%A+ ª*+*A', 189): the association of Odysseus with the arch-trickster
Sisyphus presents a deeply suspicious view of Odysseus’ rhetoric.
35 Il. 2.115; 9.22.
36 Nagy (1979), 69–71 speculates on the etymology of Achilles’ name as meaning
‘pain for the people’.
37 Rose (1995), 71 argues that Sophocles presents a ‘particularly unheroic image of
the ordinary sailors’ to emphasize Ajax’s heroic stature. That may be true; but it passes
over the resonances with Homeric epic. Hesk (2003), 27–30 discusses the extent to
which the Chorus’ language happens to ‘reverberate with Homeric soundings’ (p. 29). At
this point in the drama, he notes, the Chorus’ glowing description indicates ‘a dissonance
between their conception of Ajax as a warrior of epic proportions and the audience’s
current understanding of him as an enfeebled figure who is very much under the sway of
Athena’ (ibid, his italics).
38 See Act I, intro. above, with Haubold (2000), 14–46. It is interesting (as Haubold
notes, pp. 8–11) that Aristotle assimilates the tragic chorus to Homer’s people: ‘Of the
ancients only the leaders were heroes, and the people were human beings: whence derives
the Chorus’ ("ƒ %b >ª*,&+*' #H+ IæåÆ(ø+ ,&+"Ø q)Æ+ læø*', "ƒ %b ºÆ"d ¼+Łæø!"Ø, z+
K)#d+ › å"æ&', Arist., Pr. xix 48.922b).
39 Achilles admits as much (Il. 16.200–9), which is picked up by Hermes
(Il. 24.403–4).
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After her report, Tecmessa’s first task is to lure Ajax out of his tent
where he has been sitting in ominous silence since his first appearance.
This scene clearly evokes the beginning of the play, when Athena
enticed Ajax onto the stage in a state of maddened exultation: here,
however, Ajax is brought out in his right mind to face the consequences
of his actions. Not that he is ready to back down: while both the Chorus
and Tecmessa try to conciliate him (349–429), Ajax remains committed
to dissent, as both his men and his wife plead with him to tone down his
language, or express unease about it.40 Furthermore, his unrelenting
grievance against the Greek leaders has a tangible effect on the play’s
structure, as he responds to the iambics of his interlocutors in lyric
monody. The verbal manifestation of Ajax’s earlier physical assault
brings to the fore the problem of his dissent. In the shifting forms of
immoderate speech acts, from the wild rumours flying around to Ajax’s
careless insults, the play demonstrates how dissent may get out of hand
if not properly managed.
After some 100 lines or so, Ajax abruptly shifts into iambics by deliver-
ing a substantial speech in answer to Tecmessa’s worries (430–80). With
the change in metre heralding a more reflective register, Ajax explains and
justifies his refusal to accept the judgement of arms (440–9). This, the first
occasion that a report of the judgement of arms has been given, presents
Odysseus’ victory as a travesty of justice: ‘the sons of Atreus have made
their minds over to a man without scruples’ (+F+ %7 Æh#7 1#æ*E%ÆØ çø#d
!Æ+#"ıæªfiH çæ-+Æ' j :!æÆ6Æ+, 445–6) and shunned his own might
(I+%æe' #"F%7 I!0)Æ+#*' Œæ.#Å, 446). As well as representing Odysseus
in the negative light usual for his appearances on the tragic stage,
Ajax represents himself in Achillean terms. He is dishonoured by the
Argives (¼#Ø,"' 1æª*("Ø)Ø+, 440); he raises the possibility of returning
home—only to dismiss the idea (460–5). Indeed, according to Ajax, had
Achilles been alive to judge the contest, he would have given the arms to
40 So, the Chorus: *hçÅ,Æ ç0+*Ø, 362; ,Å%b+ ,-ª7 *Y!Å', 386; Tecmessa: ,8 Æh%Æ
#.%*, 368; *hçÅ,Æ ç0+*Ø, 591; the messenger (reporting Ajax’s words to his father): ›%7
9łØŒ&,!ø' ŒIçæ&+ø' M,*(łÆ#", 766. Ajax is described as ‘uttering evil words’ (ŒÆŒa
%*++.Çø+ Þ8,ÆŁ7 , 243) and ‘laughing loudly’ (ª-ºø+ !"º/+, 303). While Ajax’s terrible
words seem to attract the goddess’ wrath, the issue of frank speaking will be reworked
when Teucer enters the scene and faces up to the twin Atreidae. See sec. 2 below.
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none other than himself.41Ajax seeks to justify his dissent by casting doubt
on the legitimacy of the judgement and by casting himself in the role of the
Iliadic Achilles. Finally, like Achilles too, Ajax speaks forcefully and insists
on the finality of his word: !.+#7 IŒ8Œ"Æ' º&ª"+ (480).42
Yet his speech is very far from being the last words on the subject:
Sophocles gives Tecmessa a speech in reply of very nearly equal length
(485–524). As many scholars have noticed, the portrait of a wife trying to
dissuade the hero from pursuing a fateful course of action recalls the scene
betweenHector and Andromache in the Iliad.43But there are a number of
differences between the two scenes that relate to the discussion at the
beginning of this Act on the staging of dissent. In the first instance
Sophocles has reversed the scene so that the woman answers her man,
which throws emphasis onto the female voice.44 Next, in his answer to
Andromache Hector uses a generalizing speech that imagines what people
will say about himwhen they see his wife in slavery; here, Tecmessa herself
articulates these same concerns using the same rhetorical device.45 The
reversal is all the more striking given the fact that, unlike Andromache,
Tecmessa is no regal wife but a slave girl, Ajax’s concubine.46 It is as if
Briseis had been given a voice to complain to Achilles about his extreme
41 ‘If Achilles were still alive and were to judge victory in supreme valour for his own
arms, no other but I would receive them’ (*N ÇH+ 1åØºº*f' #H+ ‹!ºø+ #H+ z+ !-æØ j
Œæ(+*Ø+ :,*ºº* Œæ.#"' IæØ)#*(Æ' #Ø+(, j "PŒ ¼+ #Ø' Æh#7 :,Ææł*+ ¼ºº"' I+#7 K,"F, Aj.
442–4).
42 Cf. Il. 9.430–1.
43 See Kirkwood (1965), 56–8; Reinhardt (1979), 19–22; Winnington-Ingram
(1980), 15–16; Zanker (1992), 22–3; Ormand (1996; 1999), 111–19; and esp. East-
erling (1984); Hesk (2003), 52–73.
44 Easterling (1984), 1–5.
45 Hector: ‘Some day someone seeing you crying will say: “Here’s the wife of Hector,
who was best at fighting of the Trojans, when they fought about Ilion”’ (‘ŒÆ( !"#- #Ø'
*Y!fi Å)Ø+ N%g+ ŒÆ#a %.æŒı å-"ı)Æ+! j “ $‚Œ#"æ"' l%* ªı+8, n' IæØ)#*/*)Œ* ,.å*)ŁÆØ j
Aæ0ø+ ƒ!!"%.,ø+, ‹#* 7 ”ºØ"+ I,çØ,.å"+#"”’, Il. 6.459–61); Tecmessa: ‘One of my
masters will let fall bitter words like these: “See the concubine of Ajax, whose strength
was the greatest in the army, and the servitude she nourishes instead of envy”’ (ŒÆ( #Ø'
!ØŒæe+ !æ&)çŁ*ª,Æ %*)!"#H+ Kæ*E j º&ª"Ø' N.!#ø+, ‘Y%*#* #c+ ›,*ı+-#Ø+ j `YÆ+#"', n'
,-ªØ)#"+ Y)åı+* )#æÆ#"F, "¥ Æ' ºÆ#æ*(Æ' I+Ł7 ‹)"ı Ç8º"ı #æ-ç*Ø’, Aj. 500–3).
46 H. Foley (2001), 90 makes the connection: ‘Sophocles’ spear-bride Tecmessa . . .
resembles in part the other loving slave concubines of the Iliad such as Achilles’ Briseis,
but also, in her famous attempt to persuade Ajax not to abandon his family and commit
suicide, adapts the words of Hector’s virtuous wife Andromache.’ She concludes that
‘Tecmessa implicitly gains a symbolic recognition as “wife” for which the Iliad ’s Briseis
futilely longed’ (p. 91).
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form of dissent. In fact, the scene between Hector and his wife is not the
only scene from the Iliad that potentially informs this episode. Given
Ajax’s self-presentation as an Achilles figure, Tecmessa’s speech also re-
sonates with the attempts made at persuading Achilles in the Iliad. Thus,
by stressing her isolation Tecmessa also plays a Phoenix, as she tries to tie
the hero into a network of obligations (490ff.).47Or, by supplicating Ajax
and enjoining him to remember, she recalls a Priam, his father.48 Or, by
recommending to the hero the pleasures of life, she appears as a Briseis.49
Most strikingly of all, in her repeated demand for respect, she cites Ajax
himself.50 In addition, it is important to note that it is only whenTecmessa
speaks that the audience become aware of the potential Iliadic paradigm of
Hector and Andromache, by virtue of which emphasis is again placed on
the female response to the hero. Therefore, although Ajax subsequently
reasserts his voice and brings this contest of words to an end,51 it is
Tecmessa’s speech that initiates the process of translating Ajax’s dissent
for the wider group.52The rest of the play explores the social consequences
of Iliadic dissent in relation to the Athenian tragic space.
As Ajax enforces his will to silence, those around him are left to talk
about the impact on them. It is not only a question of their dependency;
the play stages Ajax’s dissent as seen from their perspective. A Briseis
joins with Achilles’ Myrmidons to voice discontent about their leader’s
47 Il. 9.434–605. Easterling (1984), 3 observes that Tecmessa spends less time than
Andromache on appealing to pity, instead focussing on her filial obligations. Zanker
(1992), 21 argues that Tecmessa pits affection against Ajax’s stress on honour (#Ø,8).
48 Iºº 7 ÆY%*)ÆØ ,b+ !Æ#-æÆ #e+ )e+ K+ ºıªæfiH j ª8æfi Æ !æ"º*(!ø+, Soph. Aj. 506–7;
Hom. Il. 24.485–506. See Zanker (1992), 23.
49 #*æ!+e+ *Y #( !"ı !.Ł"Ø, Aj. 521. In the Iliad it would not be appropriate for
Briseis to say this. Instead, the desirability of sex is left to Thetis to suggest to Achilles—
with Briseis in mind: Il. 24.130–1.
50 ÆY%*)ÆØ, Aj. 506, 507; cf. Il. 9.640–2. For the synthesizing of Priam and Ajax, see
March (1991–3).
51 ,c ŒæE+*, ,c 7 6-#ÆÇ*! )øçæ"+*E+ ŒÆº&+, Aj. 586. From this point Ajax’s speeches
approach monologues: Winnington-Ingram (1980), 24.
52 Segal (1995), 22 also draws attention to the different perspective from epic that
Sophocles’ play presents. Far from being told from the perspective of the hero, as in epic,
the hero’s narrative is now told ‘as an object to be recovered and reconstituted with effort
and difficulty’. He continues: ‘Hence even when the play closely follows the epic, as it
does partly in using the scene between Hector and Andromache in Iliad 6, it takes up the
continuous plot line of the inherited material and retells the tale through partial, retro-
spective, and often hostile points of view.’
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big talking. By doing so, they not only initiate a process of assessing the
value of dissent; they also act out that very value themselves by dissent-
ing from their man.
Thus, when Ajax commits suicide the play has not yet run its course,
for Sophocles has left a series of questions: the º*0' (sailors from
Salamis) have lost their shepherd, Tecmessa and her child their shield;
now Ajax’s body is at the mercy of his enemies. Who will protect them,
how, and with what consequences for this play’s examination of dissent
form the subject of the next section.
2. SPEAKING BACK IN THE AGO¯N
In coming to his senses, Ajax is made to face the shame of his nocturnal
activities coming to light. Exposed to the harsh glare of public scrutiny
on stage, Ajax resists all attempts by his philoi (the Chorus and Tec-
messa) to turn aside his dark thoughts.53 Instead, he retreats to a
deserted beach, where he removes himself from the spectacle by falling
on his sword.54 With this last act Ajax silences himself, but in a way that
affirms his lasting defiance of the Greek leaders.
As Ajax falls silent, so does much of the commentary on the play.
Ever since Aristotle, indeed, scholars have been impressed by the stature
of the Sophoclean hero; but here is one play in which the hero kills
himself barely halfway through the action. In its wake Sophocles stages
not one but two formal debates, which for most scholars mark an
unfortunate lessening in the dramatic tension.55
53 They think that they have won him over when he speaks of change (Aj. 646–92)—
the so-called ‘deception’ speech. For this scene’s pervasive ambiguities, see Ferguson
(1970); Goldhill (1986), 189–92; Hesk (2003), 76–95; its misleading rhetoric: Taplin
(2003), 128–31; Heath (1987a), 185–90; its resonances with hero cult: Seaford (1994),
392–9.
54 Problems abound regarding how Ajax’s suicide would be staged: see Taplin (2003),
86–8; Seale (1982), 163–7; Heath (1987a), 192–5; Rehm (2002), 123–4, 130–3; Hesk
(2003), 97–103. On the importance of the corpse on stage as a focal point, see Burian
(1972); Easterling (1988), 93–5; March (1991–3), 31. As Rehm (2002), 133 comments:
‘On an empty beach, around a dead body, human values and familial structure reemerge
and civilize, projecting the hero’s memory into the future.’
55 See e.g. Reinhardt (1979), with n. 8 above. M. Lloyd (1992) compares Sophocles
favourably to Euripides, because he (Sophocles) ‘avoids formality and incorporates agones
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Indeed, the hero-centric focus of much scholarship has had the effect
of dictating the terms with which the ago¯n is studied—as a contest
between the protagonists, with a concurrent expectation that it ought to
resolve the conflict. The present section goes on to suggest that the ago¯n
may be understood better in line with this chapter’s focus on the
responses to the hero and the thematization of dissent. While the two
debates arise ostensibly over the question of burial, both soon turn to
issues of authority and power, in ways that invite a reassessment of the
principles by which Ajax stood in his defiance of the Atreidae. Thus,
although the dual ago¯n fails ultimately to secure Ajax’s burial, it con-
tinues the process towards the reception of the hero in the community.
You came as king of Sparta (Sophodes, Ajax 1040–1162)
One of the main criticisms of the ago¯n in Ajax is the judgement that it
demeans the tragedy: in the wake of Ajax’s suicide, less impressive figures
clash over the greatman’s body; Ajax’s eloquent soliloquies are replaced by
petty bickering and insults; tragic grandeur yields to modern-sounding
debate and point-scoring.56 Since the discovery of Ajax’s corpse, Teucer
has been leading the lamentations over the dead body: the contemplative
and respectful repose that has been built up is abruptly shattered by the
arrival of Menelaus (1047–54), who comes on stage to deny burial.57
into his plays in a more naturalistic way’ (p. 2). He criticizes the dual ago¯n in Ajax for
being ‘more or less regular by Euripidean standards’ (p. 12). Cf. Duchemin (1968), 57.
See, however, Collard (2003), 66, who argues that ‘there is no stiffness, no lack of
circumstance, no feeling of abstraction about these [the Ajax] debates’; Heath (1987a),
198–205, and Hesk (2003), 104–30, both interpret these agonistic features positively.
56 For criticism of the post-heroic figures of the Atreidae and including Teucer, see
Bowra (1944), 38; Stanford (1981), pp. xlv–clvi; Torrance (1965), 279; Gellie (1972),
22–3; Garvie (1998), 216. Taplin (2003), 149 comments: ‘Teucer, though desperately
courageous, again cannot lift himself above the low level of dispute.’ While Goldhill
(1986), 195 regards Menelaus and, in particular, Agamemnon as ‘far removed from their
Homeric counterparts’, this study has shown that Agamemnon’s authoritative attitude is
entirely familiar from the Iliad.
57 Denial of burial is an extreme form of punishment and potentially transgressive.
While there is evidence for it, examples also show the concern to ensure burial:
Themistocles’ bones were said to have been brought home and buried in Attica secretly,
though he was a traitor (Thuc. 1.138.6); the Athenians themselves claim that they buried
the Argive dead (Hdt. 9.27.3); cf. Xen. Hell. 1.7.33. See Parker (1983), 45, n. 47. It is a
theme that seems to have been of particular interest to Sophocles, if Antigone andOedipus
at Colonus are anything to judge by.
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The new atmosphere is apparent from the beginning of the scene.
Immediately on entering, Menelaus sets about berating Teucer in a
manner that reflects his scant regard for his opponent and conveys a
sense of his own superiority: he doesn’t address Teucer by name, but
instead calls out insultingly, ‘You there, I’m telling you . . . ’58 His
insulting, base style serves a point: it is an expression of (his conception
of) his power and authority over his antagonist. By the very force of his
language Menelaus sets out to brook no argument. Indeed, the denial of
burial, according to Menelaus, is his decision and the decision of army’s
ruler. The clumsy repetition of %"Œ"F+#Æ, the prescribed formula for
decision-making in the Athenian assembly, reveals his very different,
and dictatorial, perception of the decision-making process: he and his
brother—the ruler of the army he presumably refers to—make the
decisions in this world.59 But even here Menelaus fails to deny Teucer
a response. On both occasions Teucer replies with a sarcastic rejoin-
der.60 Thus, this opening stichomythic exchange sets the tone for the
following ago¯n, as first Menelaus tries to rule out dissent, and Teucer
responds in defence of his half-brother and the importance of speaking
back. We may now begin to appreciate Ajax’s earlier complaints against
the judgement of arms.
Menelaus follows up these opening manoeuvres by launching into a
self-righteous speech that interprets Ajax’s action as insubordination
(1067–72):
*N ªaæ 4º-!"+#"' ,c 7 %ı+8ŁÅ,*+ ŒæÆ#*E+,
!.+#ø' ŁÆ+&+#"' ª 7 ¼æ6",*+, Œi+ ,c Ł-ºfi Å',
å*æ)d+ !Ææ*ıŁ/+"+#*'. "P ªaæ :)Ł7 ‹!"ı
58 "y#"', )b çH+ø, Aj. 1047. ‘"y#"': here clearly intended to be rude as, e.g. in O.T.
532’: Stanford (1981), 192.
59 %"Œ"F+#7 K,"( , %"Œ"F+#Æ %7 n' ŒæÆ(+*Ø )#æÆ#"F, Aj. 1050. For the Athenian
assembly formula ‘it seemed best’, see ch. 4, n. 45 above and ch. 6, n. 58 below. Hesk
(2003), 110 comments: ‘Menelaus is immediately provocative: Teucer must not arrange
burial for Ajax’s corpse (1047–8). The bowman asks him why. Because he and Aga-
memnon have decided on it, says the king. Here is the unattractive rigidity and
intransigence which he and his brother will maintain throughout.’
60 See esp. Teucer’s opening reply: ‘For whose sake have you wasted that speech?’
(#(+"' å.æØ+ #")&+%7 I+8ºø)Æ' º&ª"+; Aj. 1049), which draws explicit attention to the
evaluation of speech.
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º&ªø+ IŒ"F)ÆØ ÇH+ !"#7 MŁ-ºÅ)7 K,H+.
ŒÆ(#"Ø ŒÆŒ"F !æe' I+%æe' Z+#Æ %Å,&#Å+
,Å%b+ %ØŒÆØ"F+ #H+ Kç*)#0#ø+ Œº/*Ø+.
Why, if we were not able to have power over him when he was alive, then we
shall rule him now that he is dead, even if he’s unwilling, directing him with our
hands. For, while he was alive, he never wanted to listen to my words. Yet it is
typical of a bad man, though only a commoner, to claim the right not to listen
to those in authority.
A string of moral platitudes on authority follow, by which means Mene-
laus emphasizes the importance of maintaining discipline in the face of
such insurrection. But, however commendable the generalizing senti-
ments may be, it is not difficult to observe the personal motivation behind
them. Particularly striking is his description of Ajax as ‘a commoner’
(%Å,&#Å'). One commentator has glossed this remark as a ‘grotesquely
insulting description of Ajax’, which ‘leaves us in no doubt that Menelaus
is wrong’.61 Whether that is the case or not, the collapse of the world of
epic (represented by Ajax) into the world of the everyday audience (the
de¯mos writ large) not only challenges Menelaus’ claim—the Iliad had
certainly not represented Ajax as anything other than a major hero62—it
also invites the audience to think about the issue of status in Athenian
democratic culture through the example of Ajax and his half-brother.
The Athenian colouring of this debate is further underlined by
Teucer’s reply, and cast in significant terms. In defending Ajax from
Menelaus’ accusations of insubordination, Teucer asks (1099–1102):
"PŒ ÆP#e' K6-!º*ı)*+ ‰' Æ9#"F ŒæÆ#H+;
!"F )f )#æÆ#Åª*E' #"F%*; !"F %b )"d º*g+
:6*)#7 I+.))*Ø+ z+ ‹%7 Xª*#7 "YŒ"Ł*+;
@!.æ#Å' I+.))ø+ qºŁ*', "På >,H+ ŒæÆ#H+!
Did he not sail out as master of himself? How are you his commander? How is
it possible that you rule over the people whom he brought from home? You
came as king of Sparta, not as master over us.
61 Garvie (1998), 223, n. 1071–2. Heath (1987a), 200 puts it even more strongly: ‘as
if Ajax were some recalcitrant Thersites!’
62 Menelaus’ insult ‘cannot have found favour with an Athenian audience—not just
because of its snobbery but because of its lack of “fit” with Ajax’s aristocratic grandeur
and Athenian associations’: Hesk (2003), 111.
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This barrage of questions immediately challenges Menelaus’ author-
ity in ways that recall the Iliadic Achilles. First, Teucer corrects
Menelaus’ assumption of control: he does not possess authority over
them ("På >,H+ ŒæÆ#H+, 1102), because he is not their king. On the
contrary, Ajax was their leader (1101). The direct challenge to the king’s
exercise of power resonates with Achilles’ stand against Agamemnon’s
use and abuse of authority in the debate that opens the Iliad.63 Second,
Teucer goes on to claim that Ajax ‘did not go to war for the sake of your
wife’ ("P ª.æ #Ø #B' )B' "o+*Œ 7 K)#æÆ#*/)Æ#" j ªı+ÆØŒ&', 1111–12).
The emphasis on fighting on account of a woman echoes the Iliadic
Achilles directly: in rejecting the embassy, Achilles had railed against the
hypocrisy of fighting at Troy over Menelaus’ wife, when his woman,
Briseis, had been taken away by Agamemnon.64 In section 1 above it
was suggested that Ajax has been largely modelled on the Iliadic Achilles
in terms of his dissent from the Achaean leaders and relations to the
Chorus and Tecmessa; here, Teucer appears to evoke Achilles himself in
his own rebuttal of a son of Atreus. Thus, the echoes of the Iliadic
Achilles combine to draw the two half-brothers together, as Teucer
inherits Ajax’s on-stage persona as a heroic figure.65
Equally importantly, Teucer’s reprise of the role of the Iliadic
Achilles carries more weight in denying legitimacy to the Atreidae’s
assertion of authority than those previously associated with Ajax’s act of
defiance, which was offset by Athena’s staging arrangements. That is
particularly true given the contemporary resonance with which Sopho-
cles recasts dissent in Teucer’s mouth. Teucer laces his criticism of
Menelaus with a peculiarly Athenian edge: Menelaus lords it over
63 See e.g. Il. 1.149–72.
64 Il. 9.334–45, esp. 339: ‘q "På $¯º-+Å' ;+*Œ 7 MßŒ&,"Ø"’. Teucer repeats this pointed
vocabulary at the conclusion to his speech against Agamemnon: )B' 9!bæ j ªı+ÆØŒ&' (Aj.
1311–12). Teucer’s claim here that Ajax came to Troy because of his oaths and did not
value ‘nobodies’ ("P ªaæ M6("ı #"f' ,Å%-+Æ', Aj. 1114) also echoes Achilles: he labels
Agamemnon a ‘people-devouring king, since you rule over nobodies’ (‘%Å,"4&æ"'
4Æ)Øº*/', K!*d "P#Ø%Æ+"E)Ø+ I+.))*Ø'’, Il. 1.231), and asserts that he too will be called
a ‘nobody’ if he yields ("P#Ø%Æ+e', Il. 1.293). By insisting that Ajax came to Troy as his
own commander (Aj. 1100–4), Teucer exploits a tension already present in that first
assembly of Iliad 1 between the notion of Agamemnon as supreme leader and the
independence of the other commanders.
65 Rehm (2002), 133–5 speculates that the same actor played the two roles, in which
case Teucer’s enactment of Ajax’s dissent would be more apparent. Cf. Pavlovskis
(1977), 116–17.
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Spartans, not over Ajax and his people. The Iliadic precedent of Achilles
challenging Agamemnon’s authority here is reworked in the form
of Teucer’s defiance of Spartan hegemony. Peter Rose suggests that
Ajax’s impiety toward Athena emerges as a ‘model for Teucer’s thinking
big in the face of Spartan attacks on free speech and independent
action’.66 Providing a ‘model’ puts it rather too strongly: nevertheless,
it is significant that Teucer’s language taps into Athenian anxieties about
authority, particularly the very Spartan kind of unquestioned obedi-
ence.67 In Athens, on the other hand, the relationship between dissent
and authority appears to be balanced very differently—at least as far as
this tragedy presents the issue at this point. The ago¯n, which by its very
structure puts the onus on a contest of voices and dissent from mono-
logical expression, here represents the brother and joint-leader of the
army singularly failing to assert his word and silence opposition to it.
Indeed, Teucer underpins his defence with a forceful critique of Mene-
laus’ speech act: he will not be cowed by the violence of Menelaus’
language.68 In like manner to Achilles in the Iliad, Teucer stands up to
authority—but here, on the tragic stage, the onus lies especially on what
one says and how one says it.
The interest in speech and speaking continues in the stichomythic
exchange that succeeds the ago¯n. Introducing Teucer’s low rank as an
archer, Menelaus sarcastically remarks on his opponent’s boldness of
66 Rose (1995), 72. See also Bowra (1944), 51–2; Stanford (1981), 198; Rehm
(2002), 135. Cf. Hesk (2003), 111–13.
67 Hesk (2003), 112 argues that ‘Menelaus’ authoritarianism should be viewed
through a double lens’—not just Spartan conservatism but Athenian demagoguery:
‘there is nothing in what Menelaus says about the need for discipline which could not
have been uttered by an Athenian general or demagogue’ (his italics). While the Spartan
colouring to issues of authority may be stronger than Hesk suggests (his example of
Pericles’ statement of obedience at Thuc. 2.37.3 occurs in the context of a broader
comparison between Athenian and Spartan attitudes to authority), he is right to assert
the unsettling resonances of Menelaus’ polis-based rhetoric for the watching Athenians: it
‘invites an audience to think carefully about rights, responsibilities and the limits of
authority in their own polis’ (pp. 112–13). The same is particularly true of Agamemnon’s
commitment to collective decision-making below.
68 ‘They who are thought to be well-born go wrong by uttering such words’ (‹Ł7 "ƒ
%"Œ"F+#*' *Pª*+*E' !*çıŒ-+ÆØ j #"ØÆFŁ7 ±,Ææ#.+"ı)Ø+ K+ º&ª"Ø' :!Å, Aj. 1095–6);
‘Rebuke [your subjects] with pompous words’ (ŒÆd #a )-,+7 :!Å j Œ&ºÆÇ7 KŒ*(+"ı',
1107–8); ‘[I’ll bury him], in no fear of your tongue’ ("P #e )e+ %*()Æ' )#&,Æ, 1110);
‘I’d never turn about on account of your noise’ (#"F %b )"F ł&ç"ı "PŒ i+ )#æÆç*(Å+,
1116–17).
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speech,69 which prompts the response: ‘it is possible to think big with
justice’ (6f+ #fiH %ØŒÆ(øfi ªaæ ,-ª7 :6*)#Ø+ çæ"+*E+, 1125).70 Where
previously Ajax’s ‘big talking’ had been configured as dangerous and
inappropriate, now this kind of speaking back is being recast in a more
positive light, as legitimate defiance of Menelaus’ attempts to pull
rank. In the end, after his final word and order meets with a sound
rejection,71 Menelaus resorts to a fable (1142–9):
X%Å !"#7 *r%"+ ¼+%æ 7 Kªg ªº0))fi Å ŁæÆ)f+
+Æ/#Æ' Kç"æ,8)Æ+#Æ å*Ø,H+"' #e !º*E+,
fiz çŁ-ª,7 i+ "PŒ K+ÅFæ*', >+(Œ7 K+ ŒÆŒfiH
å*Ø,H+"' *Yå*#7 , Iºº7 9ç 7 *¥,Æ#"' Œæıç*d'
!Æ#*E+ !Ææ*Eå* #fiH Ł-º"+#Ø +Æı#(ºø+.
"o#ø %b ŒÆd )b ŒÆd #e )e+ º.4æ"+ )#&,Æ
),ØŒæ"F +-ç"ı' #.å 7 ¼+ #Ø' KŒ!+*/)Æ' ,-ªÆ'
å*Ø,g+ ŒÆ#Æ)4-)*Ø* #c+ !"ººc+ 4"8+.
Once I saw a man, bold in his tongue, urge sailors to sail during a storm. But
you wouldn’t have heard a peep from him when he was in the storm’s grip, he
was hidden under his cloak, letting the sailors walk over him at will. So too with
you and your loud mouth: a mighty storm blowing up from some small cloud
will put a stop to all your shouting.
The popularity of the ‘ship of state’ allegory in political or quasi-
political discourse demonstrates Menelaus’ last attempt to reassert con-
trol over his antagonist and, in particular, to suppress a response.72 But,
69 ‘Greatwould be your boasting, if youwere to acquire a shield’ (,-ª7 ¼+ #Ø Œ",!.)*ØÆ',
I)!(%7 *N º.4"Ø', 1122); ‘Your tongue nourishes your spirit so terribly’ (> ªºH)). )"ı #e+
Łı,e+ ‰' %*Ø+e+ #æ-ç*Ø, 1124). Menelaus’ criticisms rely on a snobbery concerning the
‘classical civic ideal of the all-Greek hoplite warrior’: Hesk (2003), 106. On the centrality of
the hoplite figure in ancient Greek thought, including the Athenian democracy, see Vidal-
Naquet (1986), 85–105; Loraux (1986a), 155–71; Hesk (2000), 24–9.
70 ‘Perhaps we realize now the force of Ajax’s question “will I not learn to be moderate
(sophronein)?” [677]. Such “moderation” in the language of the Atreidae’s hierarchy
means knowing one’s place of obedience’: Goldhill (1986), 196. Both Menelaus and
Agamemnon try to disqualify Teucer from speaking by casting him as a Thersites-like
character: in this case, however, this figure speaks back.
71 Menelaus’ order ‘this man must not be buried’ (#&+%7 K)#d+ "Påd ŁÆ!#-"+, 1140) is
countered by Teucer’s ‘but you’ll hear one word back, he will be!’ (Iºº 7 I+#ÆŒ"/)fi Å #"FŁ7
;+, ‰' #*Ł.ł*#ÆØ, 1141). As Hesk (2003), 115 notes, ‘Teucer mockingly and playfully
echoes Menelaus’ vocabulary in order to trump each new argument or insult’. On the
long tradition of capping verses, see Collins (2004).
72 So e.g. Aesch. Sept. 62–4, on which see Hutchinson (1985), 52.
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the speech act he chooses, with its barely concealed message, suggests his
lack of control.73 In fact, Teucer replies with a fable of his own that
parades the artificiality of this kind of speech act: ‘Or am I speaking in
riddles?’ (,H+ fi M+Ø6.,Å+, 1158).74 The low character with the bold
tongue not only sees off his opponent but also exposes the authoritative
strategies inherent in that man’s language.75 The ago¯n, along with the
stichomythia that follows it, is absolutely fundamental to the drama: it
privileges speaking back to power and initiates a process of rethinking
Ajax’s own dissent.76
The first ago¯n takes place, not so much over the issue of burial as is
demanded by the strict narrative context, but over the general issues of
authority and language. Menelaus’ sententious moralizing is countered
by Teucer’s ideological distinction between a Spartan-like authority and
a legitimate resistance to it, which begins the process of reassessing the
value of dissent and recouping it in terms of Athenian, democratic,
practice.
73 ‘Menelaus eventually resorts to a fable—a rhetorical device of low character’: Heath
(1987a), 200; cf. Fraenkel (1950), 773–4. Hesk (2003), 116 discusses how, while his
intended meaning is clear, ‘Menelaus’ allegory works against him’.
74 Winnington-Ingram (1980), 64, n. 21 labels Teucer’s attempted use of the fable as
‘characteristically incompetent’. But see Heath (1987a), 200, who notes that Teucer is
fully aware of the limitations of the fable by his ‘deliberately scornful tone’; and Hesk
(2003), 116, who suggests that, since Menelaus’ intended meaning is so obvious, ‘Teucer
chooses an allegorical rejoinder which is not really an allegory at all, but a mockingly
transparent parody of Menelaus’ unsophisticated riddle’.
75 Menelaus’ accusation that the man (meaning Teucer) speaks with a ‘bold tongue’
(ªº0))Å ŁæÆ)/', 1142) is suggestive of the kind of frank speaking that tragedy puts on
stage. A related compound is used by the Chorus of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, in their
assessment of Clytemnestra’s justification for killing her husband: ‘We are amazed at
your speech, how bold-tongued you are!’ (ŁÆı,.Ç",-+ )"ı ªºH))Æ+, ‰' ŁæÆ)/)#","',
Aesch. Ag. 1399). Euripides uses the same collocation for Agamemnon’s description of
Polymestor (Hec. 1286—see Ch. 6, n. 129 below) and Tyndareus’ description of
Orestes: ‘Since you are brazening it out, not curbing your tongue . . . ’ (K!*d ŁæÆ)/+fi Å
Œ"På 9!")#-ººfi Å º&ªøfi , Eur. Or. 607). On frank speaking in Orestes, see Barker 2011.
76 With his final words Menelaus makes explicit the threat of force that has under-
pinned his speech: ‘I’m off, since it would be shameful if someone should find out that
I’ve been chastising with words when I could use force’ (¼!*Ø,Ø! ŒÆd ªaæ ÆN)åæ&+, *N
!/Ł"Ø#& #Ø' j º&ª"Ø' Œ"º.Ç*Ø+ fiz 4Ø.Ç*)ŁÆØ !.æÆ, 1159–60). Again, Teucer makes a
suitable rejoinder that not only appropriates and trumps Menelaus’ expression—‘indeed,
it’s most shameful for me,’ (ŒI,"d ªaæ ÆY)åØ)#"+, 1161)—but also evaluates his lan-
guage: it’s shameful ‘to listen to a vain man speaking foolish words’ (Œº/*Ø+ j I+%æe'
,Æ#Æ("ı çºÆFæ 7 :!Å ,ıŁ"ı,-+"ı, 1161–2).
302 Act III: Tragedy
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 302 29.4.2011 11:31am
Don’t you remember . . . ? (Sophocles, Ajax 1223–1315)
Menelaus eventually departs with a last insult ringing in his ears: ‘Be off
with you then, since for me too it is utterly shameful to listen to a vain
man spouting foolish words’ (¼ç*æ!- +ı+! ŒI,"d ªaæ ÆY)åØ)#"+ Œº/*Ø+ j
I+%æe' ,Æ#Æ("ı çºÆFæ 7 :!Å ,ıŁ"ı,-+"ı, 1159–60). The outcome of
this first ago¯n is clear: the Achilles-like Teucer sees off Menelaus in the
guise of Iliadic Agamemnon, concerned above all with obedience to his
word. Yet, a little over sixty lines later, with only a short choral lyric
dividing the action, Agamemnon himself arrives on stage. There follows
a virtual replay of the first ago¯n, as another son of Atreus again tries to
harangue Teucer into silence—and is again met by fierce resistance. But
the repetition does not amount to structural frigidity, as it has appeared
to some scholars. For one thing, the appearance of Agamemnon so soon
after Menelaus stages a visual symbol of the Atreidae’s attempted
domination of the arena of speech. Furthermore, this second ago¯n
represents a significant escalation in the crisis, as both speakers more
directly consider Ajax’s past record, with repercussions for thinking
about his dissent.
In the wake of Menelaus’ departure, the Chorus announce that ‘there
will be an ago¯n of great strife,’ (:)#ÆØ ,*ª.ºÅ' :æØ%&' #Ø' Iª0+, 1163),
which both anticipates more trouble and formally indicates the contest
of words as an ago¯n. There is nothing formal about its setting up,
however (1223–8):
A¯B˚Cˇ@ ŒÆd ,c+ N%g+ :)!*ı)Æ #e+ )#æÆ#Åº.#Å+
1ªÆ,-,+"+7 >,E+ %*Fæ" #&+%7 ›æ,0,*+"+!
%Bº"' %- ,"P)#d )ŒÆØe+ KŒº/)ø+ )#&,Æ.
`ˆ`?¯?˝D˝ )b %c #a %*Ø+a Þ8,Æ#7 Iªª-ºº"ı)( ,"Ø
#ºB+ÆØ ŒÆŁ7 >,H+ z%7 I+"Ø,øŒ#*d åÆ+*E+.
)- #"Ø, #e+ KŒ #B' ÆNå,Æºø#(%"' º-ªø.
teucer I made haste since I saw the general, Agamemnon, rushing on his way
here to us. And it is clear to me that he is about to unloose his foolish
tongue.
agamemnon You they tell me have dared to open your mouth wide with such
impunity to utter terrible words against us. You, I mean, the son of the
captive-woman.
Speaking back in Sophocles’ Ajax 303
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 303 29.4.2011 11:31am
Teucer only just manages to make it back on stage to announce
Agamemnon’s entry before Agamemnon launches directly into a long
tirade, with not even a passing word of introduction or address. Thus, in
spite of the fact that the same issues seem to return—Teucer objects to
his opponent’s speech, while Agamemnon is derisive of his opponent’s
status—the opening skirmishes that introduce this second ago¯n reveal
a considerable upping of the ante. In particular, both antagonists show a
concern about proper speaking: Teucer anticipates Agamemnon’s vi-
triol by remarking that the king comes with the intention of loosening
his foolish tongue; Agamemnon, on the other hand, immediately shows
contempt for his opponent by describing Teucer’s open mouth and the
terrible words it utters.77 Agamemnon emphasizes too Teucer’s lowborn
status, which, to his mind, disqualifies his antagonist from speaking.78 It
is the nature and meaning of that open mouth that this latest ago¯n, and
the play more generally, explores.
Initially it appears that Agamemnon has been tipped off by his
brother, since he responds directly to one of Teucer’s arguments dis-
cussed above: ‘[you declared that] Ajax sailed—so you say—as his own
leader’ (Iºº7 ÆP#e' ¼æåø+, ‰' )f ç8', `YÆ' :!º*Ø, 1234). But Aga-
memnon extends the point to have Teucer claim that the Atreidae had
not come as rulers either over Ajax’s men or the Achaeans as a whole
(1229–34). Agamemnon’s exaggeration of his opponent’s case reveals
his anxiety over this issue and his concern to maintain his grip on
authority.
That serves as an introduction to the most extended discussion yet of
the contest of arms (1239–50). According to Agamemnon, the contest
they set up over the arms of Achilles is likely to prove bitter if Teucer is
77 Agamemnon uses a word, åÆ+*E+, from the Aristophanic stage: Ar. Ach. 108, 109,
878; cf. Vesp. 324. As Hesk (2003), 120 puts it: ‘status and speaking rights are
immediately at issue.’
78 On the problematic status of bastards in fifth-century Athens, see Ogden (1996).
On the marginality of Teucer’s illegitimacy: Ebbot (2003; 2005). Hesk (2003), 121
draws attention to how ‘Teucer’s “deconstruction” of Agamemnon’s “Greekness” and
“nobility” speaks to (and perhaps questions) the exclusionist and elitist tendencies of
Athenian civic identity in particular and Hellenic chauvinism in general’. Similar issues
such as these are again ‘up for grabs’ when Euripides’ Agamemnon establishes an ago¯n at
the end of Hecuba. See Ch. 6, sec. 2 below.
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allowed to continue to defame them.79 It is notable that Agamemnon
uses the first-person plural to denote the establishment of the contest,
and that he associates Teucer’s bad words with not yielding to the
decision of the majority. In this way Agamemnon represents himself
as the upholder of civic justice and impartial judgement, while Teucer’s
dissent is aligned with illegitimate abuse and assaults from ambushes—
very unheroic behaviour.80 Indeed, as Agamemnon puts it, ‘from such
turns as these, there could never be the institution of any law, if we are
to thrust aside those who have justly won and bring to the front those
who were behind’.81 Here Agamemnon voices a fundamental anxiety of
any society that has communal decision-making at its core. For contests
to benefit the group as a whole, they must be predicated on the necessity
and desirability of reaching a consensus that all parties can accept; dissent
cannot be allowed to go on outside the institutional arena. According to
Agamemnon, then, the problem with the defiance of Ajax and now
Teucer stems from their inability to accept or, at least, abide by demo-
cratic based rule. Since Ajax had submitted to the arbitration of the
group as a whole, he ought to have accepted the majority decision (in
favour of Odysseus); similarly, Teucer risks committing the same offence
by refusing to obey the present dictate that denies burial.
Thus Agamemnon’s argument presents an important challenge to
this book’s general thesis that representations of debate reproduce
dissent from authority. As Agamemnon’s concerns make plain, dissent
is not always a good thing, even, or especially, in political cultures—
such as democracy—where decisions (ideally at least) are taken on a
majority basis with the good of the majority in mind. The degree and
kind of dissent makes a difference: it is, for example, of vital importance
that dissent does not continue outside the civic institutional framework.
Yet the figure who articulates these concerns is Agamemnon. His
intervention has history: this is the figure from the Iliad who had
gone to some lengths to suppress dissent. And here he is doing the
79 !ØŒæ"f' :"Øª,*+ #H+ 1åØºº*(ø+ ‹!ºø+ j IªH+Æ' 1æª*("Ø)Ø ŒÅæF6ÆØ #&#*, j *N
!Æ+#Æå"F çÆ+"/,*Ł7 KŒ A*/Œæ"ı ŒÆŒ"( , Aj. 1239–41.
80 The exception that proves the rule is Odysseus, both in his Odyssean but also
Iliadic guise (cf. Iliad 10).
81 KŒ #H+%* ,-+#"Ø #H+ #æ&!ø+ "PŒ ¼+ !"#* j ŒÆ#.)#Æ)Ø' ª-+"Ø#7 i+ "P%*+e' +&,"ı, j
*N #"f' %(Œfi Å +ØŒH+#Æ' K6øŁ8)",*+ j ŒÆd #"f' Z!Ø)Ł*+ K' #e !æ&)Ł*+ ¼6",*+, Aj. 1246–9.
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same thing: his concerns about dissent are expressed with a view to
silencing opposition. There are further doubts about the way Agamem-
non applies his argument about dissent. On the one hand, he elides the
judgement of arms with the decision to deny burial. While the former
judgement may indeed have been carried out by the group for the
benefit of the group, there is no reason to suppose that the same
would be true of the issue of burial: Menelaus has already made it
plain that it was his decision, and the decision of his brother, alone.82
Agamemnon’s argument, which could relate to the judgement at arms, is
less applicable for thinking about Teucer’s opposition.
On the other hand, Agamemnon uses the general worries about dissent
in an attempt to silence Teucer. First, he attacks the fact that Teucer is
even contemplating speaking back to him and his brother: ‘By speaking
with a free tongue,’ he claims, Teucer ‘commits hubris’ (94æ(Ç*Ø'
ŒI6*º*ıŁ*æ")#",*E', 1258). This equation of frank talking with hubris
shocks, particularly in an Athenian context in which frank speaking was
upheld as an ideal. Indeed, Agamemnon’s unique compound verb,
K6*º*ıŁ*æ")#",*E+, resonates with highly charged moments in other
tragedies, when frank speech is under threat.83 He backs up this attack
with an even more outrageous claim: that he won’t be able to understand
Teucer’s reply in any case since that man is a barbarian and doesn’t
82 See n. 59 above, with accompanying text. It should be noted again that Sophocles
significantly has avoided representing the contest of arms. As a result, ‘the audience can
only wonder whether the vote was free of “sleaze”’: Hesk (2003), 123. Hesk goes on to
suggest that, ‘if the majority of judges genuinely voted in favour of Odysseus, then surely
Agamemnon is right to point out that majority verdicts must be accepted?’ (his italics).
That is to say, Agamemnon’s arguments do have force and ‘should make us uneasy’. On
the other hand, it is difficult to ignore Agamemnon’s personal stake in this argument.
83 Aeschylus uses the compound twice, on both occasions to describe the frank speech
of a sympathetic character. In the Suppliants, the king Pelasgus sends the Egyptian herald
away with the words: ‘You’ve heard the truth from free-spoken lips’ ()ÆçB %7 IŒ"/)*Ø' K6
Kº*ıŁ*æ")#&,"ı, Aesch. Supp. 948); in Prometheus Bound, the Chorus tell the hero: ‘You
give too much freedom to your tongue’ (¼ªÆ+ %7 Kº*ıŁ*æ")#",*E', Aesch. PV 180).
While both occasions demonstrate an anxiety over frank speaking (in both, violence will
ensue), the general impression is positive, particularly since the characters speaking so
frankly occupy the sympathetic focus. The same is not true, however, in the one instance
in Euripides: his Hermione draws attention to her grandiose wealth on the basis of which
she asserts her right to speak freely (u)#7 Kº*ıŁ*æ")#",*E+, Eur. Andr. 153). Sophocles
uses the collocation twice, at El. 1256 and OT 706.
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speak Greek (1262–4)!84 Here, the proponent of civic decision-making is
unmasked as a blustering stage tyrant, seeking to deny his opponent the
right of reply. The strongest assertion of the problem of dissent turns out
to be the clearest indication that dissent is needed.85
Agamemnon speaks to enforce his will and silence opposition; but he
fails to circumvent the formal structure of the tragic ago¯n, which duly
supplies a response through the figure of Teucer (1273–9). In turn,
Teucer poses a string of questions that not only sets a challenge to
Agamemnon but also threatens to open up the debate which Agamem-
non had tried to close down. ‘Do you no longer remember?’ ("P
,+Å,"+*/*Ø' "PŒ-#7 "P%-+, 1273), Teucer asks—before describing a set
of circumstances when Ajax proved his worth: when the Achaeans were
shut in behind their walls, the ships were alight, and Hector stood above
the trenches.86 The issue of remembering Ajax is in itself no trivial
matter. From the very first scene of this play Ajax’s assault on the
Achaean leaders has won almost universal condemnation and sullied
his reputation to such an extent that he killed himself rather than remain
alive and face the shame. Now Teucer invites the audience to look
beyond the narrow confines of this play to recall his previous great deeds
on behalf of the community. But what Agamemnon and the audience
are being invited to remember is also significant. The picture of Ajax
84 ‘The pretence that Teucer does not speak intelligible Greek brings the speech to its
offensive end’: Garvie (1998), 239, nn. 1262–3. Stanford (1981), 213, nn. 1262–3, is so
disturbed by Agamemnon’s claim that he finds it ‘hard to believe that 1263 is not an
explanatory Interpolation . . . . [C]ould he possibly say that Teucer, born and bred in
Greece, and his comrade in arms for nine years, spoke a foreign language?’ This
explanation neglects the way in which the tragic ago¯n draws material from outside its
immediate context, including the world of the audience and contemporary anxieties
regarding who can speak, into its contested arena. On the other hand, we should also not
overlook Agamemnon’s rhetorical strategy: like his brother before him, he tries to
forestall any response. Stanford touches upon this rationale when he cites the interpreta-
tion of "PŒ K!ÆEø as ‘I do not give a hearing to’. This, as Stanford notes in passing, is
suggestive of a law court: Agamemnon is attempting to disqualify Teucer from speaking.
85 Agamemnon attracts Heath’s censure for not taking up the issue of burial. But
Agamemnon’s ‘irrelevant maxims’ (Heath (1987a), 201) are very relevant for thinking
about how to regard Ajax and what is at stake for an Athenian audience to bury him with
ritual honours.
86 >+(ŒÆ j 5æŒ-ø+ !"Ł 7 9,A' K+#e' KªŒ*Œºfi Å,-+"ı', j X%Å #e ,Å%b+ Z+#Æ' K+ #æ"!fi B
%"æ&', j Kææ/)Æ#7 KºŁg+ ,"F+"', I,çd ,b+ +*H+ j ¼Œæ"Ø)Ø+ X%Å +Æı#ØŒ"E'<Ł’> 5%øº("Ø' j
!ıæe' çº-ª"+#"', K' %b +Æı#ØŒa )Œ.çÅ j !Å%H+#"' ¼æ%Å+ $‚Œ#"æ"' #.çæø+ o!*æ,
Aj. 1273–9.
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fighting off the Trojan fire from the ships, or standing up as the only
man ready to face the Trojan hero, derives from the Iliad.87 Teucer’s
representation of Ajax’s past record, then, relies on and implicates the
audience’s extra-dramatic knowledge, which is crucial for the dynamic
of the ago¯n. Agamemnon’s strictures against dissent may be acutely
pertinent to a system of government—like Athenian democracy—that
bases its governance on communal decision-making; but Teucer’s ex-
ploitation of the audience’s familiarity with the Iliad obstructs any
complacent acceptance of that principle and, instead, prompts each
audience member to assess the validity of Ajax’s individual case in
relation to their recollection of the epic representation. In ways such
as these, the tragic ago¯n transfers responsibility for sanctioning and
policing dissent from the tragic actors to individual members of the
audience.
In the conclusion to his discussion of the ago¯n, Malcolm Heath
writes: ‘Teucer’s overwhelming victory in the verbal contest is entirely
satisfying to our sense of antipathy.’88 Teucer’s frank speaking—the
gaping open mouth that ‘utters terrible words’ (#a %*Ø+a Þ8,Æ#Æ, 1226),
according to Agamemnon—contributes fully to the dramatic impact of
the play. But more is at stake than emotional response or theatrical
appeal alone, since that same gaping open mouth has been ideologically
marked in the play. At one level, in his rebuttal of the twin kings of
Sparta, Teucer demonstrates the necessity and desirability of dissent as a
democratic prerogative. He even rehabilitates Ajax in terms that make
the issue of his dissent—if not its manifestation—look both seemly and
valuable after all. At another level, the ago¯n reproduces a contest of
voices, which puts responsibility for judgement on individual members
of the audience. This experience is not just a reflection of the audience’s
‘real-life’ familiarity with debate in the law court or assembly; the tragic
87 Particularly telling is Teucer’s description of the Achaeans being shut in behind
their wall, which points to the action of the Iliad: Il. 15.676–88, 727–46; 16.101–11;
7.181–305 respectively. Cf. Murnaghan (1987b), 181–2. Kamerbeek (1963), 241–2
(nn. 1276–9) catalogues some differences in detail, but they do not detract from an
overall impression that evokes the Iliad. Hesk (2003), 27–9 discusses the Homeric
soundings in the play, but without reference to this agon.
88 Heath (1987a), 208. Hesk (2003), 104–23 also emphasizes the dramatic appeal of
Teucer’s resistance to the Atreidae, but tempers that praise with the importance of the
polis, which has been raised by both Menelaus and Agamemnon. Murnaghan (1987b),
188 sees Teucer’s ago¯n with the Atreidae as his own aristeia’.
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ago¯n stimulates the proper management of dissent precisely because it
does not present an end to the crisis, as the final section will explore in
more detail.
3. MEDIATING CRISIS
Contrary to much scholarship on the play, the dual ago¯n has proven
critical not only for a dramatic appreciation of Ajax’s tragedy but also
for thinking about the issues for which the great man had stood. The
beginning of the play had—explicitly, under Athena’s guiding hand—
staged Ajax’s refusal to accept the judgement of arms in a brutally harsh
light; events succeeding that opening offered a more favourable view of
Ajax from the perspective of his men and wife; but it is not until the
ago¯n that the audience is invited to think of Ajax’s dissent in a more
socially constructive way. This results from both the bullying tactics of
the Atreidae, who equate their judgement with that of the group at
large, who view their antagonist as socially inferior without even the
right to speak, and who portray alternative views as acts of insubordina-
tion, and Teucer’s Ajax-inspired resistance to such overt expressions of
authority.
Yet, it is important to note that the ago¯nmarks only the beginning of
the process of re-evaluating Ajax. On the one hand, the Atreidae, as
leaders of the army, clearly possess the authority and power to deny
burial. On the other hand, Teucer has shown, with the forcefulness of
his language, that he will not be cowed into submission. The possibility
of recourse to physical means of preventing burial remains; but that
option is complicated by the ritual dynamics of the scene.89 Thus the
contest of words looks as though it may propel the drama headlong into
physical conflict. In addition to these concerns, there still remains the
question of Athena’s ‘hateful’ role in staging Ajax’s shame.90
89 As Rehm (2002), 133–4, 137 has explained, the mere presence of Teucer, together
with Ajax’s wife and child, creates a sacred space around the body. For the creation of a
ritualized space around the body, see Burian (1972), esp. 152–3; Easterling (1988),
93–5; Henrichs (1993), 170–3.
90 Athena as ‘harsh’ is the scholiast’s description, see n. 27 above.
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Perhaps this is why, far from resolving the crisis, the ago¯n has led only
to impasse.91 The Chorus not only fail to endorse Teucer’s rebuttal of
Agamemnon; even more remarkably, they turn to Odysseus (1316–17):
¼+Æ6 7O%ı))*F, ŒÆØæe+ Y)Ł7 KºÅºıŁ0',
*N ,c 6ı+.łø+, Iººa )ıºº/)ø+ !.æ*Ø.
Lord Odysseus, know that you have come at the critical moment, if you are here
not to join in with the quarrel, but to join in untying it!
The Chorus’ invitation to Odysseus to intercede is remarkable for
several reasons. First, his return to the stage comes as a complete
surprise. Stichomythia often follows an ago¯n, but it is highly irregular
for a third party to enter while one of the ago¯n speakers (in this case
Teucer) is sidelined.92 Besides, the Chorus announce Odysseus’ en-
trance when they might have been expected to comment on Teucer’s
response to Agamemnon; there has been no suggestion that Odysseus
would make a reappearance, and the switch from the two ago¯n speakers
to a third party is sudden, with few dramatic precedents.93 Second, it
is—anyway—something of a shock for the Chorus to turn to Odysseus
in this way. Up to this point in the play the Chorus have uniformly and
consistently condemned Odysseus as wily, deceptive and self-seeking—
in fact, as Odysseus is most often represented in tragedy and as we
would have expected, given the Chorus’ close association with Ajax.94
Yet here the Chorus address their appeal deferentially to ‘Lord Odys-
seus’, in the hope that he comes with the intention of solving the crisis
()ıºº/)ø+, 1317); the passing mention of the alternative—‘if you
haven’t come to join in the quarrel’ (*N ,c 6ı+.łø+)—draws attention
to exactly the sort of expectation borne of the Chorus’ earlier response to
91 On this and the gist of the proceeding argument, see Barker (2004b). The present
study represents a more fully developed discussion of that argument.
92 ‘Mais la stichomythie attendue ne se pre´sente pas telle quelle: a` peine Teucros a-t-il
acheve´ son discours, Ulysse arrive.’ The scene then moves towards ‘un de´bat de ton
amical’: Duchemin (1968), 57.
93 There is one Sophoclean parallel: the sudden appearance, again of Odysseus, in the
Philoctetes 1293. In that play there is no doubt that his intervention is shocking and
sinister.
94 This is their first mention of Odysseus, after having depicted him in his usual
(tragic) guise ‘making up such slanderous words’ (#"Ø"/)%* º&ª"ı' łØŁ/æ"ı' !º.))ø+,
148).
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Odysseus. Their change of attitude presents something of a conun-
drum.95
This last section will attempt to explain that conundrum by reassessing
the question and role of the Chorus. As mentioned above, the Chorus are
introduced in terms that relate to an epic model of a Homeric people
dependent on their leader. It will be shown that this model is threatened
and irrevocably fractured by Ajax’s suicide, since the Chorus are left with-
out their leader. The rest of the play explores their gradual re-emergence as
a group capable of independent thinking and assessment, as testified by
their involvement in the contests of words. Their final turn to Odysseus
makes sense only from the perspective of Sophocles’ audience, who gained
a privileged insight into this Odysseus at the beginning of the drama.96
Now it is a concern for me to dance
Section1 suggested that the identity of the Chorus in this play coincides
approximately with the depiction of the Iliadic group, the laos. The
Chorus’ entry song demonstrates their commitment to, and dependence
on, Ajax, their leader. This relationship, if nothing else, should make
one pause before dismissing the second half of the play as an irrelevance
or lacking in drama: Ajax may be dead, but Sophocles has left us with
the question of what will happen to the group. Its dependence on Ajax is
shown in dramatic terms when, remarkably for a Chorus, they leave the
stage in search of their leader and return divided as the body is found.97
Ajax’s suicide puts at stake his group’s very existence.
95 As Stanford (1981), 220, n. 1316 remarks, ‘the change of mood has not been
motivated in the play’. Garvie (1998), 243, nn. 1316–17 agrees that the Chorus’ trust in
Odysseus ‘is scarcely consistent with the hostile view of Odysseus shared by all Ajax’
friends throughout the play’. Considering it ‘probably fruitless to try to explain the
change of attitude in terms of the chorus’ psychology’, he suggests that ‘Sophocles merely
uses the chorus-leader to introduce the sudden change of mood to prepare the audience
for what in fact is going to happen’.
96 J. Davidson (1975), 168 suggests that the Chorus are forced to revise their
judgement ‘when, at his second appearance, Odysseus assumes the roˆle foreshadowed
in the prologue’.
97 On this decisive break, see Taplin (2003), 42, 148–50. Cf. Jebb (1896), 134, nn.
866–78; Stanford (1981), 165, nn. 815 ff; Garvie (1998), 195–6, nn. 719–865. Such is
its dependence that when Ajax is found dead, the Chorus’ thoughts turn to the nostos
(l. 896) that collectively they have now lost. As mentioned above (Act III, intro., 47),
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In a recent analysis of Sophoclean language and community, Felix
Budelmann has shown the interest in the group many of his plays
display, and suggests that Sophoclean Choruses invariably find salvation
at the end of the drama. The Chorus in Ajax are no different: by
expanding their horizons beyond the individual on whom they depend,
the Chorus become less isolated as the play progresses and gain security
by the time the play draws to a close.98 More can be said, however,
about the form which that horizon takes. As we have seen, the Chorus’
first words are ‘son of Telamon’ (A*ºÆ,0+Ø* !ÆE, 134), which clearly
mark their dependence on one man. From their next ode, however, the
Chorus start on a process of discovery. In this first stasimon they address
not Ajax but ‘glorious Salamis’ (t Œº*Ø+a @ÆºÆ,(', 596), which in-
dicates not only a common place of origin, but also one with close
associations to Athens.99 In the third stasimon the Chorus’ song charts a
course from the plains of Troy to the Attic coast (1185–1222), which
not only maps out a (prospective) return from Troy, but also symboli-
cally represents this play’s appropriation of epic subject-matter. By
evoking the events at Troy in the context of bringing them home to
Athens, the group on stage assume the role of a Chorus in tragedy,
positioning the play in and against an epic backdrop.
The second stasimon is particularly interesting in this light. Ajax has
just given the impression to Tecmessa and the Chorus that he has put
aside suicidal thoughts: the Chorus respond joyously, and express their
desire to dance.100 This example has been taken to show that ‘the sailors
simultaneously realize their dramatic character as Salaminians as well as
their choral identity as performers of the choral dance’.101 But, as far as
this case is concerned at any rate, the Chorus’ reaction points to a gap
between the dramatized ‘reality’ on the one hand and the Chorus’
something similar happens with the Chorus of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon at the point of his
death.
98 Budelmann (2000), 235–44, esp. 242; cf. Segal (1995), 17.
99 There might even be a recollection of the famous Delphic ‘wooden-walls’ pro-
phecy to the Athenians: t Ł*(Å @ÆºÆ,(', Hdt. 7.142.2. Along these lines, Stanford
(1981), 136, nn. 596–9, labels the Chorus’ reference anachronistic, since Salamis could
not really be called famous until after the Persian defeat. Garvie (1998), 181, nn. 596–8,
on the other hand, sees no such anachronism.
100 ‘Now it is a concern for me to dance’ (+F+ ªaæ K,"d ,-º*Ø å"æ*F)ÆØ, Aj. 701).
101 Henrichs (1995), 75.
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understanding of it on the other, which, in fact, makes the existence of
the group seem even more precarious. The Chorus are dancing, but they
are dancing mistakenly for their leader.102
The Chorus’ shift in identity comes to a head in the dual ago¯n. Before
the first ago¯n takes place, the Chorus align themselves unswervingly, and
completely, alongside Teucer in such a way that he appears to replace
Ajax as the focus for the Chorus’ affiliations (1040–3). In their first
speech-dividing couplet, the Chorus offer a brief, if pointed, critique of
Menelaus’ speech by drawing a distinction between his ‘wise thoughts’
(ª+H,ÆØ )"çÆ(, 1091) and his application of these worthy-sounding
principles to the present case. Indeed, the Chorus implore Menelaus not
to be hubristic (,c . . . 94æØ)#c' ª-+fi Å, 1092). It is the Chorus, then,
who raise the possibility that the Atreidae are the ones guilty of hubris
by insisting on denying burial.103
But as the debate advances, so the Chorus appear to shift position.
Thus, the Chorus express dissatisfaction with Teucer’s riposte to Me-
nelaus, commenting that, though Teucer’s words are just, harsh words
bite (#a )ŒºÅæa ª.æ #"Ø, Œi+ 9!-æ%ØŒ 7 fi w, %.Œ+*Ø, 1119). There is no
suggestion that Teucer is wrong to stand up to Menelaus; but neither do
the Chorus’ words represent a ringing endorsement.104 Teucer is right
to defend Ajax, but the very means by which he sets out that defence
results in impasse, since positions on either side become entrenched,
and the characters—and this includes Teucer—fail to find a way out of
the crisis.
102 This will manifest itself dramatically when the Chorus depart the stage in search of
their leader. Taplin (2003), 42 notes only one other parallel for leaving the stage empty:
when the Furies leave in pursuit of Orestes, which heralds a remarkable change of scene
(Aesch. Eum. 230–1).
103 This strong assessment of Menelaus’ speech raises an important question: what do
the gods think? Moreover, it challenges Menelaus’ portrayal of Ajax as an insubordinate
who behaved in a hubristic fashion towards his betters. Hesk (2003), 112 comments
that, while these sentiments may evoke Athenian obedience to the laws, ‘Menelaus still
revolts us because of his application of these principles of discipline to the particular case
of Ajax and his refusal to grant a burial’ (his italics).
104 Segal (1981), 440, n. 133 understands the Chorus’ comment as criticism of
Menelaus’ attack on Teucer. This would still leave the problem that it says nothing
positive about Teucer’s speech. Jebb (1896), 165, nn. 1091f. draws a distinction between
the Chorus’ dramatic function and their dramatic character: ‘The dramatic function of a
Chorus required that these Salaminian sailors, while loyal to Ajax, should recognise the
sound elements in the speech which they have heard.’
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This is particularly true when the Chorus anticipate still more conflict
in the wake of Teucer’s success in seeing off Menelaus. At the end of the
first debate the Chorus comment: ‘There will be a contest of great strife:
Teucer, as fast as you can, hurry and see to a shallow grave for him, where
he will possess a dank tomb, a memorial for always for men.’105 Such an
explicit indication of a contest of words is striking in Sophocles, it being
the only example of its kind in the extant corpus. For the first time we see
the Chorus taking a stand and gaining a degree of control over the
situation: sending Teucer off to find some ‘shallow grave’ for Ajax’s
body, they set in motion the crucial process of honouring Ajax.106
Furthermore, in reply to Agamemnon’s speech in the second ago¯n, the
Chorus appeal to both speakers (9,E+ I,ç"E+, 1264–5)—Agamemnon
andTeucer—to be moderate. The Chorus not only show themselves fully
aware of the limitations of such a contest of words; they also begin to
acquire a different identity.107 In contrast to the parodos, where they felt at
the mercy of rumours and the persuasive tongue of Odysseus, here the
Chorus weigh up the speeches and offer a balanced appraisal of the debate,
while remaining fully supportive of Ajax’s burial, shifting from being the
laos dependent on their leader to being a Chorus with a degree of
independence from any character. Furthermore, this new role comes
about in the democratic speech-environment of the ago¯n. The fact that
this ago¯n, at least, does not lead to resolution is precisely the point.
Teucer’s rebuttal of Agamemnon decisively ends the ago¯n.108 But the
audience is not given decisive guidance for interpreting it. The actors’
105 :)#ÆØ ,*ª.ºÅ' :æØ%"' #Ø' ¼ªø+. j Iºº 7 ‰' %/+Æ)ÆØ, A*FŒæ*, #Æå/+Æ' j )!*F)"+
Œ"(ºÅ+ Œ.!*#&+ #Ø+7 N%*E+ j #fiH%7 , :+ŁÆ 4æ"#"E' #e+ I*(,+Å)#"+ j #.ç"+ *Pæ0*+#Æ ŒÆŁ-6*Ø,
Aj. 1163–7.
106 As Easterling (1988), 96–7 observes, the phrase ‘shallow grave’ (Œ"(ºÅ Œ.!*#"',
1165) recalls the Iliad ’s memorial to Hector (K' Œ"(ºÅ+ Œ.!*#"+ Ł-)Æ+, Hom. Il. 24.797).
The Chorus’ hope that Ajax’s grave will be an ‘always-remembered tomb’ (I*(,+Å)#"'
#.ç"', 1166–7) is enacted by the play itself, just as the Iliad had constructed an ‘always-
remembered tomb’ for Hector. See also Budelmann (2000), 242–4.
107 This lends force to Teucer’s response to Menelaus, in which he sarcastically asks:
‘How is it possible for you to lord it over the laos whom this man led from home?’ (!"F )f
)#æÆ#Åª*E' #"F%*; !"F %b )"d º*g+ j :6*)#7 I+.))*Ø+ "s+ ‹%7 Xª*#7 "YŒ"Ł*+; 1100–1)
Evoking the Iliad, the Homeric-sounding laos is immediately defined: ‘You came lording it
over the Spartans’ (@!.æ#Å' I+.))ø+ wºŁ*', "På >,H+ ŒæÆ#H+, 1102). The contemporary
gloss maps the Homeric model onto a contemporary setting. See the discussion of tragedy’s
‘double-vision’ above, Act III, intro. with n. 16.
108 Heath (1987a), 208.
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bickering has led to an impasse, as the Chorus correctly judge. Instead,
the Chorus now turn to a new speaker and thus pave the way for a route
out of the crisis, for this third-party will indeed negotiate the burial of
Ajax. By entering the ago¯n, the Chorus start out on a path to a more
secure future.109
Yet it still remains to be seen why the Chorus turn to Odysseus, the
slandering demagogue and their bitterest enemy, to negotiate a way out
of the impasse.
It is to you, Lord Odysseus, we turn
So far we have seen the progress of the group on stage, from being a laos
dependent on their leader to aChorus performing as commentators on the
action. A strong indication of that shift to a more active role is the Chorus’
refusal to endorse fully Teucer’s harsh words against the Atreidae and their
invitation to a third party to intervene. Yet that third party turns out to be
the hated Odysseus. It is not as if the Chorus have previously displayed a
different attitude from their leader regarding Odysseus. In their entry
song, the Chorus express their suspicion of and hatred for Odysseus as
‘the one who fabricates whispering words’ (#"Ø"/)%* º&ª"ı' łØŁ/æ"ı'
!º.))ø+, 148), ‘he who arrogantlymocks’ (ŒÆŁı4æ(Çø+, 153), ‘he who is
of the forsaken race of Sisyphus’ (åT #A' I)0#"ı @Ø)ıçØ%A+ ª*+*A',
189). So too, in the immediate aftermath of Ajax’s death, the Chorus’
thoughts turn to Odysseus, who—they imagine—‘no doubt grows inso-
lent in his black heart, the much-enduring man, and laughs with much
laughter at these maddened pains, alas alas, and with him the two kings,
109 For the Chorus finding salvation by the end of the play, see Budelmann (2000).
Many scholars have understood that salvation in terms of ritual: Burian (1972); Easterling
(1988); Henrichs (1993); Seaford (1994), 392–405; Rehm (2002), 133–8. Observing the
importance of the Chorus’ description as ‘sons of Erechtheus’ (l. 202) and Salaminian
sailors (with their associations with Athens, ll. 859–60), Hesk (2003), 49 notes that they
‘are closer thanmost tragic choruses to the Athenian deˆmos in terms of identity’ (his italics).
He also observes that they are neither a ‘fundamentally degraded image . . . of the Athenian
de¯mos’ (Rose (1995), 70–1) nor ‘ideal’ Athenian citizens (Gardiner (1987), 74–8); but his
conclusion that ‘they exhibit a mixture of positive and negative traits’ (p. 50) overlooks the
movement of the Chorus as they, along with the spectators watching this play, experience
the drama. It is not simply the case that the play ‘dramatises Ajax’s journey towards cult-
heroic status’ (Hesk (2003), 141): it also enacts through the Chorus the audience’s progress
towards recognition and acceptance of that status.
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the sons of Atreus, when they hear him’.110 Laughter is Ajax’s great fear
and a primary motivation for his ultimate decision to kill himself: at this
point in the play, at any rate, the Chorus appear to confirm that fear and
imagine Odysseus as the figure most likely in his hubris to find Ajax’s fate
agreeable.111 As late as their discovery of Ajax’s body, therefore, the
Chorus are still blaming Odysseus. Yet, after the ago¯n, it is Odysseus to
whom the Chorus turn, a change which appears unmotivated by the
standards of consistent characterization.
Odysseus’ response to the Chorus may help shed light on their about-
face. Addressing the Chorus as ‘men’, Odysseus relates that he ‘heard the
sons of Atreus shouting over this brave corpse’ (4"c+ 1#æ*Ø%H+ #fiH%7 K!7
IºŒ(,øfi +*ŒæfiH, 1319). It is striking thatOdysseus describesAjax’s corpse as
‘valiant’, a Homeric adjective which resonates strongly with Ajax’s past
conduct in the Iliad.112At the same time, he explains his on-stage presence
as a response to the war cry of the sons of Atreus, which also strikes a
Homeric note, but one more suited to the battleground than the arena of
debate. It already seems that Odysseus will offer a new way forward out of
the ago¯n.
Less striking, but equally significant, is Odysseus’ address of the
Chorus as ‘men’ (¼+%æ*', 1318). This form of address is not only
‘courteous’ and indicates Odysseus’ ‘conciliatory temper’;113 it also
marks a noteworthy change in status for the Chorus. In instances prior
to the ago¯n, the Chorus are addressed according to their status as Ajax’s
people;114 it is only in the ago¯n that the Chorus are called simply ¼+%æ*'
110 q ÞÆ Œ*ºÆØ+0!fi Æ Łı,fiH Kçı4æ(Ç*Ø j !"º/#ºÆ' I+8æ, j ª*ºfi A %b #"E)%* ,ÆØ+",-+"Ø'
¼å*)Ø+ j !"ºf+ ª-ºø#Æ, ç*F ç*F, j 6/+ #* %Ø!º"E 4Æ)ØºB' j Œº/"+#*' 1#æ*E%ÆØ,
Aj. 955–60.
111 Kçı4æ(Ç*Ø, Aj. 955. Tecmessa bears out their assessment, adding: ‘Let him be
hubristic’ (94æØÇ-#ø, 971). On Odysseus’ tricky Odyssean persona, and the bad press he
receives on the tragic stage, see Stanford (1983), esp. 102–17.
112 See Hom. Il. 11.483, used of the Trojans but, interestingly, in the context of the
wounded ‘hero’ (læø') Odysseus holding them off until rescued by Ajax (11.485–7).
Ajax’s Iliadic stature is recalled by other Homeric adjectives, such as ‘great’ (megas), on
which see Hesk (2003), 28–30, 124, who cites the Iliad ’s description of Ajax (at
Il. 11.563, 591; 15. 417, 560). Cf. Rosenbloom (2001).
113 Jebb (1896), 196, nn. 1318f.
114 The Chorus are first addressed by Ajax as ‘sailor friends’ (ç(º"Ø +Æı4.#ÆØ, 349)
and a ‘race of sailors’ (ª-+"' +ÆEÆ', 357). Ajax next calls the Chorus a ‘seafaring
people’ (K+.ºØ"' º*0') and ‘shield-carrying men’ (¼+%æ*' I)!Ø)#Bæ*', 565). The
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(1093),115 the title Odysseus uses here. Moreover, while ¼+%æ*' may be
simply rendered as ‘men’, it also often has the connotations of ‘citi-
zens’.116 While Teucer is the first to intimate a new path for the Chorus,
when he addresses them as ‘men’ in the ago¯n, it is Odysseus’ use of this
form of address that acknowledges their right to judge—an ability the
Chorus have been learning in the ago¯n.
Thus, even with his initial response Odysseus bears out the Chorus’
faith in him and answers them as citizens. That Odysseus responds in
this manner should come as no surprise for the audience, since they have
already seen him in action. Indeed, Sophocles has gone to some lengths
in order to establish Odysseus as a sympathetic figure from the very
beginning of the play. Once Ajax leaves the stage to return to the
slaughter within, Athena turns to Odysseus to draw the moral: ‘Do
you see’, she asserts, ‘the magnitude of the power of the gods?’ (›æfi A' #c+
Ł*H+ N)åf+ ‹)Å; 118). Scholars find Athena’s tone here harsh, and the
lesson harsher.117 But, significantly, rather than taking the opportunity
to gloat at his enemy’s misfortune, Odysseus draws a very different
lesson (121–6). He reflects on his own situation and expresses pity for
his enemy.118 This ability—to witness the spectacle of man fallen from
grace and reflect on the lessons that has for the human condition—is
messenger similarly equivocates between two epithets, glossing ‘men’ with the defining
marker ‘friends’ (¼+%æ*' ç(º"Ø, 719), as he introduces word that Ajax’s life is threatened.
115 The messenger’s more equal address of ‘men, friends’ suggests they both belong to
the same group, both dependent on Ajax.
116 Other usages in Sophocles suggest a coherent pattern, in which the Chorus—with
varying degrees of explicitness—are connected to a citizen-body. There are four other
occasions when Sophocles use the vocative ‘men’ (¼+%æ*'). On two occasions ‘men’ is
glossed by ‘citizens’ (!"ºE#ÆØ) to clarify the Chorus’ citizen status: OT 512; OC 1579.
Cf. Aesch. Ag. 855. Each of these Choruses explicitly represents a citizen body. A third
example begins Creon’s famous speech in Antigone (l. 162), the later section of which
Demosthenes quotes as an example of civic conduct (19.247–48). The last, Neoptole-
mus’ address to his sailors at Philoctetes 974, offers the closest parallel to the present case.
It is perhaps no coincidence that this play is much studied in relation to the institution of
the ephebeia: Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988), 161–79; Lada-Richards (1998). For the
initiatory role of the Chorus in general: Winkler (1990b); Nagy (1995); Calame (2001).
117 See n. 27 above.
118 Odysseus recognizes Ajax as an enemy, yet never the less expresses pity for him on
the basis of their common humanity. See the discussion in sec. 1 of this chapter above,
particularly nn. 28–31.
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highly suggestive of a spectator’s response to tragedy, which is telling,
given that the beginning of the play has been set up by Athena.119
Therefore, when the Chorus turn to Odysseus to resolve the crisis, the
audience might well consider him the ideal figure to negotiate a com-
promise, having already witnessed Odysseus’ humanity. But—it should
not be forgotten—the Chorus have not been party to this. It makes no
sense for the Chorus to act as they do ‘in character’; it makes sense only
for the audience, with their knowledge of the opening scene. The
audience are invited to supplement the Chorus’ focalization with their
own, and to take over from where the Chorus leave off.
The importance of this collapse of identities becomes apparent in the
last scene, as the question—is Odysseus friend or foe?—comes under
intense scrutiny. In order to overcome the seemingly intractable division
between the Atreidae and Teucer, Odysseus aims at eliciting consent.
On the one hand, he consistently exploits his personal connection to
Agamemnon (1328–9, 1353); he absolves Agamemnon of all responsi-
bility for the decision to allow burial, so that blame falls on Odysseus
himself and him alone (1368); most strikingly of all, he seeks to bolster
Agamemnon’s authority by—paradoxically—requesting that he yield:
‘Stop! You win by being won over by your friends’ (!ÆF)ÆØ! ŒæÆ#*E' #"Ø
#H+ ç(ºø+ +ØŒ0,*+"', 1353).120 On the other hand, he draws a series
of associations with the Chorus ()ıªª+0,Å+, 1322, )ı,4Æº*E+, 1323);
he calls Ajax noble (1355) and praises his excellence (Iæ*#8, 1357);
and he even concedes the title of the best of the Argives (¼æØ)#"+
1æª*(ø+, 1340) to his rival. The last example is particularly striking,
since the whole tragedy has been predicated on the contest between
Odysseus and Ajax about this very issue.121 And his claim undoubtedly
119 Easterling (1993), 83 suggests that ‘the action of the play simply fails to yield to
analysis in the moral terms reportedly proposed by Athena’. Segal (1995), 18–19 also
stresses the human perspective—or humanity—of this scene.
120 Holt (1981), 287, n. 29 notes that: ‘Odysseus’ position as an enemy of Ajax
(which he mentions at 1336, 1347, and 1355) is a powerful help in persuading
Agamemnon’. He, however, reads Odysseus’ intervention as solving the crisis of, and
to a certain extent correcting, the ago¯n, which again betrays a concentration on the agents
rather than on the positioning of the audience.
121 As Odysseus concedes to Athena in the prologue (l. 78), and to Agamemnon in
the stichomythia (ll. 1347, 1355).
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jars.122 Moreover, the painfully deliberate manner in which Odysseus
concedes the title—‘I could not dishonour him, so as not to say that
in him I saw the best of the Argives’ ("h #i+ I#Ø,.)ÆØ,7 ¼+, u)#* ,c
º-ª*Ø+ j ;+7 ¼+%æ 7 N%*E+ ¼æØ)#"+ 1æª*(ø+, 1339–40)—makes it difficult
for his interlocutor to refuse him. Odysseus’ successful manoeuvring of
Agamemnon off-stage is, then, indebted to his traditional portrait as
persuasive, collusive, manipulative . . .123
With Agamemnon’s departure from the scene, the drama moves
towards ritual and reconciliation.124 Teucer carefully but categorically
rejects Odysseus’ offer to ‘join in with the burial’ ()ı+Ł.!#*Ø+, 1378),
‘for fear of doing a thing displeasing to he who is dead’ (,c #fiH ŁÆ+&+#Ø
#"F#" %ı)å*æb' !"H, 1395); Odysseus responds by expressing his desire
to participate, but accepts Teucer’s prerogative to exclude him (1400–1).
Stichomythia, which so often leads to communication breakdown in
tragedy, here leads to an acceptable consensus. On this occasion, Odys-
seus’ non-dissent has a positive end in setting the stage for ritual, though
he remains excluded from it. The play cannot, or will not, fully suppress
Ajax’s implacable anger: but different opinions are allowed to coexist
alongside his own.125
In the light of this ending, it is time to reassess the manifestations of
dissent in this drama and, in particular, Athena’s role in staging the
crisis. First, the play explores the fallout from Ajax’s dissent through the
122 March (1991–3), 7, observing that Odysseus concedes the title of being best to
Ajax, wonders how Odysseus did manage to win; cf. Machin (1981), 31–59. Blundell
(1991), 100 suggests that Odysseus shows that he is indeed the ‘best’ of the Achaeans, by
helping Ajax’s dependants. For the importance of Odysseus in Ajax’s tragedy, see Kitto
(1956), 184–6 (esp. on Odysseus’ presence at the beginning of the play); Stanford
(1981), pp. liv–lvii.
123 ‘Odysseus, the statesman and the trickster of epic, uses the uncertainties of moral
evaluation to make possible Ajax’s burial’: Goldhill (1986), 160. See also Worman
(1999), 35–68, who traces Odysseus’ bad reputation on the tragic stage back to his
ability in Homeric epic to adapt his persona to each addressee in order to gain a
favourable reception and establish his authority. Kirkwood (1965), 64 sees Odysseus
here as exclusively Iliadic, not the Odyssean trickster.
124 The Iliad again provides a precedent. There Achilles breaks the mood of
thoughtful repose brokered between himself and Priam with the anticipated threat of
Agamemnon’s sudden appearance: Il. 24.653–5.
125 Blundell (1991), 101–4 emphasizes that the play ends as a cooperative endeavour;
Segal (1981), 138 suggests that there is continuing tension. The truth is perhaps some-
where inbetween, since Odysseus helps to set the stage for, but is not involved in, Ajax’s
burial.
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eyes of those looking on. At the beginning this was presented in explicit,
metatheatrical terms, as Athena brings Ajax on to the stage and Odys-
seus watches in the wings as a spectator of and a commentator on the
opening scene. But throughout the play an emphasis has been placed on
responses to the hero, from Tecmessa challenging Ajax’s monological
lamentations, to Teucer recasting dissent as a social good in opposition
to the Atreidae’s attempted denial of burial. Such an interpretation not
only makes sense of the whole play, including the events that follow
after Ajax’s suicide; it also shows the value of the double ago¯n, which
invites a reassessment of Ajax’s worth to the Argives and challenges the
authority of the Atreidae.
Second, a primary player in the tragedy’s focus on spectating is the
Chorus, who undergo a role-change from an epic group dependent on
their leader to a Chorus performing in a tragedy. They express their
insecurity, as Ajax is marginalized; their hope, as Teucer arrives to
protect them; but it is only when they enter the ago¯n that they open
up a route to a more secure future, one that has its seeds in the Chorus’
growing independence. With the agents in the ago¯n failing to reach an
agreement, it is left to the Chorus to initiate a third way, with their
invitation to Odysseus to get involved. Ultimately, the play ends as it
began, with Ajax offered as an example to behold—but this time it is the
Chorus who invite the audience to reflect on Ajax, both man and play
(1418–20).126
Third, the mediating role of the Chorus closely intersects with the
involvement of the audience. At the very moment when the Chorus are
finding their voice in the double ago¯n, the audience is invited to reassess
the value of Ajax’s opposition to the Atreidae. Furthermore, it is the
Chorus’ appeal to Odysseus that initiates the final movement, which
makes sense only from the perspective of the audience, who have already
witnessed the new and improved Odysseus in the opening scene. In
addition, the Chorus’ intervention presents the audience with the
fundamental problem of how to think about Odysseus.127 In this way,
126 ‘Many are the things for mortals to learn once they’ve seen them; but before
they’ve seen them there’s no seer of the future, of what will happen’ (q !"ººa 4æ"#"E'
:)#Ø+ N%"F)Ø+ j ª+H+ÆØ! !æd+ N%*E+ %7 "P%*d' ,.+#Ø' j #H+ ,*ºº&+#ø+, ‹ #Ø !æ.6*Ø,
1418–20).
127 Are they also prepared to put aside their doubts about Odysseus? Can they turn to
Odysseus and keep him at arms’ length? Ultimately, can they accept the desirability of
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the Athenian audience are invited to take over whence the Chorus left
off. As the group who have found security in the institutional frame-
work of the Athenian polity, the audience are well qualified to assume
the role left to them by the Chorus, most obviously in the form of the
ritual that they perform in honour of Ajax but that the play stops short
of staging.128 In fact, this play reworks the process by which the group
finds security within civic institutions.129
Fourth, a major part of the process that the Chorus experience in
their transformation from an epic people to a quasi-civic body and that,
in turn, the audience are invited to undertake in interpreting the drama
is the management of dissent. Ajax’s anger is allowed to continue to
reverberate through the ages, as Teucer excludes Odysseus from parti-
cipating in the burial on the basis that Ajax would turn in his grave.130
Yet, as we have seen, the play—in the form of the double ago¯n—also
dramatizes the importance of dissent, particularly in opposition to
Spartan-like authoritarian individuals. The Chorus roundly abuse
Odysseus throughout, but turn to him for a solution as the crisis reaches
an impasse; Teucer excludes Odysseus from actively participating in the
ritual, but he does allow him to stand by and watch as a spectator
allowing differences to remain? Rose (1995), 64 complains that Odysseus is a relatively
‘colorless’ character. That may be the point: what hue he takes will depend on through
what lens we choose to see him.
128 See Easterling (1988), 96, 98. Rehm (2002), 137–8 suggests that the ‘corte`ge
bearing [Ajax’s] body out of the theatre of Dionysus moves the action away from Troy
and into the world of Athens’. In this way, the ‘point of death, the place of the body, the
status of the dead man, all move expansively outward, a process that culminates in Ajax’
future role as a civic hero of Athens, his story told in its theater and his cult celebrated in
the agora’ (p. 137).
129 In his study of Homer’s people, Johannes Haubold distinguishes the epic ºÆ&'
from the º*0' of the classical Athenian imagination: the latter, he argues, have now
found the security within the polis’ institutions that their epic forebears once lacked.
While granting that Haubold’s distinction holds true for the actual Athenian audience of
Homeric epic (Haubold is talking about the Panathenaiac festival), what I suggest here is
that the tragic group—the Chorus—are a great deal less secure. In fact, as this chapter has
tried to show, the play enacts the securing of their survival by locating for them a role
within the institutions of Athens. See Haubold (2000), 145–96, esp. 163. Cf. Seaford
(1994).
130 Aj. 1393–5. The hero’s anger is an important feature of cult: by observing ritual,
one hopes to redirect the hero’s anger against one’s enemies. Considering Athena’s role in
Ajax’s tragedy, this ‘may prove another instance of the pattern wherein a god is
antagonistic to a hero in myth, yet associated with the hero in ritual’: Bradshaw
(1991), 114, n. 34. On ritual antagonism: Nagy (1979), 289–300.
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(1381–99). Dissent is made useful, not by being silenced or else
privileged to the extent of justifying violence, but by letting differences
and uncertainties remain. Dissent is not only thematized in tragedy; this
play shows how it is part of a process, as the audience are drawn into
managing dissent for themselves.
Lastly, all of these points suggest a new way of thinking about Athena
and the tragedies that take place in her city. Ajax was enshrined in the
epic tradition for taking his dissent to the grave. In this play, too, we see
the limitations of Ajax’s dissent, which leads to his attempted murder
of the Greek leaders and, ultimately, to his suicide. Nor can Teucer
resolve the crisis, though he demonstrates the positive value of standing
up to the overbearing authority of the twin sons of Atreus. Athena,
however, has prepared the ground, by staging the scenario and inviting
the watching spectator(s) to draw a particular lesson. Odysseus’ response
reveals the potential to interpret the events differently and to come to a
human understanding of the events as, in her absence from the rest of
the play, the human agents both on—and off—stage must work out and
work through the crisis that she has set up. But, if we end up with a
greater awareness of what is at stake in dissent, then that is because of,
not in spite of, Athena’s role.131Where epic narrative had left Ajax silent
in the shadows of Odysseus’ tale-telling, in the democratic theatre
differences are free to remain to the extent that both Ajax and Odysseus
can occupy the same stage in honour, though not necessarily together.
Ajax’s act of suicide enshrines his dissent eternally in silence. In fact, his last
words, ‘as for rest, I shall tell it to those below in Hades’ (#a %7 ¼ºº7 K+
FØ%"ı #"E' Œ.#ø ,ıŁ8)",ÆØ, 865) powerfully conjure up the dead Ajax
with whom we are presented in the Odyssean underworld. But, whereas
Sophocles’ Ajax reproduces his epic gesture, the play does not end with it:
131 Cf. Segal (1981), 150, who sees Odysseus’ flexibility as denoting ‘secular human-
ism’; or Maslanka (1995), who regards the play as setting out a new kind of relationship
between man and an amoral divinity (Athena). This is fine as far as it goes, but I prefer to
see the potential for man to construct a moral system under the gods’ care, however
distant that may be. See Budelmann (2000), 186, who speaks of ‘the simultaneous
impact and inscrutability of the divine’, which engages the audience in a critical debate
over divine responsibility. Murnaghan (1987b), 180–1, connects Athena’s role in this
play of ‘activating the evaluative mechanisms of the city [i.e., the trial] and of drama’ to
‘her traditional association with culture and civic order and specifically her institution of
the trial in the Eumenides’.
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Ajax’s last word is not only received in contest with others’; it prompts a
range of responses, all of which participate in the investigation into the role
of dissent within the community. Unlike their epic counterparts, who
remain largely silent, Ajax’s group and concubine-wife are given a voice to
articulate the impact of the hero’s dissent on them. The hero’s half-brother
reproduces dissent from authority, but this time in a legitimate fashion
that initiates a process of reassessing its value. Finally, the Chorus, who
instigate the play’s striking turn toOdysseus, implicate the audience’s own
judgement, since they too must put aside prejudice and be prepared to
respect Odysseus’ role in mediating the crisis. Thus the play stages the
beginning of the Iliad in such a way that all are made responsible for
exercising judgement, and Sophocles suggests a place, an institutional
place, for dissent after all on the tragic stage.
Two further points emerge for thinking about tragedy more gener-
ally. First, the shift in focus that dissent undergoes can help counter
criticism of the ago¯n as being neither a generic part of the action nor
resolvable. These readings focus on the characters, whereas this chapter
has shown that the ago¯n in Ajax is directed as much towards the
spectators: the first makes Teucer’s dissent desirable and Athenian; the
second more directly involves the audience by inviting them to recall
Ajax’s role in the Iliad. As a result, the ago¯n stimulates a process of
reviewing, re-evaluating, fundamental to the audience’s judgement of
Odysseus and, consequently, to their interpretation of the play as a
whole. While the actions and words of the tragic protagonists remain
important, the tragic ago¯n turns the focus just as much onto the
judgement-making process of the audience. From an Athenian, demo-
cratic perspective, the spectators are agents too.
Second, this point suggests one way in which tragedy functions
within the democratic polity of Athens. The audience experience judge-
ment as a process, rather than a single event; that is, as a self-monitoring
exercise, rather than as the assertion of an authoritative solution. In
short, the tragic ago¯n represents decision-making as a process of self-
reflection that puts the onus on individual responses within a collective
framework.132 It is tragedy’s capacity for prompting self-reflexivity
through dissent, for engaging individual responsibility within the
132 For a view of the Chorus along these lines, see Budelmann (2000), 231–44.
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collective process, that makes it such an integral part of Athenian
civic life. As the audience members watch tragedy, they are not merely
invited to reflect on or even question democratic ideology; they also
participate in an institutional framework to reproduce it and to perform
as citizens.133 Entering the tragic ago¯n is one element to performing as
a democratic citizen.
It’s a performance that Euripides puts to the test.
133 Both Rose (1995), 81, n. 14 and Goldhill (2000) have suggested ways in which
democratic ideology is able to recoup difference.
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6
Beyond the ago¯n in Euripides’ Hecuba
The hero’s suicide with little under half of the play still remaining
provides one of the reasons why Sophocles’ Ajax has been regarded as
a problem play. The double ago¯n in its second half is a manifestation of
the problem, since the formality of two sets of opposed speeches strikes
the modern audience as unnecessarily artificial and the intensity of the
wrangling destroys the tragic dignity of Ajax’s last monologue; besides
which, the ago¯n fails to resolve the crisis. Yet, as we have seen, an
analysis of the play through the lens of dissent can account for its
perceived structural weaknesses and make sense of its dramatic, as well
as ideological, impact.
Euripides’ Hecuba suffers from many of the same anxieties with
respect to its form and, in particular, the role of the ago¯n in the
drama.1 The first half of the play stresses Hecuba’s suffering, establish-
ing the former Trojan queen as the archetypal tragic victim at the mercy
of fickle fortune. When, in response to her son’s murder, she exacts
revenge, it appears to mark a decisive break in the action of the play and
in Hecuba herself, from sufferer to doer. Moreover, the brutality of that
1 It is interesting to note that Hecuba’s tragedy follows directly on from Ajax’s suicide
in Ovid’s reworking of the tradition in his Metamorphoses: Ov. Met. 13.1–578. More-
over, while Ovid represents the contest of arms between Ajax and Odysseus—Ovid, of all
people, was not going to pass up the opportunity of representing law-court rhetoric—he
allocates Hecuba a long monologue as the centre-piece of her episode. This shift in
Ovidian narrative dynamics from debate to monologue may help shed light on the
different strategies towards dissent employed by our two case studies as, in contrast to the
debates over Ajax’s image, Euripides’ Hecuba projects a monological view of the prota-
gonist’s suffering—until the drama’s conclusion. I thank Duncan Kennedy for bringing
Ovid’s connection of the two stories to my attention. Mossman (1995), 248–51
indicates how Ovid ‘follows the narrative order of [Euripides’] play very faithfully’
(p. 248). She also speculates that it is in this play that Hecuba ‘first takes a central
role’ (p. 213).
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 325 29.4.2011 11:31am
vengeance is itself problematic and has tended to prompt one of two
critical reactions: either to condemn the play for its broken-backed
structure that depicts—unwarranted—atrocity;2 or else to condemn
Hecuba herself as an example of how a noble character is corrupted
by excessive suffering.3
Although critics nowadays may be less inclined to dismiss the play for
being a poorly worked whole of two halves, the view that Hecuba
represents a noble character’s fall from grace is still commonly held
and warrants further consideration.4 Some critics have countered this
view by arguing that Hecuba is not simply a passive figure in the first
half of the play: her rebellion against the decision of the Greek army, in
which she urges her daughter not to take her fate lying down, prefigures
her response to the news of Polydorus’ murder, when she successfully
wins from Agamemnon the right to act.5 While it may be true, however,
to say that both halves of the play have in common Hecuba’s refusal to
accept the circumstances dictated to her,6 that approach is hardly
sufficient to account for the marked shift in perspective of Hecuba
from suffering victim to raging avenger. A stark manifestation of the
play’s and Hecuba’s descent into the sordid realm of contemporary
2 The play’s ‘broken-backed’ structure is the label applied by Mossman (1995), 3,
describing previous scholarship on Hecuba. See also Kovacs (1987), 79; Michelini
(1987), 132; Gregory (1999), p. xvi. For a strong defence of the play’s unity, see
Heath (2003), who notes the popularity of this play in other periods less critical of the
notion of (justified) atrocity than modern sensibilities.
3 Revenge as a sign of a degeneration in Hecuba’s character: Kirkwood (1947), 66–8;
Abrahamson (1952), 128–9; Pohlenz (1954), 281; Conacher (1967), 162–4; Vellacott
(1975), 213; Luschnig (1976), 232; Tarkow (1984); Reckford (1985), 114; Michelini
(1987), 131–80; Rabinowitz (1993), 108–9; Rehm (2002), 175–87. For the most
sensitive reading of Hecuba’s moral decline see Nussbaum (1986), 397–442, with the
review by Heath (1987b). Other critics have argued that Hecuba’s revenge is justified and
worthy of the name heroic: Adkins (1966); Meridor (1983); Kovacs (1987), 78–114;
Gregory (1991), 107–14. For a position somewhere in between: Heath (2003);
Mossman (1995), 202–3.
4 Heath (2003) charts the play’s fall from grace. See also Nussbaum (1986), 319;
Michelini (1987), 3–51, with bibliography (Ch. 5, nn. 1, 4).
5 Steidle (1966). Cf. Kovacs (1987), 99.
6 Kovacs (1987), 81 sees the contrast between the determination by Hecuba (and
Polyxena) to assert their will and the Greeks’ adherence to the will of the majority as the
central feature of the play.
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Athenian politics appears to be the final ago¯n, in which Agamemnon
explicitly sets up a trial to judge between Hecuba and Polymestor: yet it
not only fails to resolve the crisis, but even leads to an escalation in
verbal violence.7
This final chapter sets out to investigate Euripides’ play in terms of
the thematization of dissent, though this example is handled rather
differently from the case analysed in Chapter 5 above. It has been
argued that Sophocles’ Ajax makes the case for re-evaluating the role
of dissent in the community and bringing it back within a civic frame-
work through both Teucer’s anti-Spartan rhetoric of the ago¯n, and
the progress of the Chorus over the course of the drama. Seen from
this perspective, it was felt that Sophocles’ play reworks the dynamics
exhibited by the Iliad, in which dissent is located at the heart of the
community and made institutional over the course of the narrative. It
will be argued here that Euripides’ Hecuba re-enacts the strategy for
exploring dissent from the other epic narrative, the Odyssey, by plotting
the protagonist’s pursuit of vengeance as necessary and desirable—with,
however, a radical twist.8 In Euripides’ play, the avenger is not the
returning hero from Troy but a foreign woman, former queen turned
slave—in other words, the ideological ‘other’ of Athenian self-defini-
tion.9 Consequently, her act of vengeance, though sympathetically man-
ufactured to a degree comparable to that enjoyed by the epic Odysseus,
ultimately represents the revenge of a figure who stands outside, and
threatens, the carefully policed Hellenic order. She, unlike Odysseus, is
not a figure of authority, but a figure through whom Euripides can
7 ‘The end of the play, it has to be admitted, is weak in dramatic logic. It is hard to
know whether Euripides uses the trial-scene (Hec. 1129 ff.) to help out this weakness
theatrically, or the debate is his chief purpose’: Collard (2003), 72.
8 Echoes of the Odyssey in the play have been identified before, but they have been
taken to show Hecuba’s transformation into an agent of Odysseus-like persuasive guile:
see esp. Segal (1993), 162–3, 185, and p. 349 n. 96 below. This approach, however,
focuses on evaluating Hecuba’s character in terms of moral decline with little regard to
the effect of Odyssean resonances on watching the play.
9 See esp. Segal (1990a). The subject of the barbarian and Greek self-definition has
spawned a huge bibliography in recent decades. Studies that have emphasized the ‘other’
as barbarian include Goossens (1962); Cartledge (2002); Harrison (2000b); and esp. E.
Hall (1989). Studies that have challenged the polarity in tragedy are Synodinou (1977);
Vidal-Naquet (1997); Rehm (2002); Saı¨d (2002b), 62–100, 236–69. For an extensive
critique of E. Hall’s discussion of Greek self-definition, see Papadodima (2008).
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explore the possibilities for, and problems of, dissent outside a civic
institutional framework.10
This chapter recounts Hecuba’s odyssey in three stages, charting the
play’s disjointed journey from sacrifice to revenge and thence to its
terrible conclusion. Each stage, moreover, engages with, and tries to
account for, a feature that has caused critics anxiety. The first section
examines the events leading to the sacrifice of Polyxena, which comes to
a head in the ‘near-ago¯n’ scene between Hecuba and Odysseus. This
ago¯n is problematic precisely because the anticipated contest of words
fails to materialize and Polyxena goes off willingly to her death. By
examining this ago¯n in context, it will be shown that Euripides has
constructed an episode which aims at establishing harmonious accord
over Polyxena’s (beautiful) death and Hecuba’s wretched suffering. The
second section sets out how Euripides’ drama continues to stress Hecu-
ba’s suffering and promote her case for revenge in a way that recalls
Odysseus’ own triumphant homecoming. Culminating in a formal
ago¯n that is only tenuously connected to the surrounding events and
that markedly fails to resolve the crisis, this scene puts the actions of the
on-stage judge under scrutiny, who expressly tries to put a stop to the
violence and redirect Hecuba and Polymestor towards performing
within the safe environment of a contest of words. It will be argued
that, by these means, Euripides tests the ago¯n as an institution that can
accommodate extreme differences of opinion, and finds it wanting. The
final section examines the fallout from the ago¯n, which propels the
conflict towards its harrowing conclusion in a grotesque display of
one-upmanship between the blinded Polymestor and the savage Hecuba.
Here Euripides presents his audience with a tragic version of the Odyssey
that opens the doors onto the grim aftermath of revenge, which the
Odyssey had conspicuously closed.11 By removing any institutional
10 The impression of a world lacking institutional security, in spite of the fact that the
Greeks hold a full assembly and Agamemnon sets up a law court, is magnified by the
play’s location on the Chersonese. As Rehm (2002), 177 remarks: ‘by its very imperma-
nence, the transit camp constitutes a “moral no-man’s-land” where the civilized values of
the polis (such as they are) cannot be guaranteed.’ See also Conacher (1961), 16–18;
Segal (1993), 171–2; Zeitlin (1996), 172–6.
11 In particular, this chapter will draw upon the Agamemnon ‘palimpsest’ that
Thalmann (1993) has uncovered (quotation from p. 128). Whereas Thalmann reads
the palimpsest as Euripides’ critique of the Trojan War (pp. 130–6), Aeschylus’ Oresteia
(esp. p. 150) and, more generally, his whole culture (p. 157), the present study will
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security for managing dissent, Euripides puts the onus on his audience
to face up to their individual responsibilities for judging action.
1. CONSTRUCTING CONSENSUS
In the narrative tradition of the Trojan War saga, Hecuba is over-
whelmingly represented as the archetypal suffering spectator.12 In the
Iliad she looks down from Troy’s battlements to see her son die on the
plain below.13 The cyclic epics apparently told of her witnessing her
husband’s slaughter at the altar by Achilles’ son.14 Her tragedy, as
Shakespeare powerfully reminds us, is in her watching.15 The first half
of Euripides’ play explores Hecuba’s tragedy through the lens of her
looking on. From her opening words, in which Hecuba appeals to the
Chorus to lift her up, she draws attention to herself as a receptacle for
the audience’s reaction to the events.16 Indeed, there is in Hecuba’s
explore Euripides’ thematization of dissent in terms of the play’s shift in narrative
paradigm, as the Odyssean template suffers increasing interference from the Agamemnon.
Like Thalmann, then, the palimpsest will be discussed in a more coherent way than the
array of closets from which the Orestes draws, according to Zeitlin (2003), in which she
coins the term ‘palimpsest’.
12 Mossman (1995), 254–6 assesses the iconography of Hecuba. She suggests that
Euripides has innovated by portraying Hecuba as ‘the central active figure rather than a
bystander, an observer, a mourner’ (p. 256); cf. H. Foley (2001), 286. Alternatively, it
might be said that Euripides stages the drama of Hecuba’s spectating until her discovery
of Polydorus’ body little over halfway through the play.
13 Il. 22.79–89. There is nothing passive in Hecuba’s watching: even in the Iliadic
precedent, Hecuba desires to eat out Achilles’ heart (Il. 24.212–13).
14 Such as the ‘Little Iliad’ or ‘Sack of Troy’: M. Davies (2003), 60–76. Cf. Eur. Tro.
481–3; Verg. Aen. 2.500–25.
15 In the scene of Hecuba’s tragedy recited by the first player, the language of sight
dominates: ‘But who, ah woe!, had seen the mobled Queen . . . j Who this had seen, with
tongue in venom steeped j ’Gainst Fortune’s state would treason have pronounced. But if
the gods themselves did see her then, j When she saw Pyrrhus make malicious sport . . . j The
instant Burst of Clamour that she made . . . j Would have made milche the Burning eyes of
Heaven’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, II. ii). Interestingly, Polonius interrupts to ask: ‘Looke
whe’er he ha’s not turn’d his colour, and ha’s teares in’s eyes.’ To whom does his ‘looke’
apply, the actor playing Hecuba or to Hamlet looking on? Much is being made here of
the activity of spectating, in relation not only to Hecuba, whose tragedy is in her
spectating, but also to the spectator of Hecuba’s tragedy, in this case Hamlet himself.
16 ‘Bring the old woman in front of the house, my children, bring your fellow slave,
once queen, women of Troy, keeping her upright’ (¼ª*#7 , t !ÆE%*', #c+ ªæÆF+ !æe
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consistent description of herself as victim more than a hint of this
drama’s self-consciousness as a spectacle.17 While these events relating
Hecuba’s misery are dramatized, little opportunity is given to see the
protagonist as anything other than a figure worthy of sympathy. Only in
her supplication of Odysseus is there a brief glimpse of a more sinister
Odyssean palimpsest underlying this script.
The most striking way in which the play constructs a uniform view-
ing of Hecuba occurs through two scenes of debate that manage Poly-
xena’s sacrifice. The first takes place off-stage and shows the degree to
which dissent becomes minimized when debate is reported. The second
almost presents an ago¯n, but ultimately fails to set up a contest over the
rights and wrongs of killing Polyxena.
In the full assembly of the Achaeans
The event dominating the first, and more favourably received, half of
the play is the sacrifice of Hecuba’s daughter, Polyxena. The decision to
sacrifice Polyxena is narrated by the Chorus in their entry song.18 First
of all, the Chorus identify that the decision belonged to the Greek army:
an exercise of collective resolve took place within a full assembly (!º8æ*Ø
6ı+&%øfi , 107).19 Next, their report of the assembly proceedings repre-
sents the debate that ensued (116–41). To begin with, initial sugges-
tions of disagreement are raised as a ‘wave of great strife clashed’
%&,ø+, j ¼ª*#7 OæŁ"F)ÆØ #c+ ›,&%"ıº"+, j Aæøfi .%*', 9,E+, !æ&)Ł* %7 ¼+Æ))Æ+, Eur. Hec.
59–61).
17 Hec. 73–7, 284–5, 807–11. See Heath (2003), 218; Gregory (1991), 111–14.
18 This use of the Chorus as a messenger, which has some connection to the parodos
of the Ajax, demonstrates Euripides’ manipulation of tragic convention. Here it empha-
sizes the helplessness of the Trojan women in the assembly context. To put that another
way, whereas the Iliad and, to a certain extent, Sophocles’ Ajax represent progress
towards the achievement of institutional security, Euripides’ play takes the perspective of
those shut out, the marginal and disempowered.
19 Gregory (1999), 58, n. 107, suggests that ‘Euripides’ use of the technical term
!º8æÅ', which refers to the Athenian KŒŒºÅ)(Æ or 4"ıº8 in full conclave (Andoc. 1.112;
Willink (1986) on Or. 884), indicates that in describing this assembly the playwright has
in mind contemporary Athenian political procedure’; cf. Rehm (2002), 182–3. Gregory
continues by noting that ‘references to fifth-century Athenian issues, practices, and
institutions [in Hecuba] cluster around the topic of Polyxena’s sacrifice’: by such
means, it will be argued, Euripides reproduces a sense of collective responsibility for an
event that is all too easily passed over in its narration. Cf. Gregory (1999), p. xxviii.
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(!"ººB' %7 :æØ%"' )ı+-!ÆØ)* Œº/%ø+, 116) and ‘opinion went in two
ways, divided among the spear-carrying army of the Greeks’ (%&6Æ %7
Kå0æ*Ø %(å 7 I+7 $¯ºº8+ø+ j )#æÆ#e+ ÆNå,Å#8+, 117–18). A ,-+ j %-
construction follows that sets out the difference of opinion,20 which
manifests itself in speakers coming forward to articulate both sides,
including Agamemnon, leader of the army and champion of the Trojan
cause.
Thus far the picture of the debate has suggested a balance between the
two sides, though a closer look reveals a quite different scenario. First, the
defence of Polyxena is compromised by the figure supporting her, Aga-
memnon, who’s in bed with Cassandra, so to speak.21 Second, speaking in
favour of sacrifice are forebears of the Athenian polis, the ‘twin sons of
Theseus’ (#g ¨Å)*(%Æ, 122), who were, the Chorus explain, ‘orators of
double-speeches’ (%Ø))H+ ,ıŁH+ j Þ8#"æ*' q)Æ+, 123–4). As well as their
obvious connection to Athens, the authority of their speech is conveyed by
the fact that, though there are two of them, they speak with one mind
(ª+0,fi Å %b ,Øfi A, 124),22 which recalls the management of the assembly
under the ‘one mind’ (;+Æ Łı,e+, Hom. Od. 3.128) of Nestor and
Odysseus;23 moreover, unlike the passing reference to Agamemnon’s
defence, their speech is quoted in indirect discourse. Lastly, the end-
balance relayed by the Chorus’ narrative between the speeches—‘and the
rivalries of the arguments that were put forward were more or less
equal’24—is critically disrupted by Odysseus’ entry into the debate. La-
belled as ‘the cunning liar, the sweet-tongued people-pleaser, the son of
Laertes’ (› !"ØŒØº&çæø+ j Œ&!Ø' >%ıº&ª"' %Å,"åÆæØ)#c' j ¸Æ*æ#Ø.%Å',
20 #"E' ,b+ %Ø%&+ÆØ j #/,4øfi )ç.ªØ"+, #"E' %7 "Påd %"Œ"F+, Hec. 118–19.
21 This is precisely the point that the sons of Theseus take up. Mossman (1995),
74–5 notes that the contrast between Agamemnon’s personal reasons and the commu-
nal bond of Achilles’ geras is brought out by the jingle #a %b ˚Æ)).+%æÆ' º-Œ#æ7 / #B'
1åØº*(Æ' j . . . º&ªåÅ' (ll. 127–9).
22 Critics have noticed that the phrase ‘orators of double speeches’ evokes a world of
sophistic discussion, in which the ability to speak on either side of any question is valued.
The fact that they don’t, but instead voice only one concern, further underlines the lack
of debate. See Michelini (1987), 143; Kovacs (1987), 140, n. 19.
23 As we saw above (Ch. 2, sec. 2), the one time their management of the assembly
fails is catastrophic: the two sons of Atreus came into strife, and condemn the Achaeans
to a homecoming of woe: Hom. Od. 3.130–50. As Nestor puts it, a ‘twofold plan’ (%(åÆ
4"ıº8, 3.150) found favour with the Greeks, by which means Zeus assigned them an evil
doom (3.153).
24 )!"ı%Æd %b º&ªø+ ŒÆ#Æ#*Ø+",-+ø+ j q)Æ+ Y)ÆØ !ø', Hec. 130–1.
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131–3), there is no doubt as to the key influence of that intervention.25 In
its teleological drive towards recording the outcome of debate, the Chorus
construct the fate awaiting Polyxena and Hecuba as, ultimately, irrevoc-
able.26 Dissenting voices are marginalized as a decisive consensus is
reached over the necessity of sacrifice.
Such has been the compelling nature of this representation that many
interpretations have been convinced by that necessity, though it is
worthwhile looking more closely at Odysseus’ influential argument in
favour of it.27 According to the Chorus, Odysseus persuaded the
army ‘not to shun the best of the Danaans’ (,c #e+ ¼æØ)#"+ ˜Æ+ÆH+
!.+#ø+ . . . I!øŁ*E+, 134–5). The phraseology ‘best of’ suggestively
echoes the Iliad and its staging of contest over the ‘best of the
Achaeans’.28 Similarly, Odysseus later defends the decision before He-
cuba on the basis that the Greeks need heroes, and those heroes need to
be obeyed: ‘For us, Achilles is worthy of honour, woman, because he died
beautifully as a man for Greece’ (>,E+ %7 1åØºº*f' ¼6Ø"' #Ø,B', ª/+ÆØ, j
ŁÆ+g+ 9!bæ ªB' $¯ºº.%"' Œ.ººØ)#7 I+8æ, 309–10).29 Homeric epic and
25 On the use and abuse of persuasion in this play, see Buxton (1982), 170–86. Jouan
(1984), 9–10 identifies Odysseus as a typical Euripidean demagogue.
26 The Chorus announce upfront that the Greeks had resolved to sacrifice Polyxena
(Hec. 107–9).
27 Kovacs (1987), 82–3, for example, comments: ‘The Greek army is relentlessly
public-minded, almost collectivist, in its actions and attitudes. They will not allow any
private motives or feelings to influence the public and impersonal pursuit of their
national interest. They are not portrayed as cruel, and in fact are rather kindly when
their own interest is not at stake. They are, however, inflexibly committed to their own
public good. Private feelings of pity exist but have no influence on the public policy.’ See
also Heath (2003), 257–8, who emphasizes the army’s moral dilemma posed by the need
to honour their hero. Grube (1941), 217–18 observes that Odysseus makes a compelling
case for sacrifice by putting the communal claim over the individual. Cf. Adkins (1966).
28 Used of Achilles at Il. 1.244, 412; 16.274. On the significance of the phrase ‘best of
the Achaeans’ in Homer, see Nagy (1979), 26–41. Gregory (1999), 64 notes: ‘It is as if
Odysseus can assume that the Greek soldiers, like the Athenian spectators, are familiar
with the Iliad, and can use the Homeric phrase to remind them of the threat to the
community posed by an angry, aggrieved Achilles, whether alive or dead.’
29 King (1985), 55 wonders how we should take Achilles’ words on Odysseus’ lips,
‘whom tradition had turned into Achilles’ diametric opposite’. Her thesis is that echoes of
the Iliad serve as a rejection of a male-centred warrior ethic which exposes the Iliad as a
myth: ‘Achilles becomes a vehicle for carrying to its logical and ultimate barbarity the heroic
system of using human prizes as measures of time¯’ (p. 53). The argument being made here
stresses rather theGreeks’ commitment to Achilles’ demand as a particularly narrow reading
of the Iliad—the Iliad summed up as a soundbite, as it were. The audience, far from being
encouraged to ‘(mis)remember’ the Iliadic scene (King (1985), 54), are invited to reflect on
the difference, and on what is lost in the narration of it.
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contemporary concerns merge as Euripides’ play exposes one way in
which the Iliad could be read in fifth-century Athenian culture, as a
relatively straightforward source of heroism and inspiration to others.
Yet the precise terms laid down by Achilles’ shade, as reported by the
Chorus, makes somewhat different reading (113–15):
‘—"E %8, ˜Æ+Æ"(,
#e+ K,e+ #/,4"+
)#-ºº*)Ł7 Iª-æÆ)#"+ Iç-+#*';’
‘Where are you going, Danaans, leaving my tomb without its prize of
honour?’30
The language of Achilles’ shade clearly evokes the opening of the Iliad, in
which Agamemnon had claimed to be without a prize and demanded
one.31 There, it had been Achilles who had stood up to the king and
asserted the principle of the communal distribution of booty: now, it is
Achilles’ ghost who demands not to go without a prize. With Odysseus
making the plea not to dishonour Achilles, it is as if Euripides has provided
a reflex conclusion to draw from the Iliad ’s narrative of honour slighted
and asserted—to submit to Achilles’ demands without question. The
dissenting voice of epic has in tragedy paradoxically become the authority,
which in part derives from the fact that from tragedy’s perspective the Iliad
is the authority.32 Somewhere lost in translation is the Iliad ’s depiction of
Achilles as a disruptive force and sponsor of dissent.
30 The quotation of Achilles’ ghost adds to the dramatic vividness of the demand, as
Mossman (1995), 74 notes. But it also lends a ‘presumption of fidelity’: Gregory (1999),
p. xxv.
31 Il. 1.118–20. See King (1985), 51; Gregory (1999), pp. xxv–vi. H. Foley (2001),
94 associates the demand of Achilles’ ghost with news of Agamemnon’s sexual relations
with Cassandra: ‘both the desire of Achilles’ ghost for the sacrifice of the virgin Polyxena
and Agamemnon’s for Cassandra invades the political arena in a divisive fashion that
recalls the quarrel among the two heroes over concubines at the opening of the Iliad and
thus creates a sense of inevitable repetition of violence.’ Although Achilles’ ghost’s
demand is far less unequivocal (as will be seen), Foley’s argument draws attention to
the presence of the Iliad behind the events being narrated on stage, and the pressure they
exert on the interpretation of the current scene. Barrett (2002) makes the case that
messenger speeches—which to all intents and purposes the choral parodos represents in
this play—draw on Homeric epic for authority.
32 Homer is the paradigm to which Aristotle continually returns when discussing the
art of tragedy: see Act III, intro., n. 3 above. On the problem of canonization, see
Goldhill (1993), 151, who remarks, ‘the classics enter later culture all too often as a series
of authoritative and authorising quotations: the tag, the motto.’
Beyond the ago¯n in Euripides’ Hecuba 333
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 333 29.4.2011 11:31am
And yet Euripides has structured the scene so that Achilles should still
be seen as a figure of division and conflict. In spite of the number of
critics who talk about the necessity placed on the Greeks to sacrifice
Polyxena, the Chorus’ quotation leaves the object of its claim unex-
pressed: the shade itself appears not to have demanded a specific prize,
even though, in the lines that follow, the Chorus report the debate over
whether or not it was best to give a sacrificial victim to Achilles’ tomb
(117–19).33 That is to say, the Chorus seem to take for granted the
crucial premise that the prize to be offered should be a human sacrifice.
Worse is to follow as a further premise is soon conceded: the debate over
whether or not to offer a sacrificial victim easily, and almost impercept-
ibly, slides into the decision to sacrifice Polyxena. Neither premise for
debate, however, is a necessary condition to satisfy the shade’s demand.
Instead of an Achilles who contests Agamemnon’s claim not to go
without a prize, then, Euripides presents an Achilles who obtains uni-
versal acceptance that he deserves a prize—a girl at that, as if the Greeks
had read a script of the Iliad and were attempting to forestall his wrath.
But this Achilles is but a shadow of his former self.34 He is, in fact, more
like his shady self from the Odyssey, who finally receives due honour
from Agamemnon and is hailed as the ‘best of the Achaeans’, even as the
Odyssey leaves him in Hades while tracing the triumphant homecoming
of his epic rival Odysseus.35 It is noteworthy, then, that the figure who
holds up Achilles as an authority is again Odysseus, this time as a means
of maintaining army discipline. In Odysseus’ mouth, Achilles, the
figure of dissent in the Iliad, whose withdrawal from the community
33 Cf. Gregory (1999), pp. xxviii–ix. She explores how Polyxena’s sacrifice is articu-
lated by three different characters, Polydorus (Hec. 40–4), Hecuba (Hec. 171–96) and
Odysseus (Hec. 303–20), each of whose versions reveal their characterization. It remains
the case, however, that ‘the audience has heard from the chorus (110–40) that Achilles
made no such demand’ (p. xxviii).
34 ‘[T]he characters of the play debate the meaning of the appearance of Achilles’
ghost and the need to preserve his memory. In an era ravaged by [the Peloponnesian] war
and social upheaval, Achilles belongs to a past, a past which becomes problematic and
questionable, open to conflicting viewpoints, used in different ways and to different
ends’: Michelakis (2002), 19.
35 Od. 24.19–97. Cf. 11.467–540. See A. Edwards (1985).
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structures its entire narrative, has crystallized into the authority that no
one can or is willing to dispute.36
An ago¯n of groans
Euripides immediately follows the choral parodos and its decision of the
assembly with a scene in which Odysseus announces its verdict and
Hecuba attempts to dissent from it, without success.37Odysseus appears
on stage as self-professed herald of the assembly’s proceedings. ‘The
Achaeans’, he comments, ‘have resolved’ (:%"67 1åÆØ"E', 220) to sacri-
fice Polyxena.38 The scenario of reporting back on a debate has a
precedent in Homeric epic, when it was again Odysseus who reported
back to the Achaeans after the embassy to Achilles.39 In both cases
Odysseus reports only the final outcome of the debate, which has the
effect of leaving out the process of negotiation as well as the difference of
opinion encountered. It is striking too that Odysseus’ pronouncement to
Hecuba echoes the formula of the Athenian assembly.40 But more to the
point, Odysseus presents himself as simply the spokesman of the group,
here to educate Hecuba (%Ø%.)Œ"ı, 299), as if he had no role or personal
stake in the deliberations, when it was quite clear from the Chorus’
36 Talthybius later describes the construction of Polyxena’s pyre in way that draws on
the image of burial (Hector’s) at Il. 24.782–9. In fact, it is a kind of Iliad without the
strife. Here we see the people and Agamemnon working together, joined by the
connective particle #*: ºÆ"d %7 K!*ææ&ŁÅ)Æ+, 1ªÆ,-,+ø+ #7 ¼+Æ6 *r!*+ ,*Ł*E+ÆØ
!ÆæŁ-+"+ +*Æ+(ÆØ', Eur. Hec. 553–4. Cf. the opening of the Iliad and the divided
reaction to Chryses’ appeal (Il. 1.22–5), ch. 1, sec. 1 above.
37 The juxtaposition of an offstage assembly and an onstage ago¯n is present too in the
Orestes: Euripides seems particularly concerned to explore the issues at stake in coming to
decisions and the ways in which responsibility for decision-making tends to be disowned
by a mass audience: see Barker (2011). On the Athenian de¯mos absolving itself of
responsibility for the catastrophic Sicilian Expedition, see Thuc. 8.1, with the commen-
tary by Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1981), 5: it is not only the case that ‘voters ought
to be treated as equally responsible with their advisers’; here, ‘Thucydides has emphasized
the commitment of the whole city to the enterprise’. In the foreword to his new
translation, Tony Harrison, Euripedes, Hecuba (London, 2005), p. x recasts the sense
of group culpability in starkly modern terms: ‘We may still be weeping for Hecuba, but
we allow our politicians to flood the streets of Iraq with more and more Hecubas in the
name of freedom and democracy.’
38 Cf. the Chorus’ %&6ÆØ at 1. 108. See Hogan (1972); Gregory (1991), 88. Cf. Rehm
(2002), 82–3.
39 Il. 9.676–94. See Ch. 2, n. 3 above.
40 See Kovacs (1987), 86; Gregory (1991), 88.
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report that it was his intervention which proved decisive.41 Narrating
debate not only closes down possibilities for dissent; it also removes the
individual from culpability for the decision, which instead lies with the
amorphous group as a whole—the army. Euripides’ juxtaposition of
these two versions of the off-stage debate poses the question of individual
responsibility within the process of collective decision-making.
So far, then, this section has shown the overwhelming consensus that
surrounds the decision to sacrifice Polyxena. In response to Odysseus’
report, however, Hecuba threatens to break the harmonious mood
(229–30):
ÆNÆE! !Ææ-)#Åå 7 ‰' :"ØŒ 7 Iªg+ ,-ªÆ',
!º8æÅ' )#*+Æª,H+ "P%b %ÆŒæ/ø+ Œ*+&'.
Alas, it seems a great contest is at hand, one full of groans and not empty of
tears.
Hecuba’s explicit indication of an agon raises expectations of a contest
of words, such as the kind often witnessed on the Euripidean stage.42
Yet, scholars are divided as to whether this instance really does introduce
an ago¯n or not. While several agonistic features—the stichomythia, the
paired set speeches in formal opposition to each other, the presence of a
third party (in this case Polyxena) to judge between them—may be
identified,43 the subsequent exchange of speeches between Hecuba and
Odysseus lacks bite.44 Hecuba appeals for her daughter’s life on the
basis of the debt Odysseus owes to her for having saved his life;
Odysseus responds in kind by offering to save Hecuba, but he refuses
41 He intervenes at the point when both sides were ‘more or less equal’ (q)Æ+ Y)ÆØ
!ø', Hec. 131).
42 See Prologue, n. 25 above.
43 Strohm (1957), 16, 32 discusses the tripartite structure of the ago¯n. Mossman
(1995), 56 suggests that the scene becomes an ago¯n after the unpromising beginning of
Odysseus’ report to Hecuba. Cf. Duchemin (1968), 122. Mossman’s worthy intention
to explore Euripides’ manipulation of form nevertheless overlooks interesting distinc-
tions between formal debates. Not all are ago¯n-scenes—or, rather, not all ago¯n-scenes are
contests. Michelini (1987), 142 takes it for granted that the scene in question is an ago¯n.
Cf. Matthiessen (1974), 12; Hose (1990–1), 114.
44 Collard (1991), 143 concludes: ‘what is missing here for the full agon is the tone of
irreconcilable and hateful difference.’ M. Lloyd (1992), 8 notes the lack of ‘the angry
dialogue after the speeches is normal in the agon’—as a result of which he excludes this
scene from his analysis of the ago¯n.
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to go against the will of the majority to save Polyxena.45 In effect
Odysseus agrees with Hecuba, but proposes a literal like-for-like trade-
off: just as she had once saved his life, so he is prepared to save hers, but
only hers. Thus Odysseus avoids open confrontation with Hecuba even
as he rejects her appeal.46
Further light may be shed on this scene if one considers how Hecuba
makes her appeal. On first inspection it would appear that Hecuba
supplicates Odysseus, which is what one would expect, given that she is
appealing for her daughter’s life. But, since Greek tragedy comes to us
without stage directions, all comment regarding aspects of staging must
be based on the characters’ own words and remain provisional. In this
case the language that Hecuba uses is particularly striking, especially her
apostrophe of Odysseus’ beard (Iºº7 7 t ç(º"+ ª-+*Ø"+, ÆN%-)ŁÅ#( ,*,
286), which has prompted at least one scholar to conclude that Hecu-
ba’s supplication takes place in words alone.47 Two further points may
support that interpretation. First, when Hecuba responds to Odysseus’
rejection, she makes no mention of the ritual act itself, only of her ‘words
that have been cast idly to the winds’ ("9,"d ,b+ º&ª"Ø !æe' ÆNŁ-æÆ j
çæ"F%"Ø ,.#Å+ ÞØçŁ-+#*', 334–5). Second, when Odysseus thinks that
Polyxena is about to supplicate him, he does move away (342–4)—a
gesture which would seem to lose its significance had he already spurned
Hecuba’s physical supplication.48 If Hecuba’s supplication is indeed
45 See esp. Hec. 303–5.
46 He deflects Hecuba’s personal appeal by insisting on strict reciprocity. As a result,
his speech appears impersonal. Mossman (1995), 115 suggests that ‘this kind of recourse
to imagined public opinion has the effect of generalizing the illustrandum while still
retaining a lively personal style’. Collard (1991), 145 also observes how Odysseus’ speech
avoids a ‘point-by-point’ rejoinder. We might note that Odysseus’ strategy of non-
dissent is consistent with his representation in Sophocles’ Ajax—though there it had a
positive end—and has its ultimate roots in Homeric epic: on which see Achilles’
assessment, ‘I hate like the gates of Hades a man who says one thing but keeps another
in his heart’, Il. 9.312–13.
47 Gould (1973), 84–5 stresses the ritual element of supplication, in particular the act
of touching. The implication that follows is that it would have been a most serious act for
Odysseus to reject a full supplication, which is not indicated by the text (de Romilly
(1986), 160 rather downplays the significance of supplication by glossing Odysseus’
rejection: ‘Mais Ulysse n’est pas un sentimental’). For an alternative view, however, see
Mossman (1995), 55–6. I have benefited from discussion with Malcolm Heath on this
point.
48 Mercier (1993), 155–6 notes that Odysseus’ move away represents his desire to
avoid the ‘ritually significant contact’, but does not apply the same criterion to Odysseus’
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only verbal, that would represent an effective moment of deferred
expectation and a dramatic contrast to her later physical supplication
of Agamemnon.49 But it would also mark an effective deferral of
contest, since Odysseus would not be placed under ritual obligation to
respect Hecuba’s plea. It has the effect of maintaining a conspiracy of
silence over the rights and wrongs of Polyxena’s sacrifice.
Significantly, the epic tradition bequeaths one such example of
verbal-only supplication: when Odysseus supplicates Nausicaa from a
distance, after having first debated the issue in his mind (Hom. Od.
6.139–48). This notable precedent is particularly interesting given the
other Odyssean resonances in the episode. Hecuba recalls a moment
during the Trojan War when Odysseus, behind enemy lines, was
recognized by Helen—a story, which though odd, chimes with the
account related by Helen in the Odyssey.50 But Hecuba then goes on
to add a bizarre twist to an already remarkable story: apparently, Helen
informed her of Odysseus’ presence, with the result that it was she—
Hecuba—who had been the one to spare him.51 It is difficult to know
what to make of this account. Odysseus himself readily concedes the
point; yet scholars, from antiquity on, have remained unconvinced by
it.52 While there remains the possibility that other versions of the
Trojan War saga had narrated just such an episode, it does seem to
rejection of Hecuba’s supplication: ‘he successfully evaded the one with a long, discoura-
ging speech, just as now he prudently evades the other by getting out of the way’ (p. 56).
49 Gould (1973), 84, n. 54 argues: ‘The full ritual act in this scene is constantly
expected, constantly deferred and, in the end, does not take place, since Polyxena scorns
to supplicate.’
50 Od. 4.244–56. Of course, Helen relates this incident in order to portray herself in
the best possible light to her audience—her husband, Odysseus’ son and us.
51 Hec. 239–48.
52 Gregory (1999), 74 nn. 239–50: ‘The incident which Hecuba recalls to Odysseus
is told by Helen in theOdyssey (4.242–58). Odysseus, disguised like a slave, entered Troy
on a reconnoitering expedition. Helen recognized him but promised to keep his secret,
receiving in return an account of the Greeks’ strategy. Euripides grafts onto this story the
innovative detail (243) that Helen did reveal Odysseus’ identity to Hecuba. As a scholion
on 241 complains, the addition is implausible (I!(ŁÆ+"+): while Helen with her divided
loyalties might reasonably hesitate to betray Odysseus to the Trojans, Hecuba would feel
no such inhibition. The detail is crucial to Euripides’ purpose, however, because it
enables Hecuba to raise the issue of å.æØ' (136–37n) with Odysseus.’ The scholion on
l. 241 reads: I!(ŁÆ+"+ #e !º.),Æ ŒÆd "På $ˇ,ÅæØŒ&+! "P ªaæ i+ K)(ªÅ)*+ $¯Œ.4Å
!"º-,"+ Ł*Æ),-+Å ŒÆ#"!#*/"+#Æ #e ŒÆ#a #"f' AæHÆ' !æ.ª,Æ#Æ. > %b $¯º-+Å *ƒŒ&#ø'!
¼#Å+ ªaæ ,*#-)#*+*+ 1çæ"%(#Å'.
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stretch the realms of probability to the limit to believe either that
Hecuba would have been the third party,53 or that, once informed,
she would have kept silent. It is one thing for Helen, the wife of his
friend Menelaus, to pity Odysseus and spare him, but quite another for
the queen of Troy to keep mum.54
All this talk of supplication—Hecuba’s account of Odysseus’ pre-
vious plea and her verbal-only appeal—would be right at home in the
Odyssey ; as it is, it creates a very knowing and compelling piece of
theatre. On the one hand, the resonances combine to engage the
audience’s sympathy for the heroine, as before the ‘much-enduring
Odysseus’ had enjoyed universal sympathy for his circumstances: both
suffer excessively and undeservedly at the hands of others.55 On the
other, the specific recollection of one of Odysseus’ labours serves to cast
doubt on Hecuba’s desperate pleas—would she have really accepted his
supplication?—and to trap her in a tragic retelling of those events. Both
aspects ensure that the emotional focus remains on the suffering of the
barbarian queen. Her plight is inescapable and most worthy of pity.
The likelihood of Hecuba’s woes eliciting pity from the audience is
brought out by the conclusion to the scene. Having failed to win round
Odysseus, Hecuba turns to Polyxena and calls on her daughter to appeal
to Odysseus as she had previously done, in the hope that Odysseus’
strict application of the like-for-like principle will succeed should he be
supplicated by the victim herself.56 Expectations are again raised of an
ago¯n of words—and again are dashed. Instead of a desperate appeal to
her captor, Polyxena in fact willingly embraces death.57 Her action may
53 In her funeral oration over Hector, Helen mentions in passing Hecuba’s reproaches
(Il. 24.770).
54 Collard (1991), 144 notes: ‘While Od[ysseus’] espionage and Helen’s recognition
are in Homer (Od. 4.242 ff., cf. Little Iliad EGP 52.19ff. Davies; Rhes. 710ff.), Helen
informing Hecuba seems to be Eur[ipides’] invention here for the moral hold it affords
over Od[ysseus], and to win his sympathy for one placed now as he was then himself.’ See
also Zeitlin (1996), 196 who, however, goes on to argue that Polymator also recalls
Homer’s Odysseus.
55 Right at the beginning of the epic Athena explicitly sets out that Odysseus suffers
undeservedly, a point which is immediately conceded by Zeus (Od. 1.45–62).
56 Hec. 334–41.
57 For the unexpected shift in this scene: Strohm (1957), 32–4, 57; Steidle (1966). As
Gregory (1999), 87, nn. 342–78comments: ‘Polyxena’s alacritymakes her an ideal sacrificial
offering.’ The willing self-sacrifice appears to have been a favourite topos of Euripidean
theatre: see H. Foley (1985), 65, n. 1; (2001), 123–5;O’Conner-Visser (1987).
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be regarded as a rejection of the terms set for her and, thus, a show of
dissent—she refuses to join in by joining in; but, besides that, it is also a
sign of the play’s continued refusal to put the sacrifice and the reasons
articulated for it under the harsh glare of a public debate on stage. In the
place of an ago¯n of words, which might have challenged the assembly’s
decision as represented by Odysseus, the audience are to hear Hecuba’s
lament—her ‘ago¯n of groans’—over Polyxena’s sacrifice, a form of
female discourse that, while carrying the potential to disrupt the male
public logos, does have a culturally legitimate place in the polis.58
Although in this case the dead warrior is a maiden, and she goes will-
ingly to her death for the good of another polis . . .
Passing over this scene because it fails to conform to preconceived
notions of an ago¯n neglects to consider why and how it is not an ago¯n:
interpreting contest must always pay close attention to the rules set
down for contest. In this case, the impression of an ago¯n that fails to
ignite is precisely the point. Instead of putting the army’s collective
decision under the spotlight, which is what would have happened had
an ago¯n been established, by not representing a contest of words at this
point Euripides defers judgement over whether the sacrifice is right or
not. With both Odysseus and Polyxena avoiding direct confrontation
and seeking consensus, the decision is allowed to stand uncontested in
spite of Hecuba’s vain attempts to the contrary. That is not to say that
the audience may not dissent from or feel uncomfortable with the
decision; rather, they are not invited to dwell on the matter. For the
time being at least, the focus remains exclusively, and insistently, on
Hecuba’s suffering, as Euripides propels us towards the tragedy of
Polyxena’s fate in a way that makes it appear inevitable. Instead, Eur-
ipides will establish an ago¯n over the rights and wrongs of Hecuba’s
revenge.
58 The public thre¯nos is particularly prominent at the end of the Iliad (24.719–76).
Lucı´a Romero Mariscal has suggested to me that the thre¯nos could in itself be seen as a
sort of antipolitique, the only possible way of dissent to the logos of the city. In certain
contexts, especially in tragedy, this kind of female discourse carries within it the potential
to disrupt: see e.g. the closing scene of Sophocles’ Antigone (1257–1318), on which see
Segal (1995), 119–37, esp. 129–32. On the deep cultural conflict between the thre¯nos (of
women) and the (male) epitaphios, see Alexiou (1974), 108; Loraux (1986a), 45–9. Here,
however, Euripides’ restriction of the ago¯n to a lament seems indicative of the play’s
refusal to ignite a contest of words over Polyxena’s sacrifice.
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2. TESTING THE AGO¯N
After the near-ago¯n, Polyxena goes off stage to her death, which is
reported by Talthybius the herald. At this moment, just when it seems
that the queen has suffered all she can, and lies on stage utterly
devastated, another messenger enters, who comes bearing still worse
tidings: the body of Polydorus, Hecuba’s son, has been found, mur-
dered, it transpires, by Polymestor, a family friend. (Can it get any
worse?) From this point on the play shifts gear and focus, as it follows
the means by which Hecuba gains vengeance for that betrayal.59
The structural and thematic break between these two episodes is so
marked that many scholars have regarded the play as two poorly
worked-together halves.60 Alternatively, attempts have been made to
explain the sudden change in terms of Hecuba’s individual psychology,
and her moral degeneration.61 This next section observes the close
structural properties of the play’s two halves—the parallel scenes of
(near) supplication and ago¯n—which bring to light a marked difference
in the thematization of dissent.62 Just as the first half of the play had
59 Various commentators draw an association between the three acts of brutality—the
Greek sacrifice of Polyxena, Polymestor’s murder of Polydorus and Hecuba’s vengeance
on Polymestor: see Gregory (1999), p. xxiii. In particular, it is suggested that in setting
up a trial scene, Euripides ‘creates a situation where the standards of public policy in the
assembly confront the standards of private justice in the law courts’: Segal (1993), 211.
Cf. H. Foley (2001), 297. Rehm (2002), 183 argues that ‘by their placement and
context, these theatrical versions of political and legal practice do not simply mirror
what happened in the Athenian polis; they call its efficacy and purpose into question.’
This chapter, however, draws attention to the different effects prompted by Euripides’
representation. By virtue of being narrated by the Chorus, the Greek assembly does not
give space to dissent, which reproduces the sense of inevitability of Polyxena’s sacrifice.
On the other hand, by setting up an ago¯n over Hecuba’s revenge, Euripides puts the case
that could appear to be the most justified and least problematic under scrutiny.
60 See n. 2 above. Heath (2003), 254–5 argues that there is no break: the Polyxena
scene is subordinate to what follows. It should be noted that news of Polydorus’ death has
been announced by the character himself in the prologue.
61 See n. 3 above. See, however, Heath (2003); Mossman (1995), 203; Gregory
(1999), pp. xxxii–xxxiii.
62 Mossman (1995), 48–68 discusses the play’s structure from the perspective of
stagecraft. She argues that ‘to have Hecuba emerge to bad news mirrors the beginning of
the play: there she came out fearing for Polydorus and received bad news about Polyxena,
and here she comes out assuming that the body will be Polyxena’s, but in fact she receives
bad news about Polydorus’ (p. 61).
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focused exclusively on Hecuba’s suffering, so the play’s denouement
invites endorsement for her revenge up to and including the ago¯n. In the
wake of Hecuba’s shocking revenge, Euripides uses the formal contest of
words to test the capacity of an institutional framework to make sense of
and manage even this extreme manifestation of dissent.
Like a painter stand back and look at me
The second half of Euripides’ play charts Hecuba’s defiance of her dire
circumstances—the suffering and state of slavery she endures—as she
takes her revenge on the friend who wronged her. Her suffering and act
of vengeance both resonate with Odysseus’ epic narrative, but with a
major difference. Though Odysseus returns in disguise, and has to
endure every kind of humiliation, there is never any doubt that a hero
lies beneath the rags of the beggar or that he will exact revenge in the
manner of a good epic hero. Hecuba, however, cannot act by her own
volition alone. As a woman, slave and foreigner, she represents the figure
of the ideological ‘other’ to the Athenian male citizen, he who possesses
agency within the city. Hecuba’s revenge not only belongs to a different
category from Odysseus’ legitimate slaughter of the suitors; she even
requires assistance just to gain the opportunity for revenge. The person
to whom she turns is the commander-in-chief of the Greek coalition
forces, Agamemnon.
In marked contrast to her earlier scene with Odysseus, Hecuba’s
supplication of Agamemnon could not be more explicit. In a remark-
able stichomythic exchange, during which Agamemnon vainly tries to
engage with Hecuba in dialogue while she continues to talk to herself,63
the audience are invited not merely to observe ritual supplication in
performance but also to reflect on the extremities of Hecuba’s predica-
ment in having to make her supplication. Once again, there is little
opportunity to see Hecuba as anything other than the most tragic
character of them all.64
The scene climaxes in Hecuba’s physical act of touching Agamem-
non, when she appeals for pity by inviting Agamemnon to ‘stand back
63 See Segal (1993), 203; Gregory (2005), 260. Cf. Bain (1977), 56.
64 See e.g. %/)#Å+7—K,Æı#c+ ªaæ º-ªø º-ª"ı)Æ )-, j $¯Œ.4Å—#( %æ.)ø; Hec.
736–7.
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like a painter’ and look on what evils she is suffering.65 At the climax of
his report on Polyxena’s sacrifice, Talthybius had made a similar gesture
towards the visual arts (558–61):
ºÆ4"F)Æ !-!º"ı' K6 ¼ŒæÆ' K!ø,(%"'
:ææÅ6* ºÆª&+Æ' K' ,-)Æ' !Ææ 7 O,çÆºe+
,Æ)#"/' #7 :%*Ø6* )#-æ+Æ Ł7 ‰' Iª.º,Æ#"'
Œ.ººØ)#Æ . . .
Taking her robe, from the shoulder to the middle of her navel she tore it and
showed her breasts, like a statue, beautiful . . .
Talthybius’ turn to sculpture appears to be motivated by his concern to
capture the beauty of the scene he is describing. His words draw a path
with Polyxena’s moving hand downwards from her shoulder to her
navel, as she opens her robe to expose her breasts66—at which point
Talthybius’ thoughts turn to the perfect form of a statue. By breaking
off his narration at this point, Talthybius draws attention to an art form
that transfixes beauty, freeing the body from the decay of human
existence. As well as seeing Polyxena as a victim, then, the audience
are also invited to view her from the vantage-point of the massed group
of (male) onlookers.67 As the aestheticized—and eroticized—moment
of sacrifice is maximized, the tragedy of it—the pain, ugliness and
65 "YŒ#Øæ"+ >,A', ‰' ªæÆç*/' #7 I!")#ÆŁ*d' j N%"F ,* ŒI+.ŁæÅ)"+ "x 7 :åø ŒÆŒ.,Hec.
807–8.
66 To be sure, there is something assertive, even heroic, in Polyxena’s gesture of baring
her breast to the blade; but equally, Talthybius’ report entices his audience to linger on
the femininity of her body. So Rehm (2002), 179: ‘Euripides offers a variety of
perspectives on the sacrifice of Polyxena: as an existential choice in the face of the
inevitable; as a violent exhibition of male bloodletting; as a display of the eroticized
female body, transforming men into rapt spectators unable to stop watching what they
no longer want to see.’ On the associations of marriage and death, sacrifice and sexual
violation of this scene, see Loraux (1987), 39–41, 56–60.
67 Michelini (1987), in 165: ‘Polyxene’s motivation, in so far as it has been estab-
lished, is noble, brave, and decorous. Further, the picture of her nudity is appealing in the
pathetic as well as the sexual sense: it imitates a familiar gesture of supplication that the
audience will have recognized and enjoyed. Finally, the combination of apparent
innocence and purity with sexual appeal permits us, as Talthybios does, to ogle Polyxene,
even as we sympathize with her. The appeal to shameful pleasures is very satisfyingly
blended with high moral tone: what audience could fail to indulge themselves?’ See also
Rabinowitz (1993), 55–6; Segal (1993), 175–6; Thalmann (1993), 137–47; Rehm
(1994), 167, n. 34; (2002), 180; Scodel (1996). The (fatal) attraction of the scene is
contested by Mossman (1995), 142–63.
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loss—is in danger of being passed over.68 Moreover, by assimilating the
death of a maiden with the (erotic) portrait of a woman, Euripides
constructs an image that evokes the spectacle of tragedy itself, which, by
its very nature as a competitive art form, presents terrible and terrifying
acts in a beautiful way. So far, indeed, the play has been an invitation to
enjoy spectating suffering. Oh, what a lovely tragedy!69
Repercussions of Polyxena’s sacrifice seem to be passed over as the
play shifts gear and focusses on the introduction of Polydorus’ murder
and Hecuba’s desire for revenge. Yet, in and of itself the narration of
a maiden’s sacrifice has a precedent in the famous choral parodos of
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon.70 It is significant, therefore, that Euripides
brings to mind that scene not with respect to the sacrifice itself but in
what Hecuba says. Her appeal to Agamemnon to ‘Stand back like a
painter and pity me,’ (‰' ªæÆç*/' #7 I!")#ÆŁ*(', 807) echoes the
description by Aeschylus’ Chorus of the moment of Iphigeneia’s sacri-
fice, ‘who stood out as in a painting’ (!æ-!"ı)Æ Ł7 ‰' K+ ªæÆçÆE',
Aesch. Ag. 242).71 The deferral brings out Euripides’ shift in emphasis
onto Hecuba, who, unlike the sacrificial victim, uses the metaphor
herself as she performs the role of a tragic victim.72 At the same time,
though critics have leapt on Hecuba’s self-presentation as marking her
moral decline,73 the subject of the simile also undergoes a transforma-
tion: whereas the actor (Polyxena or Iphigeneia) was the focus of the
68 Segal (1993), 174–5 notably resists the temptation: ‘Even critics who recognize the
horror of the scene succumb to its alluring mixture of reverence and personal nobility of
the victim. These modern critics fall into Euripides’ trap. They confound the admiration
that we are supposed to feel for the victim with the circumstances of her killing.’ Cf.
Conacher (1967), 149, 153–4; Pucci (1977), 180; O’Conner-Visser (1987), 63–7. Segal
has in mind such critics as Rivier (1975), 154–5; Gellie (1980), 34; Michelini (1987),
160–1, 180. Cf. Vellacott (1975), 209–10.
69 On Euripides’ exploitation of the paradox of enjoying suffering, see esp. Segal
(1993), 13–33.
70 Aesch. Ag. 217–49. See esp. Thalmann (1993), 137–47.
71 The correspondence is noted by Segal (1990a), 9–10.
72 Mercier (1993), 158 suggestively comments: ‘The performance of [the supplica-
tion] is a spectacle; to maintain a physically awkward and humiliating act at such length
discomforts suppliant, supplicated, actors, and audience alike.’
73 Especially offensive to most critics is Hecuba’s use of the fact that Cassandra shares
his bed to persuade Agamemnon. According to the scholion on Soph. Aj. 520, this makes
Hecuba like a pimp for her daughter: see also Kirkwood (1947), 167; Conacher (1967),
162; Luschnig (1976), 232; Buxton (1982), 176; Tarkow (1984), 134–6; Michelini
(1987), 142, 151–2. By contrast, Mossman (1995), 127 sees Hecuba’s language as
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metaphor for art, Hecuba explicitly draws attention to the act of spectat-
ing.74 It is an image that appears particularly apt, since it captures a
central paradox of watching tragedy. On the one hand, it asserts the
activity of spectating, which accords well with the image of the demo-
cratic spectator sketched out above:75 like painters, the audience paint
an image of the play’s events in their minds as they watch, and on that
picture they base their judgement.76 Yet, as spectators, the audience are
also inevitably detached from the tragic action too, since they neither
possess influence over the events nor suffer as a result of them.77 The
second half of Euripides’ Hecuba exploits this tension to the full, as
Euripides unwinds the implications of siding with Hecuba. It does so
precisely by bringing to the fore associations not so much with the epic
Odyssey as with the tragic Agamemnon.78
As a result of Hecuba’s supplication, Agamemnon gives uncondi-
tional support for her to act as she deems fit in defiance of her situation
and status to right her wrong. She wins that assurance, however, by
absolving Agamemnon of all responsibility for what will happen: ‘As for
the rest—take heart! I’ll arrange everything well’ (#a %7 ¼ººÆ—Ł.æ)*Ø—
!.+#7 Kªg Ł8)ø ŒÆºH', 875). The full significance of that absolution
‘demure’, and Gregory (1999), 143 nn. 826–30, even considers it ‘standard for parental
figures in tragedy to make explicit references to their children’s sexual lives’—which earns
a disbelieving rebuke from Rehm (2002), 365, n. 51. We might note that Hecuba herself
calls attention to the fact that she is pushing her argument to the extreme: it is a ‘foreign
argument’ (#"F º&ª"ı 6-+"+, Hec. 824).
74 A point Agamemnon performs as he moves away precisely so as to avoid becoming
involved (l. 812): Mossman (1995), 126. Aristotle famously understands tragedy as a
spectacle that produces in the audience pity, the compassion that Hecuba asks Agamem-
non for herself. See Ch. 5, sec. 1 above on Odysseus as a spectator in Sophocles’ Ajax.
75 See Act III, intro., n. 36 above.
76 The question Hamlet asks: ‘What’s Hecuba to him, or he to her, j That he should
weep for her’, Shakespeare, Hamlet, II. ii.
77 Being able to discern the events on stage as representative of a reality, and not as the
reality itself, is essential to the role of being an audience, as comedy attests by frequently
blurring the lines of demarcation. See e.g. the discussion of Rehm (2003), 9–20.
78 Zeitlin (1996), 213, n.70 suggests that ‘the Aeschylean echoes begin in earnest
from the second stasimon, which precedes the king’s [Agamemnon’s] entry onto the
stage (659–66) and recalls the Helen ode in the Agamemnon’. The third stasimon
(ll. 905–52), in which the Chorus concentrate their ire on Helen, would seem to be a
closer intertext with the Helen ode in the Agamemnon (Aesch. Ag. 681–781): so
Thalmann (1993), 134–5. Nevertheless, it is significant that the echoes of Aeschylus’
play begin with the entry of the protagonist of that play, especially since Agamemnon is
explicitly invited to perform the role of a spectator of Hecuba’s suffering.
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becomes apparent very quickly when Hecuba wreaks terrible vengeance
on the unholiest of hosts, Polymestor.
Throw that barbarism from your heart, and speak
Hecuba’s refusal to accept her current situation lying down takes the
form of a violent attack on Polymestor, the friend who betrayed her.
With the Chorus enlisted on her side and acting with her, she murders
his children in front of his eyes, and then stabs his eyes out.79 Taking
revenge on one’s enemies, especially punishing friends who have done
you wrong—an eye for an eye—conforms to normative standards of
Greek morality.80 Epic narrative, too, has shown that heroic action
often tends towards the excessive. Even so, the manner in which Hecuba
achieves retribution (deception), and the form it takes (murder of
children, blinding), are disturbing.
Significantly, the closest parallel that suggests itself is Odysseus’
brutal actions in the Odyssey, his blinding of Polyphemus and his
vengeance on the suitors.81 After father and son have exacted a terrible
revenge on the suitors, Odysseus openly concedes to his son that their
actions may throw up one or two problems—killing over a hundred of
one’s own people is generally not regarded as a good thing.82 Yet, it is
important to note that, as I observed above, the Odyssey constructs a
narrative that carefully marginalizes sympathy for that other group: the
79 We might note again the emphasis on spectating—and in this case the catastrophic
consequences related to it. See Nussbaum (1986), 410 for the significance of eye-contact
(or lack of it) during Hecuba’s scene with Polymestor.
80 See Blundell (1991); Vlastos (1991), 179–99. Kovacs (1987) regards Hecuba as
heroic in the epic mould.
81 Zeitlin (1996), 195 draws a series of connections between Polymestor and Cyclops:
‘violator of xenia, blinded in revenge, threat of anthropophagy, parting curse. He too
inhabits a remote territory by the shores of the sea at which Greeks stop, to their peril, on
their journey home from Troy. His name, Polyphemos, most directly evokes the king’s
name, Polymestor.’ She argues, however, that Polymestor also resembles Odysseus
(pp. 194–7). See also Segal (1993), 184 who, however, takes the identification of
Polymestor with Cyclops as a sign of Hecuba’s transformation into her enemy and of
her moral decline. This chapter argues that Hecuba is identifiable with Odysseus from
the beginning of the play, and sees Hecuba’s character as constructed by the audience as
they experience the drama. For a similar articulation of characterisation in Greek tragedy,
see Easterling (1990), 99.
82 Od. 23.117–22.
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suitors come to a bad end ‘because of their own recklessness’.83 In this
way, the returning king’s revenge can be, and is generally, regarded as
legitimate. In stark contrast, although Hecuba is the focus of the play’s
sympathies, her action takes place from a position of marginality. As a
female, slave and foreigner, her revenge cannot be constructed as the
reassertion of authority; it is inevitably an act of dissent from the
(Greek) occupying powers that control her life, particularly since
the object of her fury is their friend and ally. Typically, Euripides has
presented an extreme scenario that poses the question whether even this
kind of dissent can be regarded as legitimate and beneficial to the
community, given the moral bankruptcy of the victim and the moral
right of the aggressor, the all-suffering Hecuba.
That test soon presents itself, when Polymestor appears on stage on
all fours, dehumanized, and screaming blue murder (1109–13). Soon
afterwards Agamemnon arrives, having heard a ‘racket’ (ŒæÆıªB'
IŒ"/)Æ' qºŁ"+, 1109),84 as if Echo herself were making a ‘rumpus’
(7˙åg %Ø%"F)Æ Ł&æı4"+, 1111)85 and ‘not quietly shrieking’ among the
army ("P ªaæ l)ıå"' j º-ºÆŒ7 I+a )#æÆ#e+, 1109–10). The violent
physicality of Hecuba’s dissent here is translated into the verbal realm,
as Agamemnon describes a series of wildly disproportionate speech acts
that have disturbed his army. Such was the noise, indeed, that, accord-
ing to Agamemnon, had they not known that Troy had already fallen,
they might have thought that they were at war again.86 Polymestor’s
83 )ç*#-æfi Å)Ø+ I#Æ)ŁÆº(fi Å)Ø+,Od. 1.7. While first used of Odysseus’ companions, and
thereafter mainly of the suitors (see Ch. 2, n. 132 above), it next occurs in the first
episode in association with Aegisthus, as Zeus sets out the moral agenda of the Odyssey
(1.34–43). Agamemnon’s (tragic) nostos was already paradigmatic in the Odyssey: see Ch.
2, n. 133 above, with text.
84 Of all the tragedians, only Euripides uses ŒæÆıª8: cf. Hipp. 902; Andr. 1144; El.
695; Ion 893; Or. 1510, 1529.
85 Cf. Hec. 872. In Euripides’ Orestes, the messenger identifies the demagogue as
trusting in the commotion (Ł"æ/4øfi #* !()ı+"', Or. 905). We saw above that the Chorus
of Sophocles’ Ajax feel threatened by great commotions going round the Greek camp
(,*ª.º"Ø Ł&æı4"Ø ŒÆ#-å"ı)7 >,A', Aj. 142; cf. 164). Cf. Soph. Philoct. 1263. For the
political connotations of Ł&æı4"', see Bers (1985). See also J. Roisman (2004), 264 with
n. 7, for the picture of tumultuous interchanges that emerges from orations, during
which the speakers had to make themselves heard above the clamorous din. Being cowed
into silence was not only damaging to one’s speech, it was thought of in terms of
disenfranchisement: Montiglio (2000), 116.
86 *N %b ,c GæıªH+ j !/æª"ı' !*)&+#Æ' fi q),*+ $¯ºº8+ø+ %"æ(, j ç&4"+ !Ææ-)å7 i+ "P
,-)ø' ‹%* Œ#/!"', Hec. 1111–13.
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cries evoke the fearful prospect of a Troy undestroyed, as if Agamem-
non’s fear in the Iliad has been realized, and they were forced to return
home without having captured the city.87 Even more disturbing for
Agamemnon, Polymestor’s cries echo his own from Aeschylus’ epon-
ymous play, prompting the clearest suggestion yet that events are about
to take a turn for the worse.88 The fallout from Hecuba’s dissent from
her tragic fate has the potential to destabilize the carefully constructed
post-war order of the Greek coalition and the life of their leader.
Dissent has transgressed into violence: Polymestor, swearing revenge,
bears bloody witness to Hecuba’s revenge for wrong done to her. In
response, Agamemnon attempts to reassert order by setting up a contest
of words (1129–31):
Y)å7 ! KŒ4Æºg+ %b ŒÆæ%(Æ' #e 4.æ4Ææ"+
º-ª7 , ‰' IŒ"/)Æ' )"F #* #B)%- #7 K+ ,-æ*Ø
Œæ(+Å %ØŒÆ(ø' ¼+Ł7 ‹#"ı !.)å*Ø' #.%*.
Hold on! Throw that barbarism89 from your heart and speak so that by hearing
both you and her in turn I may judge fairly the things that you’re suffering.
Appealing to the fighting parties to put aside their barbaric ways and
talk to each other, Agamemnon sets a Greek manner of achieving
resolution through the sanctioned contest of words against the violent
acts and inarticulate threats of barbarians.90 His framing of this ago¯n
87 See Hom. Il. 9.17–28, when Agamemnon gives up on Troy.
88 þ,"Ø ,.º 7 ÆsŁØ', Hec. 1037¼Aesch. Ag. 1245: see Meridor (1975); cf. Segal
(1993), 187. Evidently, these were memorable lines: Sophocles also reworks them in
his Electra (l. 1417). On the Aeschylean scene that is being evoked here, Thalmann
(1993), 148 comments: ‘The deception and blinding of Polymestor is a citation, verbal
and visual, of the scene between Agamemnon and Clytemnestra.’
89 For a discussion of ‘barbarian’ as a category that applies to standards of ethical
behaviour (as here), rather than exclusively to a person’s ethnicity, see Papadodima
(2008).
90 The setting up of a law court may be more pointed than that. As H. Foley (2001),
285 remarks, the trial Agamemnon sets up is ‘unique in revenge tragedy outside the
Oresteia’. But, whereas the Oresteia brings conflict into the institutional fabric of the
community (even if Athena has to negotiate the Furies’ dissent outside the law court
itself—see Act III, intro., above), the current play pushes dissent to the extreme, so that it
is not even brought within the bounds of the play itself. In a comparable case, theOrestes,
Euripides displaces the act of institutionalization, which the Eumenides dramatizes, to
another time and place (Or. 872–3), thereby adding to the sense of insecurity regarding
the play’s capacity to manage dissent. See Barker (2011). Cf. Hesk (2007), 82.
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holds the promise—expectation almost—that it can manage even this
extreme outbreak of dissent.91 This marks the most extreme version of
the ago¯n’s capacity to make sense of violence and give legitimacy to acts
of defiance.
On first impressions, the ago¯n would appear to bear out the events
previously witnessed. Against all evidence to the contrary, Polymestor
attempts to rid himself of any culpability for the murder of Polydorus,
thereby ensuring that sympathy remains fully behind Hecuba.92 Inter-
estingly, the majority of his speech comprises a report of off-stage
events, which is usually given by a third party and understood as an
adequate representation of what really happened.93 Here Euripides
displaces the authoritative messenger narrative to an antagonist present-
ing a case in the contested space of the ago¯n. Not only does the
displacement problematize sympathy for Polymestor concerning what
has happened; it also has the tangible effect of curtailing the argumen-
tative section of his speech.94 On both scores, as a result, his speech lacks
integrity and its capacity to convince is greatly reduced.
While Polymestor is found wanting in terms of his persuasiveness,
Hecuba’s measured response amounts to a rhetorical tour de force.95
Her careful point-by-point rejoinder to her opponent’s arguments re-
calls the persuasive adeptness of an Odysseus, who had previously
defeated her in argument.96 More striking still, she deploys a Greek
conceit of superiority over barbarians to challenge Polymestor’s propo-
sition that he had acted to benefit the Greeks—though, of course, she is
91 ‘Agamemnon’s appearance at this stage of the action supplies Hecuba with both a
social framework and the responsible authority’: Meridor (1983), 15.
92 From his very first appearance, Polymestor has been guilty of ‘sententious general-
izations and fluent improvisations’: Gregory (1991), 109.
93 Recent scholarship has challenged notions of objectivity regarding messenger
speeches: de Jong (1991); Barrett (2002), who, however, omits Polymestor’s speech
from his appendix of messenger speeches (p. 224). So too Gregory (1999), 179,
nn. 1132–82 who, while conceding that it displays characteristics of a messenger speech,
concludes that ‘it does not . . .meet one crucial criterion: the narrator is not a subsidiary
character but one of the principals’. This seems to me to impose too artificial a
distinction on Euripides’ manipulation of form and convention.
94 Mossman (1995), 133.
95 On Hecuba’s speech, see Buxton (1982), 181–2; Kovacs (1987), 107–8; Michelini
(1987), 136–7; M. Lloyd (1992), 97–9; Mossman (1995), 133–7.
96 Conacher (1967), 162 sees Hecuba’s persuasiveness as a sign that she has learnt
from Odysseus the use of rhetorical skills. Cf. Segal (1993), 184.
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foreign herself.97 So devastating is her rebuttal of her opponent that
scholars have sought psychological interpretations to account for how a
long-suffering female victim could have delivered such a speech, espe-
cially given the precise lack of persuasiveness of her earlier speech.98 In
formal terms too, given that the ago¯n restores support for Hecuba in
spite of the cruelty of her deed, it appears curiously ‘insulated’ from its
embedded context.99
Yet, in spite of this insulated impression, dissent is not so easily
contained within the institution that Agamemnon has set up. It has
already been noted that Polymestor’s speech is utterly unpersuasive.
This is true, insofar as it relates to the context of the events that have been
witnessed. But Polymestor’s framing of his messenger narrative (1138–
44), in which he employs two arguments drawn from outside the
drama, resonates more broadly than the events of the play would seem
to allow. In the first scenario, Polymestor expects his audience to believe
that he killed Polydorus to benefit the Greeks, in order that no Trojan
prince would later rise to challenge the Greek hegemony.100 In the
context of the play, this excuse appears entirely specious and unconvin-
cing, since Polymestor’s lust for gold has already been established as his
97 ‘Barbarian peoples neither would nor could be friends with the Greeks’ ("h!"#7 i+
ç(º"+ j #e 4.æ4Ææ"+ ª-+"Ø#7 i+ $‚ººÅ)Ø+ ª-+"', Hec. 1199–1202). Cf. Bacon (1961),
151–2; Baldry (1965), 20–4. While this comment would seem paradoxically to con-
demn the speaker herself, there is some doubt as to whether Hecuba would include the
Trojans in the group of barbarian peoples. After all, elsewhere Hecuba speaks of three
categories, Greeks, Trojans and barbarians (Eur. Tro. 472–8). See Papadodima (2008).
Even from an Athenian perspective, it is not self-evident that the Trojans would, or
should, be considered barbarians, considering their longevity in ancient Greek literature
and their non-barbaric representation in the Iliad: see Ch. 1, n. 98 above.
98 The psychological case has been put most forcefully by Nussbaum (1986) and
Michelini (1987). For a discussion of the relationship between character and rhetorical
context: see Dale (1954), pp. xxvii–xxviii; Conacher (2003), passim; and, most recently,
Scodel (2000), 132. Buxton (1982), 150 suggests that characters are what they persuade
the audience, which comes close to what Easterling says (cf. n. 81 above).
99 As Mossman (1995), 201 puts it, Hecuba’s revenge is ‘insulated from the account
of the metamorphosis by the ago¯n, where she is in fact extremely reasonable’. The
prophecy then adds to the confusion to create a ‘state of flux’ (p. 203). All in all,
‘Euripides gives us not a “most difficult case” but an “easiest case” and then makes us
think about its problematic aspects’ (p. 205). This present study conceives of the agon
rather differently, as a form that exceeds not only its context in, but the boundaries of,
the play itself, with the result that both this representation and the tradition at large are
drawn into its contested space.
100 Hec. 1134–44.
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motivating principle.101 Yet, killing a young Trojan prince to forestall
the possibility of a later revenge attack is a motif not only familiar to the
audience; Euripides himself represents the selfsame scenario else-
where.102 The killing of an innocent child is an argument that the
Greeks themselves have used to justify their actions before now.
The second example occurs after Polymestor has related the off-stage
events surrounding his blinding. Having described in horrific detail the
women’s assault against him and his children, he sums up his suffering
by drawing a moral about the role of women (1178–82):
*N #Ø' ªı+ÆEŒÆ' #H+ !æd+ *YæÅŒ*+ ŒÆŒH'
j +F+ º-ªø+ :)#Ø+ #Ø' j ,-ºº*Ø º-ª*Ø+,103
–!Æ+#Æ #ÆF#Æ )ı+#*,g+ Kªg çæ.)ø!
ª-+"' ªaæ "h#* !&+#"' "h#* ªB #æ-ç*Ø
#"Ø&+%7 ! › %7 ÆN*d 6ı+#ıåg+ K!()#Æ#ÆØ.
If any man has previously spoken ill of women, or is saying so now or is going to
say so, summing everything up I make this declaration: neither sea nor land
breeds any creature like them. Anyone who has dealings with them knows this
well.
At the end of his speech Polymestor generalizes from his particular
situation to condemn women as a whole, which is by no means an
uncommon strategy in agon speeches.104 As an argument that is likely to
ring true to his audience, however, it fails to convince. Even though his
appearances on stage have been brief, Polymestor has done nothing
to suggest that he suffers undeservedly at the hands of Hecuba. On
the contrary, he has been so self-serving, so utterly disregarding of
101 Hecuba forcefully rejects his suggestion (Hec. 1195–1216), and wins support
from the onstage judge Agamemnon (1245–6).
102 The Greeks throw Andromache’s son Astyanax from the city’s wall, a story the
Iliad foreshadows: Eur. Tro. 709–99; cf. Hom. Il. 24.734–6. Helen even argues that
Hecuba should have done the same with Paris (Eur. Tro. 919–22). Cf. Zeitlin (1996),
211, who notes in passing that ‘in the Troades, Hekabe suffers the same losses (replace
Polydoros with Astyanax)’.
103 In his (1995) Loeb edition, Kovacs deletes this line. The expression is certainly
odd; but it does suggest the difficulty of pinning down Polymestor’s words to a specific
context.
104 Like Jason (Eur. Med. 573–5) or Hippolytus (Eur. Hipp. 616–18). See Gregory
(1999), 183–4. For the negative stereotype of women at play here, see generally
Rabinowitz (1993), 113–21; Zeitlin (1996), 208–16.
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guest–host ties, that the audience are more likely to put his comments
about women down to the uncivilized and chauvinistic ravings of a
Thracian. Once again, therefore, if judgement is restricted to the events
of the play alone, Polymestor’s words at best present a dodgy dossier of
the events witnessed, at worse simply another example of his remarkable
arrogance and misogyny. But, as much as the audience may (want to)
dismiss his analysis out of hand, that may prove all the more difficult for
the judge of the case, Agamemnon, for whom this description of women
carries, or should carry, a particular purchase. The Odyssey portrays
Agamemnon on two occasions, both times in the Underworld, and
both times complaining that he has ended up there because of his wife.
Indeed, in the second Underworld scene Agamemnon doesn’t just
condemn his wife’s actions; he offers her as an example to all,105 as a
negative paradigm of female virtue that potentially condemns all
women.106 But, just as importantly, Clytemnestra has enacted this
role in tragedy before, in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon.107 When Polymestor
makes his sententious criticism of women, then, he operates within a
tradition started by the judge, Agamemnon, himself. Polymestor’s con-
clusion, ‘anyone who has dealings with women knows this well’, directly
looks back to Agamemnon’s (future) troubles.
Agamemnon had set up the ago¯n in order to contain violence and
manage dissent. By doing so, he provides the clearest example yet of the
ago¯n’s capacity to prompt and contain frank speech. In Chapter 5 we
saw that Sophocles’ Ajax presented the ago¯n as an institution that allows
a free and frank airing of views, that does not necessarily lead to
resolution, and that does not so much stage the contest between the
105 ‘[Unlike Penelope] the daughter of Tyndareos fashioned her evil deeds, when she
killed her wedded lord, and a hateful song will be hers among men, and will promote an
evil reputation for the race of women, even for one whose acts are good’ (‘"På ‰'
Aı+%Ææ-"ı Œ"/æÅ ŒÆŒa ,8)Æ#" :æªÆ, j Œ"ıæ(%Ø"+ Œ#*(+Æ)Æ !&)Ø+, )#ıª*æc %- #7 I"Ø%c j
:))*#7 K!7 I+Łæ0!"ı', åÆº*!c+ %- #* çB,Ø+ O!.))*Ø j ŁÅºı#-æfi Å)Ø ªı+ÆØ6( , ŒÆd l Œ7
*P*æªe' :fi Å)Ø+’, Hom. Od. 24.199–202). Cf. Gregory (1999), 184.
106 The Chorus try to restrict the applicability of Polymestor’s statement: ‘because of
your own misery don’t put the whole race of women together like that and blame them’
(,Å%b+ ŁæÆ)/+"ı ,Å%b #"E' )Æı#"F ŒÆŒ"E' j #e Ł8ºı )ı+Ł*d' z%* !A+ ,-,łfi Å ª-+"',
1183–4).
107 Noting the correspondence of ll. 1177–82 to Aeschylus’ Choephoroi 585–92,
Thalmann (1993), 151 suggests that Polymestor’s musing whether anyone in the past
has spoken ill of women ‘seems to gesture to Aeschylus’.
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characters as much as reproduce that contest among the audience. But
the ago¯n’s capacity to institutionalize dissent is severely tested by Eur-
ipides’ play. In the first place, Hecuba’s actions represent an extreme
form of dissent in terms of both what she has done and who she is.
Secondly, the ideological emphasis on hearing the other side creates an
unusually unsettling effect. Polymestor’s arguments are entirely spe-
cious and he is soundly beaten in the debate. But they are specious
only if they are kept within the bounds of the play; the tradition may tell
a rather different story.108 Consequences for judgement reverberate far
beyond its immediate context—as Agamemnon, the judge who has
already been bought off, and the audience themselves are soon to dis-
cover.
3. FRANK SPEAKING AT THE LIMITS
In a bid to control the acts of terrorism that have broken out under his
watch, the leader of the Greek coalition forces sets up a debate. The
conceit that words can make sense of, and bring an end to, violence
represents the ideological force of the ago¯n as an institution that can
108 The audience have got some tough decisions to make: does the resonance with the
tradition serve to cast a different light on the play, so that we recognize how Euripides has
focalized his play through Hecuba’s eyes by giving us a brief glimpse of a different view as
the drama draws to a close? (That is to say, do we come to regard Hecuba as a
Clytemnestra figure?) Or do we rather see the male tradition itself questioned and
condemned by the events of this play, which we have seen through female eyes? (In
this case, are we invited to reflect on Clytemnestra as a figure closer to the Hecuba of our
play?) Observing the associations of Hecuba with Clytemnestra and Polymestor with
Agamemnon, Thalmann (1993), 149 suggests that ‘Polydoros’s death cannot be made to
appear a sacrifice for the good of the community; Polymestor does not have even the
excuse (whatever it is worth) that Agamemnon did, or Odysseus in this play, though
significantly he tries to argue that he does (Hek. 1136–44).’ One feature of the Eur-
ipidean ago¯n is its capacity to draw on material from outside the present drama: in this
way, not only do the characters engage in contest with each other, but the chosen story-
pattern of the play itself, even the wider tradition, get drawn into the conflict. See e.g. the
case of Helen in Trojan Women, whose attempts to blame Aphrodite (Tro. 924–50)
appear entirely specious in relation to the events of the play, though in actual fact they
belong to the tradition (and relate rather closely to the divine prologue Euripides has
staged); and Jason, who appears to wander on to the stage directly from his epic tradition
(see esp. his emphasis on nautical imagery, the role of Aphrodite and the mention of
Orpheus: Med. 523–31, 541–3), oblivious of the new song already set in motion by
Medea and the Chorus (cf. Med. 410–45).
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accommodate dissent. On the one hand, both speakers, given the
opportunity to air their grievances, are drawn into a political process
of argument. On the other hand, by presenting the relative merits of
either side in speeches of roughly equal length, the ago¯n invites the
audience to engage in a performance of decision-making. In this case,
the ago¯n appears to bear out the conclusions already reached: Polymes-
tor proves himself to be utterly despicable by introducing specious
claims with little relevance for the events witnessed; his version of events
is strongly countered by Hecuba, whose arguments are much more
firmly grounded in the action of the play. It is true that ripples of a
destabilizing undercurrent have surfaced in the resonances with the
broader tradition; but still, the ago¯n confirms the play’s sympathetic
focus on the all-suffering Hecuba. Notably, however, the play does not
end with the ago¯n. Instead, Euripides stages the brief, but thoroughly
disturbing, fallout from the formal contest of words, which pursues the
consequences of dissent outside an institutional context.109
In your face!
The last scene begins conventionally enough with the on-stage justice of
the peace, who issues his judgement as if presiding over a law-court case
(1240–5). First, Agamemnon admits that it is a burden for him to judge
the evils of others, yet judge he must (IåŁ*Ø+a ,-+ ,"Ø #Iºº&#æØÆ Œæ(+*Ø+
ŒÆŒ., j ‹,ø' %7 I+.ªŒÅ, 1240–1). Yet, after his initial hesitancy Aga-
memnon proves himself to be a most willing judge, delivering a defini-
tive and damning judgement on Polymestor. In his summing up of the
case before him Agamemnon concludes that Polymestor murdered
Polydorus, not out of any ‘patriotic’ desire to spare the Greeks further
casualties, but for gold alone.110 Such amoral behaviour he puts down
to an ideological difference between Greeks and barbarians: ‘perhaps for
you it is easy to kill a guest, but to us Greeks at any rate it is shameful’
(#.å 7 "s+ !Ææ 7 9,E+ Þfi.%Ø"+ 6*+"Œ#"+*E+! j >,E+ %- ª 7 ÆN)åæe+ #"E)Ø+
109 Gregory (1999), 190, nn. 1254–84 notes that the ‘prophecy of events lying
beyond the framework of the action is a regular feature of Euripidean endings’. Cf.
Dunn (1996), 66–7. It seems that this is one means by which Euripides’ plays resist
closure.
110 K,"d %7 , ¥ +7 *N%fi B', "h#7 K,c+ %"Œ*E' å.æØ+ j "h#7 "s+ 1åÆØH+ ¼+%æ 7 I!"Œ#*E+ÆØ
6-+"+, j Iºº 7 ‰' :åfi Å' #e+ åæı)e+ K+ %&,"Ø)Ø )"E', Hec. 1242–5.
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$‚ººÅ)Ø+ #&%*, 1247–8). The inclusive ‘to us’ resonates beyond the
immediate group of the Greek army, whom Agamemnon has previously
conceded would support Polymestor.111 Rather, Agamemnon’s words
invite the audience to regard the ago¯n as affirming the superiority of
civilized behaviour over acts of barbarism, words over violence, reason
over passion—and having just witnessed Hecuba’s complete victory in
the ago¯n, they are likely to.112
Yet, such a complacent judgement is complicated by the position of
the on-stage judge, Agamemnon, who, as we saw above, sanctioned
Hecuba’s vengeance, including its means of exaction, provided that his
army don’t get to hear of it.113 As a judge, then, Agamemnon is
critically compromised, since he has already agreed to support Hecuba
in her case against Polymestor. Thus Euripides has staged a contest of
words in which it is far from clear whether or not the judge bases his
judgement on the arguments made before him or else according to his
predisposition towards one of the contestants.114 In fact, given Aga-
memnon’s history in trying to suppress dissent, which has been traced
from the Iliad to Sophocles’ Ajax, one might be a little sceptical as to his
commitment to open debate now. The audience must not only assess
the ago¯n, but judge the judge.
The context for the ago¯n makes a difference to its assessment as well.
In the first half of this play there had almost been an ago¯n over the fate of
Polyxena, only for a consensus over the decision to reassert itself as
tragic necessity: the heroine must die. Instead, an ago¯n takes place in the
aftermath of Hecuba’s vengeance. By this formal structuring of events,
Euripides constructs a debate not over the action that the Greeks should
111 Hec. 857–63. The application to the Athenian audience is further underlined by
the reference to ‘Hellenes’, which represents a contemporary coinage for the more
Homeric-sounding ‘Achaeans’.
112 ‘Euripides knew, I think, that his audience would take satisfaction in that
revenge . . .We cannot help conniving at this victory’: Reckford (1985), 118. He goes
on, however, to judge how ‘it is also a terrible defeat for Hecuba, and for nobility’, rather
than, what is being suggested, that the audience are being made complicit in the revenge.
113 Hec. 854–5. After Hecuba’s partial explanation of her plan, Agamemnon’s prayer
becomes vaguer still (Hec. 902–4). The manner of Hecuba’s revenge may not be quite
what he had in mind; but he has given her assurances that he would not interfere.
114 To what extent has Agamemnon ‘pre-judged’ the ago¯n or is compromised by this
closeness to Hecuba is a common concern for scholars: Michelini (1987), 155; Mossman
(1995), 132.
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or should not have taken (to kill or not to kill Polyxena), but over how
Hecuba’s action should be judged (whether or not it was right that she
acted in this way). Thus, although the ago¯n appears, as one critic has put
it, ‘insulated’ from the surrounding events—by refocusing on Hecuba’s
cause—it nevertheless poses a question of her act’s legitimacy and
whether that most extreme form of dissent can be kept within an
institutional framework.
In fact, Euripides dramatizes the ago¯n in such a way as to show its
inadequacy as an institution that can deal with dissent properly. For, in
spite of the ease with which Agamemnon sums up the contest of words,
the ago¯n does not resolve the crisis. As I have previously noted, Poly-
mestor’s portrayal of the play’s events against a familiar backdrop of
infanticide and deceitful women has already opened up more disturbing
lines of enquiry. Now, in the fallout from the ago¯n, the doors are opened
to more sinister horrors lurking within, as the Odyssean Hecuba comes
face-to-face with her epic nemesis, Polyphemus.
In a notable failure of the ago¯n to contain dissent, a rapid-fire and
vicious stichomythic exchange between the three characters on stage
brings the play to a terrifying climax. Now, without his eyes, Polymestor
suddenly finds himself endowed with the power possessed by all good
tragic blind characters, the power of second-sight—though his knowl-
edge derives from an external source, ‘the Thracian prophet, Diony-
sus’.115 As Hecuba rather gleefully points out, that knowledge has failed
to save Polymestor from his terrible fate (1268). It is interesting,
however, that both points—blindness and knowledge of the future—
are characteristics shared with the Odyssey’s Polyphemus: both charac-
ters are blinded by a weaker foe employing a devious trick in revenge for
the murderous transgression of xenia; both prophesy evils to come for
the hero with information derived from their special relationship with a
divinity.116 Far from containing violence and frank speech within the
115 Hec. 1267. By identifying the source of Polymestor’s knowledge with the god of
tragedy, the play already suggests a certain metatheatricality.
116 Od. 9.506–21. See Segal (1993), 184–7. Segal (1990b), 309–10 posits a further
parallel: Agamemnon rushes on to the stage (ll. 1109–10) on hearing Polymestor crying
out for help (l. 1089), just as the Cyclopes gather on hearing Polyphemus’ cries
(Od. 9.399–408). See also Mossman (1995), 191, who notes their general similarities
(both Polymestor and Polyphemus are savage and barbarous in temperament, both
become frantic and vindictive in their helplessness); and Gregory (1999), 170, who
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ago¯n, the stage becomes infected by the violent speech of the ‘very
famous’—or ‘many voiced’—Polyphemus.
Not only do these resonances point to a more vigorous engagement
with Odyssean material than has previously been observed; they also
point up the differences between the epic tale of heroic vengeance and
this tragic version: Polymestor proves to be a much more troubling foe
for our hero and her play. After a rapid exchange of insults between the
two antagonists, which already suggests that this play is not going to
manage dissent particularly well, the power of unlicensed words comes
to the fore as Polymestor describes Hecuba’s death and subsequent
transformation into a wild dog (1265). Debate has raged as to the
precise meaning of that ‘sign’ ()B,Æ, 1273),117 whether it symbolizes
Hecuba’s moral degeneration,118 or else whether an interpretation can
be found that is more in keeping with the sympathetic focus of the
play.119 In the context of this semiotic crisis, Euripides slyly memor-
ializes the sign as a ‘fixed mark for sailors’ (+Æı#(º"Ø' #-Œ,Ææ, 1273), as
if the final word were left with sailors—among whom would rank many
of the Athenian audience before whom this play is staged.120 Yet, what
kind of ‘fixed mark’ or final say the audience are to set on the play as it
argues that Euripides’ own Cyclops play ‘contains striking echoes of this scene’. Cf.
Zeitlin (1996), 194–7, with n. 81 above.
117 For the term )B,Æ as designating a hero’s tomb: Nagy (1979), 340–3; (1990),
209–11. Henrichs (1993), 171, n. 22 suggests that the example here presets a bitter twist
on the theme of monumentalizing cult and poetry. In general for this scene, see
Nussbaum (1986), 410–18.
118 Erbse (1984), 59 suggests that the image recalls Aeschylus’ Eumenides, in which
the Erinyes (divinities that resemble creatures in the form of dogs) transform
into benefactor and humanitarian deities thanks to the trial that takes place in a
democratic Athens. Orestes is released by a civic institution from the awful
consequences of his revenge, while Hecuba loses her humanity and transforms into a
bitch in a barbaric place of desolation. This strongly suggests the dog as the symbol of the
non-integration in the city, of the contempt of all kinds of nomos. See also Zeitlin (1996),
183–6.
119 Burnett (1994) argues that dogs were not inevitably negative cultural symbols. In
defence of Hecuba, Gregory (1991), 110 notes a suggestive parallel: Odysseus’ heart
‘barked like a dog’ at the insulting behaviour of the suitors (Od. 20.14–16). Has
Polymestor ‘seen through’ Hecuba’s Odyssean mask?
120 Mossman (1995), 199 perceptively comments: ‘It seems probable that [the]
divided tradition [regarding Hecuba’s end] is partly the product of the lack of explanation
of the metamorphosis in Euripides’ (my italics). See also Gall (1997), who stresses that
Hecuba’s metamorphosis is not so much a punishment as a symbol.
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draws to a close remains open to question, particularly given more
uncomfortable resonances with Aeschylus’ classic portrayal of the sub-
sequent events.121
Part of the difficulty of interpreting the whys and wherefores of this
‘sign’ derives from the fact that Hecuba herself makes little of it: ‘it’s of
no concern to me’ ("P%b+ ,-º*Ø ,"Ø, 1274), she comments, now that
Polymestor has paid his dues ()"F ª- ,"Ø %&+#"' %(ŒÅ+, 1274).122 As a
result, Polymestor changes his line of attack, by casually mentioning
Cassandra’s death at the hands of Clytemnestra.123 He is on surer
ground here, since that prophecy is fulfilled by the audience’s extra-
dramatic knowledge of what happens next from the tales either in-
herited from epic or dramatized on the tragic stage, such as in
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon.124 In any case, now Hecuba is touched, and
spits back in his face (I!-!#ı)7 , 1276) the fateful words in the hope of
averting a new disaster.125 By this gesture Hecuba now acts as the
figure who tries to close off dissent, while Polymestor assumes her
previous role of the marginalized figure standing up to all attempts to
silence him. But, as a grotesque prophet-like figure spouting hatred
at all and sundry, Polymestor stands as the very antithesis of Hecuba,
who has been the sympathetic focus of the play. As a consequence, his
dissent poses a fundamental challenge to the notion of it as an
acceptable, socially beneficial form of disagreement. His is not
the kind of voice that any audience can feel safe with, let alone
support.
121 Clytemnestra describes the beacons which give the message that her husband is
returning as a ‘limit and symbol’ (#-Œ,Ææ #"Ø"F#"+ )/,4"º&+ #* )"Ø º-ªø, Aesch.
Ag. 315).
122 Not appearing to be touched at all by the threat suggests that the metamorphosis
may not be all that bad after all. (Or perhaps it is because the transformation is another
Euripidean invention, one that Hecuba hasn’t heard of before either.)
123 ŒÆd )8+ ª 7 I+.ªŒÅ !ÆE%Æ ˚Æ)).+%æÆ+ ŁÆ+*E+, Hec. 1275.
124 Thalmann (1993), 154 draws connections between three of Polymestor’s prophe-
cies and Aeschylus’ Oresteia: the mention of Clytemnestra as a bitter housekeeper
(l. 1277) evokes Aesch. Ag. 154–5; the detail of the bloody bath (l. 1281) picks up on
Eum. 461; Agamemnon’s plea to be released from toil (ll. 1291–2) replays the first line of
the trilogy (Ag. 1), on which see n. 139 below.
125 Cf. Eur. Hel. 664; Hipp. 614.
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Won’t you shut his mouth?
Hecuba is not alone in feeling the full force of Polymestor’s tongue-
lashing. With eyes that are closed but a mouth wide open, Polymestor
keeps speaking, and keeps coming up with bad news of a kind that defies
the plot of the play. Turning his sights now onto the judge of the ago¯n,
he further prophesies that Clytemnestra will kill Agamemnon as well
(l. 1279). Since returning to the stage Agamemnon has maintained the
fiction of being an independent figure, untouched by the evils that have
broken out, sufficiently distanced from them in order to cast an im-
partial judgement.126 Now Polymestor’s words provoke him to join in
with the outing of the child-killer. First, the king issues a gagging order,
asking his slaves: ‘won’t you shut his mouth?’ ("PŒ Kç-6*#* )#&,Æ;
1283). This gesture of suppressing dissent is certainly strongly marked,
but it recalls one passage which we have previously examined: when, in
the Odyssey, Odysseus had cut off the head of the suitor Leiodes, as he
was still talking.127 But where Odysseus had succeeded unequivocally,
Agamemnon fails dramatically to silence the dissenting voice: Polymes-
tor simply says: ‘It has been said’ (*YæÅ#ÆØ ª.æ, 1284). He is right too:
these events have been said before.128 Again, knowledge of the extra-
dramatic tradition authorizes Polymestor’s terrible words, even as the
on-stage authority tries to override them in a blatant assertion of power.
Next, Agamemnon resorts to an even more extreme measure to silence
Polymestor: he orders his slaves to throw the prophet out onto some
deserted island, since Polymestor ‘speaks with a tongue overly bold’
(º(Æ+ ŁæÆ)ı)#",*E, 1286).129 The problem of Polymestor is here
126 At the beginning of his summing-up Agamemnon had pointedly stated that the
‘troubles of others’ were difficult to judge: #Iºº&#æØÆ ŒÆŒ., Hec. 1240.
127 See Ch. 1, sec. 1 above. In Euripides’ Orestes Electra urges the chorus not to wake
Orestes: ‘won’t you guard your tongues?’ (çıºÆ))",-+Æ )#&,Æ, Or. 184). This is a near
collocation of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon Chorus, who describe how Agamemnon’s men put
a guard on Iphigeneia’s mouth ()#&,Æ#&' #* ŒÆººØ!æfi0- j æ"ı çıºÆŒfi A ŒÆ#Æ)å*E+, Aesch.
Ag. 236). Similarly, the Chorus of Aeschylus’ Persians frame the consequences of Persia’s
defeat in terms of the opportunity for free speech: ‘No longer will men’s tongues be
guarded: for the people are set free to speak freely’ ("P%7 :#Ø ªºH))Æ 4æ"#"E)Ø+ j K+
çıºÆŒÆE', Per. 591–3).
128 Electra also uses *YæÅ#ÆØ (Or. 1203), though in her case it sums up the tradition-
defying plan to take Hermione hostage.
129 As we saw above, Menelaus in not very subtle terms indirectly accuses Teucer of
speaking with a bold tongue (Soph. Aj. 1141). Agamemnon first orders simply that
Beyond the ago¯n in Euripides’ Hecuba 359
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 359 29.4.2011 11:31am
explicitly connected to his frankness of speech—his dissent. But Aga-
memnon’s attempts to restrict that overly bold tongue are again
doomed to failure. The mention of a desert island recalls an odd
passage from the Odyssey, in which Aegisthus is said to have exiled the
bard, whom Agamemnon had posted to watch over Clytemnestra, by
sending him off to a desert island.130 Even in the act of reasserting
authority, control again, as always, slips from Agamemnon’s grasp.131
In prefacing his final verdict on the ago¯n between Polymestor and
Hecuba, Agamemnon had described the subject of his judgement as
‘foreign’ (#Iºº&#æØÆ, 1240), though he recognized the necessity of
issuing judgement. His final words in the play severely test that assess-
ment (1289–92):
ŒÆd ªaæ !+"a'
!æe' "rŒ"+ X%Å #.)%* !",!(,"ı' ›æH.
*s %7 K' !.#æÆ+ !º*/)ÆØ,*+, *s %b #I+ %&,"Ø'
:å"+#7 Y%"Ø,*+ #H+%7 Iç*Ø,-+"Ø !&+ø+.
For in fact I see that the winds are here that will escort us home. May we sail well
to our fatherland, and may we see all things well in our houses, escaping from
our present troubles.
Drawing attention to Agamemnon’s deployment (once more) of the
first-person plural—‘may we sail’, ‘may we see all things well’—Charles
Segal wonders whether Agamemnon’s inability to silence Polymestor
locates the horrors in the hearts of the audience. Watching these savage,
brutalized barbarians, the Athenians, according to Segal, were ‘really
watching themselves’.132 Segal here is thinking of the direct relevance to
contemporary political events:133 on this interpretation Euripides is
Polymestor be removed ("På ;º6*#7 ÆP#&+, %,H*', KŒ!"%g+ 4(fi Æ; 1282); only after
further provocation does he issue the command to remove Polymestor to some deserted
island ("PŒ ‹)"+ #.å"' j +8)"+ Kæ8,ø+ ÆP#e+ KŒ4Æº*E#- !"Ø, 1284–5).
130 Od. 3.269–73, esp.: #e+ ,b+ I"Ø%e+ ¼ªø+ K' +B)"+ Kæ8,Å+ j Œ.ººØ!*+, 3.270–1.
There are other alternatives that resonate internally to the play itself, none of which are
pleasant to recall, such as the status of the women themselves, deserted in the aftermath
of the war, or the dumping of Polydorus’ body: Hec. 27, 699.
131 Agamemnon’s attempted assertion of power over a prophet recalls the Iliad ’s
opening scene. There too he failed: Il. 1.106–20. See Ch. 1, sec. 1 above.
132 Segal (1993), 190.
133 ‘The community of spectators watching the play doubtless wanted to see itself as
the humane, pitying audience that Hecuba was trying to create for her suffering. But the
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exposing the evils that men do in the name of spreading democracy and
freedom. Something like that effect may well be true, though looking
for direct political allusion, as noted above, is problematic: if nothing
else, it limits the referentiality of these words, when the first-person
plural usage suggests precisely a generalizing tone and universal applic-
ability.134 An alternative view may draw attention to the process of
interpretation involved in spectating these events. Agamemnon’s em-
phasis on sight—‘I see that’, ‘may we see’—and use of the first-person
plural together serve to implicate the watching audience.135 After all,
Agamemnon’s windy talk recalls other instances when the Greeks
prayed for a following breeze on their Trojan trip, ominously when
Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter to launch the expedition in the first
place.136 Thus, the evils that Agamemnon had earlier hoped to avoid are
brought tragically home as he unwittingly recalls his own miserable end:
Agamemnon has already played the role of sacrificing (his own) ‘Poly-
xena’ to appease a wrathful divinity,137 and another mother is waiting at
home to take revenge.138 In fact, Agamemnon’s last words, ‘[May we
escape] from our present toils’ (#H+%7 Iç*Ø,-+"Ø !&+ø+, 1292) quote
the first line of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, spoken by the watchman:
‘I beg the gods for release from these toils’ (¨*"f' ,b+ ÆN#H #H+%7
members of this Athenian audience of the war years, as Thucydides’ Mytilenean and
Melian debates indicate, also know that they were citizens of a powerful state involved in
an increasingly ruthless struggle’: ibid. 189. Similarly Gregory (1999), p. xxxvi regards
the tekmar of Cynossema as exploiting tragedy’s double-vision: ‘It serves to alert
seafarers—whether heroic-age Greeks or fifth-century Athenians—to danger ahead.’
134 See Act III, intro., above.
135 See Nussbaum (1986), 410 and Zeitlin (1996), esp. 185–6, 186–91, for very
different discussions of the importance of sight in this play. The imagery also exploits
Agamemnon’s metaphorical blindness, as Segal (1993), 190 notes.
136 Paradigmatically, the choral parodos of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon sing of the dread-
ful means by which the leader of the coalition forces launches his attack: Aesch.
Ag. 217–48.
137 Segal (1993), 187.
138 Thalmann (1993), 150 comments: ‘Agamemnon may think that he is uninvolved,
judging other people’s troubles . . .watching an episode of murderous treachery and
grisly vengeance among barbarians from a detached Hellenic point of view (Hek.
1247–48), and the audience may think so too. But similarities in the patterns of action
annihilate the distance.’ He puts this down to Euripides depicting one of the Athenians’
most important myths ‘in its full brutality’.
Beyond the ago¯n in Euripides’ Hecuba 361
Barker 9780199542710_0203-0373_Barker_chap4-8 Final Proof page 361 29.4.2011 11:31am
I!ÆººÆªc+ !&+ø+, Ag. 1).139 At the very end of Euripides’ play, then, the
audience ‘hear’ the beginning of another tragedy, which directly negates
Agamemnon’s first-person-plural wish for us all ‘to be free from toils’.
But that is not all: the winds carry with them important questions for
the audience too. The Greek fleet has been stuck in this marginal space
on the fringes of the Greek world because Achilles’ ghost held them
back. But, it seems, the winds return only once Hecuba has been
allowed to take revenge, as if a divine hand is moving behind the scenes
to ensure that Polymestor gets his just deserts.140 Up until the end,
judgement had been relatively secure and carefully bounded by the
events: Hecuba had suffered so much and was surely right to take
revenge. Now, in the fallout from the ago¯n, dissent threatens to exceed
not only the institution of the ago¯n, but the formal framework of the
play itself, as a series of questions are not only left unanswered, but are
not even worked through in dramatic performance.141 Where the
questions end and who in the end controls dissent are matters for all
audience members to resolve for themselves.142
139 Gregory (1999), 197, nn. 1291–2 notes that ‘a combination of factors seems to
ensure the allusion: emphatic position (this is the last line spoken by an actor, whereas
the Aeschylean line is the first), prayer form, sense, and shape (in both lines #H+%7 . . .
!&+ø+ occupies the caesura onward, with the separation of the demonstrative and the
noun).’ Cf. Thalmann (1993), 154.
140 Critics have associated the lack of winds with the case at Aulis, as if Achilles’ ghost
were like Artemis, holding back the troops: see Collard (1991), 33. But when Agamem-
non tells Hecuba that the winds have failed (thus allowing her to take her revenge), this is
presented as new information (Hec. 898–901). That is to say, the gods are silent over the
issue of Polyxena’s sacrifice, but seem to endorse Hecuba’s revenge: Segal (1993), 220;
Gregory (1999), pp. xxix–xxxii; cf. Heath (2003). Segal (1989) discusses the problem of
the gods in more detail.
141 Given the echoes of Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigeneia on behalf of the army’s
sailing, what should the audience now make of the decision to sacrifice Polyxena for the
exact same reason? Can they keep separate his individual act of sacrificing his daughter
from the action of sacrificing Polyxena, an action not only undertaken collectively by the
Greek army but decided by consensus? More radically still, does the audience’s view of
Clytemnestra’s murder of Agamemnon in revenge for Iphigeneia’s sacrifice change now
that they have witnessed and sanctioned Hecuba’s action? For a thorough study of
Euripides’ citation of Aeschylus at this point: Thalmann (1993), 148–56. He concludes:
‘There is no ending to this play, only an opening-up onto another text that this one
repeats (or that repeats this one?)’ (p. 155), which has the effect of putting ‘the whole of
the Oresteia in a different context’ (p. 157).
142 Perhaps the bard on the Odyssean desert island is Polymestor acting out his
Polyphemus role. Or perhaps Euripides is representing himself as a Polymestor seen in
terms of a (male) epic tradition that celebrates the return of the king, as we see in
Homer’s Odyssey, or else mourns his murder, as in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon.
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Up until the end, the many resonances with the Odyssey had seemed
to project that narrative’s strategy as the dominant paradigm for under-
standing the play: a long-suffering hero(ine) returns to exact legitimate
vengeance on his (or her) wrongdoers. Now, in the aftermath of judging
the ago¯n, the events are discovered to have special meaning for the
judge; after an epic voyage, the play reasserts a tragic modality. In the
final reckoning, the play gestures towards the events that will most
assuredly follow: it has been about Agamemnon’s—the judge’s—nostos
after all, an Agamemnony.143 It is as if the audience were to arrive back,
not on Ithaca, but in Mycenae, caught up in a net of their own making.
Seeing that her supplication of Agamemnon is about to fail, Hecuba
introduces an argument that, according to some accounts, prostitutes
her own daughter, Cassandra, by making use of the fact that Agamem-
non has taken her to his bed.144 Equally disturbing, however, is the
image with which she ends her appeal (835–40):
K+&' ,"Ø ,FŁ"' K+%*c' :#Ø.
*Y ,"Ø ª-+"Ø#" çŁ&ªª"' K+ 4æÆå(")Ø+
ŒÆd å*æ)d ŒÆd Œ&,ÆØ)Ø ŒÆd !"%H+ 4.)*Ø
j ˜ÆØ%.º"ı #-å+ÆØ)Ø+ X Ł*H+ #Ø+"',
‰' !.+Ł7 ±,Ææ#fi B )H+ :å"Ø#" ª"ı+.#ø+
ŒºÆ("+#7 , K!Ø)Œ8!#"+#Æ !Æ+#"("ı' º&ª"ı'.
My speech lacks one thing else: would that I had voice in my arms, and hands,
and hair and feet by the arts of Daedalos or one of the gods, so that all together
they might seize your knees crying and laying all kinds of arguments upon you.
At this critical juncture of the play, Hecuba transforms herself into a
fantastic creature with voices speaking from every limb to argue her
case.145 Under such a bombardment of words, it is no surprise that
143 Gregory (1991), 108 argues that the play reverses the plot of theOresteia: vendetta
returns when the appeal to institutional justice fails.
144 See n. 21 above.
145 Nussbaum (1986), 415–16 considers this a ‘ghastly moment’ (p. 415), and
Michelini (1987), 152 bizarre. But see Gregory (1999), 144, who notes literary pre-
cedents for speaking bodies (Aesch. Cho. 95; Eur. El. 334–5). On speaking organs, see
Pellicia (1995), 115–20. Rehm (2002), 178 considers that Hecuba’s wish to transform
her body into a persuasive voice reflects her earlier failure to persuade the Greeks not to
sacrifice Polyxena.
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Agamemnon expresses his pity and agrees to support her as far as he is
able. Thus Euripides sets in train a series of events that will climax in
Polymestor himself denouncing both Hecuba and Agamemnon with all
kinds of arguments. Voices speaking from every limb presents an
appropriate image for the way in which this play gives a voice to all of
its characters, even the marginalized and despised.146
Throughout Euripides’ play there has been an emphasis on the
spectacle and the spectating of tragedy: an apparition gives the opening
prologue; a prostrate Hecuba invites the audience to look upon her
fallen figure; reports of an off-stage debate are delivered; Hecuba verb-
ally supplicates Odysseus; a messenger describes Polyxena’s sacrifice as if
the embedded audience were all gazing at a statue; Hecuba persuades
Agamemnon to look on her as a tragic victim; Agamemnon formally
establishes an ago¯n with him as presiding judge over it. The movement
of the play has not been so much towards Hecuba’s greater action and
moral culpability as most critics have made out; rather, emphasis is
placed on the increasing involvement and complicity of the audience.
This final chapter has argued that such a strategy resonates with the
narrative of the return of the king in the Odyssey. Events are staged in
order that the audience may see Hecuba as a tragic sufferer at every
turn—in short, as an Odysseus.147 Yet, in the ago¯n Euripides puts to the
test the democratic imperative of hearing both sides of the question. At
one level, the formal contest of words confirms the judgement on
Polymestor’s crime, as if it were possible, and desirable, to make even
Hecuba’s violent revenge institutional as a kind of legitimate dissent.
146 Too (1998), 18–50 discusses the Hesiodic portrait of Typhon’s many tongues
(Hes. Th. 821–38) in terms of the threat multiple discourses pose to order and the
desirability of their containment. Her study takes into consideration Aristophanes’
portrait of the blustering Cleon (Ar. Ach. 510–11), which, she argues, ‘invokes the
monster’s utterances as a metaphor for oratorical excess in the classical democratic city’
(p. 19). She notes, however, that the comic poet also ‘queries the constraints placed on
social language’ (p. 44). For attempts to portray Aristophanes as a critic of democracy,
see Cartledge (1990), who casts the comic poet in an elite paternalistic role; and Ober
(1998), 122–55, who sees him as an ‘immanent critic’ (p. 155)—a view Greenwood
(2000), 16 suggests makes Aristophanes sound like a civil servant. On more destabilizing
portraits of Aristophanes, see e.g. Goldhill (1991), 167–222 on the comic poet’s
contribution to his city’s ‘contest of voices’, and Hesk (2000), 248–58 on his exposure
of rhetorical strategies used by politicians.
147 For the play between much-enduring Odysseus and Odysseus polutropos, see Pucci
(1987); cf. Stanford (1963), 8–80.
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But, even as a civic utility may be found for Hecuba’s acts, dissent spills
over the ago¯n’s institutional frame. Instead of bringing about conflict-
resolution, the play gives the stage to the frank speaking Poly-phemic
Polymestor, whose prophecies, by virtue of being based on the tradi-
tional version of events, succeed in breaking the silence that Agamem-
non seeks to impose. The effect that Euripides achieves through
privileging dissent at all costs radically destabilizes a complacent view
of the play, in view of either the beauty of its depiction of suffering or
the justice of revenge. Instead, as the audience learn that Hecuba will
metamorphose into the symbol of a raging dog, and Agamemnon will
soon be in his own tragedy, they are left to deal with the repercussions
alone.148 In this way, Euripides removes the comfort of an institutional
context such as the agon, or indeed the formal structure of the play
itself, for working through the management of dissent.
By the end of the play, the audience find themselves not at home in
Ithaca enjoying Penelope’s ‘like-minded’ charms after all, but in bed
with Clytemnestra. This is the Odyssey as tragedy:149 Euripides’ Hecuba
brings troubles home to roost. In the end, each and every member of the
audience must take the responsibility for managing dissent. In Eur-
ipides’ version of Hecuba’s tragedy democracy begins at home.150
148 This lack of institutional security relates to what some critics have called the play’s
‘devastating critique of a world that has lost touch with basic moral values’: Segal (1993),
210; cf. Abrahamson (1952); Reckford (1985), 126.
149 That is not to say that the Odyssey does not have the capacity to provoke some
discomfort about its suppression of alternative viewpoints. The point being made here is
rather that these worries are explicitly explored, and made significant to the Athenian
polis, in Euripides’ play.
150 Zeitlin (1996), 174 notes the absence of polis structure, at least so far as the
topography of Thrace is concerned: ‘If the place has a king, it has no citizens in evidence
and no city. Polymestor moves only from one dwelling to another (his house, Hekabe’s
tent) or else absents himself in the interior of the land (963). A city, the city, was there
across the straits. It fell that one night and is now destroyed.’ Whereas it is possible to
trace a path towards greater institutional security on the part of a Sophoclean Chorus (see
Budelmann (2000), 235–44; Ch. 5 above), Euripides here, and elsewhere (cf. Tro.; Or.;
Bacc., etc.) reverses that movement, towards the dissolution of institutions.
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Epilogue
Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens,
and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities.
(George W. Bush)1
"P ªaæ %8, ‰' "YŒÆ)Ø, K4"/º"+#" *r+ÆØ Kº*/Ł*æ"Ø.
(Hdt. 3.143.2)
This book has investigated one of the most characteristic and prominent
features of ancient Greek literature—the scene of debate or ago¯n, in
which with varying degrees of formality characters square up to each
other and engage in a contest of words. It has made the case that such
scenes of debate are best understood in relation to a specific institutional
context, the assembly, in which issues relating to authority and dissent
are played out. Tracing the different manifestations of debate both over
different genres and within the same genre, has allowed us to gain a
sense of the impact of generic form on the representation and outcome
of debates, as well as the rival strategies employed by comparable
narratives towards the dynamic between dissent and authority. Both
approaches point to the involvement of an audience or readership in the
process of working through the possibilities for, or problems of, debate,
leading to the construction of an agonistic mentality that intersects with
1 Second Inauguration Speech, Jan. 2005. The quotation continues: ‘And when the
soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and
traditions very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of
government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice,
attain their own freedom, and make their own way.’ Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html. The idea that institutions are enacted by those
working within them recalls Giddens’ theory of structuration (see prologue, nn. S1–3,
with text) and has been a central argument of this book. As we shall see below, Herodotus
is, again, a key witness to the paradox of being granted freedom.
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and informs a broader cultural context in which greater political parti-
cipation was in development.
The importance of dissent is at once established and questioned by
the two foundational narratives of Greek culture, the Iliad and Odyssey.
From its very beginning the Iliad locates strife at the centre of the
Achaean community, as Achilles and Agamemnon break up the as-
sembled ranks of Achaeans, ‘warring with words’. While much has
gone wrong in this opening assembly—Achilles withdraws from the
coalition and swears an oath condemning the people—the need for
dissent has been clearly demonstrated and the importance of speaking
publicly on behalf of the community firmly established, as Achilles first
assures Calchas of protection against retaliation from the king, and then
asserts the efficacy of decisions that have been communally sanctioned.
The means for dealing with the community’s woes do not reside with
Achilles, however, but in the institution he sets up. Thus, in what
follows, the Achaean assembly continues to explore tensions within
the group on the basis of who can or cannot speak, and the conse-
quences that follow from gathering the people together; the series of
assemblies (without Achilles) culminate in Diomedes making dissent
institutional by appealing to Achilles’ precedent of opposing the king
with fighting words. From that point on, strife is socialized within the
Achaean community to the extent that all the young men are said to
engage in it, and Achilles, upon his return, faces resistance to his desire
for immediate battle from the hero of the rival epic tradition.
It is far from the case, however, that the course of these events is easy or
without complication: many problems are encountered on the way, and
many remain still to be resolved; nevertheless, by the end of the Iliad a
sense of achievement has been gained, and the assembly has been
affirmed as the place where dissent can, and should, take place. That
positive outlook is severely tested by the Odyssey, which stresses the
divisions that debate can open up, rather than its justifiable cause or
beneficial outcome. The change in focus matches the narrative’s overall
strategy, in which the disguise, deception and endurance of the returning
hero, Odysseus, are privileged. From his perspective, debate is shown to
be highly disruptive and ultimately destructive: dissenting voices are no
longer heard with the prospect of reinforcing the social cohesion of the
group at large, but remain on the outside, on the margins, vigorously
antisocial, enemies of the tale of homecoming being told.
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The inevitable skewing of debate when seen from the perspective of
an authority becomes the key issue for thinking about the historians’
representation of debate. On the margins of their culture as writers of
prose, the historians must work to gain a voice in their communities’
contests of words: one way in which that may be achieved is through the
appropriation of the public space of assembly. That phenomenon is
most prominent in the narrative of Thucydides, who investigates the
failings of his community’s decision-making—and that of others—by a
clear and accurate depiction of institutional debate represented in the
form of the ago¯n. But his claim to the superiority of his written text does
not lie in the act of appropriation itself; put simply, Thucydides’
representation of debate as ago¯n no more directs readers to a definitive
interpretation of their role within the narrative than it provides
an interpretation of each individual debate itself. The reader gets a
clear insight into the failure of the assembly as an institution of dissent
and consent; but far from retreating into the shadows like an Antiphon,
Thucydides recoups the ago¯n so that his readers have to perform as
independent, free-thinking agents—in short, as citizens—even in the
act of reading.
Herodotus too, however, exploits scenes of debate in a way that
promotes the value of his narrative. His enquiry into the cause of the
Persian Wars problematizes the cultural distinction between Greek and
barbarian by showing debate going wrong among the Greeks, while at
the same time presenting the most formal debates as taking place among
the Persians. By continually challenging his readers to dissent, Herodo-
tus entices them into reproducing his enquiry and discovering a role for
reading within the community. Not only does this suggest a more
nuanced picture of Herodotean ‘dialogism’ than is usually posited; it
also exposes the problem of the lack of a cohesive Panhellenic institu-
tional framework that can sustain or manage inter-poleis relations. His
narrative explores that problem and presents itself as one potential
solution to the growing crisis facing the Greek world as its fragile
coalition implodes and fragments.
No other genre pursues the break-up of social order quite as tena-
ciously as tragedy in Athens; and here, where dissent has become fully
institutionalized within the political framework of the city, and where
tragedy plays a critical role in the community’s renewal of itself, it is the
aftermath of dissent that comes under the spotlight. Strikingly omitting
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the judgement of arms that supplies the backdrop to the events on stage,
Sophocles’ Ajax explores the fallout from a most extreme act of defiance:
the protagonist has taken up arms against the Greek leaders. It is as if the
opening scene of the Iliad were replayed, when Achilles goes to strike
down Agamemnon in frustration at his commander’s heavy-handed
grip on authority; only here, on the tragic stage, it is not that act
which comes under focus, or the resultant communication between
the hero and god, but the consequences which follow from it for the
hero and, just as importantly, for his group. At the beginning of the play
it seems impossible that Ajax’s dissent can be brought within the bounds
of an institutional framework, as he first comes to terms with his failed
attempt to kill the Greek leaders, and then turns his sword on himself.
But, with the appearance of his half-brother, the value of dissent is
enacted as Teucer stands up to not one but two Agamemnons. The
process of rethinking dissent comes to a head when the Chorus turn to
Odysseus, their most hated enemy, to resolve the crisis: their sudden
change of mind and critical influence on the action make sense only
from the perspective of the audience, who have previously been witness
to his humane pity for Ajax. As the play’s closing scenes negotiate the
reception of Ajax into Athenian ritual, the audience must play a role too
in assessing the relative achievements of both Ajax and Odysseus and
allow differences to remain.
Sophocles’ Ajax investigates dissent from the perspective of an ex-
treme manifestation of disobedience and pursues its consequences for
those caught up in it: nevertheless, by the end of the play Ajax’s
tarnished reputation has been salvaged somewhat, dissent has been
recouped as a force for good by Teucer’s acts of defiance, and the
audience has been invited to take over the function of their epic
forebears, the Chorus, and accept diversity of opinion. Euripides’
Hecuba presents a far more troubling vision of dissent. It insists on
the justice of Hecuba’s cause, as if she were an Odysseus—though as a
foreign female ‘other’ her revenge can never be quite so authoritative as
the epic hero’s. Even so, the ago¯n, set up by an on-stage judge expressly
to deal with the fallout from her dissent, confirms support for Hecuba,
as if even her extreme vengeance on Polymestor and his children could
be considered institutional. But, in the end, the ago¯n is shown to be
insufficient in dealing with dissent: speaking back spills over the ago¯n’s
institutional bounds and spirals out of control, as first Hecuba and then
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Agamemnon, the justice of the peace, become the target of Polymestor’s
prophetic tongue. The audience too find themselves implicated in the
sudden turn for the worse, since, while Polymestor’s arguments stand at
odds with the events of this play, they replay other narratives that
possess some kind of civic authority. This radically unsettling gesture
occurs right at the play’s climax, expressly outside the institutional
context of the ago¯n, with no space left to work through dissent and no
one left capable of controlling it—bar the audience themselves.
Crucial, then, to this study has been the notion of debate as a
structural feature within a narrative or drama that is experienced as a
process and re-enacted by each and every reader or audience member.
The understanding of the generation and renewal of institutions
through participation within them is not only a central tenet of the
theory of structuration outlined above; it may also be traced back to the
texts under scrutiny here. Near the end of his general investigation into
different forms of government in book 3 of his enquiry, Herodotus
returns to the example of the Samians, who, like the Persians before
them, face a crisis of government now that their single ruler Polycrates
has met his downfall (3.142). A certain Maeandrius, who has inherited
the tyrants’ symbols of authority from Polycrates, the sceptre and power
()ŒB!#æ"+ ŒÆd %/+Æ,Ø', 3.142.3), proposes placing the rule ‘in the
middle’, and proclaims ‘equality’ for them all (‘Kªg %b K' ,-)"+ #c+
Iæåc+ #ØŁ*d' N)"+",(Å+ 9,E+ !æ"Æª"æ*/ø’, 3.142.3). In return he asks
only for six talents from Polycrates’ fortune and, in perpetuity for
himself and his ancestors, the priesthood of Zeus the Liberator,2 ‘for
whom I built the shrine and now hand freedom over to you’ (‘#fiH ÆP#&'
#* ƒæe+ ƒ%æı).,Å+ ŒÆd #c+ Kº*ıŁ*æ(Å+ 9,E+ !*æØ#(ŁÅ,Ø’, 3.142.4). As
scholars have noticed, the language of putting the affairs ‘into the
middle’ (K' ,-)"+) and proclaiming ‘freedom’ (Kº*ıŁ*æ(Å) represents
and reworks the discourse of democracy.3 As we have seen before,
however, any claim to put something K' ,-)"+ is highly charged, and
2 #").%* ,-+#"Ø %ØŒÆØH ª-æ*Æ K,*øı#fiH ª*+-)ŁÆØ, KŒ ,-+ ª* #H+ —"ºıŒæ.#*"'
åæÅ,.#ø+ K6Æ(æ*#Æ £6 #.ºÆ+#. ,"Ø ª*+-)ŁÆØ, ƒ*æø)/+Å+ %b !æe' #"/#"Ø)Ø Æƒæ*F,ÆØ
K,"( #* ÆP#fiH ŒÆd #"E)Ø I!7 K,*F ÆN*d ªØ+",-+"Ø)Ø #"F ˜Øe' #"F 7¯º*ıŁ*æ("ı, Hdt.
3.142.4.
3 For Jean-Pierre Vernant (1983), 191 this episode is the locus classicus for an early
articulation of democratic ideology. In particular, he notes the ‘close connections in the
political thought of the Greeks between the concept of the centre, ,-)"+, similarity or
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so it proves here. Maeandrius’ offer in fact meets with stiff resistance, as
the people prove to be less the grateful group he imagines and actually
more like the independent democratic body he supposedly wishes to
establish.4 As a result, realizing that he will be under threat should he
give up the power, he retreats into the citadel (‰' I+Æå0æÅ)* K' #c+
IŒæ&!"ºØ+, 3.143.1), from which he and his family retain their hold on
power. This leads Herodotus to conclude brusquely: ‘So it seems, the
Samians did not wish to be free’ ("P ªaæ %8, ‰' "YŒÆ)Ø, K4"/º"+#" *r+ÆØ
Kº*/Ł*æ"Ø, 3.143.2).
It would be quite easy to assent to Herodotus’ passing judgement
here and condemn the Samians for not wanting their freedom. But this
would be to miss the subtle irony in Herodotus’ representation of the
proposal to hand over power.5 It is not quite right to say that the
Samians do not want their freedom, since Maeandrius decides to hold
onto power precisely because he is treated like anyone else and is bluntly
told not to expect special privileges; the fact that his offer is met with
dissent is, in itself, an enactment of freedom and equality. The point is,
rather, one of freedom or equality itself: the depiction of Maeandrius
offering to give the Samians their freedom, and the Samians’ refusal to
accept this privilege meekly, shows that freedom is not something that
can be handed out as if it were an act of charity; it is, rather, a continual
equality, ›,"Ø&#Å', N)"#8', and freedom from domination, "P ŒæÆ#"/,*+"',
ÆP#"ŒæÆ#8'’. Cf. Vernant (1982), 126–7.
4 Two aspects of this reply are worthy of note. First, Herodotus does not identify any
one particular Samian, but uses the vague ‘someone among them stood up and spoke’
(#H+ %- #Ø' K6Æ+Æ)#a' *r!*, Hdt. 3.142.5). Second, the anonymous speaker specifically
objects to Maeandrius’ presumption that he has the power to do as he says: ‘But you’re
not worthy to rule over us, since you’re low born and a disaster’ (‘Iºº 7 "P%7 ¼6Ø"' *r' )/ ª*
>,-ø+ ¼æå*Ø+ ª*ª"+0' #* ŒÆŒH' ŒÆd Kg+ Zº*Łæ"'’, 3.142.5). Both points signify that the
Samians are already behaving freely, even as they reject Maeandrius’ proposal to give
them freedom. Moreover, the speaker goes on to hold Maeandrius to account (Æººa
,Aºº"+ ‹Œø' º&ª"+ %0)*Ø' #H+ ,*#*å*(æØ)Æ' åæÅ,.#ø+)—a feature typical of demo-
cratic government.
5 Dewald (2003), 57, n. 64 notes another irony: ‘the Persian who strips Samos of its
population for Darius ca. 515 B.C. and re-establishes Syloson on Polycrates’ throne is
Otanes, the same Otanes who propounds the superiority of democracy and the horrors of
tyranny in the Constitutional Debate (3.80).’
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struggle of becoming and requires continual revolution, re-enactment
and renewal.6 As Michel Foucault has put it, ‘liberty is a practice’.7
This book provides one way of thinking about this subject. The texts
that have been investigated have shown various ways in which dissent is
made necessary to and valuable for the community. They have done this
first by exploring how dissent may be managed within an institutional
apparatus, and then by involving the audience or reader in this process of
management. Each different representation is another contest. Each dif-
ferent response to it is another performance of dissent within that institu-
tional frame. To stress a link between interpretation and an institutional
framework as I am doing here is to expand on Vernant’s suggestion that
the spatial arena of the agora impacts upon one’s mental vision:8
responses are conditioned by the structures of the text in a way that gives
them meaning; at the same time, even as responses are made to those
structures, they help to reproduce them.9 Representations of debate,
therefore, reproduce dissent from authority and help construct an agonis-
tic mentality by which one may perform as a citizen, whether that is
listening to epic, reading history or watching tragedy.
Much-enduring, much-resourceful, Odysseus silences dissent, whether
with a stroke of the sword in epic (cutting off Leiodes’ head as the suitor is
still talking) or with the charm of his words in tragedy (policing agreement
with an Agamemnon or a Hecuba). The Odyssean Zeus, father of gods
and men, goes further by imposing an end to conflict and enforcing
forgetfulness on what has happened. But there are alternatives to the
imposition of power or the adherence to authorial dictate. Agamemnon,
shepherd of the people, tries to assert his authority and shout down
6 Wolin (1996), 63–4 contests the assumption that Athenian democracy relies on its
institutional forms, and instead points to the importance of agonistic action. Foucault, in
Rabinow (1991), 245, makes a similar point, when he argues: ‘The liberty of men is
never assured by the institutions and the laws that are intended to guarantee them.’
7 In Rabinow (1991), 245.
8 ‘What this urban framework [of the ,-)"+] in fact defined was a mental space; it
opened up a new spiritual horizon’: Vernant (1982), 48. See the last section of the
Prologue, above.
9 Johnstone (1999), 132 draws a similar conclusion in his study of the practice of law
in Athens: ‘In the courts, male citizens learned and shared certain kinds of knowledge,
creating a commonalty of interests and abilities. One of these was the ability to interpret
laws in an authoritative manner. The laws themselves did not indicate how to do this;
rather, proper interpretative skills were learned and handed down in the culture of the
courts among an interpretative community.’ Cf. Cohen (1991, 1995).
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opposition, whether that is a recalcitrant seer, a disobedient archer or an
unwelcome host; he tries too to deny Achilles and the force of his
instituting act. Yet, ultimately, he cannot make dissent equal disobedience
or disloyalty. If freedom is truly something to value and aspire to, then
ways must continue to be found of responding to the challenge that
Achilles lays down.
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epic 105, 124
Odysseus exacts vengeance on 346
with n.81, 357n.119
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played by the Athenians in
Sicily 257n.178
supplication:
Odysseus’ rejection 126–7
in the Iliad 126n.124
Achilles’ return of Hector’s
body 131 with n.143
Hecuba supplicates Odysseus
337–9 with n.47 (Gould), and
Agamemnon 342–6, 363–4;
Odysseus supplicates Nausicaa
in the Odyssey 338
Tecmessa 283, 286 with n.19, 290,
291–5, 299, 312, 316n.111,
320
Telemachus:
calls an assembly 94–5
throws down the sceptre 101–2
learns to avoid contest 105–7,
112
spares the bard (and Medon) 127
Teucer 13, 280, 283, 284, 292n.40,
296–302, 303–11, 313–15,
317, 318–22, 327, 359n.129,
369
Thebes, Thebans 128n.132, 158,
174, 248–54
Themistocles 153–4 with n.31,
163–72 with n.64, 200–1,
225n.77, 258n.185, 261n.195,
296n.57
Thersites:
dissent from Agamemnon
56–60, 65
in rhetorical treatises 134n.154
played by the Athenians 159,
Themistocles 163n.64,
169–70 with n.87,
Cleon 244 with n.135,
Ajax 298n.61, Teucer
301n.70
coupled with Odysseus 269n.9
Thetis 50, 75–6 with nn.134–5,
77n.136, 78n.140, 287n.23,
294n.49
Thoas 65–6
Thucydides:
relationship to Herodotus 203n.3,
204n.4, 210n.27, 216n.46,
218n.54, 226 with n.78, 252–4
with nn.164–7, 261n.195
ancient reception 203n.2
influence on modern
historiography 203n.1
Iliadic 203n.3, 213n.34,
228n.85, 244, 256–7 with
nn.177–9, 259–61 with
nn.187 and 194
focus different from
Herodotus 211–12 with n.31,
137–8n.2, 203n.3;
demands authority 204nn.5–7,
217 with n.50, 222–3
‘vividness’ 204–5 with n.8, 207,
263n.203
connection to politics 204n.4,
206–7, 215n.45, 223–5, 237,
240, 242 with n.130, 253–4,
258–9, 262–3
statement on
methodology 209–16
contentious 205n.9, 212–16,
216–19, 241–2, 244–5, 249,
252–3, 256–7
cause of the war 216–19
speeches 206–8, 213–15,
222–5 with n.68, 226–7,
243
dialogue form 219–21
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Thucydides: (cont.)
use of the ago¯n 206–7, 222–39,
244–8, 258–9, and its
framing 233–9, 239–59
see also narrative voice
to hellenikon ($e 1¯ººÅ#ØŒ*#) see
Greek identity
tragedy:
festival context 267–9
politics or not 269–75 with nn.10
and 12–14
the Chorus 271–2 with n.18
the ago¯n 6–7nn.17, 18 and 20,
8n.25, 272–4 with nn.24–7
Panhellenism 270nn.15–16
‘double-vision’ 270–1, 276, 277,
314n.107, 360n.133
Troy, Trojans
the assembly 66–74
led by Priam 68–9
elders 70
the polis 70n.113, 74
sack of 53–5, 59, 113–14 with
n.88
walls of 174
as judges of Achilles’ arms 283n.11
neither Greeks nor
barbarians 350n.97
tyrants, tyranny 139, 147n.13, 149,
154, 157, 159, 160–3, 178,
183–4 with nn.129–31, 191,
307, 370
Vernant, J.-P. 17–18, 24–5, 27–8,
372
voice-print 137n.2, 174 with n.98
walls:
Troy 117
wooden walls 153n.29, 312n.99
the Achaean wall 166n.75, 307
Artabazus’ advice 173–4 with
nn.94–5
Deioces’ city 183–4n.131
Westlake, H. 239–40
women:
conflict between Achilles and
Agamemnon 42–3, 79n.146,
299 with n.64
suitors’ view of Penelope 102–5
with n.52
mythological rape of
women 196n.166
in tragedy 271 with n.17,
discourse of 340n.58
Tecmessa 291, 292–5
Hecuba 327, 329n.16, 342
the Chorus of Euripides’
Hecuba 330–1, 360n.130
Polymestor’s indictment 351–2
with n.104, 356
writing:
on the margins of the
polis 139–40, 146n.11,
191
crucial to marking
authority 140–1 with n.14,
171
challenge to politics 190, 201–2
tension in Thucydides’ depiction
of the ago¯n 206–7 with
nn.19–21, 226–8
way of doing politics 207n.22,
233–9, 239–61, 262–3
Nicias’ letter 259–61
Plato on writing 260n.192
xenia (23#)Æ, ‘guest-
friendship’) 108n.71, 346n.81,
356
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Xenophon 74n.127, 198n.173,
296n.57
Hellenica 198n.173, 296n.57
Xerxes 167, 172, 173–4, 176–81,
193–5; in Aeschylus’
Persians 273–4
Zeus: controls the assembly in
the Iliad 75–8; sets the
agenda in the Odyssey 128–30,
339n.55, 347n.83, and
stage-manages the end
131–2
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